JUDGMENT Sengupta, J. : This appeal is directed against the order dated 11th August, 1993 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on a writ petition filed by the respondent, Birendra Kumar Saha, an officer of the Indian Police Service, holding the rank of Director General (Prosecution), restraining the appellant from giving any effect to or further effect to or taking step or further step in terms of or pursuant to or in furtherence of the order, summons being annexures 'C' and 'D' to the writ petition and/ or from compelling the writ petitioner/respondent to make statement in any manner whatsoever against the writ petitioner/respondent's free will and volition till the disposal of the writ petition. 2. The antecedent facts, shortly stated, are that the Deputy Secretary, Home (P & A R), Government of West Bengal, issued a Memo dated 7th July, 1993 requesting Mr. Saha, the writ petitioner, who holds the rank of Director General (Prosecution) to see Mr. Ajoy Kumar Chakraborty, Deputy Superintendent of Police (I) Anti Corruption Bureau, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, on 16th August, 1993 at 12-00 hours at Vikash Bhawan, Bidhan Nagar. Therein, Mr. Saha was further asked to give a statement in writing' in clarification of the matter/ manner of acquisition of the assets owned by him, his wife and his dependants under his dated signature'. A further requirement of the said Memo was that Mr. Saha was to prepare with 'all documents as mentioned in the enclosed sheet'. The list of documents as mentioned in the said Memo appearing as annexure thereto referred to the documents classified under 20 different heads, of which items 19 and 20 were as follows :– "19. Paper-documents relating to consumption of cooking gas, milk etc. 20. Any other documents which will be required at the time of giving clarification on the points raised to Mr. B. K. Saha, I. P. S." 3. The instant Memo of 7th July, 1993 was issued by the Deputy Secretary, Home (P & A R), as a sequel to a Memo dated 30th June, 1993 issued by the Deputy I. G. Police, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, addressed to the secretary (Home), P & A R Department, Government of West Bengal. The said Memo dated 30th June, 1993, the originating source of the action against Mr. The said Memo dated 30th June, 1993, the originating source of the action against Mr. Saha, indicates as the subject of the Memo 'Open investigation with regard to allegation against Mr. B. K. Saha, I.P.S'. So, what followed the issuance of the Memo dated 30th June, 93 was the goings-on of an open investigation into the allegation against Mr. Saha. The recital part of the said Memo of 30th June, 1993, discloses that 'on receipt of certain allegations' the Anti Corruption Bureau, Vigilance Commission, made a confidential investigation and on perusal of the report of the investigation, 'the Vigilance Commission is of the opinion that there is a prima facie case for further investigation by way of examination of the public servant and it is, accordingly, ordered that there could be a further open investigation into the conduct of the public servant'. The said Memo dated 30th June, 1993 contained further requirement that Mr. Saha may be requested to see Mr. Ajoy Kumar Chakraborty, Deputy Superintendent of Police, on 16th August, 1993 at 12-00 hours 'for examination'. It transpires that the starting point is the Memo dated 30th June, 1993 and it was issued 'under the order of the Vigilance Commissioner' upon perusal of the preliminary confidential report and, accordingly, the letter of Home (P&AR) Department of 7th July, 1993 issued asking the writ petitioner, Mr. Saha, to see the said Deputy Superintendent of Police (I). Mr. Chakraborty, of the Vigilance Commission, and to disclose the source of income with which the assets were acquired by him and his family members. The action was, thus, heralded by a confidential inquiry and the Deputy Secretary, Home (P&AR) issued the direction to the petitioner by the Memo dated 7th July, 1993 only at the behest of the Vigilance Commissioner. 4. The learned Trial Judge passed an interim order granting injunction restraining the appellants and each of them, their servants and/or agents from giving any effect to or further effect to or taking any or further steps in terms of or pursuant to or in any furtherance of the said two memoranda and/or from compelling the writ petitioner/respondent to make statements in any manner whatsoever against the writ petitioner against his free will and volition till the disposal of the writ petition. Against the said order of injunction the present appeal and in connection therewith an application for stay of operation of the said order of injunction passed by the Trial Judge has been filed. 5. At the very outset, we must observe that although the present appeal is directed against the ad-interim order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge, the learned Counsel appearing for the parties have made elaborate arguments on the maintainability of the writ petition as well as on the factual and legal issues raised in the writ petition. 6. The precise point of challenge in the present writ application is the power and authority of the West Bengal Vigilance Commission is so far as the said Commission purports to entertain allegation, to hold an open enquiry from its own opinion with the ultimate purpose of embarking upon a further open investigation into the conduct of the public servant requiring him to appear personally and fare 'examination' by an Officer who is 7th stage lower in rank than the public servant concerned, regardless of the fact that the said public servant is a member of the Indian Police Service. 7. Before the learned Trial Judge, the public servant, the writ petitioner, Mr. Saha, challenged the said two memoranda, inter alia, on the ground that no investigation and/or enquiry could be undertaken by the Police in the absence of FIR or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 8. The status of the Vigilance Commission itself is in challenge in the writ petition. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that the Government of West Bengal by a resolution No. 221-GAC dated 4th March, 1965, decided to set up a Vigilance Commission with certain powers as enumerated therein. The said resolution of 4th March, 1965 clearly shows that the Vigilance Commission was just a creature of an executive order of the State Government. Nonetheless, the said executive order purports to govern the members of the All India Services serving in connection with the affairs of the State Government and to make them amenable to the authority of the said Commission. Nonetheless, the said executive order purports to govern the members of the All India Services serving in connection with the affairs of the State Government and to make them amenable to the authority of the said Commission. This intention is manifest in paragraph 4 of the said Memo dated 4th March, 1966 reading :– "The Vigilance Commission will, for the present, be attached to the Home Department but in the exercise of its powers and functions it will not be subordinate to any department and will have the same measure of independence and autonomy as the Public Service Commission". 9. Thus, an executive order of the State Government clothed the West Bengal Vigilance Commission with the executive authority to hold an open investigation into the conduct of a public servant of the All India Services necessarily including a member of the Indian Police Service as in this case without, however, resort to the framing of any charge sheet which is an imperative pre-requisite of an open investigation. The writ petitioner in his petition seeks to strike at the very fundamental question of locus standi of the Vigilance Commission to hold an open investigation against him, more so, when disciplinary proceeding has not been at all initiated. The authority so conferred on the Commission is assailed as extra-constitutional authority, availing to a purely domestic organ of the executive authority of the State Government not depriving any power from any statutory or constitutional source. According to the writ petitioner, this Commission cannot purport to be a Disciplinary Authority for the members of the All India Services including the Indian Police Service. The writ petitioner's case is that the Vigilance Commission cannot derive any autonomy or independence merely by virtue of an executive order of the State Government. Such autonomy or independence can be derived by it only from the statutory or constitutional source and not from executive circulars. It must be a creature either of statute or of the Constitution itself. It was further contended by the writ petitioner that the rights and privileges of a member of Indian Police Service which are regulated and controlled by various laws and rules thereunder could not be overridden by the extraneous extra-constitutional and self-styled authority. It must be a creature either of statute or of the Constitution itself. It was further contended by the writ petitioner that the rights and privileges of a member of Indian Police Service which are regulated and controlled by various laws and rules thereunder could not be overridden by the extraneous extra-constitutional and self-styled authority. The final thrust of the writ petition was that there could be no commencement of a valid proceeding initiated by the Commission and the petitioner could not be directed by the said authority to appear before a Deputy Superintendent of Police who has no jurisdiction as regards the writ petitioner. The Memo dated 7th July, 1993 is, therefore, non-est for lack of inherent jurisdiction and competence. Unless a lawful proceeding commences against the writ petitioner, the writ petitioner can neither be directed to appear nor to disclose the records and documents pertaining to assets and expenditure of himself and his wife and other members of his family. 10. The writ petition further alleged that the entire proceeding against the writ petitioner was tendentious, mala fide contrived for sidelining the writ petitioner from the promotion as Director General and Inspector General of Police, with effect from 1st October, 1993. The timing of the proceeding, viz. on the verge of the consideration of the writ petitioner's case, for the said promotion gives out the ulterior purpose of the entire exercise. There are also other pointers to the fact that malice played the major role in the action that has been initiated against the writ petitioner. The interested authorities of the State Government saw to it that the fact of the proceeding for an open investigation having been initiated against the writ petitioner gets widest possible publicity so as to tarnish the image of the writ petitioner in public eye and to create a general prejudice against the writ petitioner, a prominent public official in the State. It became a flash news item arousing great public excitement. It was calculated to vitiate the judicial atmosphere by surcharging the public with mistrust against the writ petitioner. 11. The entire course of action taken by the Vigilance Commission was meticulously planned to contrive a situation where the writ petitioner/respondent may be left out of consideration for appointment as Director General and Inspector General of Police. 12. It was calculated to vitiate the judicial atmosphere by surcharging the public with mistrust against the writ petitioner. 11. The entire course of action taken by the Vigilance Commission was meticulously planned to contrive a situation where the writ petitioner/respondent may be left out of consideration for appointment as Director General and Inspector General of Police. 12. The first contention of the Learned Counsel of the appellants is that the Central Administrative Tribunal has and this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Secondly, the two memoranda impugned in the writ petition were issued in lawful exercise of power by the Vigilance Commission which is competent to hold preliminary enquiry as the State Government has power to initiate formal disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. Thirdly, the allegation of the writ petitioner/opposite party's protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution has been infringed is not correct. Lastly, the action was defended as absolutely bona fide action free from all malice. 13. On each of the four limbs of the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, we have been addressed at length. We hereinafter sum up the submissions limb by limb and examine the validity of the propositions on which it is founded. On the question of jurisdiction, it is the contention of the appellants that by reason of Sections 14 and 28 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1985) jurisdiction of this Court is barred. According to the appellants, the dispute here pertains to service matters within the meaning of the said expression under Section 3(q) of the said Act. Now under Section 14(1) (b) ibid all service matters relating to members of All India Services shall lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. This necessarily means the complete ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance was placed in that connection in (1) Union of India v. Paramanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 . In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Tribunal is the substitution for the Civil Court awl High Court including writ jurisdiction. This necessarily means the complete ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance was placed in that connection in (1) Union of India v. Paramanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 . In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Tribunal is the substitution for the Civil Court awl High Court including writ jurisdiction. The Court observed in paragraph 18 as follows :– "From an analysis of Sections 14, 15, 16, 27, 28 and 29, it becomes apparent that in the case of proceedings transferred to the Tribunal from a Civil Court or High Court, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise all the powers which the Civil Court could in a suit or the High Court in a writ proceeding could have respectively exercised. In an original proceeding instituted before the Tribunal under Section 19, the Tribunal can exercise any of the powers of a Civil Court or High Court. The Tribunal thus could exercise only such powers which the Civil Court or the High Court could have exercised by way of judicial review. It is neither less nor more. Because, the Tribunal is just a substitute to the Civil Court and the High Court. That has been put beyond the pale of controversy by this Court while upholding constitutional validity of the Act, in (2) S. P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India, 1987(1) SCC 124 : AIR 1987 SC 386 ." Therefore, the writ petition in the instant case was not entertainable by this Court, according to the appellants. 14. According to the learned Counsel, the matter involved in the case being disciplinary matter shall necessarily be embraced by Clause (iv), alternatively the matter may fall under Clause (v) Section 3(q) of the Act, classifiable as a residuary matter answering the description 'any other matter whatsoever'. 15. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the expression 'any other matter whatsoever' in Clause (v) is a residuary clause and has a very wide expanse and has to be read in a comprehensive manner to cover any matter relating to conditions of service not falling under the preceding clauses. Thus, the cause of action in the writ petition shall find place within the score of the definition of the expression Service matters' in Clause 3(q). Therefore, the matter was only entertainable by the Tribunal as a matter pertaining to 'Conditions of Service'. Thus, the cause of action in the writ petition shall find place within the score of the definition of the expression Service matters' in Clause 3(q). Therefore, the matter was only entertainable by the Tribunal as a matter pertaining to 'Conditions of Service'. The High Court has become functus officio since the commencement of the said Act of 1985. 16. It has been further pointed out that Article 309 of the Constitution does not define 'conditions of service' nor there is any guidance available from Section 3 of the All India Services Act as to the meaning of the said expression. It is only Section 3(q) which is the authoritative definition of the words 'conditions of service'. It is further stressed that Article 309 is not conceived to be self-contained and it contemplates further enactment by the appropriate legislature and the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is such a 'further law'. According to the appellant, the present dispute would be covered by the expression 'any other matter' within the meaning of Section 3(q)(v). In this connection, reference is also made to Article 323A(1). It is submitted that Article 232A does not interpret what the terms 'conditions of service' of persons appointed to public services shall mean. It merely permits Parliament to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of such persons. Thus, by process of elimination the definition in Section 3(q) of the said Act of 1985 is the only authoritative definition and has the statutory sanction. 17. These aspects of the law are highlighted by the appellants' Counsel only to bring home the ouster of the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the appellants' contention that the writ petition should not have been at all entertained as no writ in law can lie in this matter as the dispute is not triable by this Court. Attention was drawn to two questions of fact said to have arisen in this regard. The respondent writ petitioner claims that his chances of promotion have been sought to be pre-empted by various unauthorised or illegal acts of the appellant. Now the appellants' submission is that the injury to chances of promotion complained of, shall fall within the conditions of service being a matter pertaining to 'any other matter whatsoever' and would thus attract Section 3( q) (v). Now the appellants' submission is that the injury to chances of promotion complained of, shall fall within the conditions of service being a matter pertaining to 'any other matter whatsoever' and would thus attract Section 3( q) (v). The other aspect brought to light in the submission is that the respondent/writ petitioner's posting as Director General and Inspector General of Police does not constitute any promotion as the posting is merely a matter of transfer by selection. At present, the writ petitioner is the incumbent of the post of Director General. The prospect of his being posted as Director General and Inspector General of Police would not have meant any higher scale of pay. The only benefit that could accrue to him from the posting he pines for, would have been the grant of a charge allowance of Rs. 250/-. Therefore, it cannot be said that disciplinary action has been initiated against the writ petitioner when the promotional opportunity was knocking at his door. Even if the posting is considered to be career advancement that would be a matter of dispute attracting Section 3( q) (i) for decision by the Central Administrative Tribunal as a dispute concerning transfer. 18. The further contention of the appellant is that one of the letters marked as Annexure 'C' which is the bone of contention in the writ petition intends the holding of merely a preliminary or fact finding enquiry. Citing Rule 2 (iii) (i) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 and Rule 2(a) (iii) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, learned Counsel contends that for the petitioner, a member of the Indian Police Service, serving in connection with the affairs of State Government of West Bengal, the Disciplinary Authority shall be the Government of West Bengal. The expression 'Government' shall necessarily refer to the State Government. Reference is also made to Rule 7(1) (b) (i) of A I S (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969, which provides that the authority to institute disciplinary proceeding and to impose penalty in the present situation is the State Government as the writ petitioner/respondent is serving in connection with the affairs of the State Government. The said rule says who the Disciplinary Authority shall be when a member of the All India Services has committed any act or omission which renders him liable to penalty. 19. The said rule says who the Disciplinary Authority shall be when a member of the All India Services has committed any act or omission which renders him liable to penalty. 19. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the appellants has cited the decision in (3) D. S. Garewal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 512 . There the Supreme Court held that the State Government can be the Disciplinary Authority for a member of the All India Services if he serves in connection with the affairs of the State Government. The observations in paragraph 9 were particularly referred to. There the Supreme Court observed as follows :– "The last contention is that the Punjab Government has no authority to institute these proceedings under the Rules. It would be necessary in this connection to refer to the Rules. Rule 3 provides for penalties, which are seven in number. Rule 4 provides for the authorities, who can impose the penalties, and three of the penalties, namely, dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, can only be imposed by the Central Government, while the other four penalties can be imposed by the State Government. Rule 5 provides the procedure for imposing penalties. The argument is that as in this case the charge against the appellant is serious, he is likely to be dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, and therefore, the Central Government should have instituted enquiry in this case. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. In the first place, it cannot be postulated at the very outset of the enquiry whether there would be any punishment at all, and even if there is going to be punishment, what particular punishment out of the seven mentioned in R. 3 would be imposed. Therefore, even on the assumption that the Government which has to impose the punishment must also institute the enquiry, it cannot be said at this stage that the Punjab Government which can impose at least four out of seven penalties is not the proper Government to institute the inquiry. In the second place, a perusal of R. 5 shows that the intention is that the enquiry would be instituted by the Government under which the officer is serving even in cases where the penalty is to be imposed by the Central Government. In the second place, a perusal of R. 5 shows that the intention is that the enquiry would be instituted by the Government under which the officer is serving even in cases where the penalty is to be imposed by the Central Government. Rule 4(2) shows that so far as the four penalties which could be imposed by the State Government are concerned, the institution of the enquiry is by the Government under whom such officer was serving at the time of commission of such act or omission which renders him liable to punishment. Rule 2(b) defines 'Government' and the third clause thereof lays down that in the case of a member of service serving in connection with the affairs of a State, the Government would be the Government of that State." 20. The learned Counsel mentions that there will be some element of peri petitio, begging the question, if the reading of Rule 7 is not preceded by the reading of Rules 8, 9 & 10 because the latter rules prescribe the manner how to find whether such act of commission or omission has been done by the delinquent. It is only after such finding that Rule 7 shall step into the arena. The logical anomaly in Rule 7 can be saved only by interpreting that Rule 7 postulates a disciplinary enquiry to be made into the charges against the officer when alleged to be errant. That action shall as a logical corollary require a preliminary fact-finding enquiry. It is only upon having found a prima facie case of delinquency that the disciplinary enquiry can be instituted. Therefore, the State Government, according to the learned Counsel, cannot be barred from holding a preliminary enquiry when an occasion for apprehension of any mis-conduct on the part of a Government servant presents itself. Such power to hold preliminary enquiry by the State Government is judicially recognised in T. S. Garewal v. State of Punjab (Supra). 21. The learned Counsel next submits that the enquiry that presently the West Bengal Vigilance Commission has undertaken is not a disciplinary enquiry but a fact-finding enquiry preliminary to a disciplinary enquiry to be or not to be instituted. The purpose of the present exercise is merely to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case for embarking upon a disciplinary action against the writ petitioner, a Government servant, belonging to Indian Police Service. The purpose of the present exercise is merely to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case for embarking upon a disciplinary action against the writ petitioner, a Government servant, belonging to Indian Police Service. The formation of a prima facie opinion is essential as a pre-requisite for formal enquiry in the manner prescribed by Rules 8, 9 & 10 of AIS (Discipline & Appeal) Rules. In fact, Rule 8(2) requires the formation of an opinion as regards prima facie grounds for a disciplinary enquiry. The learned Counsel adverted to the precise words of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 which reads as follows :– "Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of mis-conduct or mis-behaviour against a member of the service, it may appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servant (Enquiries) Act, 1850 as the case may be, an authority to enquire into the truth thereof." 22. The learned Counsel, in the first instance, seeks to impress on us that the present enquiry not being any formal enquiry but only enquiries essential for adjudging the necessity of a disciplinary enquiry as a preliminary step would, at the worst, fall under Clause (iv) of Section 3(q) of the said Act of 1985 being a matter pertaining to disciplinary matter itself. But, if it is considered that preliminary enquiries as to the conduct of any officer for the purpose of forming prima facie opinion against the officer or dispelling any shadow cast on the officer could not be any part of disciplinary matter, in that case, the dispute would attract clause (v) as 'any other matter whatsoever'. 23. According to the learned counsel, such preliminary enquiry should also form part of the disciplinary proceeding because a preliminary internal enquiry commonly proceeds the disciplinary enquiry. The judiciary is also aware of this practice and has also approved such course. In that connection, reference was made to the decision in (4) Champaklal v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 . The following passage was adverted to '........ .even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment, what usually happens is that something in the nature of what may be called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work. The following passage was adverted to '........ .even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment, what usually happens is that something in the nature of what may be called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work. In this preliminary enquiry the explanation of the Government servant may be taken and documentary and even oral evidence may be considered. It is usually when such a preliminary enquiry makes out a prima facie case against the servant concerned that charges are then framed against him and he is asked to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him. An enquiry officer (who may be himself in the case where the appointing authority is other than the Government) is appointed who holds enquiry into the charges communicated to the servant concerned after taking his explanation and his enquiry is held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This is what is known as a formal departmental enquiry into the conduct of a public servant............". 24. So, the learned Counsel submits that here also the impugned letters do no more than initiate a non-formal preliminary enquiry to eliminate the risk of groundless institution of formal enquiry. He also cites the following observations of the Supreme Court from Champaklal (Supra) quoted in a more recent decision in (5) Ravindra Kumar v. U. P. State Handloom Corporation AIR 1987 SC 2408 which also acknowledges and approves of the prevailing practice of holding a non-formal enquiry precedent to formal enquiry :– "Generally, therefore, a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. Even where Government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct, a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy Government that there is reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee or to revert him to his substantive post, for as we have said already, Government does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore, when a preliminary enquiry of the nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a Government Servant holding a higher rank temporarily it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry (which generally follows such a preliminary enquiry) when the Government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the major three punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the Government Servant. Therefore, so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of this being governed by Article 311(2), for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of Government to decide whether punitive action under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary Government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. In short, a preliminary enquiry is for purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a Government servant in which he mayor may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte, for it is merely fur the satisfaction of Government, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry". 25. Thus the learned Counsel defends the action of the Vigilance Commissioner as an innocent well-meaning preliminary enquiry to relieve the respondent/writ petitioner of the cloud of suspicion and the odium of formal disciplinary action. 26. Much stress has been laid on the comprehensiveness of the expression 'any other matter whatsoever'. According to the learned Counsel, the words are so wide and impossible of delimitation that anything connected with the services of a Government servant would fan within its ambit. Therefore the subject matter of the writ petition is triable only by the Tribunal which subrogates all the powers of this court. 27. About the status of the Vigilance Commission and its locus standi in issuing the letter of 30th June, 1993, it is submitted that it is merely a communication to the State Government and the writ petitioner cannot be said to have been directly affected by it. 27. About the status of the Vigilance Commission and its locus standi in issuing the letter of 30th June, 1993, it is submitted that it is merely a communication to the State Government and the writ petitioner cannot be said to have been directly affected by it. The State Government was, according to the appellant, free to turn down the request contained in the letter. The Vigilance Commission has been created by the State Government in exercise of its executive power. Therefore, the Vigilance Commission wrote to the Secretary, Home Department, West Bengal, by way of assistance in the matter which is exclusively an internal affair of the State Government. The question of statutory power of the Vigilance Commission has been contended as extraneous and irrelevant. 28. The contention of the writ petitioner/opposite party that Vigilance Commission has no status has been contested by citing the decision of (6) Sunil Kumar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1980 SC 1170 where the Supreme Court has observed :– “....................... We think that if the disciplinary Authority arrived at its own conclusion on the material available to it, its findings and decision cannot be said to be tainted with any illegality merely because the Disciplinary Authority consulted the Vigilance Commissioner and obtained his views on the very same material". 29. The letter dated 7th July, 1993 which the Home Department wrote to the writ petitioner is defended as the first step towards a preliminary enquiry and is entirely informal. These letters have been issued with the benevolent object of eliminating the risk of any groundless institution of a disciplinary proceeding. If the officer himself abstains from co-operating in such preliminary enquiry for the purposes of collecting material facts to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken, he runs the risk of walking into a disciplinary proceeding initiated ex parte. In fact, in such preliminary domestic enquiry the Disciplinary Authority need not involve the Officer. It is only in the Government servant's own interest and for his protection against indiscreet and indiscriminate institution of disciplinary action that explanation is taken from the officer though no law requires such enquiry. 30. In fact, in such preliminary domestic enquiry the Disciplinary Authority need not involve the Officer. It is only in the Government servant's own interest and for his protection against indiscreet and indiscriminate institution of disciplinary action that explanation is taken from the officer though no law requires such enquiry. 30. In order to justify the requirements of the letters reference was made to the decision in (7) Amulya Ratan v. Deputy C. M. Engineer, reported in AIR 1961 Cal 40 wherein occurs the following passage :– "The position with regard to a "fact-finding enquiry' is as follows : Before making a charge, the authorities are entitled to have a preliminary investigation or a 'fact-finding enquiry'. This is not formal enquiry at all, and in such an enquiry, if it can be called an enquiry at all, no rules are observed. There can be an ex parte examination or investigation and ex parte reports. All this is to enable the authorities to apprise themselves of the real facts and to decide whether an employee should be charge sheeted. But, the departmental enquiry starts from the charge-sheet. The charge-sheet must be specific and must set out all the necessary particulars. It is no excuse to say that regard being had to the previous proceedings, the delinquent should be taken to have known an about the charges. Whether, he knew it or not he must again be told of the charges to which he is called upon to show cause and these charges must be specific and all particulars must be stated, without which, a man cannot defend himself." 31. According to the appellants, the said letters are absolutely unexceptionable. The procedure adopted is vindicated by the decisions of the Supreme Court already cited, namely Champaklal v. Union of India (Supra), in paragraphs 11 & 12 whereof this practice of pre-charge-sheet enquiry received approval by the Supreme Court. This process of giving the officer an opportunity to explain before the disciplinary action is embarked upon round approval in yet another decision in Ravindra Kumar v. U. P. State Handloom Corpn. (Supra). Therefore, no fault could be found with the action of the Home Deptt. This process of giving the officer an opportunity to explain before the disciplinary action is embarked upon round approval in yet another decision in Ravindra Kumar v. U. P. State Handloom Corpn. (Supra). Therefore, no fault could be found with the action of the Home Deptt. in requiring the writ petitioner/opposite party to appear before the officer investigating the case so as to give him an opportunity to explain and if it is found that the officer has successfully explained there will be further proceeding to the relief of both parties. Reference was also made to a decision of this Court in Amulya Ratan v. Deputy C. M. Engineer (Supra), where this Court held that the preliminary investigation or fact-finding enquiry requires no rules to be observed. It is merely a very necessary exercise to enable the authorities to be apprised of the truth of the primary imputations at its very origin and such preliminary investigation or fact-finding enquiry needs no rules to be observed. 32. It is also the contention that the writ petitioner cannot claim any right of protection against revelations in such a preliminary enquiry. It is precisely the reason why Article 311 of the Constitution of India sets forth no embargo nor any procedural method nor any other is found in statutes or rules framed thereunder. The writ petitioner cannot fetter the rights of the Government appropriate to function as the Disciplinary Authority to make its own prior enquiries and maintain vigilance as to the rectitude of the conduct of the public servants. An officer of the Anti Corruption Bureau may investigate into the allegations. There is no question of natural justice also at this stage. It is merely a stage where the appropriate Government does not propose to adopt any disciplinary action but merely seeks to keep itself enlightened about the conduct of a public servant serving in connection with its affairs. The enquiry can as well be held ex parte. The State Government cannot be said to have stepped into a pitfall by merely seeking to associate the respondent-petitioner in such preliminary domestic enquiry. This enquiry here has been confused with the regular departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceeding. The enquiry can as well be held ex parte. The State Government cannot be said to have stepped into a pitfall by merely seeking to associate the respondent-petitioner in such preliminary domestic enquiry. This enquiry here has been confused with the regular departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceeding. In any case, at this stage, the writ petitioner has no right to object to the manner how the State Government should come to an opinion about wrongful omission or the commission or otherwise of any erring act by a public officer. The purpose of the letters were stated to be obtaining explanation from the respondent/petitioner. There is nothing wrong if such explanation is recorded by an officer junior to the respondent/petitioner. Juniority or seniority of the person before whom the petitioner has to do the explaning is pleaded to be of no effect and materiality. In any case, the explanation as recorded would be finally considered by the State Government. The association of the Vigilance Commission in the entire method as an internal agency of the State Government by itself does not militate against the propriety of such preliminary enquiry. Reliance was, in this connection, placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (8) A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India, (1967) 15 FLR 347. It was further stated that the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1980 SC 1170 has upheld that the Vigilance Commission may be consulted and the report of investigation considered for framing charges. So, this shows that the making of some screening enquiries preliminary to institution of the formal disciplinary action is not unknown to the law governing disciplinary action. Rather the absence of such a preliminary investigation or enquiry could have an evil effect on use of disciplinary power because of the possibility of reckless, indiscriminate and arbitrary institution of disciplinary action. 33. The appellants further contended that there cannot be any question of protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. In order to avail of the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, two essential facts are necessary–(1) the person must be one accused of an offence, and (2) compelled to testify against himself. No such testimonial compulsion can be said to have taken place. In order to avail of the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, two essential facts are necessary–(1) the person must be one accused of an offence, and (2) compelled to testify against himself. No such testimonial compulsion can be said to have taken place. The direction issued to the writ petitioner/respondent to appear before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, has been sought to be defended by reference to a number of cases, viz. (9) Md. Dastagir v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 756 , (10) State of Bombay v. Kathikaluoghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 and (11) M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 . 34. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent submitted that the Writ Court has jurisdiction in respect of the matter inasmuch as it is not a case where charge-sheet has been issued and disciplinary enquiry has commenced. His submission is that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal could be invoked if there was a charge-sheet issued. He laid stress on the fact that the Vigilance Commission has evolved a procedure which has not the sanction of law and is unauthorised. Secondly, it was submitted that the whole affair is maneuvered with the object of bringing the petitioner to public disrepute and smearing his image so that he can be by-passed in the matter of promotion from Director General to Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police. The secret and confidential matters of which the truth is not established were made public through the press with much fanfare, so that the writ petitioner/respondent stands denigrated. 35. The action of the appellants impugned in the writ petition was taken to create artificially a general public opinion against the writ petitioner/respondent thereby to set the stage ready for denying the writ petitioner his due promotion. Therefore, the entire object of this unauthorised an illegal inquisition is to remove the writ petitioner from chances of promotion. But, such act to the pre-judice of chances of promotion cannot be said to constitute conditions of service. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the decision in (12) Md. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1631 . In that case, it has been held that a question of chances of promotion is not capable of being a subject matter of dispute pertaining to conditions of service. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the decision in (12) Md. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1631 . In that case, it has been held that a question of chances of promotion is not capable of being a subject matter of dispute pertaining to conditions of service. In that case, as a result of revision of certain rules, the number of promotional posts was reduced. The rule was challenged as affecting the promotion of the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed in that connection : – “A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service". 36. Thus, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/opposite party urged that if in the present case, the writ petitioner would have, hypothetically speaking, approached the Tribunal, the cause of action should have been pressed as one pertaining to Clause (v) of Section 3(q). But, the legal position as declared by the Supreme Court would have stood in the way and the writ petitioner/opposite party could have been altogether out of Section 3(q). Because unless the right to be considered for promotion is affected no cause of action pertaining to condition of service could be said to have arisen. If the chances of promotion, i.e., favourable consideration for promotion, are merely affected, such affection, howsoever severe, could not be a matter triable by the Administrative Tribunal. The learned Counsel quoted further passage from the decision :– "The right to be considered for promotion was not affected but the chances of promotion were severely reduced. This did not constitute variation in the condition of service. This view is completely supported by the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in (13) Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 ". 37. It was further submitted that it is welt settled that the Disciplinary Authority can hold preliminary enquiry to find the proof of allegations as and when they present themselves regarding the conduct of a public servant but such enquiries are necessarily to be discreet and confidential. At that stage, it cannot be said that any disciplinary matter has arisen so as to attract Clause (iv) of Section 3(q) of the said Act of 1985. Its purpose is limited for forming an opinion whether there are grounds for framing charges and initiating formal disciplinary enquiry. At that stage, it cannot be said that any disciplinary matter has arisen so as to attract Clause (iv) of Section 3(q) of the said Act of 1985. Its purpose is limited for forming an opinion whether there are grounds for framing charges and initiating formal disciplinary enquiry. Such pre-charge-sheet enquiry has to be a confidential enquiry but in the instant case all norms of such informal preliminary enquiry have been thrown to the winds and the respondent writ petitioner was summoned to be interrogated. The impugned letters which are Annexures 'C & D' also make no secret of the fact that the requirement of the summons was for an 'open investigation' which necessarily would imply formal disciplinary action. Therefore, the present enquiry is neither a preliminary enquiry nor disciplinary enquiry upon charges being framed. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner/opposite party laid particular emphasis on the facts that the said letters give no indication as to whether the open investigating was in connection with a Criminal investigation because the tenor of those letters does not indicate that they are in connection with the departmental proceedings nor could they be open investigation for prosecution of the writ petitioner/opposite party in the absence of formal institution of such Criminal proceedings. By process of elimination it can be said that they could be as well connected with investigation in contemplation of Criminal proceeding against the writ petitioner/opposite party. If it was pre-charge-sheet enquiry it could neither be given the appellation of open investigation nor be given publicity through the media. The very fact that no charge-sheet has been framed even though the Vigilance Commission spelt out the matter to be 'open investigation' postulates disciplinary enquiry and investigation made in public. The Vigilance Commission cannot usurp such extravagant powers. It could not be done without a formal charge-sheet. So, the learned Counsel drives home that the question of the matter being attracted either by Clause (iv) or Clause (v) of Section 3(q) of the said Act of 1985 is simply ruled out. It is an act of pure and simple oppression of a Public Officer leading to his total denigration. 38. The learned Counsel reiterated in line with the averments in the writ petition that the Vigilance Commission is an extra-constitutional and extra-legal authority incapable of exercising any powers and function against any officer. It is an act of pure and simple oppression of a Public Officer leading to his total denigration. 38. The learned Counsel reiterated in line with the averments in the writ petition that the Vigilance Commission is an extra-constitutional and extra-legal authority incapable of exercising any powers and function against any officer. It does not have the power or authority to compel a member of the All India Services to appear before and for interrogation by an officer who is holding a post 7th post below that held by the writ petitioner/opposite party. The obvious purpose is to humiliate a member of All India Services at the behest of the Vigilance Commission. It has been further stressed that the Government servant is not mere a servant and he cannot be treated as shabbily as the authority may choose. According to him, under Entry 70 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution the All India Services are placed exclusively within the legislative power of Parliament and accordingly within the exclusive executive power and the jurisdiction of Union of India by virtue of the provisions of Article 73. Under Article 162 of the Constitution, an executive power of the state extends only to the matter in respect of which the legislature of the state has power to make laws. By reasons of All India Services being included in List I of the Seventh Schedule, the state has no power or authority either to make any law or issue any executive order or instruction in respect of a member of the All India Services. Accordingly, it is clear that writ petitioner/opposite party could not be made to submit to the jurisdiction of Vigilance Commission by an order of the State Government in this regard. 39. We have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the parties. The major question, in this case, is whether in the wake of the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, this Court has become functuous officio as far as the cause of action is involved in the present petition. We have already summed up the elaborate submissions made by Mr. Roy on this issue of ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court. We have already summed up the elaborate submissions made by Mr. Roy on this issue of ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court. It is true that where the dispute to be adjudicated or tried pertains to conditions of service, the same is to be the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the said Act of 1985. It is true that the expression 'conditions of service' has not been defined in either Article 309 or Article 323A of the Constitution or in Section 3 of the All India Services Act. The authoritative definition is available only in the said Act of 1985. Section 3(q) thereof defines service matters but while defining it brings in the expression 'conditions of service'. 40. In order to appreciate the position, it is necessary to extract the provisions of Section 3(q) of the said Act, 1985 :– " 'Service matters', in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government, as respects :– (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever." 41. The appellants' contention is that this section is invoked in the circumstances of this case and it falls either under Clause (iv) being 'disciplinary matters' or Clause (v) 'any other matter whatsoever'. It has also to be noted in this connection, the provisions of Section 14 which deals with the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. The appellants' contention is that this section is invoked in the circumstances of this case and it falls either under Clause (iv) being 'disciplinary matters' or Clause (v) 'any other matter whatsoever'. It has also to be noted in this connection, the provisions of Section 14 which deals with the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. The provisions of Sub-section (1) of that section reads as follows :– "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to– (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian : (b) all service matters concerning :– (i) a member of any All India Service; or (ii) a person (not being a member of an All India Service) or a person referred to in Clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or (iii) a civilian (not being a member of an All India Service) or a person referred to in Clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence ; and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government. (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation (or society) or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment. Explanation–For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to 'Union' in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union territory." 42. Explanation–For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to 'Union' in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union territory." 42. From Section 14, it becomes quite clear that a member of All India Services even though serving in the affairs of any State is to submit to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Again, if we refer to Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969 we then find that any member of the All India Services while serving in connection with the affair of a State Government is subject to the disciplinary control of the State Government, in the sense that the State Government would be the authority to initiate or institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalty. Therefore, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants that a member of the All India Services is amenable to disciplinary control of the State Government where his services are placed with the State Government and even then any dispute arising in regard to his service matters shall be triable by the Central Tribunal are correct. There is no dispute on that aspect but what creates controversy is the manner the learned Counsel for the appellants has widened the sphere of the residuary clause (v) of Section 3(q), viz. 'any other matter whatsoever'. According to the appellants, if the case cannot come under the heading 'disciplinary matters' it would come under this residuary clause, the same being, according to them, an uncharted field. The crux of the matter lies in the delimitation of this residuary clause as the ingredients of conditions of service. To our mind, this residuary clause can cover any matter left out in the preceding clauses so long as such matter indeed relate to conditions of service. 43. On the facts of the case, it has to be admitted on all hands that in this case no formal disciplinary proceeding has been initiated. There are no charges framed and no charge-sheet issued to the writ petitioner/opposite party. There is some dichotomy in the position taken by the appellants, while the Vigilance Commission describes the proceeding as an open investigation, the appellants before us admit that this proceeding is only "pre-charge-sheet" proceeding, i e., the domestic internal enquiry to find facts, prima facie, for institution of the formal disciplinary action. There is some dichotomy in the position taken by the appellants, while the Vigilance Commission describes the proceeding as an open investigation, the appellants before us admit that this proceeding is only "pre-charge-sheet" proceeding, i e., the domestic internal enquiry to find facts, prima facie, for institution of the formal disciplinary action. At any rate, when it is admitted that this particular matter is only a pre-disciplinary enquiry it ceases to be a disciplinary proceeding and it is absolutely an internal household enquiry of the Vigilance Commission. So, it cannot be said that the cause of action can find place in clause (iv) of Section 3(q). That is why the learned Counsel for the appellants have concentrated on the implications of the residuary expression 'any other matter whatsoever'. We fail to persuade ourselves to share his views that the expression "any other matter whatsoever" means a limitless field. This expression cannot be read in detachment and isolation from the fact that the expression is used in the overall context of the conditions of service. Now, whether these non-disciplinary enquiries were connected with the writ petitioner/opposite party's service matters or not is a question of which the answer is not far to seek. The style of operation of the Vigilance Commissioner indicates that what is meant is a criminal proceeding. The very appellation of the proceeding as an open investigation leaves one guessing as to what this non-statutory and extra-legal enquiry aims or drives at. The primary and ultimate aim of the proceeding may be larger than a disciplinary proceeding because in this case undeniably the writ petitioner/opposite party is required to go through an inquisition held by another Police Officer, who is 7th degree below the post of the writ petitioner/opposite party holds. Moreover, he is also a junior Police Officer of the Anti-corruption branch. So the object of the proceeding may be without having anything to do with the disciplinary action at the moment, it may have the object of institution of a criminal proceeding against the writ petitioner/opposite party. Because in a disciplinary proceeding at the nonformal stage i.e., the pre-charge-sheet fact-finding as a prelude to a future disciplinary proceeding bas to be confidential. An open investigation through interrogation and taking evidence cannot be visualized. At that stage of domestic or internal enquiry the officer alleged against cannot be asked to submit to interrogation. Because in a disciplinary proceeding at the nonformal stage i.e., the pre-charge-sheet fact-finding as a prelude to a future disciplinary proceeding bas to be confidential. An open investigation through interrogation and taking evidence cannot be visualized. At that stage of domestic or internal enquiry the officer alleged against cannot be asked to submit to interrogation. One thing is very clear that it has been a clear attempt to force the writ petitioner/respondent to be a witness against himself. The two summons impugned herein require him not only to appear for examination before the junior most officer but also to present and produce named and unnamed documents and particulars for unknown purposes. This is not by any means an en1uiry meant b be an innocent benign pc-chargesheet enquiry. The only inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that the object was to build up a case for immediate purpose not known, on allegations not divulged, for ultimate action not known either. One thing is clear that the appellants have embarked upon an inquisition and the purpose of the present summons is fishing for evidence against the writ petitioner/respondent and compelling him to be a witness against himself. So long as the purpose of the summons or the purpose of the inquisition is unknown we are not inclined to accept such steps as innocent as a nonformal benevolent search for truth made in a preliminary enquiry. Here the matter more than exceeds the comprehensiveness of the residuary expression ''any other matter whatsoever". The expression has after all to be limited by the condition that such any other matter has as well to be matter concerning conditions of the service, and not beyond that. 44. From the facts and circumstances of the case we cannot make sure the purpose here and the action of the Vigilance Commission disregarded the requirement of the matter being essentially a matter relating to conditions of service. 45. We have gone through the records which show that the action against the writ petitioner/respondent is clearly in the nature of an inquisition, a fishing expedition and a roving inquiry beyond the scope bf the AIS (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. 46. There is an intrinsic fallacy and dichotomy in the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants. 45. We have gone through the records which show that the action against the writ petitioner/respondent is clearly in the nature of an inquisition, a fishing expedition and a roving inquiry beyond the scope bf the AIS (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. 46. There is an intrinsic fallacy and dichotomy in the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants. In the first instance the appellants emphasize the question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that the Vigilance Commissioner by directing to hold a preliminary enquiry could be said to have raised an issue pertaining to disciplinary matter. But at the same breath they justify the examination of the writ petitioner/respondent by a low ranking officer by contending that this enquiry is not a disciplinary enquiry but a preliminary enquiry and no hard and fast rules are to be followed. The latter part of the argument is nugatory of the first part. If the enquiry is not a disciplinary enquiry, no disciplinary matter arises and, therefore, the Tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction to adjudicate or try the dispute under Clause (iv) of Section 3(q). Thus, the appellants want to oust not only this Court but also the Tribunal and seek to create a situation where the dispute brought by the writ petitioner/respondent would become a non-justiciable matter. The contradiction in the argument is perhaps consciously and deliberately advanced with the object of taking away all rights of remedy from the writ petitioner. The various decisions of the Supreme Court that have been referred to, show that the highest judiciary is aware and approves of the procedure adopted for having a preliminary enquiry. The need of an internal enquiry preliminary to the decision for a disciplinary enquiry has been acknowledged by the numerous decisions. But, in this present case, the Vigilance Commission itself does not say that this is a preliminary enquiry. Its direction is that the subordinate officer appointed as the Enquiring Officer should examine the writ petitioner/respondent and shall hold an open investigation. The concert of open investigation is diametrically opposed to the concept of preliminary enquiry which the Supreme Court in the various decisions accorded approval for the benefit of elimination of groundless disciplinary proceedings to reduce harassment to a public servant to the bare minimum. The concert of open investigation is diametrically opposed to the concept of preliminary enquiry which the Supreme Court in the various decisions accorded approval for the benefit of elimination of groundless disciplinary proceedings to reduce harassment to a public servant to the bare minimum. But, the spirit in which the entire proceeding which we are not persuaded to accept as preliminary enquiry, has been set on is against the very fundamental concept which guided the judicial approval of preliminary enquiry being held. In the first instance here, the enquiry has been said to be an open enquiry or an open investigation of which the details were made public with much fanfare. Its natures is also inquisitorial a roving enquiry, a fishing expedition, which judicial conscience can never compromise with. If the enquiry is a non-formal domestic enquiry how it could be an open investigation beats all comprehension. 47. That besides, the tenor of the decisions of the Supreme Court which have been cited to support the enquiry launched, clearly shows that the public servant has to have the notice of the case against him even at this preliminary stage because the very idea of having an explanation from the public servant concerned postulates that he must know the content and purport of the al1egations occasioning such preliminary enquiry so that he can prepare to meet the case and emerge clear and clear of the cloud. There is no sense in saying that a preliminary enquiry is being held to ascertain whether a formal disciplinary enquiry is necessary or not when such preliminary enquiry is held without putting the public servant, alleged against, on due notice of the case against him. 48. Here the summons that have been impugned merely say that the writ petitioner/respondent is to appear before a very junior officer to be examined by him in respect of matters not disclosed. Even the blanket nature of the requisition with regard to documents places him obviously at a great disadvantage. The apparent purpose of the entire exercise is angling for something or anything that could be turned against the writ petitioner/respondent rather than giving him an opportunity of vindicating himself. Such approach cannot be the manifestation of anything but naked ill-will and prejudice against the writ petitioner/respondent. The apparent purpose of the entire exercise is angling for something or anything that could be turned against the writ petitioner/respondent rather than giving him an opportunity of vindicating himself. Such approach cannot be the manifestation of anything but naked ill-will and prejudice against the writ petitioner/respondent. There cannot be any shade of doubt as to the fact that the writ petitioner/respondent is going to be a victim of at most malice in law and high-handedness and protection has to be available to him. It is in this context that the question of the status or the locus standi of the Vigilance Commissioner has to be viewed. It is one fundamental principle of law that every executive action if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person must be supported by some legislative authority. It is doubtless that the subjection of the writ petitioner/respondent to the humiliation of being interrogated by a very junior officer and public exposure of such action against the writ petitioner/respondent is highly prejudicial to the writ petitioner/respondent and jeopardises his protection as a member of the All India Services against the oppression of his master, be it the State Government or the Central Government. Such wrong cannot go without a remedy and there must be a forum for justice in the situation. The manner the appellants' learned Counsel contended would lead to the negation of any right to remedy and on that score alone the arguments cannot have force. Where the Supreme Court has held that there is nothing wrong in the Government as Disciplinary Authority to take the assistance of the Vigilance Commission, what the Supreme Court had in mind is a due process of disciplinary proceeding having been intended with no collateral or ulterior purpose but with the benevolent object of saving a public servant from unnecessary disciplinary action. Here the Vigilance Commission has acted blatantly against all rule of law. It has directed a junior officer of the Police Service itself to have the senior-most officer interrogated in respect of allegations not disclosed to the latter and such holding of enquiry is being described as an open investigation and the term 'open investigation' can have place only where formal disciplinary proceeding is initiated after service of the charge-sheet. It has directed a junior officer of the Police Service itself to have the senior-most officer interrogated in respect of allegations not disclosed to the latter and such holding of enquiry is being described as an open investigation and the term 'open investigation' can have place only where formal disciplinary proceeding is initiated after service of the charge-sheet. We have noted the course of developments in the writ petitioner/respondent's case which show that the action against the writ petitioner/respondent was guided by malice in law and also in fact. The Vigilance Commissioner, respondent No. 1, was quoted in the Statesman, in the Telegraph both of July 16, 1993. Anandabazar Patrika of July 17, 1993 and Aajkal of July 15, 1993, that a vigilance enquiry was started about two years ago against the writ petitioner/respondent. It has been pointed out to us that the Vigilance Commissioner never contradicted this statement attributed to him by the Press. In fact, the Vigilance Commissioner has not either in the writ proceedings or before us, filed any affidavit contradicting the Press Report. The silence on the part of the Vigilance Commissioner clearly shows that he arranged for making public this news of an open investigation being conducted against the writ petitioner/respondent in the press. In fact, the news report in The Statesman dated 16.7.1993 shows that he met the press on this matter and gave out the information that the Anti-corruption Wing of the Vigilance Commission had been conducting enquiries against the writ petitioner/respondent for the past two years, now followed by an open investigation. What prompted the Vigilance Commissioner to go to the Press could certainly be anything but sense of duty and honest concern for unearthing corruption. Eias and malice vitiate entire proceeding. 49. From the records we find that on 18.6.1993 the Vigilance Commissioner found that the writ petitioner/respondent virtually had no assets disproportionate to his income. In the notes of the said date, the Dy-Inspector General of Police, Vigilance Commission, came to a conclusion that prima facie there is no case against the petitioner. The following extract from the said notes would show that the Commission has a predetermination to implicate the writ petitioner/respondent and it is only when baffled by the failure of the preliminary enquiry that the further investigation against the writ petitioner/respondent was started. 50. The following extract from the said notes would show that the Commission has a predetermination to implicate the writ petitioner/respondent and it is only when baffled by the failure of the preliminary enquiry that the further investigation against the writ petitioner/respondent was started. 50. Thus, on the basis of the above discussion, the total amount of disproportionate assets comes on computation as follows :– 1. Assets held on 31.12.1991 ... Rs. 19,98,824.20 2. Assets held on 01.01.1988 ...(-)Rs. 10,42,282.66 ……………………. 3. Assets acquired during the check period … Rs. 8,77,541.54 4. Expenses during the check period … Rs. 1,49,367.20 …………………… 5. Total assets & expenses during the check period ...( + )Rs. 10,26,908.74 6. Income during the check period ...(-) Rs. 10,16,275.36 7. Extent of disproportionate assets ……. …….. ... Rs. 10,633.38 51. This is a negligible disproportionate amount according to above computation and prima facie, it appears, there is no case. It is the result of a confidential investigation for submission of a preliminary report to the V.C. under Memo No. 23-GAC(Vig) dated 2.2.72 of the Government of West Bengal, Home Department (General Administration.) IMPORTANT HEADS OF INVESTIGATION NOT YET DONE. 52. The confidential investigation did not cover computation on the following points :– 1. Expenditure on the education of son; 2. Club expenditure; 3. Medical expenses which is not reimbursed ; 4. Expenditure incurred in holidays; 5. House tax and other taxes paid for property and insurance amount paid for property; 6. Expenditure on repair of building, maintenance and running of vehicle, electricity, water and gas charges. 53. Non-verifiable expenditure also has not been calculated, like ration, tea, coffee, sugar, milk, biscuits, bread, butter, vegetables, eggs, cooking oil, newspapers and magazines, shaving cream etc. fuel other than gas and electricity, clothing and washing and washerman charges, shoes and chappals etc. movies and other entertainments expenses on religious ceremonies. 54. It is only possible during open examination either by registration of case or by open enquiry except to some extent for house tax paid, medical expenses for hospitalisation in private nurshing homes, expenditure on club expenses, education of children etc. 55. It is extra-ordinary that while preliminary enquiry drew a blank the Vigilance Commission should embark upon the so-called open investigation with a big bang and thought fit to publish the news of such open investigation in the press. 55. It is extra-ordinary that while preliminary enquiry drew a blank the Vigilance Commission should embark upon the so-called open investigation with a big bang and thought fit to publish the news of such open investigation in the press. The notes as extracted only show that the present so-called open investigation is for the purpose of widening somehow or other the gap between the assets acquired and income of the writ petitioner/respondent during the 'check period', so as not to let him go unscathed. Malice has played a vital role in the manner the respondent's reputation has been undermined by blowing up in the press the fact of an open investigation initiated against him even though no charge sheet was issued and no materials were available till now for framing any Charge. 56. It is not the point of contention that in respect of the service matters of a member of the All India Services performing the duties in connection with the affairs of the State Government shall be triable by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, the ratio in Union of India v. Paramanda (Supra) is not relevant in so far as, here the entire controversy is whether any dispute which could be a dispute relating to the service matters exists in the case. As we have already seen, if it would be a disciplinary matter, it would be a subject matter of adjudication or trial by the Tribunal by reason of the definition of service matters in Section 3(q) of which Clause (iv) covers disciplinary matters, but no disciplinary matter arises in the facts and circumstances of this case. The disciplinary action has not at all been embarked upon by the State Government. Nor Clause (v) of the said definition can attract the matter as a service matter because the action that has been assailed in the petition is alleged to have in view the object of jeopardizing the writ petitioner's chance of promotion. But, any action affecting the chances of promotion of an incumbent of office cannot constitute conditions of service. This is also a settled position by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Md. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (Supra). 57. The legitimacy of the power of the State Government to set afoot a preliminary fact-finding enquiry is not disputed, either. This is also a settled position by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Md. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (Supra). 57. The legitimacy of the power of the State Government to set afoot a preliminary fact-finding enquiry is not disputed, either. It is true that the Supreme Court has approved the procedure of a pre-chargesheet enquiry as it has the salutary effect as a check against indiscriminate institution of disciplinary action. In our view, the reference to the said decisions, viz. Champaklal v. Union of India (Supra), Ravindra v. U. P. State Handloom Corporation (Supra) does not, however, render us any assistance in this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Here, the case is not that the writ petitioner was asked to explain in a confidential manner any of his particular conduct in discharge of the duties of his office. Nor is it the case that the writ petitioner was asked to explain the acquisition of any particular asset or particular monetary transactions made by himself or the dependent member of his family. A witch-hunt has been launched against him, by asking him to appear before a very junior officer for the purpose of being interrogated for reasons and object not disclosed. Even the nature of the requisition of documents shows the mala fides of the entire exercise. He has been asked to produce specified and unspecified documents, though the purpose of the requisition has been held back from him. This process is farthest from a preliminary tentative enquiry but is a frank case of an inquisition to fish for anything that may come handy to denouce the writ petitioner. Such a process of preliminary enquiry is the last thing that could be in the judicial thinking that guided the decision in the cases cited. What the Supreme Court approved was bona fide preliminary enquiry of a benign master, solicitous to avoid implicating an innocent servant in a disciplinary proceeding so that there is no harassment caused to the members of the public service by unnecessary proceeding. 58. What the Supreme Court approved was bona fide preliminary enquiry of a benign master, solicitous to avoid implicating an innocent servant in a disciplinary proceeding so that there is no harassment caused to the members of the public service by unnecessary proceeding. 58. We have also taken note of the decision of this Court in Amulya Ratan v. Dy C.M. (Eng.) (Supra), where this Court held that the preliminary investigation or fact-finding enquiry required no rules to be observed but this ratio cannot be taken as giving licence to the Disciplinary Authority to give free play to their caprice and malice and that such an enquiry could very well take the character of a moving, fishing or inquisitorial enquiry. We are of the opinion that even in fact-finding enquiry thought not subject to any codified rules, must be observed the rules of propriety. In this case, apart from the mala fide nature of the requirement of an interrogation and the production of all documents specified and unspecified, the assignment of the duty of the interrogation and examination of the documents to an officer junior to writ petitioner by 7th degree is doubtless judicially reprehensible. Its only purpose is to humiliate the writ petitioner/opposite party. In fact, this process itself is contrary to the spirit of the AIS(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. Rule 8(3) of the said rules requires that where a Board is appointed as the Enquiring Authority, it shall consist of not less than two senior officers. Even in preliminary or fact-finding enquiry the job of enquiry should be entrusted to a senior officer where a member of the service holding a high office in the hierarchy is subjected to such enquiry. The minimum requirement of propriety has been violated. We have also noted that the association of Vigilance Commission of the State Government at the stage of preliminary enquiry has been found to be unexceptionable. For this proposition, the decisions of A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India (Supra) Sunil Kumar v. State of West Bengal (Supra) have been referred to. But, to our mind, the question of status of the Vigilance Commission would have assumed no importance and would have remained a fringe issue provided it was an objective innocent preliminary enquiry. For this proposition, the decisions of A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India (Supra) Sunil Kumar v. State of West Bengal (Supra) have been referred to. But, to our mind, the question of status of the Vigilance Commission would have assumed no importance and would have remained a fringe issue provided it was an objective innocent preliminary enquiry. Here, the fundamental question is that the proceedings against the writ petitioner/ opposite party have been taken in a manner unprecedented and unsupportable by any statute or the rules framed thereunder and is blatantly in violation of all propriety. The fundamental question in the present case is whether an inquisition which does not either fall under Section 3(q) of the Central Administrative Tribunal or under any procedure of criminal justice should call for our intervention in the writ jurisdiction. 59. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent/writ petitioner could be called upon and could be directed to appear before an authority which had been created by an Administrative Circular of the State, when State had no executive power in relation to such an officer of All India Service whose conditions of service are controlled and governed by the provisions of All India Services Act which was made by Parliament and when the Central Government can exercise executive power in relation to such an officer by virtue of the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. In our view, the executive power of the State does not extend to a Member of All India Service as the executive power of the State only extends to the matters in respect of which, it has power to make law in view of the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The All India Services Act have been enacted by Parliament in exercise of power conferred under Entry 70 List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, neither the Vigilance Commission can command and/or direct the State Government to compel a Member of All India Service to appear before the Vigilance Commission of a so-called open investigation nor the State Government have any executive power to direct an Officer of the Indian Police Service to appear before an authority which had been created by an Administrative Circular issued by the State Government. From this, it is abundantly clear that save and except the provisions of the All India Services Act and/or regulations framed by the Central Government no authority far less the State Government can direct a Member of the All India Service to appear before an authority which is an extra-legal authority and State can only exercise power in such a matter only in accordance with All India Services Act and/or Rules and Regulations framed thereunder and not otherwise. Further, it can be said that the directions of the State Government to appear before the Vigilance Commission in an open enquiry for production of documents and for interrogation is not a condition of service of the writ petitioner/opposite party and if it does not relate to a matter concerning the conditions of service in that event it is a matter which falls outside the scope and ambit of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). It case a Departmental Proceeding started in accordance with the conditions of the service as laid down in All India Services Rules, in that event, the matter could have only been decided by the CAT on the question. But, here a Departmental Proceeding has not been initiated. The Supreme Court in the case of (14) Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman reported in AIR 1991 SC 2010 held, in a matter arising out of CAT, that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee it can be said that the Departmental Proceeding/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. Under the conditions of service, it the Disciplinary Authority had jurisdiction to initiate Departmental Proceeding and once Departmental Proceeding is initiated, in that event, undoubtedly it becomes a matter in which CAT had the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is ousted. In the case, the Supreme Court also observed that the sealed cover procedure for promotion is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. Pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt a sealed cover procedure. In the case, the Supreme Court also observed that the sealed cover procedure for promotion is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. Pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt a sealed cover procedure. The plea that when there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to prepare and issue charge-memo and/or charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the purity of the administration to reward the employee with a promotion etc. would not be tenable. The preliminary investigation take a long time and particularly when they are initiated at the instance of he interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately. Many a time that never results in the issue of any charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordinarily it should not take much time to collect evidence and finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits to resort to the sealed cover procedure. In the instant case, admittedly the preliminary investigation has been kept pending for more than 2 years and it is also on record that the Vigilance Commissioner was of the view that there is prima facie a case yet they had not taken any decision either to start departmental proceeding or to initiate criminal case and further kept the same pending deliberately without taking a formal decision. The procedure was adopted which is not known to service jurisprudence, namely, open investigation for production of documents and interrogation of the person concerned without letting him know what are the charges and/or allegations against him. This was obviously done at a point of time when Government was considering appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police. The allegations of the writ petitioner/opposite party that this was done deliberately and motivatedly cannot be ruled out at this stage. 60. Further question is that whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 could be said to have been taken away by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The allegations of the writ petitioner/opposite party that this was done deliberately and motivatedly cannot be ruled out at this stage. 60. Further question is that whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 could be said to have been taken away by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. In this connection, it may be observed that there are various statutes which provide that a decision under a particular statute shall be final and conclusive to all intents and purposes. In (15) Rash Beharilal v. King-Emperor, (1933) 60 IA 354 Lord Atkin observed that finality is a good thing, but justice is better. 61. Wide enactments designed to oust the jurisdiction of the courts entirely in respect of all remedies have come to be known as "ouster clause". Further, law as now settled by the House of Lords is that these ouster clauses are subject to exactly the same doctrine as the older 'no certiorari' clauses, namely, they do not prevent the Court from intervening the case of excess of jurisdiction. The violation of principle of natural justice, for example, amounts to excess of jurisdiction, so that when a Minister refused an application for citizenship without giving the applicant a fair hearing Privy Council invalidated his decision notwithstanding a statute providing that 'it shall not be subject to appeal or review in any Court'. (See Wade's Administrative Law, 5th Edition, page 620). 62. In (16) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission reported in (1969) 2 AC 147 the House of Lords held that ouster clause does not prevent determination of what was outside the jurisdiction. All errors of law fall within the definition of jurisdictional error so the decision of any authority could be quashed for such an error. In this connection, at page 605 Wade observed, 'in order to preserve this vital policy, Court has been forced to rebel against Parliament.' The Administrative Agencies and Tribunals must at all cost be prevented from being so-called judges of the validity of their own acts. If these were allowed, to quote Denning, LJ again, 'Rule of law would be at an end.' 63. In the case of (17) Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. reported in AIR 1940 PC 105, it was observed by the Judicial Committee. If these were allowed, to quote Denning, LJ again, 'Rule of law would be at an end.' 63. In the case of (17) Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. reported in AIR 1940 PC 105, it was observed by the Judicial Committee. 'it is settled law that the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that if jurisdiction is so excluded, Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.' In this case, Judicial Committee considered the finality clause in a particular statute. 64. The Supreme Court in the case of (18) Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 , laid down the principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts wherein the exceptions to such principles have been specified. 65. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (19) Bhagelu v. Civil Surgeon, reported in AIR 1960 Allahabad 353, held :– "As instructions they are and have to be administrative directions. They do not for the fact alone that they happen to concern certain aspects relating to services under the State become conditions of service of servants concerned. A condition of service is some limitation or restriction or other similar obligations connected with the employment of a person. Viewed from that angle also the provision in para 97 cannot be said, except by stretching the meaning too far, to be any limitation, restriction or obligation. As a matter of fact, it is in the nature of an administrative order which allows the Government servants to make collective approach in certain cases those concerning the general interest of the service." 66. From this, it is clear that there may be matters relating to service yet they do not relate to conditions of service. Accordingly, the purported directives and orders to appear before the Vigilance Commissioner and to produce evidence/documents and to face interrogation in an open enquiry/investigation does not and cannot come within the scope and ambit of the respondent/petitioner's conditions of service. Accordingly, the purported directives and orders to appear before the Vigilance Commissioner and to produce evidence/documents and to face interrogation in an open enquiry/investigation does not and cannot come within the scope and ambit of the respondent/petitioner's conditions of service. As the issue raised in the writ petition is not a matter relating to conditions of service' of the writ petitioner/opposite party the same does not and cannot come apparently under the mischief of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 67. We are also of the view that the Disciplinary Authority may make preliminary investigation/enquiry for the purpose of finding out the fact in connection with the allegations made against a public servant and that no Court can prevent the functioning of a fact-finding authority but this fact-finding authority functions in a confidential manner and that the same are not intended to be flashed in the newspapers and in the facts and circumstances of the case it appears to us that such confidential matter was given to the press for publication by the Vigilance Commission in contravention of the resolution by which the Vigilance Commission was created. It is one thing to collect information or materials in a secret enquiry by way of preliminary enquiry but publication in the newspapers that the writ petitioner/opposite party had to face open enquiry before Vigilance Commission on the verge of consideration of his case for appointment in the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, West Bengal, appears to be motivated. Whether or not the writ petitioner/opposite party would be appointed in the said post was outside the scope and ambit of the writ application and this appeal. Specific allegation in this behalf was not denied by the Vigilance Commissioner on affidavit before the Learned Trial Judge or before this Court. This does not appear to be at all bona fide and/or was done in public interest. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The writ application is allowed. The orders and directions impugned in the writ petition are set aside and quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Chowdhury, J. : I agree.