Judgment :- SOMASUNDARAM, J. Writ Appeals 132 and 133 of 1993 have been filed against the common order of Srinivasan, J. dated December 24, 1992 dismissing Writ Petitions 7103 and 7104 of 1992 respectively, filed by the appellants for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the second respondent in his Letter in Reference No. 131/91-GP-4 dated May 14, 1992. The appellants are licensed stevedore with the Madras Port Trust. When a licensed stevedorers M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers closed its stevedoring business, the Madras Dock Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) passed orders dated May 14, 1992, reallocating the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers, who are the third respondent in the respective writ appeals, to the appellants for further employment as monthly rated Supervisors on and from May 15, 1992 in the pay scale of Rs. 1240-50-1590-60-2070-70-2560 with other allowances as applicable to that category under the W.R.C. recommendations. The said reallocation is stated to be made under clause 18 of the Madras Unregistered Dock General Pool Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme) as a consequence of the total closure of stevedoring business of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers. The main grievance of the appellants in the writ petitions is that they are having financial problems for quite some time due to the excess staff and it could not be possible for them to absorb the third respondent as there is no vacancy in their company. The appellants contended before the learned Single Judge that the order dated May 14, 1992 was passed by the Board without notice to the appellants and that the principles of natural justice have been violated. The further contention of the appellants before the Learned Single Judge was that the proper procedure to be adopted in cases of closure of any stevedoring business is to keep the employees in the general pool known as Pool B and then make an allocation to other stevedores only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the concerned stevedorer to place the relevant facts and circumstances before the Board. The learned Single Judge, on a consideration of clause 18 of the Scheme, took the view that the Scheme does not contemplate that the employees in question should be first included in List B and then only they should be transferred to List A. The learned Single Judge further held that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice as the Scheme does not provide for either the issue of a show cause notice or for any enquiry before an allocation is made under clause 18 of the Scheme. On a consideration of the materials available on record, the learned Single Judge also found that as a matter of fact the appellants were given opportunity to make representations before the third respondent in the respective appeals was allotted to the appellants when M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers closed its stevedoring business. Consequently the Learned Single Judge dismissed Writ Petitions 7103 and 7104 of 1992. 2. The petitioners in W.P. 7740 and W.P. 9780 of 1993, who are also licensed stevedores with the Madras Port Trust filed the said writ petitions challenging the orders dated May 14, 1992 passed by the Board which are similar to the orders challenged in Writ Petitions 7103 & 7104 of 1992 reallocating the third respondent in the respective writ petitions, who are also the ex-employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers. As the points raised in the Writ Appeals 132 & 133 of 1993 and Writ Petitions 7740 and 9780 are one and the same, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Before us, Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned Senior appearing for the appellants in Writ Appeals 132 and 133 of 1993 and for the petitioners in the writ petitions, submitted in the first place that as per clause 18 of the Scheme, 7 in the event of services of Supervisors or Receipt Clerks being terminated due to total closure of stevedoring business of an employer or for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman, they have to be retained temporarily in the General Pool, viz. List B till such time they are reallocated to any other employer and that in the present case, the former employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers cannot be directly allotted to the appellants in the writ appeals and the petitioner in the writ petitions by the orders challenged in the writ petitions, without placing them in List B and therefore on that ground the said orders are liable to be set aside. The second contention of Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel, is that the Board cannot unilaterally make reallocation of the employees whose services were terminated due to the closure of stevedoring business of their previous employer without notice and without giving an opportunity to the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners to place the relevant facts and circumstances before the Board and that the impugned orders dated May 14, 1992 passed by the Board without giving notice to the appellants and the petitioners in the writ petitions and without hearing their representation are violative of the principles of natural justice and on that ground also the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 4. Per contra, Mr. G. Venkataraman, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, contended that it is not necessary to give any notice to the concerned stevedorer before making reallocation of any employee under clause 18 of the Scheme and there is no violation of any principle of natural justice. The learned counsel further contended that under clause 18 of the Scheme, the Board is empowered to make such an allocation and that there is no necessity to keep the employees of the closed concern in List B before identifying the new employer for reallocation. When the Board is able to identify a new employer, it need not keep the employees of the closed concern in List B. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 also submitted that all the relevant facts and details are available with the Board and the reallocation was made by issuing the impugned orders only after considering the same. 5. Mr. R. Ganesan, learned counsel for the third respondent, who is the concerned employee, has supported the case of the Board on this aspect of the matter and contended that the power of the Board to make reallocation cannot be questioned by the newly identified employer. 6. 5. Mr. R. Ganesan, learned counsel for the third respondent, who is the concerned employee, has supported the case of the Board on this aspect of the matter and contended that the power of the Board to make reallocation cannot be questioned by the newly identified employer. 6. In the light of the rival contentions of the counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in these writ appeals and writ petitions : (i) Can the Board under clause 18 of the Scheme unilaterally reallocate certain workers whose services were terminated on account of the closure of the business of their former employer, to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals without giving notice to them and without giving an opportunity to them to state their case against the proposal to reallocate the workers ? (ii) Whether in the present case, on facts an opportunity was given to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals to represent their case to the Board before the orders challenged in the writ petitions were passed ?(iii) Can under clause 18 of the Scheme the employees, whose services were terminated on account of the closure of the business of their former employer, be straightway reallocated to another stevedorer without retaining such employees in List B temporarily ? 7. Point No. (1). The contention of Mr. N. R. Chandran, Learned Senior Counsel, is that when the services of the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers were terminated on account of a closure of the business of their employer, such employees cannot be unilaterally reallocated to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals by the Board without giving a notice to them and without hearing their representations and that the orders of the Board dated May 14, 1992 challenged in the writ petitions are bad, because they were passed by the Board without giving an opportunity to the petitioners and the appellants to state their case. The relevant clause in the Scheme is clause 18, which reads thus : "The Supervisor and Receipt Clerk shall ordinarily be attached to a Listed Employer in the monthly register, namely List 'A'. The relevant clause in the Scheme is clause 18, which reads thus : "The Supervisor and Receipt Clerk shall ordinarily be attached to a Listed Employer in the monthly register, namely List 'A'. In the event of services of Supervisor or Receipt Clerk being terminated due to total closure of stevedoring business of the employer or for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman, he may be retained temporarily in the General Pool, namely List 'B', till such time he is re-allocated to any other employer." No doubt, clause 18 does not contemplate the issue of notice to the new employers before reallocating the Supervisors and Receipt Clerks whose services were terminated due to the total closure of the stevedoring business of their former employer. Nor does it provide for any enquiry before such a reallocation is made. However, it should be remembered that the settled position of law as declared by the highest court of the land is that the principles of natural justice required that no decision can be taken and no order involving civil consequences can be made without giving an opportunity to the person who will be affected by such decision or order. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made in conformity with the rules of natural justice. The principles of natural justice are implicit in every decision making function, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India the Supreme Court has held that where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive, it should be followed by the authorities unless it is excluded by express words of statute or by necessary implication. 8. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India dealing with the same question, the Apex Court has held as follows : "But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wadsworth Board of Works. 8. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India dealing with the same question, the Apex Court has held as follows : "But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wadsworth Board of Works. 1863 14 SBHS 180 : A long course of conditions, beginning with the starting case 1723 1 Str 557) and ending with the very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature"* . The principles of audi alternam partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice. "In para 58 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court observes thus :" Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large area of administrative action. "Again in para 61 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :" The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. "In D. K. Yadav v. J.K.A. Industries Ltd. (1993-II-LLJ-696) the Supreme Court while holding that there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice, has observed as follows :" 7. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority to act arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person. 8. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority to act arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person. 8. It is fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner the Constitution Bench held that 'civil consequences' covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edn., page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the State or country they include .... rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action ...... In State of Orissa v. (Miss) Binapani Devi (1967-II-LLJ-266) this Court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given, it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice. "9. By the orders dated May 14, 1992, challenged in the writ petitions, the Board has reallocated the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan and Brothers to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals with effect from May 15, 1992. Certainly the said orders dated May 14, 1992 involved civil consequences as far as the petitioners are concerned and, therefore, the Board is under an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice before passing the said orders. Certainly the said orders dated May 14, 1992 involved civil consequences as far as the petitioners are concerned and, therefore, the Board is under an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice before passing the said orders. In view of the settled position of law as, declared by the Apex Court, on this aspect, we are unable to accept the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 that an opportunity need not be given to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals to enable them to put forth their case before the Board reallocated the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers to the writ petitioners and the appellants on the ground that the Scheme is silent on the question of issue of show cause notice, nor does it provide for an enquiry before an order of reallocation under clause 18 of the Scheme is passed. In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred above, it has to be held that even though clause 18 of the Scheme is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence must be taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice and that the principles of natural justice must be followed by the authorities unless it is excluded by express words of statute or by necessary implications, which is not the position in the present case. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that under clause 18 of the Scheme, the Board cannot unilaterally reallocate certain workers whose services were terminated on account of the closure of the business of their former employer to the writ petitioners and the appellants without giving an opportunity to them to state their case against such reallocation of the employees.Point No (ii) 10. The next question we have to examine is whether as a matter of fact, the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners were given an opportunity to represent their case before the Board passed the orders dated May 14, 1992 reallocating the third respondents to them under clause 18 of the Scheme. The next question we have to examine is whether as a matter of fact, the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners were given an opportunity to represent their case before the Board passed the orders dated May 14, 1992 reallocating the third respondents to them under clause 18 of the Scheme. It is not in dispute that M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers closed their stevedoring business, and the third respondents in those cases were the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers and that their services were terminated on account of the closure of the business of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers. It is seen from the records that there were conciliation proceedings before the Regional Labour Commissioner on February 19, 1992 in which two representatives of the Madras Stevedores Association participated. Admittedly, the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners are members of the said Association. It is equally not in dispute that the members of the Madras Stevedores Association put forth their case before the Board with regard to the reallocation of the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers through the Association. It is also seen from the records that in the meeting convened by the Regional Labour Commissioner on February 19, 1992, it was agreed that a Committee of 5 Members including one representative of the Board should be constituted to consider the feasibility of rehabilitation of surplus staff under 'A' List of the employers in a pool to be formed by the Madras Stevedores' Association and the modalities for the same should be worked out on or before February 29, 1992. However, on March 24, 1992, a resolution was passed by the Madras Stevedores Association spelling out a scheme called "Golden Hand Shake" between the employer and the employees providing for voluntary retirement of the employees and it was also communicated to the Board. Again conciliation proceedings were held by the Regional Labour Commissioner on February 25, 1992 and the representatives of the Association did not take part in it. In the above circumstances, the Board informed the writ petitioners and the appellants that it had no other alternative but to proceed with the implementation of the Scheme and allot the affected employees to certain registered stevedores. In the above circumstances, the Board informed the writ petitioners and the appellants that it had no other alternative but to proceed with the implementation of the Scheme and allot the affected employees to certain registered stevedores. Thereafter, the Managing Director of the Company which is the appellant in Writ Appeal 132/93 wrote a letter on April 28, 1992 in his capacity as President of the Madras Port Stevedores' Association to the Deputy Chairman of the Board, assuring him that the members of the Association will abide by the decision of the Deputy Chairman in regard to rehabilitation of staff completely closed stevedoring companies. The above mentioned letter dated April 28, 1992 reads thus :April 28, 1992." To The Deputy Chairman, Madras Dock Labour Board, Rajaji Salai, Madras for the 600 001. Sir, Sub : Rehabilitation of Surplus Staff List 'A '. In continuation of the discussions the Stevedores Members had with the Deputy Chairman on April 27, 1992, we assure that we will abide by the decision of the Deputy Chairman in regard to rehabilitation of Staff of completely closed and licence-surrendered Stevedoring Companies. We request that the Deputy Chairman to ensure that all terminal benefits are settled to such staff by their erstwhile employers before allotting them on a scientific pattern as agreed to by the Deputy Chairman. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/- President. "It is only thereafter, the Board passed the orders challenged in the writ petitions. As the petitioners in the other writ petitions are members of the Association, the assurance given by the President in the Letter dated April 28, 1992 is binding on the other writ petitioners also. It is seen from the counter affidavit that the Board is in possession of the relevant materials and only on the basis of the same the reallocation orders have been passed by the Board. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the averments in para 6 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 in Writ Petitions 1703 of 1992 which runs as follows :" The third respondent and other employees were the monthly paid 'List A' employees of one M/s. Natarajan & Brothers, stevedoring firm. The said Natarajan and Bros., closed down their stevedoring business. On account of the same the services of the aforesaid List A Dock workers were terminated. The said Natarajan and Bros., closed down their stevedoring business. On account of the same the services of the aforesaid List A Dock workers were terminated. Taking into consideration the amount of shipping business transacted by the writ petitioner, the volume of cargo handled by the individual stevedores including the writ petitioners, the type of cargo handled by them and intensity of supervision required thereto, firm contracts on hand with the firms and companies, number of supervisors available with them and overall capacity of the stevedores to absorb the Supervisors/Receipt Clerks, the first respondent allocated the 3rd respondent to work as 'List A' worker under the writ petitioner. "The above averments in para 6 of the counter affidavits are not denied by the appellants. Further in response to the circular dated June 7, 1991 issued by the Board to the Stevedores, the appellant in Writ Appeal 132/92 sent a reply dated June 12, 1991 in the following terms :" June 12, 1991 The Senior Administrative Officer (GP) Madras Dock Labour Board, Madras 600 001 Dear Sir, Ref : Your Circular No. 131/91-GP 4, dated June 7, 1991. With reference to your circular cited above, it is informed that for supervising the Stevedoring work we have only executive officials as permanent employees and we do not have any employees in the designation of Supervisor and Receipt Clerk. As such we are unable to furnish the return as sought in your above circular. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For Alankar Shipping & Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Sd/- Nalliah, Managing Director." The above letter shows that the appellant in Writ Appeal 132 of 1993 does not have any Supervisor or Receipt Clerk in its staff. Further it must be pointed out here that nothing is alleged by the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals against the suitability or otherwise of supervisors or Receipt Clerks and the conduct of the third respondent in these cases who are allotted to them by the impugned orders. In the above circumstances, it has to be held that the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners were given sufficient opportunity to put forth their case before the Board passed the orders challenged in the writ petitions. Point No (iii) 11. The next contention of Mr. In the above circumstances, it has to be held that the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners were given sufficient opportunity to put forth their case before the Board passed the orders challenged in the writ petitions. Point No (iii) 11. The next contention of Mr. N. R. Chandran, leaned Senior Counsel for the appellants is that whenever a reallocation of an employee is sought to be made under clause 18 of the Scheme, he should first be included temporarily in List B and then only he can be reallocated to any other listed employer in the monthly register, namely List A, and the impugned order straightway reallocating the third respondent in these cases, to the appellants in the writ appeals and the writ petitioners without placing them in the List B temporarily is bad and it is liable to be set aside. We are unable to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. According to clause 18 of the Scheme, the employees whose services were terminated due to the reasons mentioned therein may be retained temporarily in List B till another employer is found and till he is reallocated to him. Clause 18 does not prevent the Board from reallocating such employee straightway to a new employer without placing him in List B, if the Board is able to find a new employer immediately. We must point out that clause 18 does not make allotment of employees whose services were terminated due to the reasons mentioned in clause 18 to new employers conditional upon putting the employees in List B. Further the question of transferring List A employees to List B under clause 18 of the Scheme arises only if the Board is not in a position to identify the employer and reallocate them to such employer. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that the Board in the instant case, with the information and other records of the listed stevedoring employers available with it, could identify the listed employers to whom allocation of surplus employees could be made immediately on a scientific method. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that the Board in the instant case, with the information and other records of the listed stevedoring employers available with it, could identify the listed employers to whom allocation of surplus employees could be made immediately on a scientific method. It is also seen from the records that the decision to reallocate the employees to the writ petitioners and the appellants in the writ appeals, under the orders challenged in the writ petitions, was taken after taking into consideration the amount of shipping business transacted by the parties and the volume of cargo handled by them. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, since the Board could identify readily the employer to whom the employees of M/s. C. M. Natarajan & Brothers could be reallocated, the necessity for keeping them temporarily under List B did not arise. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the orders challenged in the writ petitions, directly reallocating the third respondent in these cases to the writ petitioner and the appellants in the writ appeals without placing them in List B are well within the powers vested with the first respondent under clause 18 of the Scheme. Consequently the point number (iii) is answered in the affirmative. 12. In view of our conclusions with regard to points (i) to (iii), we see no merit in the writ appeals and in the writ petitions and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the writ appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.