JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---The question has offen been canvassed as to what precisely is the status of a final order passed by a Court during the intervening period when an appeal or further proceedings challenging that order is pending before a superior Court. It is necessary to clear the air with regard to this relatively elementary issue as it has arisen in this and also several other proceedings. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 1986, filed by the present petitioner, M/s Hindustan Ciba-Geigy Ltd., came to be disposed of by judgment and order dated 19-4-1993. The original accused, who was the respondent to that proceeding and to the present one, came to be convicted of an offence punishable under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956. The operative part of the order reads as follows :- "The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the trial Court are set aside. The respondent No. 1 accused is convicted under section 630 of the Companies Act and is ordered to pay a fine in the sum of Rs. 1,000/- per month for each month during which the offence has recurred starting from 1.4.1977 until the date of restoration of possession and the premises to the Company. The accused is further directed to hand over vacant possession of the two premises to the Company latest by 30-9-1993. In the event of the accused committing default of this order, he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. The appeal is allowed." 3. The Accused thereafter preferred Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) No. 1305 of 1993 to the Supreme Court which came up for admission on 20-8-1993. The present petitioner-Company was represented before the Supreme Court on that day, but notice was required to be issued to the State of Maharashtra. The Court accordingly issued notice stating that the matter will be disposed of finally at this stage itself. The notice was made returnable on 8-10-1993. It is relevant to point out that the petitioner had prayed for interim stay of proceedings in so far as this Court had directed the Magistrate to quantify the fine amount payable starting from 1-4-1977 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month and to levy the fine in question. The order passed by the Supreme Court very clearly states : "Notice returnable on 8-10-93. 1,000/- per month and to levy the fine in question. The order passed by the Supreme Court very clearly states : "Notice returnable on 8-10-93. Meanwhile the petitioner shall not be dispossessed." Undisputedly, there was no stay with regard to the levy of the fine and the only order passed by the Supreme Court was with regard to handing over of possession. I need to also record that the Supreme Court did not use the term "ad-interim"or "interim" order nor did it use the expression "until further orders", but the learned Judges were clear about limiting the order for a specified period upto 8-10-93 which was why the word "meanwhile" was used. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner, Shri Vashi, who states that he was present before the Supreme Court when the matter was heard, makes a statement at the Bar that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court very specifically told the respondents' Counsel that there was no stay as regards the fine and that the same must be paid. The S.L.P. thereafter reached for hearing on 15-10-1993, but for want of time has been adjourned to 19-11-1993. The original order dated 20-8-1993 has not been modified nor has any further order been passed by the Supreme Court in the proceeding. 4. One aspect of the case which is of relevance is that the accused was granted time by me while passing the final orders in the month of April, 1993 purely out of consideration for the fact that the flat in question was a residential one, that the possession be restored latest by 30-9-1993. Obviously, this amount of time was granted in order to afford him reasonable time to find out other accommodation. In the main judgment I have held that the offence punishable under section 630 of Companies Act of wrongfully witholding the premises is a continuing offence and is a recurring offence which is why the fine of Rs. 1000/- for each month during which the offence continues was levied. In this context in the operative part of the order, the learned Magistrate was directed to compute the aggregate fine payable starting from 1-4-1977 when the wrongful withholding commenced, upto the date on which possession was restored. 1000/- for each month during which the offence continues was levied. In this context in the operative part of the order, the learned Magistrate was directed to compute the aggregate fine payable starting from 1-4-1977 when the wrongful withholding commenced, upto the date on which possession was restored. There can be little dispute about the fact that even though the accused was granted indulgence upto 30-9-1993, that if the possession was restored earlier that the fine would cease on and from that date. 5. In keeping with the operative part of the judgment, on 1-10-1993 the learned trial Magistrate issued notices to the accused as he had not paid the fine. The notice was returnable on 7-10-1993 on which day the son of the accused appeared and prayed for time. The learned Magistrate issued fresh notice returnable on 14-10-1993. On that day, the advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 filed a reply. The contentions raised in the reply are; (a) that the High Court order does not specify the amount of fine, (b) that the accused was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- per month from 1-4-1977 until the date of restoration of possession of the premises to the Company. The Supreme Court has granted stay of the order directing restoration of possession till the stay is vacated the accused is under no obligation to restore possession and consequently the amount of fine cannot be computed. Thus there is not in existence the said fine amount (This to my mind is rather prevented logic and is an attempt to circumvent the operation of the High Court Order) and (c) that it would be only proper to await orders that are to be passed by the Supreme Court in the S.L.P. before embarking on recovery proceedings as the conviction itself is challenged and if the same is set aside there would be no question of payment of fine. Further, that if the conviction were to be confirmed a date would be set for restoration of possession and only then can the fine amount be specified or computed till the date of restoration of possession. 6. The petitioners have filed the present application on the ground that it was contended before the learned Magistrate that the operative part of the High Court judgment is vague and therefore, requires clarification. 6. The petitioners have filed the present application on the ground that it was contended before the learned Magistrate that the operative part of the High Court judgment is vague and therefore, requires clarification. This is a case in which the accused has successfully, through such dilatory tactics wrongfully held on to the premises from April 1977 and inspite of final judgment of this High Court against him he is now attempting to virtually subvert that judgment even though there is no stay in respect of recovery of fine. 7. Appearing in support of the application, Mr. Vashi contended that the High Court judgment is very clear and that the operative part of the order unambiguously indicates that the fine is to be paid at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month for every month until such date as the possession of the premises is restored to the Company. As on 30-9-1993 by this computation, an amount of Rs. 1,98,000/- was recoverable as and by way of fine. The operative part of the High Court order in relation to restoration of possession was only temporarily stopped as the Supreme Court had not even passed any formal stay order whereas there was a specific direction of the Supreme Court that the fine must be paid. Under these circumstances, the accused was liable to pay the fine and if he commits default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. Mr. Vashi submitted that the default clause applies in relation to both the non-payment of fine as also to the non-resoration of possession. He therefore prayed that the accused be directed to forthwith pay the fine or in the alternative that he be taken into custody and the in-default sentence to become operational. 8. Mr. Parikh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent raised a procedural objection whereby he contended that this is an application for review of the original judgment and that under the provisions of section 362 of Cr. P.C., no such review was competent. He cited a string of Supreme Court Judgments in support of his submission. I do not need to labour on this argument because the present application is not an application for review or modification of the original judgment or order but is a simple application for clarification, in view of the stand taken up by the accused before the trial Court. I do not need to labour on this argument because the present application is not an application for review or modification of the original judgment or order but is a simple application for clarification, in view of the stand taken up by the accused before the trial Court. Unfortunately, the learned trial Magistrate in his notice failed to compute the exact quantum of fine due upto 30-9-1993 which has given rise to the present controversy. 9. As on 30-9-1993 the fine of Rs. 1,98,000/- was payable by the accused. The order in respect of payment of fine has not been stayed by the Supreme Court. On the contrary, there was a specific direction to pay the fine in question. The accused ought to have, in deference to the direction of the Supreme Court, voluntarily paid up the fine due from him without waiting for formal notice from the Court. It is however more than obvious in this case that the object is to try and lodge the operation of the High Court order which is why totally frivolous and worthless pleas have been canvassed before the learned Magistrate. It is no argument to contend that the conviction itself has been challenged because it is now well settled that even where the conviction is under challenge that the payment of fine is seldom stayed and under those circumstances is required to be tendered. Undoubtedly, if the conviction is set aside, the fine will be refunded. One needs to emphasize the fact here that any order or direction of a Court is required to be respected and implemented as this is what the rule of law requires. There is no licence available to a litigant to circumvent such an order on the ground that he intends going in appeal. Under those circumstances, it is open in appropriate cases to pray for time or stay for a limited period from the Court that has passed the order or to approach the superior Court and pray for ad-interim orders. There is no licence available to a litigant to circumvent such an order on the ground that he intends going in appeal. Under those circumstances, it is open in appropriate cases to pray for time or stay for a limited period from the Court that has passed the order or to approach the superior Court and pray for ad-interim orders. It needs to be clarified once and for all that during this period of vaccum i.e. the time period between the end of the proceeding before the lower Court and the date when Appeal Court takes cognizance and passes orders; in the absence of a specific stay order, that there is no licence to the party against whom the order is passed to ignore it or to avoid implementation. Apart from the indefault consequences in the proceedings, to my mind it would constitute a clear case of contempt particularly where it is demonstrated that the party has avoided it on totally specious considerations. That aspect of the matter however hardly arises in this case since the Supreme Court has heard the matter and has refused to stay the payment of fine but has on the other hand directed its payment. 10. Under these circumstances, the learned Magistrate shall on the next date of hearing ascertain from the respondent-accused as to whether he has tendered the amount of Rs. 1,98,000 which is the fine payable upto 30-9-1993 and in the event of the same not having been paid the maximum in-default sentence of six months simple imprisonment shall take effect. In view of the clear directions of the Supreme Court, whereby the final order of this Court has not been stayed, as far as this aspect is concerned, the learned Magistrate shall be within his jurisdiction to take the accused into custody if the fine is not tendered. Rule is accordingly made absolute. After the above order was passed Mr. Parikh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent accused presented an application where he has prayed for the facility of paying the fine of Rs. 1,98,000/- through three equal instalments. Mr. Parikh states that the accused is aged-65 years, that he is retired person having no regular source of income and under these circumstances, that this Court should grant three months time as prayed for by him for the fine to be paid in three instalments. 1,98,000/- through three equal instalments. Mr. Parikh states that the accused is aged-65 years, that he is retired person having no regular source of income and under these circumstances, that this Court should grant three months time as prayed for by him for the fine to be paid in three instalments. The application has been opposed by Mr. Vashi. He contends that no valid grounds have been made out and further more that the respondent was aware of the fact that the fine is payable by him for the last several months inspite of which he is avoiding to do so on one pretext or the other. The conduct of a litignant is a very relevant factor while exercising judicial discretion. In this case, the final judgment was dated 19th April, 1993 against which the Special Leave Petition was preferred which was heard by the Supreme Court on 20th August, 1993. On that day, the Supreme Court was quite specific about the fact that the order with regard to payment of fine was not stayed and furthermore that the accused must pay the fine. Inspite of this, the fine was not tendered to the trial Court and even after 30-9-1993 when the trial Court issued a notice to the accused, a curious reply was filed which was to the effect that in the first instance no fine is leviable and secondly that it has not been computed. There is no doubt whatsoever that the entire effect is to subvert the judicial orders that have been passed in this proceeding. This unfortunately cannot be permitted by this Court. Under the circumstances, the application for payment of fine by instalments stands rejected. Mr. Parikh has also prayed for stay of the order passed by me. On this application, no orders have been passed except that the clarification which the parties desired has been issued. Mr. Parikh did point out that under section 67 of the Indian Penal Code, the maximum in-default sentence in a case where punishment is one of fine only ought to be six months simple imprisonment. In keeping with that provision, the in-default sentence has been limited as far as the payment of fine to six months simple imprisonment. Mr. Mr. Parikh did point out that under section 67 of the Indian Penal Code, the maximum in-default sentence in a case where punishment is one of fine only ought to be six months simple imprisonment. In keeping with that provision, the in-default sentence has been limited as far as the payment of fine to six months simple imprisonment. Mr. Parikh desires that his client would like to file a petition before the Supreme Court in respect of the order passed by me today or in the alternative that he would like to amend the existing Special Leave Petition. On these grounds, he submitted that the directions for payment of fine should be stayed, in order to enable him to take appropriate proceeding before the Supreme Court. In my considered view, having regard to the background of the case and particularly since I have recorded a finding in the main order that the respondent is in contempt, no such indulgence would be permissible. The order shall accordingly take effect as directed. Order accordingly.