JUDGMENT S.B. SINHA & G.S. SHARMA, JJ. 1. In this application the petitioner has questioned an order of transfer dated 28.6.1993 whereby and whereunder he has been posted to Topachanchi Circle from Jharia Circle and respondent no. 4 Braj Bhushan Sharma has been transferred at his place. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. According to the petitioner, one Sri Awadhesh Kumar, Member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly issued a letter dated 19.4.1993 to the Minister, Food, Supply and Commerce department wherein it was contended that as the daughter of respondent no. 4 was reading in S.S.L.N.T. Women's College, Dhanbad, he should be posted in any of the three Blocks namely, Bermo Block, Dhanbad Block and Jharia Block. It appears from the said letter, which is contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application that on the body thereof itself, he had directed the Deputy Commissioner and Secretary to take immediate action in that regards and comply with the said request; whereupon the Food Secretary had made an endorsement to one Shri Raj Kishore to take action immediately. According to the petitioner, pursuant to the said direction of the Minister, in the light of the recommendations of the Member of the Legislative Assembly, the impugned order dated 28.6.1993 as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application was passed. It was further submitted that prior to passing of the said order, the matter was not placed before the Establishment Committee. Learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Sri Abdul Muttalib vs. State of Bihar & other, 1985 PLJR 931 4. Mr. Awadhesh Kumar Mishra as also Mr. R.S. Roy, learned S.C.1 submitted that the petitioner was posted in the Block in question for a period of four years six months. From a perusal of Annexure 3, it would appear that the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar had issued a letter dated 3.10.1992 that all further postings and transfers should be avoided. It was further submitted that as respondent no. 4 has been transferred on humanitarian ground, his posting should not be disturbed. It has further been submitted that the petitioner had been earlier posted in Dhanbad District and he has built his house and thus he is not willing to be transferred from Dhanbad Block. It was further submitted that as respondent no. 4 has been transferred on humanitarian ground, his posting should not be disturbed. It has further been submitted that the petitioner had been earlier posted in Dhanbad District and he has built his house and thus he is not willing to be transferred from Dhanbad Block. Learned counsel further submitted that no pressure was put by the Member, Legislative Assembly and in that view of the matter, no inference can be drawn that the petitioner had been transferred on a political pairvi made by a Member of Legislative Assembly. It was further submitted that the remedy of the petitioner is to file a representation before the State of Bihar. In support of the aforementioned contention, learned counsel has relied upon the decision in Shanti Kumari vs. Regional Deputy Director, Health Services, Patna Division reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C., 1577, B. Vardha Rao vs. State of Karnataka & other reported in A.I.R. 1986 S.C., 1955 (1986) 4 SCC, 181 and a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & others vs. S.L. Abbas reported in (1993) 4 S.C.C.357. 5. It is now well known in view of the decision of this Court reported in 1985 PLJR, 931 (Supra) that an order of transfer should not be passed on the basis of a political pairvi. 6. In this case, evidently, the impugned order has been passed in terms of the direction made by the Minister to the Food Commissioner-cum-Secretary. It may further be noted that the notification dated 28.6.1993 although had been issued purported to be under the orders of the Governor of Bihar, but the same has been signed by the Secretary for the Food Commissioner, who admittedly is not authorised to authenticate any order passed by the State of Bihar in terms of clause 3 of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this connection may be made of the case of Prafulla Kumar Swain vs. Prakash Chandra Mishra & other reported in (1993) Supplementary (3) S.C.C. 181. 7. It is true that normally this Court does not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a transfer matter. It is further true that in such matters, the normal remedy available to an aggrieved person is to file representation before the State Government itself. 7. It is true that normally this Court does not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a transfer matter. It is further true that in such matters, the normal remedy available to an aggrieved person is to file representation before the State Government itself. But in the decisions referred to by learned counsel for the respondents it has only been held that even if any administrative instructions and guidelines are not followed, the same cannot be categorised as malafide. However, in this case, the order of transfer as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application is vitiated on more that one reasons. 8. As indicated hereinbefore, the order of transfer was passed on the recommendations of a Member of Legislative Assembly and thus there cannot be any doubt that the said order is vitiated both on fact as also in law. It has also not been disputed that prior to passing of the impugned order, the matter had not been placed before the Establishment Committee at all which requirement may although is directory but the same was necessary to be complied with substantially. 9. In Man Singh vs. The State of Bihar & others reported in 1982 B.B.C.J., 392, a Division Bench of this court held that executive instructions has also the force of law. The Division Bench further held as follows:– "The holding that the executive instructions are directory does not mean that they can be ignored with impunity. Even directory provisions are not meant to be violated. It was held in Pratap Singh vs. Shri Krishna Gupta. Some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter; they cannot be broken; others are only directory and a breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as whole and provided no prejudice ensues; and when Legislature does not itself state which is which Judges must determine the matter and exercising a nice discrimination, sort out one class from the other along broad based, commonsense lines. The Supreme Court accepted the dictum of the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd., Amritsar, vs. Income Tax Officer, Lahore to the following effect. The Supreme Court accepted the dictum of the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd., Amritsar, vs. Income Tax Officer, Lahore to the following effect. It is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially." It is, therefore, evident that if the matter of transfer has not been placed before the Establishment Committee at all, the order of transfer would be vitiated in law. 10. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, even the notification has been issued under the signature of Secretary to the Food Commissioner who admittedly, is not authorised to authenticate any Governmental order in terms of the Rules of Executive Business. 11. For the reasons mentioned hereinbefore, this application is allowed and the impugned order as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application is quashed. However, it goes without saying that in view of the fact that the petitioner as also respondent no. 4 have already completed more than three years, their cases for transfer may now be placed before the Establishment Committee and it will be open to the Committee to pass an appropriate and it will be open to the Committee to pass an appropriate order of transfer in accordance with law. 12. This application is allowed with the aforementioned observations.