Judgment :- 1. The second appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. First defendant is the appellant herein. The suit O.S.124/84 before Sub Court, Sherthallai was filed by first respondent herein (hereafter referred as plaintiff) against appellant (hereafter referred as first defendant) and one Gopalakrishnan Nair who remained ex parte in the suit. Plaint alleges thai first defendant had agreed to sell the plaint schedule properly to plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs. 14,000/-. An agreement was entered into on 8-11-1982. An amount of Rs.7,750/- was paid as advance towards purchase price and the balance was agreed to be paid within three months. On knowing about the intended sale to second defendant from a suit was filed by plaintiff before Munsiff's Court, Sherthallai as O.S. 608/82 to restrain first defendant from alienating the property. Thereafter a notice was sent asking first defendant to execute the assignment deed. She having failed to perform her part of the contract plaintiff was constrained to file the suit. 2. First defendant denied the execution of the document and receipt of the advance. She therefore disclaimed liability to execute the sale deed. She further contended thatan agreement was entered into between the 2nd defendant and herself. The trial court on an appreciation of the evidence held the agreement Ext.A2 alleged to have been executed by the first defendant to be not genuine. In consequence the suit was dismissed. On appeal the lower appellate court reversed that decision and held that the document is genuine. It was further found that first defendant was having absolute rights over the properly. The appellate court directed the first defendant to execute an assignment deed in respect of the plaint schedule property after receiving the balance consideration. It is against that decision that first defendant has come up in second appeal. 3. The following substantial questions of law arc seen formulated in the appeal memorandum. i. When the contract for sale states that the property belongs to the 'sakha' of 1st defendant and her four named children will a suit for specific performance lie against the 1st defendant only? ii. When Ext.A2 states that the property belongs to the sakha of 1st defendant and her 4 children can specific performance be granted against the 1st defendant, treating the 1st defendant alone as the owner? iii. ii. When Ext.A2 states that the property belongs to the sakha of 1st defendant and her 4 children can specific performance be granted against the 1st defendant, treating the 1st defendant alone as the owner? iii. When Ext.A2 is purported to be entered into by 1st defendant and 4 named children and those children have not signed Ext. A2, can it be construed as a completed contract capable of enforcement? iv. In the absence of any ease that 1st defendant had been acting on behalf of her children also, when the property is alleged to belong to them also in the contract for sale, can specific performance be granted against the 1st defendant alone and that too without the children on the party array? v. When Ext.B1 and B2 copies of Ext. A2 served by plaintiff on 1st defendant differ in material particulars, is it not a strong telling unassailable circumstance militating against the genuineness of Ext.A2? vi. Is the 1st appellate court entitled to disturb a finding of fact in the absence of circumstances that escaped the notice of the trial court which could warrant a different conclusion? vii. Is not the court bound to consider the equities and circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff before exercising the discretion to grant specific performance? Notice was ordered on these questions of law. 4. Heard counsel on both sides. 5. One of the substantial questions of law raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the agreement Ext.A2 being an incomplete contract the court below should not have permitted enforcement of the same. The agreement was intended to be executed by first defendant and her four children, Gangadharan Nair, Sasidharan Nair, Hariharan Nair and Jalajakumari. But it was executed by first defendant alone. The children of first defendant did not subscribe their signatures to the document. On the face of it, Ext.A2 is an incomplete contract. The document mentions about allotment of the property in partition of the year 1961 to. the Sakha (group) of first defendant. Mention is made about the joint rights and joint possession of first defendant and her children. The children of first defendant did not subscribe their signatures to the document. On the face of it, Ext.A2 is an incomplete contract. The document mentions about allotment of the property in partition of the year 1961 to. the Sakha (group) of first defendant. Mention is made about the joint rights and joint possession of first defendant and her children. The agreement was intended to be executed by all the five persons agreeing to sell their rights for a total consideration of Rs.14,000/- of which an advance of Rs.7,750/- was received by them and the balance amount of Rs.6,250/- was agreed to be paid within three months thereafter. As observed earlier the first defendant alone had signed the document. The contention of plaintiff appears to be that the property belonged to the first defendant alone and a purchase certificate was obtained from the Land Tribunal in her name. H is therefore pointed out that first defendant has absolute rights over the property. This contention found favour with the lower appellate court. According to me, a grave error was committed by the court in accepting this contention which is unsustainable in the light of the recitals contained in Ext.A2. Plaintiff cannot pretend ignorance of the recitals in that document. He had bargained for the rights of first defendant and all her children. The agreement was to get an assignment deed by all of them in respect of their rights over the property which they obtained in the partition of the year 1961. Plaintiff was thus aware that first defendant was only one of the sharers and was having only a fractional share. Having entered into agreement with open eyes and incorporating recitals about the joint rights of first defendant and her children and their joint possession it is futile for plaintiff to rely on a representation alleged to have been made by first defendant that she was having absolute rights over the property. The purchase certificate obtained by one of the co-owners will not confer absolute rights on her whereas it will enure to the benefits of the other co-sharers also. Plaintiff having understood the nature of rights which the children of first defendant have over the property cannot therefore fall back upon the purchase certificate and contend that first defendant was having absolute rights. Plaintiff having understood the nature of rights which the children of first defendant have over the property cannot therefore fall back upon the purchase certificate and contend that first defendant was having absolute rights. Here is therefore a case where the agreement was intended to be executed by 5 co-sharers and was really executed only by one of them. Ext.A2 is therefore incomplete contract. Only a completed contract which itself is valid and enforceable can be specifically enforced through court. The agreement having been found to bean incomplete one the relief of specific performance is liable to be rejected. The trial court has rightly denied the relief and for proper reasons. The lower appellate court has not considered this aspect at all and the reliance by the court on the purchase certificate obtained from the Land Tribunal is highly improper in the light of the recitals contained in the agreement. Reversing the finding of the lower appellate court and agreeing with the trial court I hold that Ext. A2 agreement being an incomplete contract cannot be specifically enforced. 6. The relief of specific performance is a discretionary remedy. Merely because it is .lawful to grant such relief the court is not hound to do so. But the discretion should not be arbitrary and must be sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles. Inorder to enable the plaintiff to avail of this particular remedy of specific performance he has to come to court with clean hands. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the conduct of the plaintiff in producing incorrect copies of the agreement in an earlier suit disentitles plaintiff from seeking this discretionary relief. A suit for injunction was filed by plaintiff as O.S.608/82 seeking to restrain first defendant from transferring the property. It appears that copies of the agreement were sent along with the order of temporary injunction granted by the court before issuing notice to the defendant. Those copies were produced before the trial court in this case and marked as Exts.Bl and B2. Though they were sent to the first defendant purporting to be copies of Ext. A2 they are not actually true copies of Ext. A2. The trial court has pointed out the various differences noticed in the true copies. The explanation on the part of the plaintiff appears to be that a mistake was committed, while preparing the copies of the original agreement. A2 they are not actually true copies of Ext. A2. The trial court has pointed out the various differences noticed in the true copies. The explanation on the part of the plaintiff appears to be that a mistake was committed, while preparing the copies of the original agreement. This explanation was accepted by the lower appellate court. The reason for accepting this explanations not seen to have been mentioned in the judgment. One could have accepted this explanation provided the mistakes arc minor in nature. There are some additions in Exts. B1 and B2. If the copies are prepared from the original such mistake would not have arisen. About 15 differences were noticed by the trial court. True, the original agreement was also produced in the earlier suit. It could be contended that no alteration has been made in the original agreement and that mistakes arose only in the copies. Ordinarily the mistake in a copy may not.be relevant when the original itself had been produced in court. But in a suit for specific performance, which is a discretionary relief, the mistake assumes considerable importance. Since there is material difference between the agreement Ext. A2 and the true copies Exts.Bl and B2 one is tempted to say that Exts.Bl and B2 purport to be copies of some other agreement between the parties. True, neither party has such a case. But in view of the difference noticed in the true copies served on the first defendant in the earlier suit the relief of specific performance has only to the refused. From the difference noticed the trial court is of the view that Ext.A2 is not a genuine document. The trial court was right in drawing such an inference. The lower appellate court has not applied its mind on this aspect of the matter. The production of the original in the earlier suit by itself is no reason to grant the discretionary relief of specific performance. Though the discretion exercised by the trial court is capable of correction by the lower appellate court that can be done only for proper reasons. The discretion exercised fry the trial court was sound and reasonable. Proper appreciation of the evidence was done by the court and the recitals in the agreement were also properly analysed. The discretion was thus exercised by judicial principles. The discretion exercised fry the trial court was sound and reasonable. Proper appreciation of the evidence was done by the court and the recitals in the agreement were also properly analysed. The discretion was thus exercised by judicial principles. On the other hand, no proper reasons seen to have been given by the lower appellate court while reversing the decision of the trial court. The substantial questions of law raised by the appellant in the appeal memorandum therefore arise for consideration and those questions are to be answered in favour of the appellant. For the aforesaid reasons the second appeal is allowed and in reversal of the judgment and decree of the lower court the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. Appellant is entitled to get her costs here as well as in the courts below from the first respondent.