Judgment : The appellants are the plaintiffs before the trial court. They instituted O.S.No1187 of 1981 on the file of the learned District Munsif of Kancheepuram for declaration that the first appellant is entitled to ‘D’ schedule properties and for directing defendants 1 and 2 to hand over vacant possession of the same. The other reliefs claimed are recovery of vacant possession of A, B and C Schedule properties and for directing the respondent to render accounts of his management of A to D Schedule properties from the year 1975-76 onwards till delivery of possession. Appellants 1 and 3 are husband and wife. The second appellant is their son. The respondent is the son of the first appellant’s aunt. The second defendant in the suit is the mother of the respondent. The case of the appellants is that plaint A and B Schedule lands were allotted to the shares of appellants 1 and 2 respectively under Ex.A-4 partition deed dated 14. 1970. The ‘C’ Schedule properties were purchased by third appellant. The 1st appellant is in enjoyment of ‘D’ Schedule properties as their absolute owner. The respondent was entrusted with the management of all the plaint items with a direction to collect the Waram or Kuthagai from the tenants and hand over the same to the appellants. The respondent was paid 10 bags of paddy per bogum as his remuneration. Defendants 3 to 10 are the tenants of the suit lands. And the respondent had failed to render accounts from Fasli 1385 (1975-76) onwards. 2. The respondent disputed his liability to render accounts. He pleaded that he had surrendered possession of all items of plaint A, B and ‘C’ Schedule properties except Survey Nos.181/1 and 181/2. ‘D’ Schedule properties were given as a gift to his mother by the father of first appellant. He also contended that he was never an agent nor was he paid 10 bags of paddy per bogum as his remuneration for management. According to him, the appellants themselves have directly leased out the properties to tenants for Fasli 1386. He never collected any rent from the alleged tenants. He had paid rent in full for Fasli 1386 and nothing more is due to the appellants. He is not liable to hand over possession of Survey Nos.181/1 and 181/2 and the ‘D’ Schedule properties. He is a cultivating tenant of items 2and 3 of ‘C Schedule. He never collected any rent from the alleged tenants. He had paid rent in full for Fasli 1386 and nothing more is due to the appellants. He is not liable to hand over possession of Survey Nos.181/1 and 181/2 and the ‘D’ Schedule properties. He is a cultivating tenant of items 2and 3 of ‘C Schedule. The properties were never entrusted with him for management. Defendants 3 to 10 are in possession. 3. The trial court granted the declaration that the appellants are the owners of ‘D’ Schedule property and directed the respondent to deliver possession of ‘D’ Schedule property and items 2 and 3 of ‘C’ Schedule. Besides, it passed a decree for rendition of accounts against the respondent from 1975-76 till delivery of possession in respect of A, B, C and D Schedule items. The respondent was directed to pay the cost of the suit to the appellants. Thereupon the respondent herein took up the matter in appeal before learned Subordinate Judge of Kancheepuram in A.S.No.123 of 1983 on his file. His mother the second defendant died pending suit. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal without cost, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remanded back the suit to learned District Munsif for fresh disposal according to law. Aggrieved by the said decision the plaintiffs have preferred this civil miscellaneous appeal. 4. Both sides admitted in this Court that pending this C.M.A. the appellants have taken possession of items 2 and 3 of ‘C Schedule through court by proceeding in execution. 5.Thiru P.Veeraraghavan, learned counsel for the appellants assailed the order of remand on these grounds: 1. Since the findings of the trial court in regard to the plaint ‘D’ Schedule lands are confirmed by learned Subordinate Judge, the remitting of the entire case for fresh disposal is unsustainable. 2. The finding of the lower appellate court on the status of the respondent as a cultivating tenant is contrary to law. 3. The lower appellate court did not give any finding on the liability of the respondent to render accounts. 4. The lower appellate court was wrong in remanding the case with the sole object of enabling the appellants to prove the documents which they failed to exhibit in the trial court. 5.The requirements of the provisions of O.41, Rule 26, C.P.C., are not complied with. 6. 4. The lower appellate court was wrong in remanding the case with the sole object of enabling the appellants to prove the documents which they failed to exhibit in the trial court. 5.The requirements of the provisions of O.41, Rule 26, C.P.C., are not complied with. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants first submitted that the subject matter of dispute in A.S.No.123 of 1983 are items 2 and 3 of ‘C’ Schedule properties and ‘D’ Schedule property. So plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule properties and the remaining item in ‘C’ Schedule are not covered by A.S.No.123 of 1983. While so, the lower appellate court went wrong in remanding the entire suit for fresh disposal. A perusal of the decree of the trial court reveals that the reliefs granted were declaration in respect of ‘D’ Schedule property, recovery of possession regarding ‘D’ Schedule property and items 2 and 3 of ‘C Schedule and rendition of accounts for all schedules frpm 1975-76 onwards. Though there is no specific recital regarding the dismissal of the suit on other reliefs, evidently the claim for delivery of possession of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule and item 1 of ‘C’ Schedule properties has been negatived. And the plaintiffs have not preferred any cross appeal before the lower appellate court on this aspect. And the findings of the trial court on these items have become final. While so, the order of the lower appellate court in directing the retrial of the entire case is clearly unsustainable. 7. The respondent denied his liability to render accounts for all the items of the suit properties on the ground that he was not an agent under the appellants herein. He pleaded that he was a cultivating tenant. The trial court found that the tenancy set up by the respondent was not proved and instead he was functioning only as an agent of the appellants and accordingly he was bound to render accounts from 1975-76 in respect of A, B, C and D Schedule properties. One of the points formulated for consideration by the lower appellate court was regarding the agency. It is argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate court has committed an error in remanding the case for fresh trial without giving any finding on this point. One of the points formulated for consideration by the lower appellate court was regarding the agency. It is argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate court has committed an error in remanding the case for fresh trial without giving any finding on this point. A perusal of the judgment of learned Subordinate Judge discloses that after stating the respective contentions of the parties he has narrated how certain documents available in court were omitted to be marked during trial by the present respondent. He took the view that in the interest of justice an opportunity should be given to the respondent herein to prove his contentions by marking those documents and accordingly he set aside the judgment and decree of trial court and remanded back the suit to the trial court for fresh disposal after giving an opportunity for both parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence in proof of their respective contentions. 8. We find from the records that the present respondent has not marked any document before the trial court in proof of his contentions. It appears that as many as 11 documents were marked as Exs.B-1 to B-11 on the side of the present respondent during the enquiry, on the injunction application and these documents were omitted to be exhibited in evidence at the time of trial. As we have already seen, in order to enable the present respondent to place all his evidence before the court learned Subordinate Judge has remitted back the matter for fresh trial. 9. Let us now extract the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. As we have already seen, in order to enable the present respondent to place all his evidence before the court learned Subordinate Judge has remitted back the matter for fresh trial. 9. Let us now extract the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. O.41, Rule 23, states: “Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal or where the appellate court in reversing or setting aside the decree under appeal considers it necessary in the interest of justice to remand the case, the appellate court may, by order remand the case and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand.” O.41, Rule 23-A, states: “Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered-necessary, the appellate court shall have the same powers as it has under Rule 23.” O.41, Rule 27, runs as under: “(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if, .(a) The court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional • evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or .(b) the party seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the appellate court that such evidence notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the time when the decree under appeal was passed, or .(c) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. .(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission.” Under O.41, Rule 28, “Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the appellate court may either take such evidence, or direct the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the appellate court.” 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that under the abovesaid provisions of the Code, additional evidence could be produced in appeal only, (i) when the trial court has erroneously refused to admit evidence, (ii) the evidence sought to be produced, was not within the reach of the appellants during trial, (iii) the appellate court itself requires any evidence to render a judgment and (iv) for any other substantial cause. The plea of the present respondent does not come under any of the said four categories. He did not take any steps before the trial court for exhibiting the docu-ments which were available in the records of the trial court at any time before the judgment was delivered. Even in the lower appellate court there was no application by him to file those documents as additional evidence. He did not raise in the grounds of appeal that he was not given an opportunity to exhibit his documents. Even in the lower appellate court there was no application by him to file those documents as additional evidence. He did not raise in the grounds of appeal that he was not given an opportunity to exhibit his documents. Nor he sought for any such opportunity before the lower appellate court. Even pending this C.M.A., no application was made by him to mark those documents as additional evidence. Learned Subordinate Judge has erred in assuming that on account of oversight, documents were failed to be marked in the trial court. Further, reception of additional evidence cannot be a ground for remand. A remand cannot be ordered to enable the parties to fill up lacunae in a case. The discretion of the court should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner but should be exercised by sound principles. The impugned order of remand in the absence of any application under O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C., to let in additional evidence is erroneous. .11. In Kannu Naicker v. Kalaimani, 100 L. W. 922, cited by learned counsel for the appellants the respondents filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of 12 items of the suit properties. The trial court decreed the suit in its entirety as prayed for. On appeal the Subordinate Judge while confirming the conclusions of the trial court with regard to items 1 to 8, held so far as items9 to 12 are concerned that they have not let in any evidence to establish the rights and there is no evidence to prove the specific share of the plaintiffs. Hence learned Subordinate Judge considered it as expedient to remit the matter to the trial court to consider whether or not the plaintiffs have any share in items 9 to 12. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial court so far as the findings regarding items 9 to 12 are concerned were set aside and the matter was remitted to the trial court. The parties were also given opportunity to adduce fresh evidence in respect of items 9 to 12. Aggrieved by the remit order passed, the defendants took up the matter in appeal before this Court. The parties were also given opportunity to adduce fresh evidence in respect of items 9 to 12. Aggrieved by the remit order passed, the defendants took up the matter in appeal before this Court. Natarajan, J. took the view that the common case of the parties being that they were not prevented from adducing any evidence, the only test that should be applied by the lower appellate court is, whether the appellate court itself requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce a judgment or for any other substantial cause. As has been pointed out in a number of decisions, the appellate court should come to a finding on that question and this finding could only be after considering the entire evidence already on record. And he held that the order of remand in that case was unsustainable, as learned Subordinate Judge had remanded the matter only for the purpose of giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to adduce further evidence to establish their case with regard to items 9 to 12. The lower appellate court was directed to restore the appeal on its file, give opportunity to both parties to adduce further evidence in respect of items 9 to 12 to 12 before that court itself and to dispose of the appeal on merits and according to law. .12. In Visalakshi Animal v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal (1989)2 L.W. 414, a Division Bench of this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal had occasion to consider the order of remand of a single Judge of this Court on the ground that the discussion relating to the various aspects of the case had not been properly approached by. the trial court and that additional evidence had to be let in by both sides in order to appreciate the issues involved in accordance with law. The Division Bench, while deciding the question as to whether the order of remand ought not to have been made or the lis ought to have been decided on merits by learned single Judge himself, held: "The unsatisfactory consideration of an issue by the first court and the non-advertence to the judicial precedents by the first court while deciding an issue and the need to take additional evidence should not always be counted in favour of making an order of remand. These lacunae, if in fact they are present, can be rectified by the appellate court itself, unless there are very compelling circumstances to make an order of remand. An order of remand should not be taken to be matter of course on the above grounds. The power of remand should be sparingly exercised. There should be always endeavour to dispose of the case by the appellate court itself, when the commissions and omissions made by the first court could be corrected by the appellate court. It is not claimed by either side that there is a total dearth of evidence to decide the concerned questions. Maybe the parties were and are anxious to place additional evidence, but even that question can be thrashed out and settled by the appellate court itself. ‘All the questions require comprehensive consideration on merits and decisions thereon by the learned single Judge himself and we are not able to sustain the order of remand made on the grounds expressed by the learned single Judge on the facts of the present case." 13. In Natarajan Chettiar v. Balachandran, (1990)2 L.W. 394 , the appellate court had admitted the survey plan as additional evidence. No ground has been raised in the memorandum of appeal challenging the order admitting additional evidence. On the basis of the additional evidence and on the basis of certain other factors which are referred by the lower appellate court in its judgment, it found that the trial court has not taken into account several relevant matters and the trial court had to reconsider the matter. When this order of remand was challenged before this Court, it was argued by the appellants that it was the duty of the appellate court to consider the evidence by itself and decide the case on merits. Srinivasan, J., has held that no doubt that it is so. When the lower appellate court has held that on the basis of additional evidence admitted, the matter should be reconsidered and certain facts should be ascertained by taking the measurements of the properties, a remand is justified. And the provisions of O.41, Rule 23 of the C.P.C., have been satisfied and so there was no justification for interfering with the order of the lower appellate court. .14. It is true that the provisions of O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. should be strictly complied with by the lower appellate court. And the provisions of O.41, Rule 23 of the C.P.C., have been satisfied and so there was no justification for interfering with the order of the lower appellate court. .14. It is true that the provisions of O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. should be strictly complied with by the lower appellate court. However, it cannot be gainsaid that only by inadvertence, the documents available in court were omitted to be marked during trial by the present respondent. At the most, it can reflect only on the carelessness of the counsel concerned in conducting the case. It is unfortunate that even in the lower appellate court, the advocate appearing for the present respondent had not cared to file an application seeking permission to let in additional evidence. However, the party need not be penalised for the mistake of the counsel. Under 0.13, Rule 2, C.P.C. additional evidence could be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings if good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the court for the non-production thereof. While so, interest of justice as contemplated under O.41, Rule 23 requires that the respondent herein is given an opportunity to mark the documents already available in court as additional evidence and have a decision on consideration of the entire materials on record in respect of his liability to render accounts in case he has functioned as an agent under the present appellants. 15. We have already seen that the order of remand directing the fresh trial of the entirety of the case is unsustainable since the decision of the trial court in respect of relief of recovery of possession of A and B Schedule and item 1 of ‘C’ Schedule properties has become final. During arguments before this Court both sides conceded that possession of items 2 and 3 of ‘C Schedule properties has also been taken through court in execution proceedings. So on the remaining issues of controversy the appellate court itself can fianlly dispose of the appeal after taking the additional evidence as provided under O.41, Rule 28, C.P.C. There cannot be any remand merely for the purpose of affording an opportunity to a parly to let in additional evidence. So on the remaining issues of controversy the appellate court itself can fianlly dispose of the appeal after taking the additional evidence as provided under O.41, Rule 28, C.P.C. There cannot be any remand merely for the purpose of affording an opportunity to a parly to let in additional evidence. The expression ‘interest of justice’ occurring in O.41, Rule 23 does not widen the powers of the appellate court to remand a suit in the sense that irrespective of the fact whether it comes to the conclusion that the judgment and decree of the trial court are liable to be reversed or set aside or not, if the appellate court is of the opinion that the interests of justice require that there should be a fresh trial, it can remand the suit for fresh disposal. There is no principle or authority to support such a contention. It is clear from the scheme of the rules that generally speaking, only where it is not possible to apply O.41, Rules 24 to 27, C.P.C, a remand should be resorted to under O.41, Rule 23, C.P.C. And in view of the ratio laid down in the decisions referred to above the order of remand in this case by the lower appellate court is unsustainable. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside. The lower appellate court is directed to restore A.S.No.123 of 1983 on its file, give opportunity to both parties to adduce further evidence, oral and documentary, in respect of the points still in controversy before the lower appellate court itself and to dispose of the appeal on merits and according to law. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.