Judgment :- Plaintiffs are the petitioners in this civil revision petition against the dismissal of their I.A.No.6274 of 1993 for amending their plaint in O.S.No. 10966 of 1989 on the file of VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The said suit seeks permanent injunction against interference of their possession of the suit building. The proposed amendment seeks possession relief in the place of injunction relief. 2. Their averments in the said application are as follows: In I.A.No. 12690 of 1989, they got temporary injunction which has been confirmed by the first appellate court in C.M.A.No.28 of 1990 and by this Court in C.R.P.No.1826 of 1990. But the defendants respondents filed C.S.No.1826 of 1990 in this Court for declaration of title to the same suit land on the footing that the property was different. The said defendants also got temporary injunction against the plaintiffs herein on 8. 1990. But subsequently on the filing of O.S.A.No.85 of 1991 in this Court by the plaintiffs herein, the said injunction was stayed by order dated 27. 1991 and the said stay was also made absolute in C.M.P.No.5181 of 1991 therein. (The plaintiffs’ vendors have also filed O.S.No.1077 of 1992 in this Court for declaration that the above said suit property belongs to the plaintiffs herein). But the respondents have put up shops buildings in the suit land after committing criminal trespass over the present suit land. So, since they have thus forcibly taken possession from the plaintiffs pending the present suit, the petitioners have filed the abovesaid application for amendment of the plaint seeking possession relief with reference to the suit land after removing the superstructure put up by respondents. They also wanted suitable amendment of the body of the plaint introducing certain additional paragraphs narrating the abovesaid subsequent events and they also wanted suitable consequential amendment of paragraph 5 of the plaint altering the value of the suit to Rs. 1,50,000. .3. In the counter affidavit to the said application, the respondents averred as follows: The plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit properly, but only the 2nd respondent has been in possession. The plaintiffs have been adopting all methods to see that they did not get on with the trial of the suit. The 2nd respondent purchased the property by the sale deed dated 112. 1987. The plaintiffs claim to have purchased on 28. The plaintiffs have been adopting all methods to see that they did not get on with the trial of the suit. The 2nd respondent purchased the property by the sale deed dated 112. 1987. The plaintiffs claim to have purchased on 28. 1988 only from the very same vendors. But, their sale deed is not true or valid. In the plaint dated 211. 1989, the plaintiffs have given some schedules, describing the suit property as T.S.No.31/1. But the said survey number is only read as per the revenue records C.S.No.659 of 1990 was filed with reference to T.S.No.31/23. The temporary injunction obtained in C.S.No.659 of 1990 on 8. 1990 was subsequently made absolute on 2. 1991. Between 5. 1990 and 2. 1991 only, the above said ship buildings were put up on the said land. The stay of injunction was obtained by the plaintiffs in O.S.A.No.85 of 1991 only on 4. 1991. The present suit was in the special list even on 211. 1992. But the plaintiffs took adjournments on several dates subsequently and after several adjournments, the suit was posted to 1. 1993. Then the plaintiffs filed transfer application and sought to get stay of the present suit. They also filed another transfer application and obtained ex pane order of stay of trial of the suit. Ultimately, on 3. 1993, both the transfer applications and the stay applications therein were dismissed by Lakshmanan, J., who also gave direction to the trial court to take up the suit forthwith for trial. Then the defendants filed an application to advance the hearing of the present suit, knowing well that the hearing of the suit has been advanced to an early date, accordingly, the plaintiffs have filed the present application for amendment of the plaint and another application for punishment for contempt. They are only abusing the process of Court. The present application has been filed only to nullify the abovesaid order of Lakshmanan, J., directing the suit to. be taken up forthwith for trial. The said application is not a bona fide one. By the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs only want to take the suit to the High Court on the ground that the value of the suit would be above Rs. 1,00,000 if the proposed amendment is ordered. The plaintiffs can very well file a separate suit for possession. The said application is not a bona fide one. By the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs only want to take the suit to the High Court on the ground that the value of the suit would be above Rs. 1,00,000 if the proposed amendment is ordered. The plaintiffs can very well file a separate suit for possession. The plaintiffs have belatedly come forward with the abovesaid application with ulterior motive. 4. The court below has dismissed the application simply saying thus, without any discussion whatsoever, 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is settled law that while the injunction suit is pending if the plaintiff is forcibly dispossessed by the defendant, the plaintiff could very well amend the plaint seeking possession relief itself in view of the abovesaid subsequent event of dispossession pending suit and despite this settled legal position, the court below has erred in dismissing the said application. .6. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently makes the following submissions: If really the abovesaid application is insisted on the ground that the defendants have trespassed into the suit property and put up the abovesaid building the application should have been filed much earlier since the constructions of the building were done only between 8. 1990 and 2. 1991. But the present application has been filed only on 4. 1993 more than two years after 2. 1991. The said delay has not been explained at all. Further only to protract the trial of the suit the abovesaid transfer applications were filed and only when the transfer applications were dismissed the present application has been filed, despite the direction given in the order dismissing the transfer applications that the trial of the suit should be proceeded forthwith. So, the present application itself is abuse of process of court. If the plaint is amended, and, taking into account the value of the suit, if it is transferred to this Court, there will be inordinate delay in disposing of the suit, which will certainly result in failure of justice to the defendants. The discretion exercised by the trial court in dismissing the application should not be interfered with under Scc.115, C.P.C., when there is unexplained delay and abuse of process of court as stated above. 7. I have considered the rival submissions. The discretion exercised by the trial court in dismissing the application should not be interfered with under Scc.115, C.P.C., when there is unexplained delay and abuse of process of court as stated above. 7. I have considered the rival submissions. Normally, there would have been no difficulty in setting aside the impugned order and allowing the proposed amendment since the said amendment is sought for only in view of the alleged subsequent event of dispossession of the plaintiffs from the suit property by the defendants and since the law is that the court would take notice of the changed circumstances, where by reason of the subsequent events, the original relief claimed has become| inappropriate Vide: Rajeshwar Dayal v. P.K.Kothari, A.l.R. 1979 Raj. 17 or where the litigation gets shortened or where the consideration of the subsequent events gives complete justice to the parlies. Vide: Shikharchand v. D.J.P.Karini Sabha, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1178: (1974) 1 S.C.C. 675 and Vineer Kumar v. Manga/ Sain Wadhera, (1984)3 S.C.C. 352 . In (1984)3 S.C.C. 352 , the relevant observation is as follows: “Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. But it is well recognised that where the amendment docs not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation.” Courts have even gone to the extent of saying that even without a formal amendment adding possession relief in the original injunction suit, possession relief could be given when such relief would not be inconsistent with the plaintiffs case. Vide: Bundi Singh v. Shivanandan Prasad, A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 89. 8. But since, in the light of the lengthy averments in the counter affidavit to the abovesaid application, the learned counsel for the respondents argued vehemently as indicated above, 1 have to write out this lengthy order after setting out in extenso the averments in the affidavits and the arguments on either side. 9. 89. 8. But since, in the light of the lengthy averments in the counter affidavit to the abovesaid application, the learned counsel for the respondents argued vehemently as indicated above, 1 have to write out this lengthy order after setting out in extenso the averments in the affidavits and the arguments on either side. 9. One main contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that if the amendment is allowed, the trial court (City Civil Court, Madras) will have no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and consequently the plaint has to be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation in the High Court and that this process would only delay the trial of the suit very much. But, this cannot be normally a ground for objecting to the proposed amendment. In Allauddin v. P.S.Lakshminaraxanan, (1969)2 M.L.J. 239 :82L. W. 540:A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 247, this Court also held that where the plaintiff applied for an amendment of the plaint and it was found by the court that in case the amendment was allowed the value for the purpose of jurisdiction would probably exceed the court’s powers, the right course to adopt was to allow the amendment, grant an opportunity to the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee, and if there was any quest ion about pecuniary jurisdiction arising, examine the matter on a definite finding on that quest ion to decide whether the plaint should be retained or would have to be returned to the plaintiff as one in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of that court. In that context the said judgment also distinguishes the earlier two judgments in Singara Mudaliar v. Govindaswamy Chatty, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 400 and Nagatha Mohammed Nainar v. Vedavalliammal, (1959)1 M.L.J. 307 . In the present case, both the counsel agree that in view of the fact that the value of the suit goes to Rs. 1,50,000 if the amendment is allowed, the suit has to be necessarily taken up for disposal by this Court. 10. No doubt, there may be some delay because of the consequent transfer of the suit to the High Court. But, proper steps or representations have to be taken for early disposal of the suit once the suit reaches this Court. Therefore, on that ground amendment cannot be refused. 10. No doubt, there may be some delay because of the consequent transfer of the suit to the High Court. But, proper steps or representations have to be taken for early disposal of the suit once the suit reaches this Court. Therefore, on that ground amendment cannot be refused. 11.I also take note of the observation of Laksh-manan, J., in the above referred to order that the suit has to be tried forthwith. I also give below suitable directions for earlier disposal of the suit. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the amendment sought for, itself is an abuse of process of court and is asked for only with ulterior motives and that the above referred to delay in filing the application has also not been explained. So far as the said delay is concerned, I have to state that after the abovesaid construction of the shop buildings by the defendants on the suit properly was completed the plaintiffs were trying to transfer the suit to this Court for being tried along with the above referred to suits pending in this Court and the said transfer application was objected to by the defendants. If the transfer was granted, the plaintiffs would have had no necessity to formally amend the prayer in the suit in the light of 0.7, Rule 6, C.P.C., in view of the above referred to legal position fortified by the above referred decision in Bundi Singh v. Shivanandan. Prasad, A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 89. Anyway, after the transfer petitions were dismissed, the plaintiffs have filed the present application. 13. 1 do not think that in the circumstances of the case the delay is substantial or remains unexplained completely. Anyway, taking into account that there is some delay and taking into account that there may be some further delay when the suit is transferred to this Court, interest of justice would be served if while allowing the amendment, condition is stipulated directing the plaintiffs to pay the defendants a sum of Rs. 1,000 by way of costs. 14. Anyway, taking into account that there is some delay and taking into account that there may be some further delay when the suit is transferred to this Court, interest of justice would be served if while allowing the amendment, condition is stipulated directing the plaintiffs to pay the defendants a sum of Rs. 1,000 by way of costs. 14. 1 am unable to concur with the contention of abuse of process of court, particularly in the light of the temporary injunction granted in the suit which has been upheld by the higher courts including this Court and in the light of the fact that a Division Bench of this Court has made the stay of the temporary injunction obtained by the defendants in their suit, absolute. 15. No doubt Lakshmanan, J., has observed in the context of the transfer applications that there was abuse of process of court by the petitioners. But, in the light of the abovesaid other features. I am unable to come to the conclusion that the abovesaid transfer applications could be equally applied in the present proceeding so as to refuse as otherwise legitimate amendment sought for. 16.I am also of the view that in view of the legal position referred to by me in paragraph 7 above, the court below, in dismissing the application, erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity, which has occasioned in failure of justice in relation to the plaintiffs. Therefore, necessarily I have to interfere under Sec. 115, C.P.C. 17. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and I.A.No.6274 of 1993 in O.S.No. 10966 of 1989 on the file of VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, shall stand allowed on condition that the plaintiffs pay the defendants a sum of Rs. 1,000 as costs within four weeks from today failing which the civil revision petition shall stand automatically dismissed.