JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Addl. District Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur dated 29.4.1993, affirming the judgment and decree passed by Addl. Civil Judge, No. 2, Jodhpur, decreeing the petitioner's suit for eviction against the appellant, on the ground that the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use. 2. The facts necessary for the present purposes may be stated - the plaintiff founded his ground for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, on the allegation that the plaintiff's family consists of himself and his wife, he has no residence of his own he is presently living in his father's house in which 10 members are living and, the relation of plaintiff's wife with plaintiff's mother is not good, therefore, fed up with the daily quarrels he purchased the suit premises for his own residence and he wants to occupy the suit premises for residence of his family. The suit was also founded on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1950'). Though, ultimately, both the courts found that no ground of default in paying the rent for a period of 6 months has been made out but as the defendant has committed breach of provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950, his defence against eviction was struck off. 3. During the course of pendency of suit, on 8.7.1991, the defendant moved an application that since the filing of the suit, father as well as mother of the plaintiff had expired and the plaintiff had become owner of half of the house of his father in which he is residing. He, therefore, contended that both the grounds pleaded by the plaintiff giving rise to his necessity of leaving his father's house and occupying another house, have come to an end and, therefore, the need pleaded by the plaintiff has come to an end. An application was moved for amending the written statement. 4. In reply to the application, the fact of demise of both the parents of the plaintiff was admitted by the plaintiff and it was given to the court that the requirement, on the ground of daily quarrelling between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law will not be further pressed by the plaintiff. 5. An application was moved for amending the written statement. 4. In reply to the application, the fact of demise of both the parents of the plaintiff was admitted by the plaintiff and it was given to the court that the requirement, on the ground of daily quarrelling between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law will not be further pressed by the plaintiff. 5. On this reply, the application for amendment in written statement was disallowed. The trial court found the issue of reasonable and bona fide necessity in favour of the plaintiff, including the question of comparative hardship and non-viability of partial eviction and, decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction, by its judgment dated 26.2.1992. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal, during the pendency of appeal, the defendant moved an another application on 25.11.1992, bringing it to the notice of the court that during the pendency of appeal, in July, 1992, a portion equal to that which is in occupation of the defendant, in the suit house, which was in possession of another tenant-Bhura; has been vacated under the orders of the court and has come in possession of the plaintiff and, in view thereof, the plaintiff's need for occupying the suit premises for residence for himself and his wife, has come to an end. This application was also rejected and learned Addl. District judge affirmed the finding on the issue relating to reasonable and bona fide necessity, comparative hardship and partial eviction. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant, in Second appeal before me, has urged that both the courts-below have seriously erred in passing a decree for eviction on the basis of plaintiff's reasonable and bona fide necessity, by ignoring the fact that since the filing of suit, the plaintiff's parents have expired and, the plaintiff has acquired a property right in the house in which hitherto he was residing as a licensee of his father and that the plaintiff has also acquired another accommodation in the very same house in which defendant is residing during the pendency of appeal. These facts are not disputed by the plaintiff also. 8. These facts are not disputed by the plaintiff also. 8. Learned counsel contends, in the suit for eviction governed by the Act of 1950, what is required is satisfaction of the court at the time of passing of the decree about the existence of one or more grounds stated under Section 13(1) of the Act and, if the satisfaction of the court has been reached by ignoring material facts about which there is no dispute, the findings so recorded cannot be binding in the second appeal, as they stand vitiated. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has very strenuously urged that findings of the two courts-below, on the question of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff, is a finding of fact, based on evidence and is not liable to be interfered with in the second appeal. He further urged that defence of the appellant against eviction having been struck off, he is not entitled to lead any evidence at his own and, therefore, his application for leading additional evidence cannot be entertained. 10. Having considered the contention raised before me, I am of the opinion that this appeal must succeed. 11. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition that the jurisdictions of this Court to entertain a second appeal in respect of any question of fact is very limited. It is only where the findings of facts arrived at by misreading of the evidence, or the same is based on irrelevant considerations, or is based on partly irrelevant considerations and, it is not possible to determine to what extent the irrelevancy has affected the findings of the court, or, the findings recorded by the courts-below is so perverse that no reasonable man would arrive at such finding the findings of facts can be interfered with. 12. It also cannot be doubted that once defence of a tenant against eviction has been struck off, under Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950, a tenant is not entitled to lead independent evidence in respect of matters covered by the rent control laws, though his right to lead evidence on issues arising de-hors the provisions of the Act remains unaffected. 13. The question then arises, do the aforesaid principle govern the present case. 13. The question then arises, do the aforesaid principle govern the present case. The facts about striking out the defends of the appellant are not disputed and the evidence lead by the plaintiff remain un-rebutted, but, at the same time, these facts also remain un-disputed that, during the pendency of suit, father of the plaintiff in whose house the plaintiff was residing, died and the plaintiff acquired proprietary interest in the house in which he was residing, to the extent he had share in the property on an heir of his father. Likewise, mother of the plaintiff having also died during the pendency of the suit, had a definite effect of the ground which weighed with the plaintiff for vacating his parents' house and his need to shift to another house. This fact has also not been disputed before me that during the pendency of appeal, a portion of the suit premises, which was in the tenancy of Bhura, fell vacant under a decree of the court. Thus, the undisputed situation which emerges is that when the suit was filed by the plaintiff, he had no proprietary interest in the house in which he was residing and the house which he wanted to get vacated, no portion of it was vacant for his occupation. But, during the pendency of the suit, his residence in his parental house became residence as a matter of right. The two members went out of occupation and that a portion of the suit premises which was occupied by Bhura as a tenant, came in possession of the plaintiff, who admittedly had only two members in his family for whose need, the house was required to be occupied. All these facts were relevant facts, to which the lower appellate court ought to have apply mind before affirming the decree of eviction on the basis of reasonable and bona fide necessity. 14. On the other hand, from the perusal of judgments of the two courts-below, I find that the trial court in spite of plaintiff's concession, has dealt with the plaintiff's requirement as if the parents of the plaintiff were still alive and the quarrelling between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law were in existence, as per the statement of plaintiff and as if the number of occupants of the plaintiff's father's house were not diminished on the death of both the parents of the plaintiff. There is not a whispering about the defendant's application under 0. 6, R. 17, C.P.C. and its reply by the plaintiff or, about the fact that the plaintiff's parents in whose house the plaintiff's was residing have died and the plaintiff's occupation has become an occupation of the 'owner'. Likewise, the appellate courts' judgment does not make any mention these admitted facts. 15. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is not a case of permitting the defendants to lead any evidence on the question-whether the plaintiff has acquired proprietary interest in his father's house and whether the plaintiff has acquired vacant possession of a part of the suit premises but these were the admitted facts. As Section 13(1) commences with a obstante clause, putting a clog on the court's power to pass decree, it is abundantly clear that the grounds set-forth in Section 13(1) of the Act must exist as on the date when the decree is being passed whether by the trial court or by the appellate court and, if any fact which has come on record and has relevant hearing on determining the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of a ground for eviction for eviction set-forth under Section 13(1), it is incumbent upon the court to allude to such facts and then arrive at its findings. 16. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that acquiring of the proprietary interest in the house in which the plaintiff admittedly was living and acquisition of a portion of the disputed house during the pendency of appeal, had direct bearing on the requirement of the plaintiff to occupy the suit premises for the family's residence, which, admittedly, comprised of only two members were the relevant facts to be taken into consideration. As both the courts-below have failed to take .into consideration the relevant facts which had vital bearing on the question of arriving at the finding about reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff, the findings stand vitiated on the well-known ground affecting the validity of the findings. 17. In view of my aforesaid conclusion, the judgment and decree passed by the both the courts-below for evicting the appellant on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Addl. 17. In view of my aforesaid conclusion, the judgment and decree passed by the both the courts-below for evicting the appellant on the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity of the plaintiff cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Addl. District Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur affirming the judgment and decree passed by Addl. Civil Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, is set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court, to decide the case de novo in accordance with law. 19. There will be no order as to costs of this appeal.Appeal allowed. *******