Judgment :- 1. The respondent in I.A. No. 24 of 1992 in W.C. No. 61 of 1992 on the file of the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation-I, Madras-6, has filed this Revision Petition. The said W.C. No. 61 of 1992 claims compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and it was filed by the respondent herein, who got injured in the accident that took place on 4.2.1987. I.A. No. 24 of 1992 was also filed by the respondent for excusing the delay in filing the said W.C. No. 61 of 1992. The said application has been allowed and that is why, aggrieved by it, the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the respondent in the said Interlocutory Application. The accident, with reference to which, compensation has been claimed, took place on 4.2.1987. But the abovesaid W.C. was filed only on 10.2.1992, that is about five years later. S. 10 or the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, provides; thus “(1) No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given, in the manner here in after provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within (two years) of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death, within (two years) from the date of death.” So, as per S. 10(1) for a claim to be entertained, two requirements have to be satisfied. One is notice of the accident should have been given in the manner provided under the abovesaid Act, as soon as practicable after the happening of the accident. The next requirement is that the claim in the injury case, should have been preferred within two years of the occurrence of the accident. Now, in the present case, as already mentioned, the W.C. has been filed only on 10.2.1992, after about five years, from the date of occurrence of the accident viz. 4.2.1987. Now, what is, contended in the claim petition regarding this limitation question is that several payments were being made by the employer to the injured workman and the last of such payments was on 6.10.1988 as per Exhibit A7 and that to compute the period of limitation, the said date 6.10.1988 should be taken as the starting point. 4.2.1987. Now, what is, contended in the claim petition regarding this limitation question is that several payments were being made by the employer to the injured workman and the last of such payments was on 6.10.1988 as per Exhibit A7 and that to compute the period of limitation, the said date 6.10.1988 should be taken as the starting point. If that is so, the delay is said to be only between 7.10.1990 and 10.2.1992 and some explanation has been given, for the said delay between 7.10.1990 and 10.2.1992. That apart, it is also contended that earlier, within time, on or about 1.6.90 itself, a similar claim petition was filed claiming compensation for the injury sustained in the abovesaid accident. But as per Ex. A8 the letter sent from the Authority below to the claimants counsel on or about 22.7.1992, the said earlier Claim Petition was returned on 19.6.1990. It appears that the said earlier petition has not been represented subsequently. 2. The Authority below has even come to the conclusion that there is no delay at all and that even if there is delay, there are sufficient reasons for execusing the said delay. The Authority finds that the period would begin to run, if at all, only from 7.10.1988, that is the next day to Ex. A7 date. 3. But the learned counsel for petitioner points out that as per S. 10(1), in the present case, the limitation would begin to run only from 4.2.1987, the date of occurrence of the accident, in which the respondent sustained injury and if so, the petition is out of time. As against this submission, the learned counsel for respondent reiterated what has been held by the Authority below. One of her submissions is that the period will begin only from 7.10.1988. Another submission is that in view of the previous claim petition filed on 1.6.1990 also, there is no delay at all. She also contends that it is not correct to say that the previous claim petition was returned on 19.6.1990 and was not represented by the claimant. 4. I have considered the rival submissions. It is quite clear to me that the period of limitation prescribed under S. 10(1) would begin only from the date of occurrence of the accident, namely 4.2.1987 in the present case, which is a case of injury. 4. I have considered the rival submissions. It is quite clear to me that the period of limitation prescribed under S. 10(1) would begin only from the date of occurrence of the accident, namely 4.2.1987 in the present case, which is a case of injury. The enactment does not say that the period would begin at any later time, taking into account the payments made by the employer, towards the compensation due. Further, even though the previous claim petition was filed on 1.6.1990, that will have no bearing in computing the period of limitation, with reference to the present I.A. No. 24 of 1992. There is also nothing to show that the previous Claim Petition was not returned to the Petitioner, since Ex. A8 the document filed by the petitioner himself, itself says contra , as stated above. 5. No doubt the learned counsel for petitioner also relied on some decisions like N. Pochaiah and Co. v. Mulle Nagabhushanam (AIR 1966 Andhra Pradesh 99) but all those decisions only point out the discretion, that has to be exercised in excusing the delay. But the point involved in the present case is when actually the period of limitation prescribed under S. 10(1) begins. If it begins on 4.2.1987 itself and if there is no acceptable explanation right from 4.2.1989 (that is two years from 4.2.1987) till 10.2.1992 then the Interlocutory application has necessarily to be dismissed. Even according to the claim petition, the treatment was over by 4.4.1988 itself. The application does not also give specific details regarding the period of treatment. Further the payments made upto 6.10.1988 could not at all be taken into consideration, while considering the limitation prescribed under S. 10(1). In this regard the authority below has patently erred. 6. The learned Counsel also referred to the notice spoken to in the first part of S. 10(1), but that has no bearing at all in deciding this question of limitation. Therefore, the impugned order of the Authority below has necessarily to be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs.