Judgment B M. Lal, J. 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner seeks a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to vacate the House No. 6/4-A, Stanley Road, Allahabad, presently occupied by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation Allahabad and to hand over vacant possession of the same to the petitioner, in pursuance of the order dated 4-10-1989 (Annexure 1 to the petition) passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 2. In short the case of the petitioner is that he is landlord of the house in question which is occupied by the office of Settlement Officer, Consolidation as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 600/- per month which is being paid to the petitioner, (vide paras 3 and 4 of the petition). Presently petitioner is residing at 48, Jawaharlal Nehru Road, a leased accommodation of Bharat Pumps and Compressors Ltd., which is sought to be vacated after retirement on 31-3-1992. Instead of invoking relevant provisions of 'The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation Of Letting, Rent And Eviction Act, 1972' (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (For short, the Act), the petitioner entered into correspondence with the Government of Uttar Pradesh and ultimately Sri A.B. Srivastava, Secretary Revenue (Anubhag-8), Government of U.P., issued D.O. letter dated 4-10-1989 to Sri S. Das, Consolidation Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh for directing the Settlement Officer, Consolidation to vacate the house in question. Inspire of that, house in question has not been vacated, hence this writ petition. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 1, the State of U.P. (through the Secretary, Revenue Department) making averments that answering respondent has already made the applications to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad to allot, accommodation for the office of Settlement Officer, Consolidation and as soon as suitable accommodation will be available for the office, the house in question shall be vacated, (vide para 5 of the counter-affidavit). It has been further averred in the counter-affidavit that the writ petition is barred by alternative remedy, as the petitioner has got remedy for redressal of his grievance by resorting to the provisions of the Act (vide para 11 of the counter-affidavit). 3. It has been further averred in the counter-affidavit that the writ petition is barred by alternative remedy, as the petitioner has got remedy for redressal of his grievance by resorting to the provisions of the Act (vide para 11 of the counter-affidavit). 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the direction issued by the superior officer to subordinate officer be complied with and if subordinate officer fails to comply with the direction of superior officer, the subordinate officer can be compelled to comply with the directions of superior officer by a writ of Mandamus, under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Tara Prasad Misra v. State of U.P., (1990) 2 UP LB EC 905 (FB) 4. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the Full Bench decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. No doubt, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, certainly this Court has got powers to issue Mandamus for enforcement of directions issued by superior officer to the subordinate officer in appropriate cases to enforce legal duty imposed by the statute, common law, rules or orders having the force of law. But the fact remains that it is for the petitioner to satisfy that it is a fit case for exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we may say that issuance of Mandamus as prayed for in the instant case would result into eviction of a tenant, for the protection of whose rights along with that of a landlord, aforesaid Act has been enacted. Admittedly the Act has been enacted to provide in the interest of the general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and for matters connected therewith. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any of the sub-clauses of Section 2(1) of the Act under which the building in question is covered, wherein certain classes of buildings are exempted from operation of the Act. Admittedly, relationship between the petitioner and respondent no. 4 is that of landlord and tenant. The building in question is not covered under the exemptions from operation of the Act. Admittedly, relationship between the petitioner and respondent no. 4 is that of landlord and tenant. The building in question is not covered under the exemptions from operation of the Act. Therefore, if the petitioner has got right to evict the respondent no. 4, the tenant, he can resort to the provisions of the Act for the purpose and thus he has got effective statutory alternative remedy for enforcement of his rights ; consequently no interference in writ jurisdiction is called for. The provisions of Section 21 onwards of the Act are elaborate and exhaustive in respect of release of building under occupation of tenant, enforcement of eviction order and appeal etc. Thus on the face of elaborate and exhaustive provisions provided under the statute, there is no reason or jurisdiction for interference in writ jurisdiction and thereby permitting the petitioner to by pass the statutory provisions. 6. In Ghan Shyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha, AIR 1991 SC 2251 , the apex Court reaffirmed, that the principle as to when the High Court should exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 226 and when to refuse to do so on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy has been settled by a long line of cases. The remedy provided under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. We are constrained to say that now-a-days, it has become a fashion for resorting to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution in the cases which are not amenable to writ jurisdiction and thereby abusing extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. This practice must be deprecated by learned members of bar considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution in its true sense. 7. In view of the premises aforesaid, this petition is dismissed being barred by alternative remedy. Petition dismissed.