Judgment : The respondents 1, 3, 7, 12 and 15 in I.A.No.1659 of 1984 in O.S.No.2256 of 1981 on the file of learned I Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, are the appellants herein. The present respondent-plaintiff instituted the said suit for dissolution and accounts of the firm “Transworld” and for other reliefs. That suit was originally instituted in 1973, transferred to High Court and again re-transferred to City Civil Court. On 11. 1984, it was dismissed for default in the City Civil Court. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed I.A.Nos.1658 and 1659 of 1984. The first application is one under O.9, Rule 9, C.P.C, to restore the suit to file. The next application is under O.39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C, to restrain the present appellants from in any manner dealing with the properly bearing No.13, Venkatanarayana Road, Madras 17 either by way of lease or mortgage or any other manner of alienation by way of settlement,.gifts etc or demolishing the building pending disposal of the application to restore the suit dismissed for default. The appellants resisted that application. While dismissing that application, learned I Additional Judge, directed the present appellants to furnish bank guarantee to the tune of Rs.1,50,000 to protect the interest of the plaintiff pending disposal of the suit within two weeks from that date and directed that till then the appellants herein should not in any way deal with the property as indicated earlier. And this appeal is directed against the said order. 2. Mr.Himmatmal Mardia, learned counsel for the appellants first submitted that the impugned order is not valid on the face of it, A perusal of the petition in I.A.No.1659 of 1984 would indicate that the inj unction prayed for there in was to enure only during the pendency of I.A.No.1658 of 1984 which was for the restoration of the suit dismissed for default. There is no dispute that the suit has already been restored to file. While so it is evident that any injunction order passed in I.A.No. 1659 of 1984 came to an end the moment the other petition was allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants next pointed out that under O.39, Rule 1, C.P.C., the court may grant a temporary injunction only in a pending suit. The expression “where in any suit” occurring in the said provision is significant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants next pointed out that under O.39, Rule 1, C.P.C., the court may grant a temporary injunction only in a pending suit. The expression “where in any suit” occurring in the said provision is significant. In this case, admittedly no suit was pending when I. A.No. 1659 of 1984 came to be filed. It, therefore follows that before the restoration of the suit, the provisions of O.39, Rule 1, C.P.C., could not have been invoked. 4. Learned counsel next argued that the essential pre requisite for the issuance of an injunction order under O.39, rule 1, C.P.C., is cither the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or the defendant threatens to dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors. From this it follows that the property in respect of which injunction is sought for must be a property in dispute in that particular action. Here, the suit is one for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts. The property in respect of which the impugned order has been passed has nothing to do with the relief prayed for in the suit. 5. Besides 0.39, Rules 1 and 2 envisage that there is a danger of the property in question being wasted, damaged or alienated or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or it was sought to be disposed of by the defendant with a view to defraud his creditors. The affidavit in support of the application in I.A.No.1659 of 1984 contains no such allegations. The only averment therein is that in the event of present appellants alienating the property the plaintiff will not be able to recover the decree amount. Evidently, this allegation may be sufficient for calling upon to furnish security under O.38, Rule 5, C.P.C. but they cannot form the basis for the issuance of an injunction under O.39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the plaintiff on restoration of the suit should have filed another application to get the injunction application also restored or he should have preferred an appeal against the dismissal of the injunction petition. Instead, filing of fresh petition like I.A.No.1659 of 1984 is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the plaintiff on restoration of the suit should have filed another application to get the injunction application also restored or he should have preferred an appeal against the dismissal of the injunction petition. Instead, filing of fresh petition like I.A.No.1659 of 1984 is not maintainable. In Bhajan Singh v. Ganeshi Devi, A.I.R. 1978 P. &H. 257, it was held that an application under 0.9, Rule 9, C.P.C. is competent if it seeks the restoration of an earlier application seeking restoration of the suit in the event that the suit and the said previous application had both been dismissed for default. The provisions of Sec.141 are very wide in their amplitude and there is no reason why any restricted meaning should be attached to them in the absence of any indication to that effect in the language employed. An application under 0.9, Rule 9 of the Code is certainly a proceeding in a court of civil Jurisdiction and, therefore, the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits has to be followed in respect thereof. In other words, if an application of that type is dismissed for default, the procedure available to be aggrieved party would be the same as is open to a plaintiff when his suit is dismissed for default. In Anand Rao Kesheo Rao Pande v. Krishnaji Baliram Dhapakdar, A.I.R. 1964 Bom. 232, the judgment-debtor initiated proceedings under Sec.3(2) of Madhya Pradesh Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act. When it was dismissed for default, the judgment-debtor preferred an application for restoration of that petition. That was also dismissed for default. Held, that the proper remedy for the petitioner to adopt was to file an appeal under O.43, Rule 1(c) of the Civil Procedure Code and not to file a fresh application for restoration. What Sec.141, C.P.C, contemplates is original proceedings and to all such original proceedings which fall under the section, the provisions of O.9 must apply. Learned counsel for the appellants further pointed out that the interim stay of the order impugned is in force from 19. 1984 onwards the property still with appellants is now worth two crores of rupees and hence there is no necessary to direct them to furnish bank guarantee. I therefore, find that the order passed by the court below is unsustainable. 1984 onwards the property still with appellants is now worth two crores of rupees and hence there is no necessary to direct them to furnish bank guarantee. I therefore, find that the order passed by the court below is unsustainable. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order passed in I.A.No.1659 of 1984 directing the appellants to furnish bank guarantee is set aside. No costs.