G. P. SHIVAPRAKASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under section 50 (1) of the Karnataka rent control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') is presented against the order made in hrc no. 475 of 1988 on the file of the small causes judge, Bangalore city. The trial court has allowed the eviction petition filed by the respondent under section 21 (1) (f), (h) and (p) of the act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a public limited company having a turnover of 6 crores ofrupees with a profit of Rs. 60 to 70 lacs, ending 30-3-1990. The respondent is a surgeon with a string of academic qualifications and memberships of several professional bodies of repute to boot. ( 3 ) THE respondent owns premises bearing no. 114, 9th main, 7th cross,rajmahal vilas extension, bangalore. The petitioner is a tenant, under the respondent since september 1980, using the said premises as company guest house. The respondent wants his house for his own use and occupation and that of his family consisting of his wife and a school going daughter aged 5 years, as on the date of filing of the eviction petition in the trial court. It appears that after the completion of recording of evidence in the trial court, the respondent and his wife resolved to enlarge the family by the addition of a boy, despite want of privacy and insufficiency of accommodation, reposing full faith in the legal process to secure possession of the petition schedule premises on time, as submitted by Mr. Udaya holla, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. ( 4 ) THE respondent sought eviction of the petitioner in the first instance undersection 2l (1) (h) and (p) of the act. Subsequently the respondent amended the petition and sought eviction of the petitioner, also under section 21 (1) (0 of the act alleging that the petitioner has unlawfully sublet a part of the premises. The premises in question bears no. 114, situated in 9th main, 7th cross, rajmahal vilas extension, bangalore, as stated above. According to the respondent as on the date of presentation of the eviction petition, the petitioner was paying rent of Rs. 6,750/- per month. ( 5 ) THE respondent was living in the united states of america for over 20 years. 114, situated in 9th main, 7th cross, rajmahal vilas extension, bangalore, as stated above. According to the respondent as on the date of presentation of the eviction petition, the petitioner was paying rent of Rs. 6,750/- per month. ( 5 ) THE respondent was living in the united states of america for over 20 years. he returned to Bangalore in july 1987, on transfer of residence, with the intention of settling down permanently here. Thereafter he wrote a letter dated 8-9-1987, ex. P. 7, to the chairman of the petitioner-company requesting vacant possession of the premises in question for his own use and occupation. After return to Bangalore the respondent has been associated with several hospitals and nursing homes. Exs. P. 1 to p. 5 disclose that the respondent is a consulting surgeon on the panel of model nursing home, mallige medical centre, lake side medical central and hospital, st. Martha's hospital and yellamma dasappa hospital, All situated in bangalore. It cannot therefore, be disputed that the respondent is an active practitioner associated with several nursing homes and hospitals in bangalore. R. w. 1 admits that the respondent is an active practitioner associated with several hospitals and nursing homes. ( 6 ) THE respondent has pleaded that the house in which he is presently residingi. e. , no. 2,1st floor, 5th main road, malleswaram, bangalore, is insufficient for his requirements. His family consists of his wife and daughter who was aged 5 years at the time of presentation of the petition, besides a maid servant and a cook who also stay with the family in the said house; the accommodation available to him in the said house is a small bed-room, a small hall and a small kitchen, totally measuring about 4 squares built on a site measuring 24' x 26'. The said premises does not have a compound. The petitioner has pleaded that at least four bed-rooms are necessary for him and his family for comfortable living taking into consideration the standard of living to which he was accustomed to in the united states of america and also his status as a practicing surgeon in bangalore. In the eviction petition he has given particulars of his academic qualifications and the professional bodies of which he is a member in support of his plea regarding his professional status and the standard of living. In the eviction petition he has given particulars of his academic qualifications and the professional bodies of which he is a member in support of his plea regarding his professional status and the standard of living. He has also stated that having lived in the united states of america for over 20 years, many friends and professional associates visit him often and he finds it impossible to extend hospitality to them. They cannot stay with him in the present premises. ( 7 ) THE respondent has further stated that his daughter is attending vidya niketanschool situated in rajmahal vilas extension close to the petition schedule premises. Ex. P. 6 is the certificate dated 11-7-1989 issued by the principal of the said school certifying that anju bhagwan, daughter of the petitioner, is studying in the said school. Since the petition schedule premises is situated close to the school in which his daughter is studying, the respondent has pleaded that it would be necessary for him to shift his residence to the petition schedule premises. He has stated that the present premises in which he is living is nearly 5 kms, away from the said school and that his wife has to take his daughter every day to the school and fetch her back. ( 8 ) IN support of his case that the petition schedule premises is bona fide andreasonably required for occupation by himself and that of his family, the respondent has stated that he was living in a palatial house while in the united states of america having five bed-rooms, and his daughter since her birth is accustomed to an independent room of her own. In the premises, where the respondent is now residing, since there is only one bed-room, there is lack of privacy and the daughter cannot have a separate bed-room. Besides, while returning to Bangalore on transfer of residence he has brought many household appliances like refrigerator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, grinder, electrical fittings, computer and many professional books and literature. He has stated that for want of accommodation he has stored All the aforesaid household appliances and professional books in his father-in-law's house. ( 9 ) THE respondent has also stated that for bis professional work he is compelledto use a two wheeler to move about since his wife requires the car for taking the daughter to the school. He has stated that for want of accommodation he has stored All the aforesaid household appliances and professional books in his father-in-law's house. ( 9 ) THE respondent has also stated that for bis professional work he is compelledto use a two wheeler to move about since his wife requires the car for taking the daughter to the school. According to the respondent he is allergic to diesel fumes and the use of the scooter has aggravated his allergic condition since he is exposed to open wind and diesel fumes. He has stated that since there is no parking space in the present premises for another car, he cannot purchase another car. He has asserted that he has to make almost eight trips a day to hospitals and other nursing homes. The respondent has further stated that in the present premises, there is no accommodation for having consultation room nor a mini-operation theatre for his professional work and to give urgent and immediate attention in emergency cases. He has stated that he intends to utilise the first floor of the petition schedule premises for his residence and the ground floor for consultation and other professional purposes. He has also stated that there is a basement in the petition schedule premises which could be used as servants quarters for the maid servant and the cook. ( 10 ) THE respondent has alleged in the petition that the petitioner after obtainingthe petition schedule premises has acquired suitable alternative accommodation i. e. , no. 461, xi main, rajmahal vilas extension, Bangalore for the purpose of guest house and on that ground also the petitioner is liable to be evicted. He has stated that the chairman of the petitioner-company is owning two flats at ashiana apartments in rajmahal vilas extension which could be used as guest houses by the petitioner-company. ( 11 ) INSOFAR as sublease of the premises is concerned, the respondent has allegedthat the garage in the petition schedule premises has been leased to one mamata who was running a boutique and also making cane furnitures and that such subleasing by the petitioner was unauthorised and therefore on that count also the tenant is liable to be evicted. ( 11 ) INSOFAR as sublease of the premises is concerned, the respondent has allegedthat the garage in the petition schedule premises has been leased to one mamata who was running a boutique and also making cane furnitures and that such subleasing by the petitioner was unauthorised and therefore on that count also the tenant is liable to be evicted. ( 12 ) IN the objection statement filed by the petitioner, at the outset, it is pleadedthat the presentation of the petition is premature in view of the fact that the agreement to lease is dated 4-3-1983 and in terms of that agreement the lease is for a period of five years. The petition for eviction is filed on 22-2-1988 i. e. , before the five years period. So, it is pleaded that the presentation of the petition for eviction is premature. ( 13 ) INSOFAR as the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the respondent, andthat the petitioner has acquired vacant possession of a suitable alternative building, and that it has subleased a part of the premises to one mamata are concerned, the defence is one of total denial. The petitioner denies that the petition schedule premises is bona fide and reasonably required by the respondent for his occupation and that of his family members. The petitioner denies that it has acquired vacant possession of a suitable alternative building subsequent to occupation of the petition schedule premises. The petitioner further denies that it has subleased any part of the premises to one mamata as alleged by the respondent. ( 14 ) IN the objection statement the petitioner has given particulars of the tenancyfrom its inception. It is stated that the petitioner occupied the premises on 4th september, 1980 in terms of the lease agreement of even date which is marked as ex. R. 1. Under the said agreement the tenant had paid a sum of Rs. 45,000/- as advance. ( 15 ) THE second lease agreement is dated 4-3-1983 which is ex. R. 2. In terms ofthis agreement the period of lease was five years and the agreed rent was Rs. 2,500/- per month for the building and Rs. 2,500/- in respect of the fixtures, aggregating to Rs. 5,000/ -. A sum of Rs. 30,000/- as "interest free security deposit" was also paid by the petitioner to the respondent. R. 2. In terms ofthis agreement the period of lease was five years and the agreed rent was Rs. 2,500/- per month for the building and Rs. 2,500/- in respect of the fixtures, aggregating to Rs. 5,000/ -. A sum of Rs. 30,000/- as "interest free security deposit" was also paid by the petitioner to the respondent. According to the petitioner, there was discussion and it was agreed between the petitioner and the respondent for the extension of lease upto 1-11-1990, though under the agreement dated 4-3-1983 the period of lease was to expire on 4-3-1988. It is stated in the statement of objections that the petitioner got drafted the lease deed and sent the same along with the covering letter dated 17-7-1987 for the approval of the respondent. Copy of the said letter is ex. R. 3 appended with a copy of the undated "deed of lease". The petitioner asserts that the draft of the lease deed was prepared after mutual discussion and the same was sent to the respondent for his approval and as per the terms and conditions the petitioner was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- for the building and Rs. 2,750/- for furnitures, aggregating to Rs. 6,750/ -. According to the petitioner, since no reply was received from the respondent, another letter dated 12-10-1987 ex. R. 4 was sent to him indicating therein that in the event he did not approve the lease deed the petitioner "would be constrained to revert to clause 3 of the lease agreement dated 4-3-1983". In this context it is asserted, in the statement of objections, that since the respondent did not approve of the lease deed he has no right to demand Rs. 6,750/ -. ( 16 ) IT is also stated in the statement of objections that the petitioner got issued a legal notice dated 17-5-1988, ex. R. 5, informing the respondent that the petitioner did not require the furnitures and fixtures for which separate amount was being paid in terms of the lease. In the legal notice the respondent has been called upon to take back All the furnitures and fixtures stating that the petitioner would continue to pay rent only for the building. It is in this context quantum of monthly rent became a matter of dispute. According to the respondent, as stated in the petition, the monthly rent is Rs. In the legal notice the respondent has been called upon to take back All the furnitures and fixtures stating that the petitioner would continue to pay rent only for the building. It is in this context quantum of monthly rent became a matter of dispute. According to the respondent, as stated in the petition, the monthly rent is Rs. 6,750/-, whereas according to the petitioner the rent is only Rs. 5,000/- in terms of the agreement dated 4-3-1983 ex. R. 2 which is inclusive of Rs. 2,500/- towards furniture and fixtures. Since the company had offered to return the furnitures and fixtures the rent payable, according to the petitioner, is only Rs. 2,500/- for the building. It appears, in that context there was an interlocutory application filed by the respondent before the trial court and the trial court fixed the rent payable by the petitioner at Rs. 5,000/ -. Against the said decision of the trial court, c. r. p. no. 7145 of 1989 had been preferred to this court by the respondent and this court by order dated 15-12-1989 dismissed the aforesaid revision petition holding that since the trial court had fixed the rent at Rs. 5,000/-, no interference was called for in the aforesaid revision petition. Copy of the said order is ex. R. 6. ( 17 ) THE fact that the respondent is a surgeon and that he was working in the united states of america is not disputed by the petitioner. But the petitioner asserts that the respondent is comfortably living in his own house now at malleswaram and that the eviction petition is filed only for the purpose of securing higher rent. The petitioner further asserts that the premises now in the occupation of the respondent is not merely the first floor of no. 2, 5th main road, malleswaram, but he is in occupation of the ground floor also which has got identical accommodation as in the first floor. ( 18 ) IN cross-examination, the respondent has stated that the ground floor of the premises at malleswaram is not available for his occupation since it is in the occupation of one of his elder brothers by name shamanna. He has also stated that the accommodation in the ground floor is only a small bed-room, a small hall and a kitchen as in the first floor. He has also stated that the accommodation in the ground floor is only a small bed-room, a small hall and a kitchen as in the first floor. Besides, a portion of the ground floor of the said premises is modified as a garage for parking of the vehicle of the respondent. The trial court has taken into consideration these aspects while examining the accommodation available to the respondent in the present premises. It cannot be disputed that in the premises now in the occupation of the respondent there is only a small bed-room, a small hall and a small kitchen in the first floor measuring only 4 sq. In fact, r. w, 1 the whole-time director of the petitioner-company in his evidence has stated that be has no personal knowledge regarding the accommodation available to the respondent in the premises in his occupation. On the other hand, he says that what is stated in the objection statement regarding accommodation and also his evidence regarding the accommodation available to the respondent in the premises at malleswaram is based on what was conveyed to him by the advocate appearing for petitioner. He has denied having any personal knowledge of the accommodation available to the respondent in the present premises. Similarly, the fact that the daughter of the respondent is studying in vidya niketan high school, at rajmahal vilas extension which is close to the petition schedule premises is proved beyond doubt because of the admission by r. w. 1 himself. ( 19 ) WHILE judging the bona fide and reasonable requirement, one has to take into consideration several factors including the status, the style and the standard of living of the family. Apart from the fact that the present accommodation for the respondent and his family being inadequate in terms of floor space for living and for professional work, even from the point of convenience and location the respondent has deposed that the petition schedule premises, being close to the school in which his daughter is studying, is suitable. ( 20 ) THERE is no evidence on record, excepting mere assertion by r. w. 1, that the eviction petition is filed for the purpose of securing higher rent. The fact that the respondent received Rs. ( 20 ) THERE is no evidence on record, excepting mere assertion by r. w. 1, that the eviction petition is filed for the purpose of securing higher rent. The fact that the respondent received Rs. 6,750/- per month pursuant to an alleged agreement to extend the lease period till the end of the year 1990 cannot be believed in view of what is stated in ex. P. 7 dated 8-9-1987 which is a letter written by the respondent requesting the petitioner to vacate the premises to enable him to occupy the same. In response to the said letter, the petitioner has in its reply dated 12-10-1987 refers to a draft lease deed said to have been sent to the respondent, under cover of letter dated 17-7-1987, and asserting that pursuant to the said draft lease deed the company has been paying rs, 6,750/- per month. This has been denied by the respondent. He has denied hat there was any agreement for extension of lease on rent of Rs. 6,750/- per month. It is surprising that the letter dated 17-7-1987 said to have been written by the petitioner-company enclosing copy of the draft lease deed is not sent to the respondent by registered post therefore, the contents of ex. R. 4 cannot be taken as indicating that there was any fresh agreement between the parties for extending the lease period. On the other band, as held by the trial court, the said letter discloses anxiety on the part of the petitioner to continue to occupy the premises and an attempt is made to impose upon the respondent. The respondent has stated that the petitioner started sending rs, 6,750/- per month as agreed. In ex. P. 28 dated 13-11-1987 and ex. P. 29 dated 7-12-1987 which are covering letters of the petitioner enclosing cheques for Rs. 6,750/- each there is no reference whatsoever regarding any fresh agreement between the parties. ( 21 ) INSOFAR as the ground under section 21 (1) (f) of the Act, that is, sublease of the premises by the tenant, r. w. 1 admits that one mamata was as a matter of fact making cane furnitures in the garage which forms part of the petition schedule premises. He has also stated that the key to the garage was also given to the said lady who is the daughter of a former chief minister of the state. He has also stated that the key to the garage was also given to the said lady who is the daughter of a former chief minister of the state. ( 22 ) R. W. 1 who is a whole-time director of the company in his cross- examination has stated that the said mamata was never an employee of the company at any point of time. This evidence he has given in cross-examination on 13-2-1991. Subsequently, it appears r. w. 1 was recalled on 25-1-1992, and in examination-in-chief he has deposed that the garage was used for various purposes from time to time and was used for storing cane also. He has deposed that cane was stored in the garage to make furnitures for the guest house and the said work was being looked after by many persons including mamata. He has further deposed that the key which was handed over to her was collected back from her and that as on the date of his examination i. e. , 25-1-1992 he has stated that "furniture manufacturing work has come to an end and we have stopped it. " he asserts that the garage was not sublet to mamata, in cross-examination he has stated that mamata was the manager of wicker works and that he does not know "where it existed or where it exists now". He has further stated that the petitioner-company had no correspondence with wicker works and that the petitioner-company had made payments to wicker works. He has also stated in cross-examination, that the keys to the garage were handed over to mamata before 1985 and that he does not exactly know in which year the keys were given to her. He has also deposed in cross-examination that he has no personal knowledge "as to in what capacity mamata was in occupation of the garage". He has further stated that "it is true that personally I am not aware as to how long she was in occupation of the garage. " r. w. 2 who is the company secretary of the petitioner in his evidence has stated that he joined the company as secretary in may 1990 and that he has no knowledge that the garage of the petitioner schedule premises was in possession of the said mamata. This witness has stated that the garage was not subleased to the said mamata prior to may 1990. This witness has stated that the garage was not subleased to the said mamata prior to may 1990. ( 23 ) THE trial court while considering the ground under section 21 (1) (f) has held that the petitioner-company has not placed any material whatsoever to show that possession of the garage was given to mamata, which is admitted, because she was doing some furniture work for the petitioner company, and therefore it is reasonable to presume that the said mamata was inducted as a subtenant by the petitioner company. The trial court has relied on a decision of this court in Smt. Sarala shetty v y. Ramakrishnayya, 1992 (1) Kar. L. j. 89 : ILR 1991 Kar. 3650, in this regard, ( 24 ) IN the petition it is specifically stated that subsequent to occupation of the schedule premises by the petitioner-company as tenant, the company has secured another premises bearing no. 461, 11th main road, rajmabal vilas extension, Bangalore for the purpose of its guest house. In his evidence the respondent (p. w. 1) has stated that apart from the said premises no. 461 there are two flats in asbiyana apartments, rajmahal vilas extension belonging to the company. He has further stated that tie petitioner-company has taken two buildings in r. t. nagar on lease and one more building in basaveswara nagar. According to him, the two flats in ashiyana apartments stand in the name of jayant malhotra, the chairman of the company. ( 25 ) R. W. 1 has deposed that he resides in a building at r. t. nagar with his wife and the said premises has got four bed-rooms. He has deposed that out of 4 bed-rooms he uses only one bed-room and the remaining three bed-rooms are being used for guests. He has admitted that subsequent to occupation of the petition schedule premises the petitioner company has taken a building on rent in rajmahal vilas extension. He has also admitted that the petitioner-company has taken one more building on lease in kumara park, but that it was so taken prior to the occupation of the petition schedule premises. This witness has stated that the two flats in asbiyana apartments stand in the name of the wife of jayant malbotra, the chairman of the company. He has also admitted that the petitioner-company has taken one more building on lease in kumara park, but that it was so taken prior to the occupation of the petition schedule premises. This witness has stated that the two flats in asbiyana apartments stand in the name of the wife of jayant malbotra, the chairman of the company. He has stated that each of the flats consists of three bed-rooms, and one of the flats has been let out subsequent to occupation of the petition schedule premises. This witness has stated that the premises bearing no. 461, llth main road, rajmahal vilas extension was taken on lease by the company in the year 1985 and there are three bed-rooms in the said building and that be himself was residing in the said building in the year 1985 and that he vacated the same in the year 1987. He has stated that it is an independent house, built on site measuring 55 x 70'. ( 26 ) R. W. 2 the secretary of the company, who joined the company in the month of may 1990, in his evidence has stated that he is residing in premises no. 461, rajmahal vilas extension since june 1990 and that prior to his occupation of the said premises, an employee of the company by name parthasarathy was residing therein. He has admitted that the said building was vacant for about one month prior to his occupation. ( 27 ) THOUGH it is disputed by the petitioner company that it is in occupation of a building in r. t. nagar and basaveswara nagar, it cannot be gainsaid that in so far as premises no. 461 situated in rajmahat vilas extension is concerned the vacant possession of the same was acquired subsequent to occupation of the petition schedule premises. Therefore, the provisions of section 21 (1 xp) could be invoked by the respondent. ( 28 ) I will now consider the legal contention regarding maintainability of the petition on the ground that it has been instituted before the expiry of the period of lease. As noticed above, under the lease agreement dated 4-3-1983 ex. R. 2 the period of lease is five years. ( 28 ) I will now consider the legal contention regarding maintainability of the petition on the ground that it has been instituted before the expiry of the period of lease. As noticed above, under the lease agreement dated 4-3-1983 ex. R. 2 the period of lease is five years. Therefore, the lease period in terms of the agreement expires on 4-3-1988; whereas the petition before the trial court has been filed on 22-2-1988 i. e. , 12 days before the expiry of the lease period. ( 29 ) SRI s. g. sundaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner company contended that as on the date of presentation of the eviction petition on 22- 2-1988 the respondent has no cause of action to institute the proceedings. Therefore, he submitted that the petition has to be dismissed in limine. ( 30 ) IN bharat petroleum corporation ltd. V mohd. Haneef choohey, 1984 (2) Kar. Lj. 154 : ILR 1984 Kar. 401: AIR 1986 Kant. 191, a division bench of this court ruled thus:"the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 21 of the rent control Act, makes it clear mat the right given to the landlord is "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract". It is obvious, the clause has an overriding effect it follows, therefore that even if there is t contract for a stipulated term, the law gives a right to the landlord, to initiate action, for eviction, if the conditions in the section are fulfilled. To hold otherwise, would be making the non-obstante clause redundant. Hence, we are dearly of the view, that even in cases of 'term lease', the landlord can initiate proceedings under section 21 (1) of the act the view taken by the learned single judge in gurusiddaiah 's case, AIR 1984 Kar. 66 is not correct and hence it has to be overruled. " ( 31 ) THE above ruling held the field till it was overturned by a full bench of this court in Sri ramakrishna theatres ltd. V general investments and commercial corporation ltd. , 1992 (2) Kar. L. j. 158 : ILR 1992 Kar. 1296 holding thus: "it is unnecessary to multiply the citations as we do not find any other decision which is quite relevant to the question raised before us. V general investments and commercial corporation ltd. , 1992 (2) Kar. L. j. 158 : ILR 1992 Kar. 1296 holding thus: "it is unnecessary to multiply the citations as we do not find any other decision which is quite relevant to the question raised before us. The meaning attributed to the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 21 of the act in bharath petroleum corporation's case, AIR 1986 Kar. 191 is not correct; the overriding effect of the said clause is limited to the subject referred to immediately by the words following. In other words, even if any other law or contract provides for recovery of possession the same shall be of no effect and the eviction can be made only on the grounds slated in clauses (a) to (p) of the proviso. This indicates that the landlord should have a right to recover possession and that right cannot be held to vest in him during the period of the term lease unless mere is something in the lease deed which provides for the determination of the lease; in such a situation, even after the determination of the lease in the manner stated in the term lease, the recovery of possession will have to be made only by recourse to section 21 (1 ). We are clearly of the opinion that the view expressed in bharath petroleum corporation's case is not correct and, therefore, the same is overruled. " ( 32 ) IN view of the full bench decision, Sri s. g. sundaraswamy urged that the respondent could not have sought eviction of the petitioner on 22-2-1988 under section 21 (1) (h) and (p), the date when the petition was presented in the trial court. On the other hand, Sri udaya holla contended in view of the fact that during the pendency of the petition, since the agreed period of lease expired the respondent could invoke the provisions of section 21 (1) (h}and (p) of the act and seek eviction of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent cited number of decisions in support of their rival contentions. ( 33 ) IN hegde and golay ltd. V state bank of India, ILR 1987 (3) Kar. The learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent cited number of decisions in support of their rival contentions. ( 33 ) IN hegde and golay ltd. V state bank of India, ILR 1987 (3) Kar. 2673, a division bench of this court in general terms has observed that "the general principle of adjudication is that in legal proceedings matters are decided on the basis of rights and obligations of the parties as on the date of the commencement of the lis; though, however, it is open to the court to take note of subsequent events both of fact and law to mould relief. " ( 34 ) IN rameshwar v jot ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49 the Supreme Court has ruled thus:"the impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequentto the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v State of alabama, 1934 (294) u. s. 600. 60/, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar prasad v keshwar lal, 1940 fcr 84: AIR 1941 fc 5 falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs cannot deny rights to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Lachmeshwar prasad v keshwar lal, 1940 fcr 84: AIR 1941 fc 5 falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs cannot deny rights to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Venkateswarlu, AIR 1975 SC 1409 read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit Amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine (see chokalingam chetty 54 mad. L. j. 88: AIR 1927 pc 252 ). The law stated in ramjilat v State of Punjab, ILR 1966 (2) punj. 125: AIR 1966 punj. 374 (fb) is sound:"courts do very often take notice of events that happen subsequent to the filing of suits and at times even those that have occurred during the appellate stage and permit pleadings to be amended for including a prayer for relief on the basis of such eventbut this is ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity of proceeding or when the original relief claimed has, by reason of change in the circumstances, become inappropriate and not when the plaintiffs suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed Amendment (see steward v the north metropolitan tramways company, 1885 (16) qbd 178 and a fresh suit by him would be so barred by limitation. "one may as well add that while taking cautious judicial cognizance of 'post-natal' events, even for the limited and exceptional purposes explained earlier, no court will countenance a party altering, by his own manipulation, a change in situation and plead for relief on the altered basis. " ( 35 ) IN ramachandra bhat v rao talithaya, 1987 (2) Kar. L. j. sh. N. 205 : ILR 1986 Kar. 3552 this court while considering the question whether eviction petition filed before expiry of two months period from the date of service of statutory notice was maintainable, held that the cause of action not having arisen as on the date of presentation of the petition under section 21 (1) of the Act, on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, the eviction petition sled even before the expiry of the statutory period cannot be considered to be maintainable. In shreeram finance corporation v yasein khan and others, 1989 (3) SCC 476, the Supreme Court held that suit in contravention of section 69 (2) of the partnership Act, 1932 was not maintainable. In the said case as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shows as partners as per the Rules in the register of firms were not, in fact, partners because of the reconstitution of the firm. The actual persons suing were not shown as partners in the register of firms. In that context, the Supreme Court ruled that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 69 of the partnership Act, though the plaint was amended on a later date. ( 36 ) RELYING on the aforesaid decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the maintainability of the petition has to be determined with reference to the facts as on the date of institution of the proceedings and the subsequent events will not validate the proceedings if the inception itself was deficient. ( 37 ) IN the instant case, as on the date when the eviction petition was presented the grounds under section 21 (1) (h) and (p), reasonable and boruboona fide requirementby the respondent and that the petitioner has acquired vacant possession of a suitable building for its purpose could not have been invoked since the lease period had not expired as on that date. So it is argued, even though 12 days after the presentation of the petition, the lease period expired the same is of no consequence and will have no bearing on the maintainability of the petition. ( 38 ) IN so far as the ground under section 21 (1) (f) i-e. , sublease is concerned, this question of premature presentation of the eviction petition does not arise for consideration, because the eviction petition was maintainable under section 21 (1) (f) of the act on 22-2-1988. ( 39 ) IN narayanappa divakarappa v gopala rao Sri nivasa bhat, 1979 (2) Kar. L. j. 8, a learned single judge of this court has held that the court can take into consideration the subsequent event that the lease had expired by efflux of time and grant relief "to do substantial justice" between the parties. ( 40 ) IN sudarshan trading co. Ltd. V l. D'souza, 1984 (2) Kar. L. j. 132, a division bench of this court while considering several legal contentions which arose in a dispute between the landlord and tenant has observed thus:"what emerges from these authorities is that if the defendant denies the lease pleaded by plaintiff but sets up a different lease under the plaintiff, it would not be impermissible for the court to afford relief to the plaintiff on the basis of defendant's own case: in the present case on appellant's own showing even the ten year lease laid claim to by appellant expired in july 1982, during the pendency of the suit in the trial court. The decree granting possession made by the trial court in favour of the respondent-plaintiff in april 1983 can, in our opinion, be supported and sustained on this basis also. " ( 41 ) KEEPING in view the aforesaid decisions and the fact that the eviction petition was maintainable under section 21 (1) (f) of the act even on 22-2-1988,i hold that the original petition, even though presented before the expiry of the lease term, in view of its expiry during the pendency of the proceedings relief could be granted under section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the act also. I say so, because to hold otherwise would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. I say so, because to hold otherwise would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. To illustrate, suppose if a petition had been validly presented by a landlord only under section 21 (1) (h) of the act and if during the pendency of the proceedings, the tenant sublets the premises, could it be said that it is not open for the landlord to invoke the provisions of section 21 (1) (f) of the act in the same proceedings by seeking amendment, because it is a subsequent event which has happened after the presentation of the petition and that ground was not available to the landlord as on the date of presentation of the petition. Such a view, would be inequitable and leads to unjust results. Law if combined with equity, results in fair and just decisions though it may be at variance with formally recognised law. ( 42 ) THE other question argued at length regarding the legal utility of the unregistered lease agreement dated 4-3-1983 and its probative value and the impact of section 53-a of the Transfer of Property Act, on the facts of this case, does not arise for consideration in the view I have taken on the question of maintainability of the petition. ( 43 ) I have already considered the evidence on record regarding bona fide and reasonable requirement of the petition schedule premises by the respondent and his family. No exception could be taken to the finding of the trial court regarding bona fide and reasonable requirement of the premises by the respondent. ( 44 ) SRI s. g. sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that mere presence of a person in a part of the premises does not by itself amount to subletting. He submitted that there is no evidence on record that mamata was given exclusive possession of the garage by the petitioner. He contended that the respondent has failed to prove that the petitioner had sublet the premises to mamata. The learned counsel referred to three decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. ( 45 ) IN jagdish prasad v angoori devi, AIR 1984 SC 1447 , the Supreme Court has held that merely from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop premises, subletting cannot be presumed. As long as. The learned counsel referred to three decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. ( 45 ) IN jagdish prasad v angoori devi, AIR 1984 SC 1447 , the Supreme Court has held that merely from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop premises, subletting cannot be presumed. As long as. Control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. Similarly, in dipak v lilavati, AIR 1987 SC 2055 , it is held that in order to prove tenancy or subtenancy two ingredients had to be established: firstly, the tenant or subtenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly that right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. ( 46 ) IN Delhi stationers and printers v rajendra kumar, AIR 1990 SC 1208 , on facts the Supreme Court held that where the alleged subtenant was a brother-in-law of the tenant and was also employed with him, mere user of kitchen and latrine in occupation of the tenant by the said brother-in-law would not mean that the tenant had transferred the exclusive right to enjoy, the kitchen and latrine and had parted with the legal possession of the said part of the premises in favour of his brother-in-law, the alleged subtenant, so as to make the tenant liable for eviction. ( 47 ) BECAUSE of the illicit nature of the relationship when a premises is subleased by the tenant, the same is done in a covert manner. There will be camouflages. In the instant case, admittedly mamata was using the garage which forms part of the petition schedule premises for making cane furniture. It is also admitted that the key to the garage was also given to the said lady. R. w. 1 has further deposed that mamata was not an employee of the company at any point of time. Having so given the evidence on 13-2-1991, almost a year later, r. w. 1 when he was recalled on 25-1-1992 states in examination-in-chief that the garage was used for various purposes from time to time and was used for storing cane also. Having so given the evidence on 13-2-1991, almost a year later, r. w. 1 when he was recalled on 25-1-1992 states in examination-in-chief that the garage was used for various purposes from time to time and was used for storing cane also. He has further deposed on 25-1-1992 that cane was stored in the garage to make furniture for the guest house and the said work was being looked after by many persons including mamata. This is a camouflage and obviously an after thought. The evidence given by r. w. 1 on 13-2-1991 is very clear in so far as giving of exclusive possession of the garage to mamata by handing over the key and the same was being used by her for making cane furniture. R. w. 1 has further stated that mamata was the manager of wicker works and that he did not know "where it existed or where it existo now. " ( 48 ) IN rajbir kaur and another v s. Chokosiri and co. , AIR 1988 SC 1845 , the Supreme Court while considering the question of sublease has observed thus: "if exclusive possession is established, and the version of the respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the court te draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licences are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence got it is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of subletting is, of course, on the appellants. The burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the party's case is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion. If at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, be will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. In the circumstances of the case, we think, that, appellants having been forced by the courts below to have established exclusive possession of the ice-cream vendor of a part of the demised-premises and the explanation of the transac tion offered by the respondent having been found by the courts below to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the courts to draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to tbe situation as found. " the case of the petitioner that mamata was making cane furniture in the garage for the use in guest house cannot be believed because no evidence whatsoever has been produced to show that any payment was as a matter of fact made to wicker works of which mamata was the manager. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that mamata was in exclusive occupation of the garage and using the same as a subtenant under the petitioner. ( 49 ) IN Smt. Sarala shetty v y. Ramakrishnayya, 1992 (1) Kar. L. j. 89 : ILR 1991 Kar. 3630, a learned single judge of this court has observed thus: "sri udaya holla also placed reliance on a decision of the himachal pradesh High Court in hem raj v basta singh and another, AIR 1987 hp 9 in which the nature and extent of proof that is required in order to prove subletting has been considered with reference to the provisions of section 13 of east Punjaburban rent restriction Act, 1949. It is observed in the said decision that while considering the nature of initial onus thrown on the landlord to prove subletting, the courts must not overlook the fact that it is by no means an easy task since direct evidence of subletting is seldom available as sublease is a creation of an agreement between the tenant and the subtenant and the landlord for obvious reasons would be a complete stranger to such an agreement which is kept as guarded secret and no trace of evidence reflecting the same would be allowed to leak out thereby exposing both of them to the risk of being evicted at the hands of the landlord, and, therefore, no prudent tenant is expected either to enter into an agreement or receive rent from his subtenant or pass receipt of such rent in the presence of others and the landlord placed in such a situation can only prove the attending circumstances which should raise inference of such subletting or assignment. It is further observed that the landlord would be deemed to have discharged the initial burden placed upon him if he succeeds in showing that the tenant had parted with and handed over exclusive possession and control of the demised premises to the alleged subtenant and it is thereafter for the tenant to prove and explain the circumstances leading to such transfer of possession. So tested, I am of the opinion that the landlord in the instant case has by placing the above referred material discharged his initial onus of showing that annappayya and m. Narayana rao were the sublessees of the premises. " ( 50 ) I have no hesitation in holding that the respondent has proved sublease of the garage by the petitioner. ( 51 ) IN so far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if it has to be considered, the fact is that the petitioner company is a rich company having a turnover of over six crores ending 30th march, 1990 with a profit of Rs. 60 to 70 lakhs as deposed by r. ws. 1 and z there is sufficient evidence on record that any number of houses are available in rajmahal vilas extension I and ii stage extensions. The newspaper advertisements produced by the respondent as exhibits also disclose the availability of accommodation. 60 to 70 lakhs as deposed by r. ws. 1 and z there is sufficient evidence on record that any number of houses are available in rajmahal vilas extension I and ii stage extensions. The newspaper advertisements produced by the respondent as exhibits also disclose the availability of accommodation. Therefore, I do not see any hardship whatsoever being caused to the petitioner company if eviction is ordered. ( 52 ) IN the result, the revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, the petitioner is given time till the end of february, 1993 to deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent. --- *** --- .