J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE sole and significant question which has surfaced in this Second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("code") is " whether the impugned notices given by Baroda Municipal Corporations under section 264 of the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 ("bpmc Act") are legal and valid. "? A few relevant and meterial facts, may be suited, at the outset, so as to examine and appreciate the question paused before this Court. The appellant, Baroda Municipal Corporation, is the original defendant No. 1 in regular Civil Suit No. 628 of 1969, filed by the respondents, who are the original plaintiffs. For the convenience sake, they are, hereinafter, addressed to as they were impleaded in the suit. The plaintiffs filed a Civil Suit in the Civil Court, at Baroda, for perpetual injunction, contending that the impugned notices under Section 264 of the BPMC Act, produced, at ex. 58 to 61, by the Baroda Municipal Corporation, dated 19. 4. 1969, are illegal and, therefore, should be declared as void. The plaintiffs are the four tenants in respect of residential property situated opposite Raopura Electric Substation, at Baroda, and bearing Municipal Census No. RA-558. It is the ground floor, where original plaintiff No. 4 is a tenant. On the first floor, plaintiffs No. 1, 2 and 3 are occupying different portions. Similarly, plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 are also occupying different portions of the second floor. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs, inter alia, contended that, defendant No. 2 is the owner of the said property and their landlord. He in collusion with defendant No. 1, Baroda Municipal corporation, got the impugned notices issued. The plaintiffs contended that they are old tenants and the landlord (defendant No. 2) served them with notices for ejectment from the rented premises and having failed in his attempt, got the impugned notices issued under section 264 of the BPMC Act, in collusion with the Baroda Municipal Corporation. The contents of the impugned notices are absolutely false and illegal, as contended by the plaintiffs. The contents of the impugned notices are absolutely false and illegal, as contended by the plaintiffs. According to the impugned notices, under Section 264 of the BPMC Act, the baroda Municipal Corporation (defendant No. 1) directed the plaintiffs-tanants to vacate the suit premises on the ground that the northern wall of the suit premises and the wooden afters (Pdhias and pathias) of the First and Second floor and the Veranda portion of the said house are decayed and in a dilapidated condition, and are likely to fall at any time. The plaintiffs questioning the legality and validity of the impugned notices filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the Baroda Municipal Corporation from pulling down the impugned structure alleged to be dangerous. ( 3 ) THE defendants appared and resisted the suit by filling separate written statements, traversing all the allegations levelled in the plaint and defending the action of the Baroda municipal Corporation, in issuing the impugned notices under Section 264 of the BPMC act. The allegations of mala-fide and collusion between the defendants were denied. They also contended that the impugned notices were issued, as the Land and Estate Officer was satisfied that, in view of the very old age of the building, us it was a decayed and dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition. Thus, the action proposed to be taken under Section 264 of the BPMC Act was defended. ( 4 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances, the issues came to be settled at Ex. 32. The trial Court, on appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence, on record, was pleased to dismiss the suit, on 31st March, 1978. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the original plaintiffs preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1978, in the District Court, at Baroda, which was allowed. Thus, the suit was decreed, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, by the Appellate court, on 29. 4. 1981. Hence, this Second Appeal, at the instance of original defendant No. 1, Boroda Municipal Corporation, under Section 100 of the CPC. ( 5 ) IT has been, seriously, contended that the Appellate Court, wrongly, decreed the suit and has committed grave error. 4. 1981. Hence, this Second Appeal, at the instance of original defendant No. 1, Boroda Municipal Corporation, under Section 100 of the CPC. ( 5 ) IT has been, seriously, contended that the Appellate Court, wrongly, decreed the suit and has committed grave error. Before the merits of this submission are examined, it may be noted that the jurisdictional sweep of this Court in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is very much circumscribed. It will not be permissible for this Court to interfere with the finding of facts. It is encumbent upon the appellant-original defendant no. 1 to show that a substantial question of law is involved. Which requires serious consideration and interference of this Court in the Second Appeal. Unless and until it is, successfully, shown, this Court will be at loath to interfere with the factual finding recorded by the Courts below. ( 6 ) HAVING examined the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case, it becomes very clear that the First Appellate Court was justified in declaring the impugned notices under Section 264 of the BPMC Act illegal and invalid. The First appellate Court has recorded a factual finding that there impugned notices for demolition, resorting to the provisions of Section 264 of the BPMC ACL On this sole ground, this court is satisfied that the First Appellate Court was justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs, after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The factual finding of the Frist Appellate Court that the notices under Section 264 were issued with mala fide intention and by collusion between the defendants has remained unimpeachable. The Trial Court had committed serious error in refusing to hold that there was mala fide intention on the part of the Baroda Municipal Corporation in issuing the impugned notices. ( 7 ) IT is true that the Municipal Corpoation has got authority to issue the notice and pull down dangerous structures, after observing the procedure, in accordance with law. The relevant portion of Section 264 of the BPMC Act reads as under:-"264. ( 7 ) IT is true that the Municipal Corpoation has got authority to issue the notice and pull down dangerous structures, after observing the procedure, in accordance with law. The relevant portion of Section 264 of the BPMC Act reads as under:-"264. (1) If it shall at any time appear to the Commissioner that any structure (including under this expression any building wall, parapet, pavement, floor, steps, railings, door or window frames or shutters or roof, or other structure and anything affixed to or projecting from or resting on any building, wall, parapet or other structure ) is in a ruinous condition or likely to fall, or in any way dangerous to any person occupying, resorting to or passed by such structure or any other structure or place in the neighbourhood thereof, the Commissioner may, by written notice, require the owner or occupier of such structure to pull down, secure,"remove or repair such structure or thing or do one or more of such things and to prevent all cause of danger theredfrom: provided that when the notice as aforesaid is given to the owners of a structure, who is not himself the occupier thereof, a copy of such notice shall be given also to the occupier thereof if any. "it becomes clear from the plain perusal of the aforesaid provision of Section 264 (1) incorporated in Chapter XV of BPMC Act, that the Municipal Corporation has power for the removal of structures, which are in a ruinous or dilapidated condition and are likely to fall. Such power is required to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the said Section. However, if it is, successfully, pointed out in a given case that the exercise of powers envisaged in Section 264 arc not exercised bonafide and are the outcome of mala fide, then, in that case, the Civil Court, without statutory notice, quash the same and restrain the Municipal Corporation from enforcing the notice under Section 264. The plaintiffs have, successfully, established, without doubt, that the impugned notices produced, at Ex. 58 to 61, issued to the plaintiffs, who arc the tenants in the premises, were not only issued with mala fide intention, but also were actuated out of collusion between the Baroda Municipal Corporation and the landlord of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have, successfully, established, without doubt, that the impugned notices produced, at Ex. 58 to 61, issued to the plaintiffs, who arc the tenants in the premises, were not only issued with mala fide intention, but also were actuated out of collusion between the Baroda Municipal Corporation and the landlord of the plaintiffs. It may be noted that the following facts are not in dispute:- (1) That the plaintiffs are old tenants; (2) That the landlord of the plaintiffs resides in an adjoining building; (3) That the landlord had served the plaintiffs with notices for ejectment before the impugned notices came to be served; (4) That the plaintiffs were also earlier served with eviction notices produced, at Ex. 54, dated 28. 6. 1964; (5) That the relationship between the tenants and the landlord has been strained; (6) That no action was taken by the Municipality under Section 265 of the bpmc Act, and no reasonable explanation is given as to why no such action was taken; (7) That the Building Inspector, Mr. M. D. Topre, who was examined, at Ex. 74, along with the Land Estate Officer, Mr. Patel, has admitted in his evidence that the repairs instead of demolition could have served the purpose; (8) The report of the Building Inspector, Mr. Topre, produced at Ex. 75, is undated; (9) That Mr. Topre has further admitted in his evidence that, as such , there was no necessity to pull down the northern wall of the suit property; (10) That Mr. Topre was working as Building Inspector of the ward, wherein, the suit property was situated, from 1963 to 1970, and he had never noticed any dangerous situation of the suit property; and (11) That the Suit property has withstood all the natural calamities in the last quarter of a century, including earth quake, floods, cyclones, heavy rains, etc. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid admitted facts emerging from the record, ipso facto, are, rightly, held to be sufficient to constitute mala fide and collusion, as contended by the plaintiffs. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid admitted facts emerging from the record, ipso facto, are, rightly, held to be sufficient to constitute mala fide and collusion, as contended by the plaintiffs. Apart from that, the landlord is bound to keep the demised premises in a tenantable repairs under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ("bombay Rent Act") and, though the landlord is residing in the adjoining house, there is nothing to show that he had ever cared to keep the rented premises in a tenantable repairs. Even under Section 265 of the BPMC Act, it is found incumbent upon the owner of the building to maintain every part, therof, and everything appurtenant thereof in such repairs as to prevent its becoming dangerous. In absence of any material on record to show that the defendats had observed the statutory obigation cast on them, this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the finding of (acts recorded by the First Appellate court On the contrary, these aspects further reinforce the factual finding recorded by the first Appellate Court that the plaintiffs have, sucessfully, proved that there was collusion between the defendants and the impugned notices for demolition of the disputed property occupied by the plaintiffs, under Section 264 of the BRMC Act, were issued with mala fide intention. Unfortunately, both these aspects were not seriously examined by the Trial court. The Trial Court committed serious error in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs for perpetual induction. The error , which was seriously committed by the Trial Court, was rightly rectified by the First Appellate Court. ( 9 ) WITHOUT entering into the merits of other contentions raised against the legality and validity of the impugned notices, the aforesaid sole ground of collusion and mala fide intention for the issuance of the impugned notices is sufficient to decree the suit of the plaintiffs, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case, this Court has no hesitation in finding that the present appeal is, totally, meritless. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, with no order as to costs, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances. .