C. V. JANI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Gujarat Electricity Board has challenged the legality and validity of the judgment and order of the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in Reference (IT) No. 969 of 1984. ( 2 ) THE petitioner Board is constituted -under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Respondent No. 1 is the Union of employees working under the petitioner-Board, and respondent No. 2 was Assistant Secretary at the relevant time. The respondent Union raised a demand that respondent No. 2 Mr. M. I. Trivedi who was about to complete 58 years of age on 30-11-1984 should not be made to retire from that day, as he would be entitled to be continued in service upto the age of 60 years as per the Award made by the tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 325/81. Conciliation proceedings failed and, therefore, by order dated 26-11-84 the Deputy Labour Commissioner referred the matter for adjudication to decide as to whether respondent No. 2 should be made to retire on 30-11-84 on completion of the age of 58 years. During the pendency of the reference interim relief was granted. The demand of the Union rested on the ground that respondent no. 2 who was serving as Assistant Secretary was a workman and he had no managerial or administrative powers, nor was he working in a supervisory capacity. ( 3 ) THE petitioner-Board contended in its reply that respondent No. 2 Mr. Trivedi was not a workman as per the definition contained, in section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes act. It was contended that he had to supervise the work of the employees working under him, fill in the confidential reports of those employees and to sign the pay bills of such employees. It was also pointed out that his pay was Rs. 2640/-p. m. and the post of assistant Secretary was the highest post on the administrative cadre. ( 4 ) IT appears that the Industrial Tribunal earlier has relied upon the Government notification dated 5-1-84 and had decided that the superannuation age for workmen would be 60 years. Hence the. main question raised in this proceeding was as to whether the respondent No. 2 Mr. Trivedi would be included in the definition of workman. ( 4 ) IT appears that the Industrial Tribunal earlier has relied upon the Government notification dated 5-1-84 and had decided that the superannuation age for workmen would be 60 years. Hence the. main question raised in this proceeding was as to whether the respondent No. 2 Mr. Trivedi would be included in the definition of workman. ( 5 ) THE definition of "workman" as per section 2 (s) of Industrial Disputes Act, reads as under:"workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature". The Tribunal, therefore, had to decide as to whether the respondent No. 2 Mr. Trivedi was employed in managerial or administrative or in supervisory capacity. The question of drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1600/- per month did not arise as it was an admitted position that Mr. Trivedi was drawing the pay of Rs. 2640/- per month. ( 6 ) THE petitioner-Board examined its Superintending Engineer Shri Davda, and took on record the affidavit filed by Shri Trivedi regarding the duties performed by him and the power or control which could be exercised by him. Trivedi was drawing the pay of Rs. 2640/- per month. ( 6 ) THE petitioner-Board examined its Superintending Engineer Shri Davda, and took on record the affidavit filed by Shri Trivedi regarding the duties performed by him and the power or control which could be exercised by him. After appreciation of the material on record, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that since the duties and powers of Shri trivedi would not fall either in managerial or supervisory sphere, he would be covered by the definition of "workmen" contained in section 2 (s) of the Act. As a result, the Tribunal held that Shri Trivedi should be continued in service upto the age of 60 years. This Award is being challenged in this petition, which came to be admitted on 5-11-85; but no interim relief was granted during the pendency of the petition. ( 7 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 Shri Trivedi must have therefore continued in service upto the age of 60 years. ( 8 ) SHRI S. A. Desai, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of Shri K. S. Nanavati for the petitioner submits that the Industrial Tribunal committed an error in holding that Shri trivedi was not discharging duties of supervisory or managerial character. He took us extensively through the judgment of the Tribunal which has dealt with this aspect of Shri trivedis duties and powers. He submitted that even if the duties of Shri Trivedi might not tall under the managerial or administrative head, some of them at least were of supervisory character and, therefore, Shri Trivedi would not be covered by the definition contained in section 2 (s) of the Act. ( 9 ) WE are afraid we are not able to agree with Mr. Desai on this point. We find from the judgment of the Tribunal that though Shri Trivedi was the senior most amongst all the employees in the establishment division who used to sign letters of appointment and transfers of the employees, to sit in the Selection Committee as ex-officio member, and to write the confidential reports of the staff members, the final power of selection as well as appointment rested with the Superintending Engineer, the power to grant C. L. also was with the Superintending Engineer and that Shri Trivedi could not himself take any administrative decision either in respect of accounts or in other respects. The tribunal also considered the evidence on record to the effect that even Typists and Stenographers working in the establishment Branch were not under the supervision of the Assistant secretary, and that he had no power with regard to leave, expenditure and distribution of work. The following statements made by Mr. Trivedi in his were not controverted:"para-27. 1 have no power or control or authority for employees working with me in the establishment section either (1) to hire them (2) to transfer them (3) to suspend them (4) to recall them (5) to reward them (6) to allocate, to distribute, or to make any change in their work and duties (7) to sanction any leave either C. L. or E. L. to them (8) to promote or demote them (9) to confirm them (11) to punish them for any default on their part (12) to appoint any inquiry officer for conducting inquiries against the defaulting employees (13) to take any disciplinary action against them (14) to make even temporary appointments and arrangements for filling in vacancies, or (15) to discharge-terminate or dismiss them from their services. " ( 10 ) IN order to decide whether an employee is a workman as contemplated under section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Court has to decide as whether the work performed by him is of a supervisory or managerial nature. The label by which the post of the employee is advertised is of no consequence. The duties performed by Mr. Trivedi and his limited powers lead to only one conclusion that Mr. Trivedi was not employed mainly in managerial or supervisory capacity, and if he does not fall either under Clause (3) or clause (4) of section 2 (s), he has to be treated as a workman for all purposes, even though he might be drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1600/- per month. ( 11 ) IT cannot be said that the judgment and award of the Industrial Tribunal contains any error which calls for any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. No authority is required to be cited on this point, but it would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Andhra Scientific Co. ( 11 ) IT cannot be said that the judgment and award of the Industrial Tribunal contains any error which calls for any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. No authority is required to be cited on this point, but it would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. vs. A Seshagiri Rao and another, 1967 S. C. 408, wherein the Supreme Court held that when a Labour Court has on consideration of the evidence come to the conclusion in view on the functions that were actually being performed by an employee that he comes within the definition of "workman" under section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the High Court will not interfere under Article 226 except in cases where there is a clear error of the face of the record. ( 12 ) IN Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. , 1984 S. C. 914 while dealing with the question whether the appellant who was the security officer could be said to be a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act; the Supreme Court held on examining the fact that the substantial duty of the concerned employee was only that of Security inspector at the gate of the factory premises, and power to depute the watchman working under him to work at the factory gate or to watch towers around the factory or to accompany the visitors, to make entries in the visitorss register, would not make any difference since he had no power to appoint or dismiss any workman or order any inquiry against anybody. ( 13 ) IN S. K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra and Anr. 1984 S. C. 1462 The Supreme Court after considering the duties and powers of development officers in Life Insurance corporation of India went to the extent of saying that the scale of pay as well as authorities competent to appoint and take disciplinary action against subordinate staff indicated that the appellation development officer is no more than a glorified designation and so the Development Officer in Life Insurance Corporation of India was held to be a workman. ( 14 ) IN Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. , 1985 S. C. 985 The supreme Court held that where an employee has multifarious duties the court must find out what are the primary and basis duties of the employee and the dominant purpose of employment must be first taken into consideration. It was held that the definition of the expression "workman" clearly shows that the person concerned would not cease to be a workman if he performs some supervisory duty. In that particular case, the employee designated as a Group Leader who was performing the duties of clerical nature, and along with others incidentally looked after any work of other members did not cease to be a workman because of such additional work, and the employee also would not become an officer merely because his cadre was styled as Covenanted Contractual Staff. It was observed that such high sounding nomenclatures are adopted not only to inflate the ego of the employer but primarily for avoiding the application of the Act. ( 15 ) IN the present case, Trivedi was discharging multifarious duties, most of which were clerical in nature. He had no power to appoint, demote any employee, to take any disciplinary action against him; he could not take any decisive step even though he sat in the Selection Committee. All the powers on the subordinate staff rested in the superintending Engineer, and thus no error had been committed by the Industrial Tribunal when it was held that Shri Trivedi was a workman entitled to continue his service upto the age of 60 years. ( 16 ) THERE is no reason to interfere with the judgment and award of the Tribunal. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs. .