A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed by and on behalf of the respondent on 8th April 1985 terminating the petitioners services is under challenge in this petition under An. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition are not many and not much in dispute. The petitioner was appointed as Regional Manager on the supernumerary post by the order passed inter alia by the Managing Director of the respondent on 23rd November 1981, its copy is at Annexure Q to this petition. It does not become clear from the record on what date the petitioner assumed his office. It however transpires from the communication of 1st March 1984 that the petitioner assumed his office with effect from 28th November 1982. As transpiring from the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition, he was appointed on probation for a period of six months in the beginning and he was deemed to be on probation till he was, by a written order, taken on the regular establishment, meaning thereby that till he was confirmed in service. By one communication of 1st march 1984, the Managing Director of the respondent communicated to the petitioner certain adverse remarks for the period from 28th November 1981 to 31st March 1982 and from 1st April 1982 to 31st March 1983. Its copy is at Annexure C to this petition. The petitioner was directed to send his objections if any there to within six weeks from the date of its receipt. It appears that the petitioner did not send his representation against the adverse remarks communicated to him by the communication at Annexure C to this petition within the prescribed period. It appears that thereupon one communication of 19th April 1984 was sent to the petitioner as to posting of entries in his confidential records. It appears that a subsequent communication of 19th April 1984 stirred the petitioner into action. He thereupon addressed one communication of 14th May 1984 to the Managing Director of the respondent calling for adverse remarks conveyed to him indicating therein that the communication of 1st March 1984 was received by him on 14th march 1984. A copy of the petitioners communication of 14th March 1984 is at annexure E to this petition. He thereupon addressed one communication of 14th May 1984 to the Managing Director of the respondent calling for adverse remarks conveyed to him indicating therein that the communication of 1st March 1984 was received by him on 14th march 1984. A copy of the petitioners communication of 14th March 1984 is at annexure E to this petition. It appears that at the relevant time the communication at annexure C to this petition was addressed to the petitioner he was working at Veraval. He was found to have indulged into certain irregularities. Thereupon the petitioner was chargesheeted on 7th March 1984. A copy of the charge-sheet together with necessary annexures is at Annexure K to this petition. The petitioner was required to submit his explanation with respect to the aforesaid charge-sheet within 15 days from its receipt. By his letter of 15th March 1984 addressed to the Manager (Administration and establishment) of the respondent, the petitioner requested for one months time for furnishing his explanation to the aforesaid charge-sheet. Its copy is at Annexure L to this petition. By his further communication of 26th March 1984 the petitioner indicated that he had requested for some time for submitting his explanation to the aforesaid charge-sheet. Its copy is at Annexure M to this petition. By his communication of 12th april 1984, the petitioner tried to know from the addresses as to what happened to his request contained in his communication at Annexure L to this petition. A copy of his communication of 12th April 1984 is at Annexure N to this petition. The petitioner however did not submit any explanation to the charge-sheet at Annexure K to this petition. In the meantime, it appears that the petitioner was transferred to Lothal. It appears that, in absence of the petitioners explanation to the aforesaid charge-sheet at annexure K to this petition, some inquiry appears to have been conducted. It appears that there was some difference in stock to the tune of Rs. 420. 45ps. and it was sought to be recovered from the petitioner. Before ordering such recovery, an explanation was sought from the petitioner by means of one communication of 5th June 1984. Its copy is at annexure O to this petition. That communication was addressed to the petitioner at his place of transfer at Lothal. The petitioner appears to have resumed his office at Lotha1 on 11th May 1984. Before ordering such recovery, an explanation was sought from the petitioner by means of one communication of 5th June 1984. Its copy is at annexure O to this petition. That communication was addressed to the petitioner at his place of transfer at Lothal. The petitioner appears to have resumed his office at Lotha1 on 11th May 1984. The Managing Director of the respondent appears to have paid a surprise visit to the respondents office and guest house at Lothal on 13th May 1984. The petitioner was found to have resumed his duties thereat on 11th May 1984 but had left his office around 4 p. m. on that very day and had remained away from the headquarters on 12 and 13th May 1984. The Managing Director of the respondent, during his surprise visit to its office and guest house at Lothal, also found certain irregularities thereat. Therepupon one memo of 15th May 1984 was issued to the petitioner calling upon his explanation within a weeks time from its, receipt. Its copy is at Annexure F to this petition. By his letter of 29th May 1984, the petitioner caused its reply. A copy of his reply is at Annexure g to this petition. It appears that the Managing Director till that time was one S. K. Nanda. He was succeeded by one B. K. Sinha. It appears that the petitioner addressed one commnication to him on llth June 1984 showering praises on the new incumbent, in office as the Managing Director and voicing his grievances against the predecessor of the new incumbent. Its copy is at Annexure H to this petition. It may be mentioned at this stage that the petitioner was not confirmed in service. He was deemed to have remained on probation in view of clause 1 of the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition. The petitioner also requested the new incumbent to the office of the Managing Director of the respondent to confirm him in service. It appears that the new incumbent thereupon looked into the petitioners service record. He remained under an impression that the petitioner did not cause any reply to the memo at Annexure F to this petition. The petitioner also requested the new incumbent to the office of the Managing Director of the respondent to confirm him in service. It appears that the new incumbent thereupon looked into the petitioners service record. He remained under an impression that the petitioner did not cause any reply to the memo at Annexure F to this petition. The managing Director of the respondent thereupon issued one communication of 6th July 1984 calling upon the petitioner why his one increment should not be stopped as no explanation to the memo at Annexure F to this petition was furnished by the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid communication of 6th July 1984 is a part of Annexure R to this petition. The petitioner gave his reply thereto on 11th July 1984 pointing out therein that he had already submitted his explanation on 29th May 1984 to the memo at Annexure F to this petition. A copy of the petitioners reply of 11th Julyl984 is a part of Annexure R to this petition. It appears that the matter rested there for some time. It appears that thereafter by one office order passed on 25th September 1984, the petitioner came to be transferred to the respondents unit at Gandhi Ashram in Ahmedabad. A copy of the aforesaid office order is at Annexure J to this petition. It appears that prior thereto the petitioner made some representation to the Managing Director of the respondent on 31st july 1984. It appears that the matter reasted thereat. However, by one office order passed on 8th April 1985, the petitioners services came to be terminated. Its copy is at Annexure a to this petition. Thereupon the petitioner appears to have sent one reminder on 13th april 1985 addressing to the Managing Director of the respondent in connection with his earlier representation of 31st July 1984 and requested for personal hearing to enable him to explain "the whole story of victimisation". Its copy is at Annexure I to this petition. It appears that the petitioner was not given any personal hearing. Thereupon he has approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india for questioning inter alia the validity of the order terminating his services at annexure A to this petition. Its copy is at Annexure I to this petition. It appears that the petitioner was not given any personal hearing. Thereupon he has approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india for questioning inter alia the validity of the order terminating his services at annexure A to this petition. ( 3 ) THE petitioners challenge to the termination order at Annexure A to this petition is on the ground that, though it is innocuous in appearance, it is penal and punitive in reality. According to the petitioner, no inquiry whatsoever was made against him before passing the impugned penal and punitive order at Annexure A to this petition, and it therefore deserves to be struck down as violative of principles of natural justice. The petitioner has also sought the relief inter alia that he. should be trceted as a confirmed employee of the respondent. ( 4 ) THE undisputed facts emerging from the record may be summarised thus; (1) The petitioner was appointed as a probationer by the order of 23rd November 1981 at annexure Q to this petition, (2) As transpiring from condition No. 1 therein, his appointment was, on probation for an initial period of six months and he was liable to remain on probation till he was confirmed in service by any order in writing, (3) He was never confirmed in service by any order in writing, and (4) His services came to be terminated by the order of 8th April 1985 at Annexure A to this petition. ( 5 ) THE preliminary objection raised against the maintainability of this petition on the ground that the respondent is neither the State nor does it partake the character of the state, and as such it would not fall within the purview of Art. 12 of the Constitution of india, has to be stated only to be rejected in view of the ruling of this Court in the case of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa vs. Tourism Corporation of Gujarat Limited and others reported in 1991 (1) Gujarat Law Herald 383. In that case this very respondent was held to be the state within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) IT is an admitted position on record that the respondent is a Government company established under the Companies Act, 1956. In that case this very respondent was held to be the state within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) IT is an admitted position on record that the respondent is a Government company established under the Companies Act, 1956. It has made no rules and regulations inter alia with respect to the conditions of service of its employees. I am told at the Bar that an attempt was made by the respondent to frame certain rules bearing the title "the Tourism corporation of Gujarat Limited (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1986". I am told on behalf of the respondent at the bar that those rules never came into force. It thus becomes clear that there are no rules and regulations framed by the respondent inter alia for governing conditions of service of its employees. In that context, the petitioners status in the establishment of the respondent will have to be examined in the light of the contract of employment between the two as reflected in the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition. ( 7 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, condition No. 1 thereof clearly stipulates that the petitioners appointment was on probation for a period of six months in the first instance and he would be deemed to have remained on probation till, by a written order, he was to be confirmed in service. As pointed out hereinabove, no written order came to be issued so far confirming him in service. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the respondent, a series of rulings of the Supreme Court has been brought to my notice to the effect that there could not be any automatic confirmation in service in absence of any specific provision in the rules and/or regulations governing conditions of service of employees, in this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Veerappa r. Saboji and another reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 42. In that case, a judicial officer was appointed on probation for a period of two years and his services came to be terminated after his having put in 11 years of service by a termination order simpliciter. In that case, a judicial officer was appointed on probation for a period of two years and his services came to be terminated after his having put in 11 years of service by a termination order simpliciter. On review of the case law on the subject, the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner in that case to the effect that on expiry of the period of probation, he automatically stood confirmed was negatived on the ground that mere continuance in, service after expiry of the period of probation would not result in the automatic confirmation in service in absence of any specific rules and/or regulations in that regard. The matter of confirmation of an employee would be at the discretion of the employer in absence of any provision or automatic confirmation. The Supreme Court has also negatived the contention that dependence or confirmation on the sweet will of the employer in such a case would be violative of the guarantee of equality in matters of public employment contained in Art. 16 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Saboji (supra) is obviously binding to me in view of art. 141 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, the petitioner did not come to be confirmed in service by any written order. There is no provision for his automatic confirmation in service under any rules and/or regulations governing his conditions of service. By virtue of clause 1 in the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition he was deemed him to have remained on probation even after expiry of his initial period of probation unless he was confirmed in service by a written order. In that view of the matter, the petitioner could not be said to have automatically been confirmed in service on expiry of the initial period of probation in absence of any written order and in absence of any specific rules and/or regulations governing his conditions of service. The challenge to clause 1 in the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition based on Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India will have also to be turned down in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Saboji (Supra ). The challenge to clause 1 in the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition based on Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India will have also to be turned down in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Saboji (Supra ). ( 10 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh and others vs. State of punjab and others reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 494 as relied on by Shri Padiwal for the petitioner is distinguishable on its own facts. In that case, he relevant rule providing for appointment on probation was interpreted to mean that the period prescribed therein was the maximum period for the purpose and continuance of a servant beyond the maximum period would result in his automatic confirmation. Besides, in that case; the fact that the petitioners allowed to earn increments also weighed with the court. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh [supra] will not be applicable in the case before me for the simple reason that, as pointed out hereinabove, there are no specific rules and/or regulations governing the petitioners conditions of service and also that there is no provision in the appointment order at annexure Q to this petition prescribing the maximum period of probation. Besides, it is an admitted position on record that the petitioner had earned no increments during his entire service under the respondent Corporation. ( 12 ) THE reliance on the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1571 and in the case of Delhi Transport corporation vs. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and others reported in AIR 1991 Supreme court 101 is of no avail to the petitioner in the present case for the simple reason that the concerned employee involved therein was a permanent employee and not a probationer. What applies to a permanent employee will certainly not be applicable to a probationer when it comes to termination of his services. ( 13 ) THAT brings me to the challenge to the termination order at Annexure A to this petition on the ground that it is penal and punitive in character though innocuous in appearance. What applies to a permanent employee will certainly not be applicable to a probationer when it comes to termination of his services. ( 13 ) THAT brings me to the challenge to the termination order at Annexure A to this petition on the ground that it is penal and punitive in character though innocuous in appearance. That challenge is based on certain factual date. The first is the charge-sheet at annexure K to this petition issued to the petitioner with respect to his alleged irregularities while he was holding No. 1 position in the respondents office and guest house at Veraval. According to the petitioner, the disciplinary proceedings initiated with the charge-sheet at Annexure K to this petition came to be dropped even though the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Then, the memo at Annexure F to this petition is also brought to my notice to convince me that the termination order at Annexure A to this petition was by way of victimisation. According to the petitioner, though he submitted his explanation thereto on 29th May 1984 at Annexure G to this petition, the Managing director of the respondent called upon him why his one increment should not be stopped tor not giving any explanation to the memo at Annexure F to this petition by virtue of his show-cause notice at Annexure R (part) to this petition. Then, there is on record one representation of 11th June 1984 at Annexure H to this petition voicing the petitioners grievances against the previous incumbent to the post of the Managing Director of the respondent. The suggestion is that the grievances voiced therein might not have been palatable to the successor Managing Director of the respondent, and that is why the petitioner came to be victimised "by ordering his termination simpliciter. As against this, according to the Corporation, the termination order at Annexure A to this petition was in no way penal or punitive in character or in reality. The case of the respondent is that the petitioner was not found suitable for the job despits continuing him on probation for a long period with a view to giving him an opportunity to improve his working, and as such the petitioners services were terminated. The respondent has denied the allegation as to the petitioners victimisation by the termination order at Annexure A to this petition. The respondent has denied the allegation as to the petitioners victimisation by the termination order at Annexure A to this petition. ( 14 ) IT is an admitted position on record that no adverse remarks against the petitioner were communicated prior to 1st March 1984. As pointed out hereinabove, he appears to have joined his services with effect from 28th November 1981. The adverse remarks for the periods ended on 31st March 1982 and on 31st March 1983 were communicated belatedly on 1st March 1984 by the communication at Annexure C to this petition. 15. 10. 1993 ( 15 ) IT is true that the adverse remarks are meant for drawing the attention of the concerned employee as to defects found in his working. They are meant to put the concerned employee on his guard with respect to his performance of his job. The attention of the concerned employee is thereby drawn that his working needs improvement and his defects need correction. ( 16 ) THE delay in communication of such remarks may not be of much consequence or significance unless such delay has materially prejudiced the concerned employee. For example, the employee might have been due for promotion and his promotion is withheld and he is superseded by his juniors on the basis of uncommunicated adverse remarks. In that case, non-communication thereof or delay in communication thereof would materially prejudice the concerned employee: In that context the adverse remarks communicated to the petitioner on 1st March 1984 by the communication at Annexure C to this petition have to be viewed. The respondent cannot run away from the fact that there was inordinate delay in communication of the adverse remarks at Annexure C to this petition. The petitioner has however not been able to show what prejudice has been caused to him by the delay in communication thereof. In absence of such prejudice, much less material prejudice, the delay in communication of adverse remarks is of no much consequence or significance. ( 17 ) AS transpiring from the communication at Annexure C to this petition, the petitioner was supposed to make representation or voice his objection thereto within six weeks from receipt thereof. That communication at Annexure C to this petition was admittedly received by the petitioner on 14th March 1984. He has admittedly made no representation thereagainst or voiced no objections thereto within the stipulated time-limit. That communication at Annexure C to this petition was admittedly received by the petitioner on 14th March 1984. He has admittedly made no representation thereagainst or voiced no objections thereto within the stipulated time-limit. The so- called representation thereagainst at Annexure E to this petition was belatedly made and even a bare perusal thereof would leave no room for doubt that it was no representation even in the common parlance, much less in the legal parlance. It reads:" Kindly consider that the above referred first letter dated 1-3-1984 was received by me on 14-3-1984. The letter from top to bottom is deaf, dumb and blind. However, if there is any adverse remarks against me as shown in your above letter, may kindly be conveyed to me, specifically and categorically so that I may submit my submission. In the light of above circumstances, your honour presumption that I have nothing to say in the matter may kindly be condoned. "the bare perusal of the aforesaid representation leaver one wondering whether the petitioner was fit to occupy the responsible position of a senior manager in the establishment of the respondent. Apart from the use of harsh language by him therein, it lacks in both courtesy and decency. It smacks of irresponsible approach and attitude on the part of the petitioner toward his superior conveying adverse remarks with a view to pointing out his defects and meaning correction of his deficiency and improvement in his working. ( 18 ) AT this stage it may also be noted that the communication at Annexure C is captioned "confidential". The responsible officer issuing that communication to the petitioner was careful enough to see that the matter remained confidential. The representation at Annexure E thereto does not bear that caption. There is every reason to believe that it was sent to the address by ordinary post. In the organization like that of the respondent, letters addressed to the Managing Director, unless marked confidential, would be opened by some member of the clerical staff responsible for inwarding communications or letters received in the office. Looking to the contents there of, as a responsible officer of the respondent, the petitioner ought to have realised this position. He ought not to have sent it as an ordinary communication without marking confidential. Looking to the contents there of, as a responsible officer of the respondent, the petitioner ought to have realised this position. He ought not to have sent it as an ordinary communication without marking confidential. This itself shows how irresponsibly the petitioner has behaved with his superior ( 19 ) THERE is some more material on record displaying the petitioners irresponsible behaviour qua his service and also qua his superior authority. As pointed out hereinabove, while he was at Veraval, the petitioner was served with the charge-sheet at Annexure K to this petition. Except seeking some time to file his reply thereto, he has admittedly filed no reply thereto. He appears to have sat tight over it. This behaviour on his part would smack of his irresponsibility. It does not befit his position as the man at the helm of affairs in that unit of the respondent. ( 20 ) THERE is yet another instance on record exhibiting his casual and cavalier approach to the memo at Annexure O this petition given to him. It is an admitted position on record that the Managing Director of the respondent paid a surprise visit to the unit of the respondent at Lothal on 13th May 1984. That was a Sunday. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was transferred to that place and he resumed thereat on 11th May 1984. As a new. incumbent in that unit, he could not have left that place as his headquarters without showing courtesy to his superior officer by informing him of his intention to do so. Absence of any rules and/or regulations governing conditions of service would not mean absence of. responsibility on the part of a responsible officer manning a responsible position as done by the petitioner in the present case. Simply because the date he assumed his office at Lothal was followed by a non-working Saturday and Sunday was no ground for him just to leave his headquarters without informing his superior, much less without leave of his superior. If he had chosen to do so, one wonders what cue his subordinate staff would take from his such behaviour. Simply because the date he assumed his office at Lothal was followed by a non-working Saturday and Sunday was no ground for him just to leave his headquarters without informing his superior, much less without leave of his superior. If he had chosen to do so, one wonders what cue his subordinate staff would take from his such behaviour. As rightly pointed out by the respondent in its affidavit, as a new incumbent to that place, it was the duty of the petitioner to have spent some more time thereat not only on the day of his assumption of charge but also on the following non-working Saturday and Sunday to get himself acquainted and acclimatised with the atmosphere in that place. The respondent is brought into existence admittedly for promotion of tourism activities in the State of Gujarat. One cannot loss sight of the fact that Lotha1 enjoys a prominent place both from cultural and historical point of view. If such be the behaviour of the man at the helm of affairs in that unit, tourists would be dissuaded from visiting that place. It is said, when the cat is out the mice would play. If the first man in the unit runs away in this fashion, his subordinate staff in that unit would not at all care for the tourists visiting that place. That would certainly frustrate the very object of establishment of a unit in that culturally and historically important place. . ( 21 ) THE petitioners explanation at Annexure G to this petition to the memo issued by the Managing Director of the respondent with respect to his surprise visit to Lothal on 13th May 1984 at Annexure F to this petition is again startling. The relevant contents of both deserve to be reproduced in toto: memo"1. The Managing Director of the Corporation visited Toran unit, Lothal, on sunday the 13th May 1984 at 6-00 p. m. The Manager of the unit Mr. Jacob aron was not present during the visit. It has been reported to M. D. that the sr. Manager had left the premises on Friday the 11th May 1984 at 4-00 p. m. 2. An amount of Rs. 843/- was lying with the Chowkidhar of the unit, being the income of March, April and till 13th May 1984. Neither Mr. Aron nor Mr. It has been reported to M. D. that the sr. Manager had left the premises on Friday the 11th May 1984 at 4-00 p. m. 2. An amount of Rs. 843/- was lying with the Chowkidhar of the unit, being the income of March, April and till 13th May 1984. Neither Mr. Aron nor Mr. Vyas (Leave Reserve Manager) have deposited the income into the Bank as per the rules of the Corporation and the amount was in fact lying with the chowkidhar who is not authorised to keep the accounts of the Corporation. 3. It has been observed that handing over/taking over papers were sent to H. O. on 11th May 84 vide outward No. 14 but no entry has been made in the dead stock register which is not proper. 4. On verifying the cash book, though banding over/taking over was done, the cash which is supposed to be kept under the control of Sr. Manager of the unit was lying with Chowkidhar. 5. Guests have checked in vide Guest Register entry Nos. 160,161 and 162 but no receipt could be passed on to tourists as Chowkidhar is not authorised to issue receipt. For this purpose statement in writing was also obtained from the Chowkidhar. 6. On 7th May 84 Sr. Manager was in Gandhinagar for salary but on the same day the Hamal of the unit was also in Gandhinagar. Hence the visit of Sr. Manager could have been avoided instead of duplication. 7. From 8th to llth May Mr. Vyas (Leave Reserve Manager) was there at lothal and hence for the additional stay in Gandhinagar by Sr. Manager, no da should be sanctioned. 8. The Muster Roll for the month of May 84 has not been maintained. 9. An amount of Rs. 100/- is sanctioned as petty cash for the unit which was not available at the unit during inspection, nor the same was given to any body by the Sr. Manager. All the above lapses have been viewed very seriously and the Sr. Manager is hereby instructed to explain his reasons in writing within a weeks time from receipt of this memo, failing which disciplinary action will be initiated for the above lapses. " explanation" (1) As stated in point No. l Sr. Manager. All the above lapses have been viewed very seriously and the Sr. Manager is hereby instructed to explain his reasons in writing within a weeks time from receipt of this memo, failing which disciplinary action will be initiated for the above lapses. " explanation" (1) As stated in point No. l Sr. Manager Lothal has left the premises on Friday the 11th May 1984 which is verified by the Managing Director on 13-5-84 (SUNDAY ). I beg to state that on 12- 5-84 it was second Saturday and 13th was Sunday. Since Sr. Manager is entitled to avail holidays declared and observed by the Corporation, the question does not arise of remaining present on those days. Moreover it is stated that Sr. Manager had left on 11-5-84 at 4-00 p. m. because he had already attended his duties of more than 8 hours (since 7 a. m. onwards ). So, again the question does not arise of leaving at 4-OO p. m. (2) About undeposited, unauthorised cash of Rs. 843/- being the income of march and April 1984 and upto 13th May 1984, Sr. Manager Lothal is not at all responsible directly or indirectly because of following reasons:- (a) The charge at Lothal as Sr. Manager was taken over on 11-5-84 whereas this cash as stated by the M. D. is pertaining to the service tenure of Shri j. N. Shah and Mr. Vyas. Thus, Sr. Manager Lothal is not responsible for the mistake committed by predecessor. (b) Sr. Manager is a class II officer and assisted by team of catering supervisor, receptionist, Clerk, Store-keeper etc. generally is the pay scale of Rs. 330/- and 260/- accordingly. Hence maintenance of accounts and book-keeping pertains to accounts clerk. Moreover Sr. Manager is neither qualified nor trained for this type of work. It is a surprise that how Sr. Manager hold responsibility for such accounting procedural matters. Still I am clearly, respectively mention that as I am neither qualified nor trained for accounting matters I may be provided with minimum a Jr. Clerk to look after all accounting matters in the interest of the Corporations money. If a permanent clerk is not granted, it is an humble request that a clerk from head office may be deputed at least twice a week to comply with accounting formalities. Clerk to look after all accounting matters in the interest of the Corporations money. If a permanent clerk is not granted, it is an humble request that a clerk from head office may be deputed at least twice a week to comply with accounting formalities. (3) It is mentioned that handling taken over papers were sent to H. O. on 11-5-84 vide outward N. 14 but no entry has been made in dead stock register which is not proper. It is also surprising to me that during my total service period of about 10 years I never came across the procedure of making the entries of dead stock register about the change in charge, but if M. L. required necessary orders may be issued from H. O. to this effect, so that any adaption of new procedure is to be done in existing norms of the corporation it can also be done by Sr. Manager Lothal in all future cases. (4) At Lothal tourist home following are the basic, environmental and organisational problems: (i ). There is no sanctioned post or a person for the work of accounts clerk. (ii) Since there beginning to Lothal centre, no cash box is provided, which can be verified from the records. (iii) Since the precedent has a regular practice at Lothal to maintain the cash in the personal pocket of either Manager or Chowkidhar which had never been pointed out or objected by H. O. impliedly leads a new man like me to believe that this is the only approved method of the corporation for Lothal centre. (iv) Even in absolutely new and adverse circumstances Sr. Manager exercised his best judgment method in the interest of the corporation by not carrying the cash with him during holidays on 12th and 13th May 1984. Moreover the Cowkidhar is the only reliable and trustworthy person who looks after the whole property of Lothal, was entrusted to keep of Rs. 343/- only. Of course, if the M. D. approves the proper method may be introduced in the interest of the Corporation. (5) About the guest registers entry Nos. 160, 161 and 162 there is no irregularities or shortcoming on the part of Sr. Manager because: (i) The entry in the guest register is made as per the procedure. 343/- only. Of course, if the M. D. approves the proper method may be introduced in the interest of the Corporation. (5) About the guest registers entry Nos. 160, 161 and 162 there is no irregularities or shortcoming on the part of Sr. Manager because: (i) The entry in the guest register is made as per the procedure. (ii) The amount is collected and kept with the corporation that only because of heavy work load of handling/taking over the charge and with the consent of the guests the said receipts were not issued. If further details are needed Sr. Manager Lothal may be supplied with the authorised copy of the statement of Chowkidhar so as to find out the facts and to satisfy me by the management. (6) It is alleged that Sr. Manager and a Hamal of Lothal were present in H. O. at gandhinagar on 7-5-84 for salary and this duplication could have been avoided. It is shocking and astonishing allegation. Just to make an additional allegation on Sr. Manager carrier because Sr. Manager has taken over charge of Lothal only on 11-5-1984 whereas on 7-5-84 how in advance, before becoming Sr. Manager Lothal, can draw unauthorised salary of the employees of Tourism centre to which any Manager is not officially attached. Any wise person will not take any financial responsibilities because the same authorities can blame the Sr. Manager about his malafide intention of withdrawing the unauthorised money. Moreover, Sr. Manager visited H. O. to beg the Managing Director to release his salary which was held for no reason since last two months. Also to state that inspite of repeatitively requests leave reserve manager Mr. Vyas was moving in different fairs and festivals organised by the Corporation by ignoring the interest of service and career of Sr. Manager by not giving the charge of Lothal. And that was the reason why Sr. Manager has come to H. O. on 7-5-1984. (7) Again it is funniest blame for the claim which is not claimed so far by Sr. Manager for any type of T. A. /d. A. from 8-5-1984 - 11-5-1984. Here also it is submitted that why a poor employee like me who has been deprived of status, deprived of Confirmation and other benefits, deprived of salary for two months, is alleged with absolutely baseless and untenable charges and the claims which is not asked by Sr. Manager for any type of T. A. /d. A. from 8-5-1984 - 11-5-1984. Here also it is submitted that why a poor employee like me who has been deprived of status, deprived of Confirmation and other benefits, deprived of salary for two months, is alleged with absolutely baseless and untenable charges and the claims which is not asked by Sr. Manager. (8) The inspection of Lothal is done by M. D. on 13-5-84 whereas the charge is taken on 11-5-84 by Sr. Manager and subsequently he has observed the holidays approved by the Corporation. Hence for the previous lapses regarding attendance register the details may be asked by the previous managers. (9) No petty cash was given to Sr. Manager while taking over the charge. Hence sr. Manager is not responsible directly or indirectly for the petty cash. Of course, it may be noted that the Manager Lothal Mr. Vyas stated that the bills of petty cash were submitted to H. O. for recoupement purpose. ( 22 ) THE aforesaid contents of the explanation at Annexure G to this petition in the context of the contents of the memo at Annexture F to this petition are self-revealing and need no elucidation or elaboration thereof. They clearly show of what stuff he was made. A bare reading thereof would convince any responsible person that the author of the explanation at Annexure G to this petition knows nothing about what his responsibilities were as the Senior Manager posted at the unit of the respondent at Lotha1. He is not found knowing even ABC of supervisory work. He has to thank the then Managing Director for not having taken any serious view of the matter even after the explanation at Annexure G to this petition. He could have been terminated from service even on the basis of that explanation itself. The authority has not chosen to do so perhaps with a view to giving a further opportunity to the petitioner for improvement in his work. The petitioner appears to have failed to grab that opportunity in that regard. He has to thank himself for the ultimate outcome. ( 23 ) THE material on record leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner was unsuitable for the job. He was admittedly a probationer. His services have rightly been terminated by the respondent. The respondent cannot be faulted in that regard. He has to thank himself for the ultimate outcome. ( 23 ) THE material on record leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner was unsuitable for the job. He was admittedly a probationer. His services have rightly been terminated by the respondent. The respondent cannot be faulted in that regard. ( 24 ) THE reliance on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Nepal Singh vs. State of U. P. and others reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 84 by and on behalf of the petitioner in support of this petition is of no avail to him. In that case there was nothing on record to show how the concerned officer was not straightforward and, in what manner he created problems wherever he want. The most striking feature in that case was that the petitioners conduct of marrying the second wife during the subsistence of his first marriage was seriously viewed. As transpiring from the facts of that case, the petitioner was subjected to the inquiry proceedings in that regard and the inquiry proceedings were dropped for want of jurisdiction and that fact was made the basis for weeding him out as an unwanted element. That appears to have heavily weighed with the Supreme Court as transpiring from para 10 of the reported ruling. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Nepal Singh (supra) is clearly distinguishable on its own facts. ( 25 ) IN the case of Pradyumansinh Indrasinh vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 1982 G. L. H. 603, this Court was concerned with termination of the services of a probationer on the basis of his mere involvement in a criminal case. In that context, this court did not accept the termination order to be valid. The involvement in a criminal case on the part of the concerned employee in that case was the basis of the order of termination. It was not merely a motive therefor. In that context this Court upset the order of termination of the concerned probationer ( 26 ) THE aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Pradymansihh Indrasinh (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. It was not merely a motive therefor. In that context this Court upset the order of termination of the concerned probationer ( 26 ) THE aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Pradymansihh Indrasinh (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The charge-sheet at Annexure K or the memo at Annexure F to the petition is not made the basis of the termination order at annexure A to this petition. It might have furnished merely the motive in that regard. It cannot be regarded as the foundation for the purpose. In my humble opinion, even if the petitioners services were terminated after dropping the inquiry proceeding commencing with the charge-sheet at Annexure A to this petition or after the explanation at Annexure g to this petition in response to the memo at Annexure F to this petition, I am afraid this court might not have branded the order of termination to be penal or punitive in reality. Even at that stage, it transpires from the record, no harsh action was taken against the petitioner though he remained a probationer and an opportunity to improve his performance was given to him by retaining him in service. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Pradyumansinh Indrasinh (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case. ( 27 ) I do not want to burden this judgment of mine by referring to a series of decisions of the Supreme Court making a distinction between the order which is innocuous in nature and the order which is penal or punitive casting stigma on the concerned employee. ( 28 ) IN this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi reported in AIR 1976 supreme Court 2547. In that case, the concerned official was appointed as a temporary clerk in a canal division in 1954. Seven years later be was to appear in a departmental examination and there it was found that another clerk of another canal division was attempting to impersonate and to appear for the former. The Executive Engineer detected it and obtained the explanation of both the clerks and reported the matter to the superintending Engineer. Seven years later be was to appear in a departmental examination and there it was found that another clerk of another canal division was attempting to impersonate and to appear for the former. The Executive Engineer detected it and obtained the explanation of both the clerks and reported the matter to the superintending Engineer. Finding the explanation tendered by the clerks to be unsatisfactory, the Superintending Engineer brought the matter to the notice of the Chief engineer. The latter asked him to award suitable punishment to both the clerks. The superintending Engineer thereafter issued the orders terminating the services of both the clerks. Eventually, the concerned clerk who was supposed to appear at the departmental examination filed a suit challenging the order of termination of his services as having been made by way of punishment in disregard of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The suit was dismissed. The dismissal was maintained by the first appellate court. The high Court however allowed the second appeal filed by the concerned employee and decreed his suit. The State went to the Apex Court in such a situation. The Apex Court, after reviewing all the previous decisions, has held:"keeping in view the principles extracted above, the respondents suit could not be decreed in his favour. He was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. It is also not denied, that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one months notice. The order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. " ( 29 ) THE aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra trivedi (supra) clinches the issue against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent. It is on all fours applicable in the present case. The order of termination at Annexure A to this petition is quite innocuous. It casts no stigma on him. It is not based on any misconduct on his part. It is on all fours applicable in the present case. The order of termination at Annexure A to this petition is quite innocuous. It casts no stigma on him. It is not based on any misconduct on his part. He is simply found unsuitable for the job and his services have come to be terminated. In that view of the matter, the challenge to the impugned order of termination at Annexure A to this petition cannot be upset. ( 30 ) A reference also deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission and others vs. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1242. In that case the services of a probationer were terminated by an order of termination simpliciter even after the inquiry proceedings were initiated against him after issuing a charge-sheet for his negligence and carelessness in work. The inquiry proceedings were later on dropped. The motive behind the order of termination simpliciter was shown to be misconduct, negligence and inefficiency on the part of the employee. Even in that fact-situation, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the termination order in question. It has been held in that case :"where the short history of the service of the probationer appointed in a temporary post clearly showed that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service and that was why even though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him and in these circumstances, if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the probationer it could not be said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of article 311, when the appointing authority had the right to terminate the service without assigning any reasons. In such a case even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency might be the motive or the inducing factor which influenced the employer to terminate the services of the employee a power which the employer undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the employee such a power flowed from the contract of service, termination of service could not be termed as penalty or punishment. Further adverse remarks in the assessment roll and recommendation therein to extend the probationary period could not be said to indicate that the intention of the appointing authority was to proceed against the employee by way of punishment. "the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Md. S. Iskander ali (supra) is on all fours applicable in the present case. The charge-sheet at Annexure K to this petition was not pursued further. The inquiry proceedings appear to have been dropped. The memo at Annexure F to this petition was also not viewed very seriously for the purpose of taking any disciplinary action against the petitioner. Clause 1 of the appointment order at Annexure Q to this petition empowered the appointing authority to terminate the petitioners services without assigning any reasons. The petitioner was on probation at the time his services came to be terminated by the impugned order at annexure A to this petition. The motive behind his termination from services was his unsuitability for the job. The termination order at Annexure A to this petition is found to be innocuous and not casting any stigma on the petitioner. It is not found to be penal or punitive in character or in reality. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Md. 5. Iskander All (supra), the termination order at Annexure A to this petition has to be upheld. ( 31 ) SHRI Padiwal for the petitioner has then urged that the termination order at annexure A to this petition is a non-speaking order and, in view of the ruling of this Court in the ase of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa vs. Tourism Corporation of Gujarat Limited and others reported in 1991 (1) G. L. H. 383, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is true that the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa (supra) does assist the petitioner in this case. It may however be mentioned that in that case perhaps the termination was not found justifiably done. The Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Anopsinh Jatubha vs. V. K. Gupta, Distt. It is true that the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa (supra) does assist the petitioner in this case. It may however be mentioned that in that case perhaps the termination was not found justifiably done. The Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Anopsinh Jatubha vs. V. K. Gupta, Distt. Superintendent of Police, Jamnagar and others reported in 1986 G. L. H. 136 relied on by this Court in the aforesaid ruling in the case of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa (supra) has clearly held that it would be open to the employer to justify the termination order in its reply in response to an objection challenging its validity inter alia on the ground that it contains no reasons. This position has been explained by my learned Brother (S. D. Shah, J.) in his ruling in the case of dilipsinhji D. Rathod vs. Vijaysinh Parmar reported in 1991 (2) 32 G. L. R. 1307. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of (Miss) Chaula Kuruwa (supra) will not come to the rescue of the petitioner in the present case. ( 32 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of he opinion that the impugned order of termination at Annexure A to this petition is quite legal and valid and calls for no interference by this Court in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 33 ) IN the result, this petition fails. It is hereby rejected however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. .