JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the legality of the termination of his service w.e.f. 5th July, 1989. He has prayed for issue of a declaration that termination of his service is illegal. He has also prayed for issue of a direction to the respondents to reinstate him in service and also give him benefit of the principle of equal pay for equal work. 2. Petitioner's case is that he possesses academic qualification of M.A. and Post Graduate Diploma in Tourism and Hotel Management. He was appointed on daily wages as Lower Division Clerk in the service of the respondent, Rajasthan State Sports Council. He has then stated that on 5th July, 1989 when he went for duty he was not allowed to mark attendance by an oral order of the Chief Accounts Officer and in this manner, his service was terminated. His claim is that he has completed 240 days of service immediately preceding the date of termination of his service. No notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation were given to the petitioner on the date of termination of his service. He made representation dated 3.6.1989 and then on 17.7.1989. He also served a notice for demand of justice dated 24th July, 1989. Neither the representation nor the notice for demand of justice were responded by the respondents. Petitioner's assertion is that termination of his service is liable to be declared as void on account of violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have, in their reply, disputed the statement of the petitioner regarding his qualification on the ground that he has not placed any document in support of this assertion. They have further stated that his qualification is irrelevant for the purpose of decision of the writ petition. Respondents have further pleaded that the petitioner was appointed on daily wage basis and he has no right to work. Respondents have denied the statement of the petitioner that his service was terminated on 5th July, 1989. According to them the Chief Accounts Officer has not terminated the service of the petitioner. Further case of the respondents is that as a daily wage employee there was no question of marking attendance. Respondents have also pleaded that there is no permanent post and the petitioner was not appointed on a post. According to them the Chief Accounts Officer has not terminated the service of the petitioner. Further case of the respondents is that as a daily wage employee there was no question of marking attendance. Respondents have also pleaded that there is no permanent post and the petitioner was not appointed on a post. Respondents have pleaded that the petitioner has not furnished any proof of his having completed 240 days in a calendar year and, therefore, there is no question of violation of Section 25-F, G and H. Respondents have pleaded that no person junior to the petitioner has been retained in service. Further plea of the respondents is that a more effective remedy is available to the petitioner under the Industrial Disputes Act, and, therefore, this Court should not issue any writ in favour of the petitioner on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition. Shri Pareek argued that the petitioner has completed 240 days of service before the date of termination of his service and since there has been a clear non-compliance of Section 25-F (a) and (b), termination of service of the petitioner is liable to be declared as void. Shri Pareek argued that the denial made by the respondents about his having served for more than 240 days is absolutely unwarranted, because, as employer the respondents are in possession of the record of the work done by the petitioner and they ought to have produced the record of the petitioner's case to substantiate their case that the petitioner has not served for 240 days. No one appeared on behalf of the respondents to argue their case. 3. While the petitioner's case is very specific about the date of his appointment and the date of termination of the service as well as the nature of his employment, respondents have avoided giving of reply to the averments made in the petition. A close look at their reply shows that respondents have admitted the factor of employment of the petitioner as a daily waged employee. They have, however, not chosen to give date of his appointment. Similarly, while they have denied the statement of the petitioner that his service has been terminated w.e.f. 5.7.1987, they have not stated as to whether the petitioner has been continuing in service. They have, however, not chosen to give date of his appointment. Similarly, while they have denied the statement of the petitioner that his service has been terminated w.e.f. 5.7.1987, they have not stated as to whether the petitioner has been continuing in service. It is also significant to notice that the petitioner made representations on 3.6.1989 and 17.7.1989 immediately after termination of his service. He also got a notice for demand of justice dated. 24.7.1989 served on the respondents. The respondents kept silence and did not even bother to give reply to the notice of demand of justice. Moreover, being employer of the petitioner respondents are in possession of the record relating to the period for which the petitioner rendered his duty with the respondents. It was absolutely imperative that the respondents should have candidly placed before the court record relating to the working of the petitioner. Their failure to do so is totally inexplicable. Conduct of the respondents in keeping silence on the representations and the notice for demand of justice served on behalf of the petitioner and their failure to produce relevant material before the court relating to the work of the petitioner even though the same is in their possession shows that the averments made in the reply do not reflect the correct position. By making bald and vague denials the respondents have made an attempt to show that a disputed question of fact arises for determination by this Court and that question should not be decided by this Court. Having regard to the pleadings of the parties and conduct the respondents, I am convinced that the dispute sought to be raised by the respondents is not a genuine dispute. They have deliberately concealed the relevant material/record from the record (court). 4. Net conclusion of this discussion is that the petitioner's averment of his having worked for more than 240 days in a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination of his service has to be accepted as correct. Petitioner's service has been terminated by an oral order. He has been prevented from marking attendance w.e.f. 5th July, 1989. Net conclusion of this discussion is that the petitioner's averment of his having worked for more than 240 days in a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination of his service has to be accepted as correct. Petitioner's service has been terminated by an oral order. He has been prevented from marking attendance w.e.f. 5th July, 1989. Respondents have not chosen to file affidavit of the Chief Accounts Officer to substantiate their denial that he did not make an oral order for termination of service of the petitioner is by way of punishment or on account of medical unfitness or superannuation or in accordance with the conditions of contract of employment. Thus, termination of the service of the petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 2(oo) and it is a case of retrenchment of service as enunciated by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. N. Sundra Money, AIR 1976 SC 1111 , and as reiterated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others, (1990)2 SCC 682 . The definition of the term 'industry' contained in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 became subject-matter of interpretation in D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherji, AIR 1953 SC 58 . Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 610 , University of Delhi v. Ramnath, AIR 1963 SC 1873 , Ahmedabad Textile Industries Research Association v. State, AIR 1961 SC 484 . Safadarjang Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, 1990(1) SCC 735 , Dhanrajgiri Hospital v. Workmen, (1975)4 SCC 621 , Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Employee Club v. Management of Gymkhana Club, AIR 1968 SC 554 , Bombay Pinjarapol Bhuleshwar v. Workmen, 1971(3) SCC 349 . Some of these decisions indicated conflict of opinion on the question whether hospitals, educational institutions, clubs, research institutes etc. can be included in the definition of the term 'industry'. The matter was examined by a larger (7 Judges) Bench of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others, 1978(2) SCC 213 . Some of these decisions indicated conflict of opinion on the question whether hospitals, educational institutions, clubs, research institutes etc. can be included in the definition of the term 'industry'. The matter was examined by a larger (7 Judges) Bench of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others, 1978(2) SCC 213 . The majority judgment of the Supreme Court held that the earlier decisions rendered by the same Court in University of Delhi v. Ramnath, Safdarjang Hospital's case, Madras Zymkhan's case and Cricket Club of India, AIR 1969 SC 276 , do not lay down correct principles of law. The Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 , and observed :I. "Industry, as defined in Section 2(j) and explained in Banerjit (supra) has a wide import. (a) where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-operative between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is commercial) (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things of services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making on a large scale prasad or food), prima facie, there is an 'industry' in the enterprise. (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus in functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (d) If the organisation is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking." II. Although Section 2(j) uses words of the widest amplitude in its two limbs, their meaning cannot be magnified to overreach itself. (a) 'Undertaking' must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage as explained in Banerjit (supra) and in this judgment; so also, service, calling and the like. This yields and inference that all organised activity possessing the triple elements in I (supra) although not trade or business, may still be 'industry' provided the nature of the activity, viz., the employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to what we find in trade or business. This takes into the fold of 'industry' undertakings calling and services, adventures 'analogous to the carrying on the trade or business'. This takes into the fold of 'industry' undertakings calling and services, adventures 'analogous to the carrying on the trade or business'. All features, other than the methodology of carrying on the activity viz., in organising the co-operation between employer and employee, may be dissimilar. It does not matter, if on the employment terms there is analogy." III. "Application of these guidelines should stop short of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or outer sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology of the Act being industrial peace regulation and resolution of industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing less, nothing more. (a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs, (iii) educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v) research institutes, (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of Section 2(j). (b) A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and even gurukulas and little research labs, may qualify for exemption if, in simple ventures, substantially and going by the dominant nature criterion, substantively, no employees are entertained but in minimal matters, marginal employees are hired without destroying the non-employee character of the unit. (c) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ themselves, free of or small honoraria or like return, mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose or cause, such as lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the holiness, divinity or like central personality, and the services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those who serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of master and servant relationship, then, the institution is not an industry even if stray servants, manual or technical are hired. Such elemosynary or like undertakings alone are exempt-not other generosity, compassion, developmental passion or project." 5. In Gopal Ji Jha Shastri v. State of Bihar, (1983) 2 SCC p. 4 , the Supreme Court held that the Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh falls within the frame of 'industry'. Such elemosynary or like undertakings alone are exempt-not other generosity, compassion, developmental passion or project." 5. In Gopal Ji Jha Shastri v. State of Bihar, (1983) 2 SCC p. 4 , the Supreme Court held that the Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh falls within the frame of 'industry'. In Desraj v. State of Punjab, 1988 (2) SC 537 , their Lordships held that the irrigation department of the Government of Rajasthan falls within the ambit of the term 'industry' under Section 2(j). If the guidelines laid down in these decisions are applied to the activities of the Sports Council it becomes clear that the Sports Council falls within the frame of 'industry' under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, because, it is a body engaged for providing facilities of various sports to the students. It also runs youth hostel. Young members of the Society are provided with service in the field of sports. Therefore, even though there is an absence of profit-making motive, the activities of the council cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of Section 2(j). 6. In view of the conclusions recorded above, it must be held that the respondents have acted in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F. Termination of the service of the petitioner has been brought about without compliance of the two mandatory conditions specified in Section 25-F. Therefore, it must be held that the termination of service of the petitioner is void. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Termination of service of the petitioner w.e.f. 5.7.1989 is declared illegal and it is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to reinstatement in service. He shall also be entitled to other service benefits. However, for back wages for the period between the date of termination of his service and the date of this order, the petitioner shall be free to avail remedy under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This order shall not prevent the respondents from terminating the service of the petitioner afresh in accordance with the provisions of law.Ordered accordingly. *******