Judgment G.C.Bharuka, J. 1. This reference is under Sec. 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter the Act only) for confirmation of the decree of nullity of marriage dated 18-2-1991 made by the 2nd Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Matrimonial Title Suit No. 36 of 1987. The aforesaid Title Suit had been filed by Walter Ekka (petitioner) inter alia, praying therein that his marriage with Jyoti Ekka (Opposite party) may be declared as null and void. The Opposite party (wife) in spite of service of notice on her as also publication of the same is local newspaper has not opted to contest the proceeding either in the trial court or before this Court. 2. I may first record the relevant facts pleaded by the petitioner for seeking the intended relief. The petitioner and the Opposite party both of whom are of Roman Catholic faith got married on 5th June, 1985, in Roman Catholic Church, Doranda. After marriage on 5th June, 1985, though the Opposite party came to the residence of the petitioner but showed a complete indifference towards the petitioner and only after 5 days she went back to her parents house. When the petitioner, his mother and other family members went to her mother"s house for persuading her to come back they were insulted and humiliated by use of abusive language. Subsequently on great persuation, on the 15th June, 1985, she came to Mander with the petitioner and stayed for about 15 days; but even during this period she acted with cruelty in wilfully refusing to have sexual intercourse and bear children causing injuries of mental and physical health to the petitioner. She adopted abnormal behaviour. On the 2nd July, 1985, she went back to her mothers house and thereafter, in spite of efforts and persuation she has filed to come back and reside with the petitioner. The petitioner sought for a decree of nullity of marriage on two grounds, namely, (i) for some customary infirmities in solemnisation of marriage the same itself is invalid and illegal and (ii) the Opposite party was guilty of cruelty and desertion. 3. To substantiate the aforesaid grounds the petitioner had examined four witnesses including himself as PW 1, Bhushan Khalkho (PW 2) Francis Kharwa (PW 3) and Emanual Joseph Ekka (PW 4). Some documents were also proved as Ext. 3. To substantiate the aforesaid grounds the petitioner had examined four witnesses including himself as PW 1, Bhushan Khalkho (PW 2) Francis Kharwa (PW 3) and Emanual Joseph Ekka (PW 4). Some documents were also proved as Ext. I which is a photo copy of letter dated 1-11-1987 written by the petitioner. Ext. 1/1 which is a photo copy of letter dated 11-9-1987 written by the petitioner, Ext. 2, which is a photo copy of letter dated 16-5-1987 written by ED Barwa and Ext. 3, which is certificate of marriage. 4. The Trial Court on appreciation of the facts of this case though has held that the marriage between the parties was legal and valid but pronounced a decree for dissolving the marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion. 5. Mr. P.S. Dayal learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has taken us to the various provisions of the Act and has made desperate attempts to persuade us to confirm the decree of dissolution of marriage. His submission is that even if Sec. 10 of the Act ex facie does not confer any right on the husband to present an application for the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty or desertion still keeping in view the social justice, prevailing judicial older and trend of legislation in relation to laws of divorce in other branches of personal laws, the Court should make all endeavours to read such ground in Sec. 10 of the Act, which is age old legislation made to meet the social requirements of those times. Sec. 10 of the Act reads as under: 10. When husband may petition for dissolution.--Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof been guilty of adultery. A reading of the aforesaid provision unambiguously postulates only one ground on which a husband can seek dissolution of marriage and that is that his wife has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of adultery. In the present case admittedly this is not the ground alleged against the wife Opposite party. Therefore, the petitioner, on a bare reading of the said provision, is not entitled to a decree as passed in his favour. 6. So far as the submission advanced by Mr. In the present case admittedly this is not the ground alleged against the wife Opposite party. Therefore, the petitioner, on a bare reading of the said provision, is not entitled to a decree as passed in his favour. 6. So far as the submission advanced by Mr. Dayal are concerned, I may first usefully refer to the decision in the case of Reynold Rajamani and Anr. V/s. Union of India and Anr. -- , which was also a case under Sec. 10 of the Act wherein dissolution of marriage was sought on the ground of mutual consent. But the prayer was refused since mutual consent was not one of the grounds enumerated under Sec. 10 of the Act for seeking dissolution. Their Lordships have held that: In our opinion, when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted they constitute the only conditions on which the Court has jurisdiction to grant divorce. If grounds need to be added to those already specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the Legislature and not of the Courts. It is another matter that in construing the language in which the grounds are incorporated the courts should give a liberal construction to it. 7. Notwithstanding the aforesaid enunciation of law based on a settled cannot of interpretation of statutes and the limitation of judicial capacity, the Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of this Act, in the case of Ms. Jorden Diengdeh V/s. S.S. Chopra -- , has expressed a concern to the problems of the couples governed by these statutory provisions and has expected from the Legislature to come forward with appropriate amendment to undo the hardship. It has been held by thier Lordships that: The real problem now is that the marriage appears to have broken down irretrievably. Yet if the findings of the High Court stand, is no way out for the couple, they will continue to be tied to each other since neither mutual consent nor irretrievable break-down of marriage is a ground for divorce, under the Indian Divorce Act. Sec. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act prescribes the grounds on which a husband or wife may petition for dissolution of marriage. The ground on which a husband may obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage is the adultery of the wife. Sec. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act prescribes the grounds on which a husband or wife may petition for dissolution of marriage. The ground on which a husband may obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage is the adultery of the wife. In this case their Lordships after referring to various corresponding provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act, 1954, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, and the Mohammedan Law, have been pleased to observe that "it is thus seen that the law relating to judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far from uniform. Surely the time has now come for a complete reform of the law of marriage and make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste. It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. The case before us is an illustration of a case where the parties are bound together by a marital tie which is better untied. There is no point of purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of the Legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situations in which the couples like the present have found themselves. We direct that a copy of this order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to take. 8 Though I share the view expressed by Mr. Dayal for making of effective provisions to give relief to a husband like the petitioner, who is in constant mental torture at the instance of or because of the behaviour of deterrent and uncompromising wife, but as held by the Supreme Court, I, in my judicial capacity, am unable to provide any remedy and the lead has to be taken by the Legislature. Despite my all sympathy towards the petitioner. I find myself unable to confirm the decree of dissolution as passed by the trial Court. 9. S.K. Chottopadhayaya, J. I agree. 10. Narayan Roy, J. I agree.