Judgment Nagendra Rai, J. 1. The tenants-petitioners have filed the present revision-application against the judgment and decree dated 29th May,1993, passed by the Munsif 1st Court, Darbhanga, in Eviction Suit No.30/85, decreeing the landlords opposite parties, suit for eviction. 2. The plaintiffs-opposite parties filed the suit for eviction against the defendants-petitioners from the suit premises described in schedule 2 of the plaint on the ground of personal necessity. 3. The plaintiffs case, in brief, is that Mahahir Prasad Khetan, father of plaintiff 2nd party and grandfather of plaintiffs first party, was the owner of the property described in schedule-1 of the plaint He executed a registered deed of gift on 9-11-1984 in favour of plaintiffs first party with regard to schedule-I property and put them in possession, Jugal Kishore khetan, plaintiff second party being the father of plaintiff 1st party was looking after the suit property on behalf of his sons. Mahabir Pd. Khetan had let out a portion of Schedule-1 property to the defendants, described in schedule-2 of the plaint on a monthly rental of Rs.265/- for carrying on a business of Handloom cloths. They used to pay the rent regularly to Mahabir Prasad Khetan and then to the plaintiff second party from November, 1984 to July, 1985. Thereafter the plaintiffs first party asked the tenants to vacate the suit premises as they required the same to start their own business for their livelihood. On the request of the tenants six months six months time was granted to vacate the premises, even then they did not vacate the same, hence the suit. 4. The defendants appeared and contested the suit. Their stand is that the suit property did not exclusively belong to Mahabir Prasad Khetan, on the other hand, it belongs to his wife Indra Devi and the other brothers of the plaintiff second party are claiming interest in the said property. According to them, the entire ground-floor of the premises in question was let out by Indra Oevi to Haji Nasiruddin, husband of petitioner no.1 on a monthly rental of Rs.110/- and the rent receipts were granted by her through her husband Mahabir Prasad Khetan. On earlier occasion, on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff second party, half of the premises, which was let out to Haji Nasiruddin, which was vacated by him in the year 197v and possession was given to opp. second party. On earlier occasion, on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff second party, half of the premises, which was let out to Haji Nasiruddin, which was vacated by him in the year 197v and possession was given to opp. second party. However, the rental remained the same. Plaintiff has started a business in the aforesaid vacated portion in the name and style of Khetan Textile, which is still running. However, after execution of the deed of gift by Mahabir Prasad Khetan in favour of plaintiffs first party, the name of the aforesaid firm was changed from Khetan Textile to Vijay textile. According to them, the monthly rental was enhanced later on to Rs.265/-. The defendants denied the ground of personal necesssity as asserted by the plaintiffs. According to them, plaintiff No.1 who is the eldest son of plaintiff opposite second party, is aged 14 years and other are minors and school-going children and as such the plaintiffs did not require the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting a business. 5. As the suit was for eviction on the ground of personal necessity it was tried according to the procedure laid down under Sec.14 of the bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) It is to be mentioned that during trial the defendant filed a petition on 30th September, 1992 (Ext. E) that they had vacated the suit premises on 1-11-1989. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence and the trial court held that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting the business. The trial court disbelieved the story set up by the defendants that they had delivered the possession of the suit premises on 1-11-1989. 6. The trial court disbelieved the story set up by the defendants that they had delivered the possession of the suit premises on 1-11-1989. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised two points-firstly, that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting business is not sustainable in law for the reason that the plaintiffs neither placed in the plaint nor adduced any evidence to show as to the nature of the business which they intend to start nor they have brought any material on the record to show that they have means and capacity to start business and in that view of the matter, on the evidence on the record, it cannot be said that the requirement of the plaintiffs, in the present case, is reasonable, and bona fide. Secondly, that the trial court has not considered the question of partial eviction, as it was enjoined to consider it in view of the proviso to Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act 7. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, on the other hand, contended that the court below having considered the pleadings and the evidence on the record has come to a categorical and definite finding about the reasonable and bona fide need of the plaintiff and this Court should not interfere with the same especially when the said finding is a finding of fact and there is nothing on the record to show that the said finding is contrary to law. He also contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case the court below has rightly not considered the question of partial eviction in terms of proviso to Sec.11 (1) (c) of the act. 8. The present revision-Application has been filed under Sec.14 (8) of the Act which empowers the court to see as to whether the judgment is according to law or not. No doubt, the power under Sec.14 (8)of the Act is wider than the power under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil procedure, but the same cannot be equated with the power of appeal. This Court can only interfere with the order of eviction if it comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below is not according to law. 9. This Court can only interfere with the order of eviction if it comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below is not according to law. 9. So far as first question is concerned, a landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction only if he proves that the building is required reasonably and in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any other person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. In other words, the requirement of the landlord should be honest and convincing to reason. Only a desire or wish on the part of landlord to require the premises will not meet the requirement of Sec.11 (1) (c) of the act. There should be an element of need on the part of the landlord and and fanciful claim on his part could not be a ground for eviction. However, this does not mean that the landlord has to prove that he is in dire need of the building or the requirement should not be interpreted in such a way as to impossible for a landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court has to take a reasonable approach in deciding the said question in what circumstances the requirement of a building will be said to be reasonable and in good faitb is difficult to define, it depends upon the facts of each case which has to be decided by the court keeping in view the materials placed on behalf of the parties. It is equally difficult to lay down the element or ground on the basis of which it can be inferred the requirement of the landlord is held to be reasonable and bonafide one. 10. In a case of requirement of a building for starting a business, the court has to consider many relevant factors in determining the question as to whether the requirement is reasonable and in good faith? The nature of business, means to start a business, location of the building, non-availability of other suitable accommodation or other means of livelihood are some of the elements which have an important bearing in deciding the said question. The nature of business, means to start a business, location of the building, non-availability of other suitable accommodation or other means of livelihood are some of the elements which have an important bearing in deciding the said question. However, it is made clear that the aforesaid elements are not conclusive in the sense that prove and disprove of the same would be a deciding factor in coming to the conclusion as to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the landlord This has to be judged in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case 11. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioners while elaborating his submission contended that in the plaint the landlord have only asserted that they required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for starting a business. The nature of the business has neither been stated in the pleadings nor in the evidence On the other hand, some of the plaintiffs witnesses have stated that the plaintiffs have not decided about the nature of business which they intend to start There is also no evidence on the record to show that they have means to start a business. In view of such discrepant nature of materials on the record, the finding of the court below regarding reasonable and bonafide requirement is contrary to law. 12. The question which falls for consideration is as to whether it is necessary to state the nature of the business in the plaint when a suit is filed for eviction on the ground that the building is required by the plaintiffs for starting a business. The object of the pleading is not to punish the parties but to intimate the parties about the cases of each other and to enable the court to determine the question in controversy between the parties. The pleading is required to be construed liberally and the court has to consider its substance and not its form. The law requires that the plaint should contain a statement in concise form of the material facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim. In other words, the essential part of the facts has to be pleaded in the plaint. There is no requirement either to state the evidence by which the plaintiff wants to prove his case or to state the law. In other words, the essential part of the facts has to be pleaded in the plaint. There is no requirement either to state the evidence by which the plaintiff wants to prove his case or to state the law. Even if a plea is not raised in the plaint but the parties during the trial knew the case of each other and led evidence in support of their plea, then the claim of the parties cannot be defeated on the ground of the absence of the plea in the pleading A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kalawati Tripathi and Ors. v Smt. Damayanti Devi and Anr.1992 (2) PLJR 214 summarised the law on this point in the following words : "generally the parties should not be allotted to travel beyond their pleading However pleadings should be construed liberally and the court should not adopt a pedantic approach. If the substance of the essential material facts for grant of relief is stated in the pleading the Court should not throw away the same on the ground of defective form or the deficiency in the pleading. Even if the plea is not raised in the pleading even then a claim of the party cannot be defeated, if the parties knew the respective cases of each other on the said plea and led evidence in support of their cases. " 13. In the present case the plaintiffs, in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint, have stated their need, which is as follows :- "para 11. That the plaintiffs have got no other means of livelihood and wants to start a business of their own in the Schedule-II premises which is a fit and suitable side for business and has no building other than this for the said purpose and also that the plaintiffs have no means to hire an another building of the similar site and as such require the disputed house for bona fide purpose. Para 12. That the plaintiffs require the Schedule II property for their personal necessity and the defendants are deliberately avoiding to vacate the same inspite of the fact that other bnilding for carrying on the business may available to the defendant. " 14. Para 12. That the plaintiffs require the Schedule II property for their personal necessity and the defendants are deliberately avoiding to vacate the same inspite of the fact that other bnilding for carrying on the business may available to the defendant. " 14. From perusal of the aforesaid two paragraphs it is clear that the plaintiffs have asserted that they have got no other means for their livelihood and want to start business of their own in the said building, which is fit and suitable for business and except that they have no other building for the business. The said statements in the plaint fulfil the requirement of pleading and non-mentioning the exact nature of business will not be a ground to non-suit the plaintiffs. The details as to the nature of the business and the other relevant things are the matters of evidence. However, in this case even at the stage of evidence the plaintffs have not stated about the exact nature of business which they intend to start. In the evidence they want to start a business in the suit premises. It further appears that opposite party No.2 has been examined as P. W.20 and be has stated in his evidence that he has not as yet decided about the nature of the business to be started in the suit building. Thus, from the materials on the record it is evident that except a vague statement that the plaintiffs intend to start a business there is no evidence on the record as to the nature of the business to be started, means of the plaintiffs to start a business and other relevant points. 15. Whether on the basis of the aforesaid materials it could be said that the plaintiffs have prove their reasonable and bonafide requirement. The answer is no. The omission of the aforesaid details in the pleading as well as in the evidence would cause prejudice to the tenant. He would not be in a position to lead evidence to show lack of bonafide and good faith on the part of the plaintiffs in requiring the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by him. In such a situation, it would be also difficult to the court to judge whether the requirement of the plaintiff is bonafide and in good faith or not. In such a situation, it would be also difficult to the court to judge whether the requirement of the plaintiff is bonafide and in good faith or not. In the facts of this case, even if it is accepted that the omission to mention the exact nature of the business in the plaint would not be a fatal to the plaintiffs. The omission of the ether details in the evidence, as mentioned above, clearly shows lack of reasonableness and good faith on the part of the plaintiff in requiring the suit building. The trial court has (lost sight of these relevant considerations and has decreed the suit only on the ground that the plaintiff required it for starting a business. In my view, the requirement of the plaintiffs in this case is only a fanciful claim and the evidence on the record is lacking to prove the the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiffs. 16. As I have held above that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the building is required reasonably and in good faith, it is not necessary to decide the question of partial eviction raised on behalf of the petitioners 17. Before concluding the order, I may mention that the learned counsel for the landlord-opp. party stated that the tenants have filed a petition in the court below that they have vacated the premises and aft such the present revision application is not maintainable, I am unable to agree with this contention The landlords denied the aforesaid assertion of the tenants in the court below and the court below having accepted the stand of the landlords in this regard have held that the tenants petitioners have not vacated the premises. The said finding has not been challenged before me. 18. In the result, the application is allowed and the judgment and decree of the court below is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.