Honble BALIA, J.—This is defendants second appeal against the decree of eviction passed by the Addl. District Judge, Churu on 29.5.93 on the ground that let out a premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let out for continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, the ground set fourth in section 13(l)(j) of the Rajasthan (Premises of Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. (2). The suit was dismissed by the trial court by holding that plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant is not using the suit premises for a period of 6 months immediately before filing of the suit. This finding on issue No. 1 was reversed by the lower appellate court in its judgment dt. 29.5.93 and suit was decreed on that basis. (3). Learned counsel for the appellant in the first place contended that no foundation for seeking eviction on the ground set forth under section 13(l)(j) was laid in the pleadings of the plaintiff inasmuch as absence of reasonable cause for not using the suit premises by the defendant was not pleaded. He contends that unless ingredients of the ground of eviction stated in section 15(1) of the Act have been pleaded, the question at all ought not to have been enquired into. He placed reliance on C.P. Massey Vs. Hirachand (1). (4). Learned counsel for the respondent contended that plea of want of reasonable cause for non-user of the shop by the defendant is implicit in the pleading of the plaintiff which reads as under : — ^^;g fd dfFkr nqdku izfroknh us vlkZ tk;n 6 ekg ls cUn dj j[kh gS vkSj jrux<+ dLcs ds vewus cktkj esa ,d nqdku fdjk;s ij ysdj viuk dkjksckj djrk gSA {kfrxzLr nqdku esa mlus dkjksckj djuk cUn dj fn;k gSA blfy, ;g oknh mlls nqdku fjDr djkus dk vf/kdkjh gSA (5). He further contended that it is the non-user of premises for six months by the. tenant immediately preceding the suit is primarily the ground of eviction under section 13(l)(j). The existence of reasonable cause for such non-user furnishes the ground of defence against eviction, where the tenant is found to be not using the suit premises of the prescribed period immediately before filing the suit. tenant immediately preceding the suit is primarily the ground of eviction under section 13(l)(j). The existence of reasonable cause for such non-user furnishes the ground of defence against eviction, where the tenant is found to be not using the suit premises of the prescribed period immediately before filing the suit. He, therefore, contends that when in his written statement, defendants has denied the factum of non-user and positively pleaded that he is using the suit shop for the purpose for which the same has been let out to him, want of specific plea or any evidence about absence of reasonable cause has no effect on the substance of the case. He placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Santlal Vs. Harbans Singh (2). (6). Learned counsel for the appellant in this connection argued that decision in Santlals case has not taken into consideration the earlier decision of the coordinate Bench in C.P. Masseys case. Therefore, the question requires reconsideration. (7). Having bestowed my anxious consideration on the contention and having perused the two decisions, I am of the opinion that learned counsel for the appellant is not right in his submission. (8). In C.P. Masseys case the question about nature of pleadings required for the case falling under section 13(1)0 was not directly raised and decided. From the judgment it appears that plaintiff has sought eviction on the ground of default, of non-user of suit premises and acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation by the defendant. The suit was decreed on the ground of default and acquisition of alternative accommodation as is apparent from the ground on which decree was founded mentioned in para 4 of the report. In the first appellate court the decree was not challenged on the ground that no ground existed under section 13(1)0. Apparently inspite of the finding that suit premises has not been used for a period of 6 months, the suit was not decreed on that ground because the defendant had reasonable cause for non-user of the suit premises. Before the first appellate court plaintiff had given up the ground for eviction on account of availability of suitable alternative accommodation and the decree was affirmed only on the ground of default by the appellate court. Before the first appellate court plaintiff had given up the ground for eviction on account of availability of suitable alternative accommodation and the decree was affirmed only on the ground of default by the appellate court. The ground of default failed in the second appeal because section 13 A was inserted by Amendment Act, 1976 and the defendant appellant became entitled to protection from eviction under those provisions. Plaintiff respondent wanted to take recourse of finding in his favour that defendant did not use the suit premises for more than 6 months preceding the date of suit. The court opined that under clause 13(1)0 a defendant is liable to be evicted only in the premises is not used without reasonable cause. It further came to the conclusion that plaintiffs own statement shows that defendant did not use the suit premises because his wife was residing elsewhere due to her service exigencies. The statement on the face of it showed that there was reasonable cause for the tenant not to occupy the suit premises during a period of 6 months preceding the date of the suit. Thus having found that on evidence, ground mentioned in section 13(l)(j) is not made out. The court further observed that the plaintiff did not i even mention in the plaint that the plaintiff did not use the suit premises without reasonable cause. This absence of pleading about absence of reasonable cause was clearly used as corroboration for the conclusion at which the court has arrived on the basis of evidence about existence of reasonable cause. Therefore, the decision cannot be treated as an authority for the proposition that unless the worlds" without reasonable cause have been pleaded the pleadings are not complete. The observation made in C.P. Masseys case relied on by learned counsel for the appellant is only obiter dicta and not the ratio of the decision. (9). In Santlals case this question directly arose before this Court. The Court answers the question in negative. It observed as under : — "The other point that remains to be considered in regard to S. 13(l)(j) is that the plaintiff had not alleged that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause. It is correct that the plaintiff has not stated in the plaint that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause. It observed as under : — "The other point that remains to be considered in regard to S. 13(l)(j) is that the plaintiff had not alleged that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause. It is correct that the plaintiff has not stated in the plaint that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause. It is also true that the plaintiff has not led any evidence regarding without reasonable cause. The question is whether the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the fact without reasonable cause. Having regard to the defence taken in para 3 of the written statement, filed by the defendants, I am definitely of the opinion that it was neither necessary for the plaintiff to have pleaded about without reasonable cause nor was it necessary for him to lead evidence in this regard. The defendant did not come even with an alternative plea to the effect that the shop remained closed or was not used without reasonable cause. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for any of the parties to lead evidence in regard to the point of without reasonable cause." (10). In this connection it may be noticed that in Civil Second Appeal decided on 30.03.1993 the view similar to Santlals case has been expressed in the following terms : "While it is for plaintiff to establish that the suit premises has not been used for 6 months or more immediately before the filing of suit, it is for the defendant to allege and prove that he has reasonable cause for such non-user. This is apart from the fact that absence of reasonable cause is implicit in plaintiffs pleading that defendant has shifted to Ahmedabad for last 10 years and not using the suit shop." (11). The aforesaid decision of this Court also finds support from a decision of Supreme Court in Mahalal Vs. Kasturlal (3) where their Lordships held as under: — "In his written statement, and in his evidence the tenant had pleaded that he had not ceased to occupy the shop; he had not set up a case that the shop was not occupied for a reasonable cause. The High Court erred in holding that the Rent Controller had not given a specific finding whether the non-occupation of the shop was due to any reasonable cause. The High Court erred in holding that the Rent Controller had not given a specific finding whether the non-occupation of the shop was due to any reasonable cause. The facts necessary to establish any reasonable cause could only be in the knowledge of the tenant and if he did not lead any evidence to establish these facts it was hardly the statutory duty of this Rent Controller to give a more detailed and specific finding as to reasonable cause for not occupying the shop." (12). The Section 13(2)(v) setting forth ground of eviction under East Punjab Rent Control read as Under:— "Whether building is situate at a place other than a hill station the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause." (13). The ingredients of the ground under section 13(l)(j) under the Rajasthan Act for seeking eviction are substantially the same as under section 13(2)(v) of the E.P. Act. Therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is fully applicable to the present case. In the present case also the defendant-appellant has not pleaded or led evidence about existence of reasonable cause which could only be in his personal knowledge. (14). In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the essential requirement of pleading by the landlord seeking eviction on the ground of section 13(1)(j) are that defendant is not using the suit premises for continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit or to say non-user by the tenant for the prescribed period is the soul of plaintiffs case. It is the part of defence permitted by statute that notwithstanding such non-user if he had a reasonable cause for the same, the tenant cannot be evicted. (15). Apart from the aforesaid I am of the opinion that the pleadings of the plaintiff, in which he has alleged the suit shop has been not used for more than 6 months, the defendant has started his business in another shop in Ratangarh and he has closed his business in the suit premises, the want of reasonable cause for non-user is implicit in these averments. In reply to para 4 of the plaint the defendant has denied the very fact that he is not using the suit shop for any period. In reply to para 4 of the plaint the defendant has denied the very fact that he is not using the suit shop for any period. Contrarily he has asserted that he is doing the business of English Medicines in the suit shop as before. The plea of the previous defendant about use of suit finds place in Paras No. 2,4 and 10 of written statement. At any stage the defendant has not given even whispering that in case the suit shop is found to have not been used, he had any reasonable cause for not using the suit shop. Is that view of the matter it must be accepted In the face of pleadings of the parties that if it is found that the suit shop was not being used by defendant for a period of 6 months or more before filing the suit, there was no reasonable cause for its non-user. (16). It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellant that finding of the lower appellate court which is a finding of a reversal on issue No. 1 is vitiated as the lower appellate court has not specifically discussed the reasons given by the trial court in support of its finding. Attention of the court has been invited to discussion of the trial court wherein the statement of PW-3, who in his cross-examination admits that defendant Sewa Ram is using suit shop as godown and relying on statement the trial court came to the conclusion that the suit shop was being used for the purpose of the godown though contrary to the licencing provisions. In this context learned counsel also invited my attention to the discussion of the evidence by the appellate court wherein the court referred to the statement of P.W. 3 Mahesh and observed as under :- ^^oknh i{k ds vU; xokg egsk dqekj dh nqdku LVsku jksM+ ij gh oknxzLr nqdku ls 6 uEcj ij vkbZ gqbZ gS vkSj bl xokg us vius c;ku 20-2-87 ls igys 12 lky esa bl oknxzLr nqdku dks dHkh Hkh [kqyk ugha ns[kuk vkSj izfroknh dks bl nqdku ij nokbZ;kW csprs gq, ugha ns[kuk dgk gSA bl xokg us viuh ftjg esa lsokjke }kjk bl nqdku esa viuh nokbZ;ksa dk xksnke cuk j[kuk tks dgk gS ysfdu xokg dk ;g dFku ekuus ;ksX; ugha gS vkSj ftl ckjs esa vkxs fopkj fd;k tk;sxkA (17). Learned counsel contends on the basis of aforesaid observation that having left the statement of Mahesh to be discussed later on judgment did not lead at any state to that stage, thereafter, and therefore, the finding of the lower appellate court on the issue stands vitiated. (18). Having carefully considered the contention of the learned counsel and going through entire discussion of evidence, I do not find any merit in the contention. The observation regarding consideration later on with reference to statement of P.W. 3 Mahesh is only to the effect that statement of P.W. 3 is not reliable evidence in the light of entire evidence discussed henceforth. It may be noticed that trial Court relied on the statement of Mahesh only as a corroboration of the defendants case that the suit premises are being used by him as godown. From the entire discussion of lower appellate court it is apparent that the defendants own evidence including statement of defendant himself has not been found reliable on the question of the suit premises being used as godown, particularly in view of the fact that defendant was taking shifting stand about actual user of the suit premises by him. Once defendants own case falls on his own evidence, the finding of the trial court could not be accepted on the basis of a line in cross-examination of one of plaintiffs witness which at best can be a corroborating piece of evidence. Therefore, I find no infirmity in finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the suit shop is not being used even for the purpose of godown during the period of 6 months preceding the date of suit. (19). In view of the fact that the lower appellate court has taken into consideration even the alternative question that use of suit shop as godown can be considered as user of the suit shop for the purpose for which it was being used by the tenant though it was not even the plea of the defendant and has held after detailed discussion of evidence that the defendant has failed to prove any such user, the question raised by the plaintiff that use of shop as godown does not fall within the meaning of use of the premises for the purpose for which let out need not be discussed. (20). (20). It was also contended by learned counsel for the appellant that finding on issue no. 2 also cannot be sustained. Issue No. 2 was whether the suit shop has become dilapidated due to its non-user. Suffice it to say that neither there are averments in the plaint not there is anything on record to show that the suit shop has become unfit for human habitation. No decree for eviction can be passed on mere finding that suit shop has become dilapidated unless the requirement for reconstructions is for the purpose and in the circumstances mentioned in S. 13(l)(k), no ground for eviction is made out. Moreover the finding on issue no. 2 appears to have been arrived at without any material on record as to the condition of suit shop. (21). However, finding on this issue does not effect the end result of the appeal in view of aforesaid discussion because the decree for eviction is sustainable on the ground u/s. 13(1)(j) alone. The appeal has, therefore, no merit and the same is hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs of this appeal. (22). Learned counsel for the appellant prays for reasonable time to vacate the suit shop and surrender the possession of suit shop of the plaintiff respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant has no objection to grant of reasonable time for the purpose of obviating the necessity of executing the decree through court. In the circumstances of the case it is directed that the defendant will surrender the vacant possession of the suit shop within 4 months to the plaintiff landlord on furnishing an undertaking within two months to executing court that he shall not transfer or part with the possession of the suit shop, in any manner in favour of any person other than the decree holder and further undertakes to deliver the vacant possession of the suit premises to the decree holder by or before 31st Dec. 1993. He shall continue to pay mesne profits at the rate of which rent was payable until the vacant possession of the suit premises is surrendered. On fulfilment of aforesaid condition the respondent shall not execute the decree until 31st Dec. 1993.