A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE common majority decision rendered by the Gujarat revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 2 5/01/1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 223 of 1982 and allied matters [reported in Vilhalbhai N. Patel v. State, 1984 GRTLR 38 (FB)] and subsequent decisions by the Tribunal following the aforesaid majority decision are under challenge in this group of petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. The questions of law arising in all these petitions are common. I have, therefore, thought it fit to dispose of all these petitions by this common judgment of mine. ( 2 ) THE Full Bench of the Tribunal of five members including the president was constituted to resolve its conflicting decisions on two main questions. The first question was whether or not a major brother in a joint family could be regarded as a major son for the purpose of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (the Act for brief) where the joint family consisted of brothers and their progeny with neither parent of the brothers alive. The second question was whether or not the provision contained in Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act would be available to a major son in a family where only the female parent was alive. By its majority ruling of 3 versus 2, the Tribunal has held that a major brother in the joint family consisting of only brothers with or without their progeny, but with neither parent alive, would be a separate person for the purposes of sec. 6 (2) of the Act in view of Sec. 6 (3c) thereof. The second question was also answered in the affirmative in favour of the family, as a landholder, consisting of a mother and a major son with or without other members therein. The majority decision of the Tribunal is at Annexure a to Special Civil Application No. 5276 of 1984. The State Government has chosen to challenge the decision at Annexure A to Special Civil Application no. 5276 of 1984 and allied matters and the subsequent decisions of the tribunal based on the aforesaid majority decision at Annexure a to that petition in the other petitions. The State Government has chosen to challenge the decision at Annexure A to Special Civil Application no. 5276 of 1984 and allied matters and the subsequent decisions of the tribunal based on the aforesaid majority decision at Annexure a to that petition in the other petitions. ( 3 ) IN order to understand and appreciate the rival contentions urged before me, it would be quite proper to look at certain relevant provisions of the Act. It may be mentioned at this stage that Sec. 6 (3c) of the act was brought on the statute book along with other relevant provisions by Gujarat Act No. II of 1974 (the Amending Act for brief) with effect from 1/04/1976. The Act was brought into force with effect from 15/06/1961. The Amending Act has sought to lower the ceiling limits for holding of agricultural lands by land-holders in the State of Gujarat. In that process, it introduced certain provisions presumably to ameliorate the lots of land-holders having quite a few mouths to feed. That is how the provisions like Sees. 6 (3b) and 6 (3c) have come to be introduced in the Act. Keeping this background in mind, it would be quite proper to look at certain provisions of the Act. ( 4 ) THE first relevant provision would be Sec. 2 defining meanings of certain words and expressions. The first relevant definition is of the "appointed day" contained in Sec. 2 (iv) thereof meaning the day on which the Act came into force. It is indisputably 15/06/1961. Then the term "joint family" is defined in Sec. 2 (16) thereof to mean an undivided Hindu family and in the case of other persons a group or unit the members of which by custom or usage are joint in estate or residence. By Sec. 2 (21) thereof, the word "person" is meant to include a joint family. The expression "specified date" has its meaning assigned in Sec. 2 (27a) as the date of the coming into force of the Amending Act. It is not in dispute that the amending Act was brought into force with effect from 1/04/1976. That brings me to Sec. 6 of the Act. The expression "specified date" has its meaning assigned in Sec. 2 (27a) as the date of the coming into force of the Amending Act. It is not in dispute that the amending Act was brought into force with effect from 1/04/1976. That brings me to Sec. 6 of the Act. The relevant provisions read :"6 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any agreement, usage or decree or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day no person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sees (2), (3), (3a) and (3b) be entitled to hold whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area. (2) Where an individual, who holds lands, is a member of a family, not being a joint family which consists of the individual and his spouse (or more than one spouse) and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters, irrespective of whether the family also includes any major son and land is also separately held by such individuals spouse or minor children, then the land held by the individual and the said members of the individuals family excluding major sons, if any, shall be grouped together for the purposes of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person. (3) Where on the appointed day a person holds exempted land along with other land then, (I) if the area of exempted land is equal to or more than the ceiling area he shall not be entitled to hold other land, and (II) if the area of exempted land is less than the ceiling area, he shall not be , entitled to hold other land in excess of the area by which the exempted land is less than the ceiling area. (3a) Where any person holds any land in any other part of India outside the State, then, the area of land so held by him in such other patt, not exceeding the maximum area of land which such person is entitled to hold in such ether part of India under any law, if any, relating to ceiling on land, used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes, shall be excluded from the ceiling area in excess of which a person is not entitled to hold land under this section and the extent of land determined after so excluding such area shall in relation to such person, be deemed to be the ceiling area, to be held by him in this State :provided that where any such person disposes of, at any time before the determination of ctiling area under this Act, any land or part thereof so held by him in any other pert of India outside the State, in accordance with the provisions of law in force in such part, the area equal to the land or part thereof so disposed of shall not be excluded while determining the ceiling area under this sub-section. (3b) Where a family or a joint family consists of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any of following categories namely : (I) minor son, (II) widow of a pre-deceased son, (III)MINOR son or unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son, where his or her mother is dead, such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, so however that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area and in such a case in relation to the holding of such family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling areaprovided that if any land is held separately also by any member of such family, the land so held separately by such member shall be grouped together with the 1 and to such family for the purpose of determining the total holding of such family :provided further that where, in consequence of any member of such family holding any land in any other part of India outside the State the ceiling area in relation to the family is reduced as provided in sub-sec. (3a) the one-fifth of the ceiling area as aforesaid shall be calculated with reference to the ceiling area as would have been applicable had no such land been held by such member in any other part of India. (3c) Where a family or a joint family irrespective of the number of members includes a major son, then each major son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-sec. (1 ). (3d) For the purpose of sub-sees. (2;, OB) or (3c), the members comprised in a family or as the case may be, a joint family on the specified date shall alone be taken into consideration and any changes in the character or number of members of the family occurring thereafter shall be ignored. (4) Land in this State which under the foregoing provisions of this section a person is not entitled to hold shall be deemed to be surplus land held by such person. " ( 5 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, sub-sees. (3a), (3b), (3c) and (3d) have been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act with effect from 1/04/1976. (4) Land in this State which under the foregoing provisions of this section a person is not entitled to hold shall be deemed to be surplus land held by such person. " ( 5 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, sub-sees. (3a), (3b), (3c) and (3d) have been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act with effect from 1/04/1976. That has resulted in the necessary amendment in sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) thereof. Sub-sec. (1) ordains against holding of agricultural lands by any person beyond the ceiling area. As pointed out hereinabove, by virtue of Sec. 2 (21) of the Act, a person would include a joint family. The concept of a joint family is certainly wider than that of a family. The word "family" is nowhere defined it the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Act speaks of the holding of agricultural lands by a family for the purposes of the Act. The family referred to in sub-sec. (2) envisages both the spouses and their children excluding the major son for the purposes of clubbing or grouping together the total lands belonging to members individually. The holding of a major son in the family is to be excluded for computing the total holding of the family. Sub-sec. (3b) provides for an additional benefit of holding in excess of the ceiling area in the case of a family or a joint family consisting of more than five members with a member or members falling in any of the three categories specified therein, namely, (i) minor son, (ii) widow of a pre-deceased son, (iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son, where his or her mother is dead. In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Jat Laxmanji Talasji, reported in AIR 1988 sc 825 : [1988 (2) GLR 1036 (SC)], a family or a joint family consisting of more than 5 members with a member or members belonging to the aforesaid specified categories would be entitled to be added to its holding by the 1/-5th ceiling area for each such member belonging to the specified categories. Sub-sec. (3c) provides for some additional benefit for a family or a joint family consisting of a major son or major sons irrespective of the size of the family. Sub-sec. (3c) provides for some additional benefit for a family or a joint family consisting of a major son or major sons irrespective of the size of the family. Each major son thereunder is regarded as a separate person for the purposes of Sec. 6 (1) of the Act. It would mean that each major son in the family would be entitled to hold a separate unit of the ceiling area for the purposes of the Act. Sub-sec. (3d) provides that the members comprised in a family or in a joint family on the specified date shall alone be taken into consideration and any changes in the character or number of members of the family occurring thereafter shall be ignored for the purposes of sub-sees. (2), (3b) or (3c) thereof. The question that arises for consideration is the exact connotation of the expression "major son" occurring in Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. This question, as aforesaid, has arisen in two different fact-situations. The first could be a family or a joint family consisting of a mother and a son with or without other members therein but certainly without the male parent. The second fact-situation would be a joint family consisting of members other than the father and his sons. A joint family could have as its members major brothers with or without their progeny but certainly without either parent of the brothers living as on 1/04/1976. It could as well consist of an uncle and his major nephew or nephews with or without other members in it. There might also be a family or a joint family consisting of a grandfather and his major grandson or grandsons with or without other members therein. What has arisen for consideration is whether or not the major male members in such families would be entitled to a separate unit of the ceiling area for each male member on interpretation of sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioning State has submitted that the provisions of sub-sec. (3c) are clear enough to indicate only one meaning and that a major son in the family or the joint family alone will be entitled to as eparate unit of ceiling area for the purposes of the Act. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioning State has submitted that the provisions of sub-sec. (3c) are clear enough to indicate only one meaning and that a major son in the family or the joint family alone will be entitled to as eparate unit of ceiling area for the purposes of the Act. According to the learned Advocate-General, a major son referred to in the aforesaid statutory provision is qua a living male parent and not de hors him. Where a family, whether joint or otherwise, does not have a male parent living, irrespective of the size of the family, only one unit would be available to that family as a person contemplated under sec. 6 (1) of the Act. According to the learned Advocate-General, if the family, whether joint or otherwise, consists of a mother and a major son with or without other members, that family will be entitled to only one ceiling unit for the purposes of the Act and no more unless the case falls within the purview of sub-sec. (3b) thereof. As against this, the submission urged on behalf of the opponents (the "land-holders" for convenience) is to the effect that the provisions contained in sub-sees. (3b) and (3c) need not be construed so narrowly as to defeat the object of the Amending Act. It has been urged on behalf of the land-holders that the provisions contained in sub-sees. (3b) and (3c) have been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act with a view to broadbasing the holding of the families or the joint families having many mouths to feed after lowering the ceiling limits thereby. It has also been urged that a narrow interpretation of sub-sec. (3c), as canvassed by the learned Advocate General, would produce unreasonable, if not absurd, results qua a joint family consisting of the father and his two major sons on the one hand and a joint family consisting of only three major brothers on the other. In the case of the joint family consisting of the father and his two major sons, runs the submission on behalf of the land-holders, the joint family would get three ceiling units as against the single unit got by the joint family consisting of three brothers if the interpretation canvassed by the learned Advocate-General is accepted. In the case of the joint family consisting of the father and his two major sons, runs the submission on behalf of the land-holders, the joint family would get three ceiling units as against the single unit got by the joint family consisting of three brothers if the interpretation canvassed by the learned Advocate-General is accepted. It has been urged that the State legislature never contemplated production of such result while introducing the beneficial provisions contained more particularly in sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act. ( 7 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that sub-secs. (3b) and (3c) have been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act for broadbasing the holding of the families and the joint families having many mouths to feed, more particularly when the Amending Act had effected the lowering of the ceiling limit. The legislative philosophy behind introduction of sub-sec. (3b) of Sec. 6 of the Act by the Amending Act has succinctly been expressed by the supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Jat Laxmanji Talasji (supra ). It reads :"the philosophy of this provision stares one in the eyes. When a family is both large and comprises (which expression is employed in the sense of includes) amongst it members who are subject to one or other of the socio-economic handicaps, fairness demands that such family is permitted to retain some more land than other families which are not so handicapped. The very nature of the three categories which are specified (minors, widow of a pre-deceased son, minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son who has lost both parents) conveys this message of plight. Understandable it is, that for such a family which has to carry the burden of misery, the community acting through the legislature has a soft corner and pours milk of human kindness into this benevolent provision aimed at relieving their distress to an extent. Such is the design. "i do not think any improvement can be made therein. ( 8 ) THE philosophy behind introduction of sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act is again to see that a major son in the family having his own family or is likely to have his own family is not deprived of a separate ceiling unit for the sustenance of himself and his family or his wouldbe family. This becomes clear even from sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act is again to see that a major son in the family having his own family or is likely to have his own family is not deprived of a separate ceiling unit for the sustenance of himself and his family or his wouldbe family. This becomes clear even from sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 6 of the act. It provides for clubbing or grouping of the separate holdings of individual members of the family excluding the separate holding of the major son or major sons therein. ( 9 ) THE question that arises is whether or not the Legislature contemplated any kind of family or joint family other than the family or the joint family of the father and his major sons for the purposes of sub-sec. (3c) of the Act. It would be difficult to presume that the Legislature was unmindful of the social fabric of the State polity. The existence of varieties and various kinds of families and joint families in the State was not unknown to the State legislature when it thought of introducing sub-sees. (3b) and (3c) of Sec. 6 in the Act. It is true that the law is made generally applicable; it does not operate only in individual cases except when the law is made only for certain specified individuals. It often happens that legislative enactments or pronouncements may produce inequitable results or unhappy outcomes much to the chagrin of the affected parties. At this stage the question that may crop up would be "has a piece of legislation to be interpreted in the light of the result it produces?" The answer to this question should certainly be an emphatic No. ( 10 ) IN this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport appellate Tribunal, reported in AIR 1976 SC 331 . It has been held :"if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the result of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a Court to refuse to give it effect. " ( 11 ) THE ruling of the House of Lords in the case of Duport Steels ltd. and Ors. v. Sirs and Ors. The mere fact that the result of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a Court to refuse to give it effect. " ( 11 ) THE ruling of the House of Lords in the case of Duport Steels ltd. and Ors. v. Sirs and Ors. , reported in 1980 (1) WLR 142 furnishes the necessary guidelines for interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. In that case, certain provisions of the Trade Union and labour Relations Act, 1974 came to be amended by the Employment protection Act, 1975 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976. Thereby immunity from a part of the common law of tort was granted to a person with respect to an act done by him in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. In that context it has been held :"where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the Judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. "the aforesaid observations in the case of Duport Steels Ltd. (supra) furnish guidelines to the judiciary in interpretation of a statutory provision more particularly brought on the statute book by an amendment. ( 12 ) IT thus becomes clear that sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act will have to be interpreted as it is and not as it ought to be. It cannot be gainsaid that the wordings of the aforesaid statutory provision are quite clear; they cannot be styled ambiguous or equivocal by any stretch of imagination. The word "son" occurring therein can have only one meaning as a son and not as a brother or a nephew or a grandson. ( 13 ) MY attention has been invited to the dictionary meaning of the word "son" found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (8th Edition-1990) published by Oxford University Press. The meanings assigned to the word "son" inter alia are "a boy or man in relation to either or both of his parents, (2) (a) a male descendant, (b) (foil. by of) a male member of a family, nation, etc. " What has been emphasised before me is the meaning of the son as a male descendant or a male member of a family. by of) a male member of a family, nation, etc. " What has been emphasised before me is the meaning of the son as a male descendant or a male member of a family. The word "descendant" has been defined in the same dictionary inter alia to mean a person descended from another. The word "family" as denned in the same dictionary has to be meant inter alia as "a set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not, 2 (a) the members of a household esp. parents and their children, (b) a persons children, 3 (a) the descendants of a common ancestor", ( 14 ) MY attention has also been invited to the meaning of the word "son" occurring in Blacks Law Dictionary (5th Edition-1979) published by west Publishing Company. The meanings assigned to that word therein inter alia are : "male offspring, an immediate male descendant. " A further clarification reads to the effect : "in a broad sense, the term may be employed as designating any young male person, as pupil, ward, adopted male child or dependent". Relying on the aforesaid dictionary meanings of the word "son", it has been urged that the provisions contained in Sec. 6, sub-sec. (3c) of the Act call for a wider, other than a narrower, construction. A major son in the family or in the joint family, it has been urged, should connote a major brother or a major nephew or a mar grandson in the family or the joint family consisting of major brothers with or without their progeny or an uncle or uncles and his or their major nephew or nephews with or without progeny in the family and the grandfather and his grandsons. It has been urged that interpretation of a provision which would advance or further the object behind it has to be preferred to the interpretation which would defeat it. ( 15 ) IT is true that external aids can be used for interpretation of a statutory provision if it is ambiguous and is capable of more than one meaning. It is not necessary always to refer to the dictionary meaning of a term of common parlance. ( 15 ) IT is true that external aids can be used for interpretation of a statutory provision if it is ambiguous and is capable of more than one meaning. It is not necessary always to refer to the dictionary meaning of a term of common parlance. It is a settled principle of law that, when a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. It has, however, been held by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal, Bareily and Ors, reported in AIR 1957 SC 871 that, when the context makes the meaning of the word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings it is capable of according to Lexicographers. ( 16 ) IN this connection, a reference also deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi v. K. T. Kosalram and Ors. , reported in AIR 1971 SC 1283 . It has been held therein :"the appropriate dictionary meaning of words possessing variable shades of meanings has not to be arbitrarily selected and mechanicaly applied. Dictionary meanings, however helpful in understanding the general sense of the words, cannot control where the scheme of the Statute or the instrument considered as a whole clearly conveys a somewhat different shade of meaning. It is not always a safe way to construe a statute or a contract by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection and after separating words from their context to give each word some particular definition given by lexicographers and then to reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of those definitions. " ( 17 ) IT thus becomes clear that dictionaries can be resorted to for the purpose of finding out meanings of words only when their meanings are not plain and unambiguous. Even when dictionaries have to be consulted in order to ascertain meanings of certain ambiguous and equivocal words undefined in the relevant statute, selection has to be made from different shades of meanings assigned to those words keeping in mind the context of the statutory provision containing such words. Even when dictionaries have to be consulted in order to ascertain meanings of certain ambiguous and equivocal words undefined in the relevant statute, selection has to be made from different shades of meanings assigned to those words keeping in mind the context of the statutory provision containing such words. They dictionaries cannot be allowed to act or operate as dictators in matters of construction of statutory provisions. They can at best be used as servants but cannot be allowed to become masters. ( 18 ) THE word "son" occurring in sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act is quite plain and unambiguous in its meaning. A son in a family or for that matter a joint family would connote a son in the context of a living parent. In the patriarchal form of society, a son in the family or the joint family will mean a son in the context of a living male parent. This meaning of the word "son" is quite plain and unambiguous in the context of the common parlance. I think it would be a futile exercise to consult a dictionary to find out various shades of meanings assigned to that word and to fit a convenient meaning irrespective of the context of the statutory provision. ( 19 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the land-holders that the concept of a joint family has to be borne in mind while interpreting the word "son" occurring in the aforesaid statutory provision. The expression "joint family" is defined in Sec. 2 (16) of the Act inter alia to mean an undivided hindu family. It has been urged that an undivided Hindu family consisting of brothers with or without their progeny or an uncle. and his nephew or nephews is not unknown in the Indian society. Similarly, brothers or an uncle and his nephew or nephews or uncles and their nephews residing together by usage or custom or joint in estate by usage or custom or as undivided Hindu families in (he case of Hindus is not an unknown phenomenon. It has been urged that I should interpret the word "son" occurring in sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act in the context of the concept of joint family mentioned in it. It is difficult to accept this submission. It has been urged that I should interpret the word "son" occurring in sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act in the context of the concept of joint family mentioned in it. It is difficult to accept this submission. The idea conveyed by the word "son" qua a family would fit in qua a joint family. ( 20 ) THE substance of the aforesaid submission is that a word in a statutory provision has to be construed differently in different contexts. The word "son" in a family would convey a very commonly known idea. As pointed out hereinabove, the tern "family" has not been defined in the Act. The scheme of Sec. 6 of the Act would go to show and to suggest what the Legislature has contemplated by the expression "family" occurring therein. for the purposes of sub-sec. (2) thereof, the word family" connotes "two spouses and their children whether major or minor". What is sought to be done is that a separate holding of a major son or major sons in the family has not to be clubbed or grouped together for the purpose of computing the holding of the person referred to therein. The concept of family in sub-sec. (3b) thereof is only marginally different. It takes care of other members in the family like the grand-children. The family for the purposes of sub-sec. (3b) of Sec. 6 of the Act is somewhat larger than the family envisaged in sub-sec. (2) thereof. The context however does not fail to suggest existence of a living parent in the family. Only in that context expressions "minor son", "widow of a pre-deceased son", and "minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son where his or her mother is dead" will have relevance. It is obvious that a minor son in absence of a living parent will not be treated as a minor son. If a minor male child resides with his uncle, he will be known as a minor nephew but not a minor son. If he resides with his elder major brothers, he will be styled as a minor brother and not a minor son. So will be the position of a minor grandson qua his grandfather. . ( 21 ) IT is true that every male member in a family is a son of some common ancestor. If he resides with his elder major brothers, he will be styled as a minor brother and not a minor son. So will be the position of a minor grandson qua his grandfather. . ( 21 ) IT is true that every male member in a family is a son of some common ancestor. That would obviously be so long as the mythological figure of Adem does not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for the purposes of sub-sec. 3 (C) of Sec. 6 of the Act. That concept is wholly out of the context qua the statutory provision with which this Court is concerned in this group of petitions. If a joint family consists of only brothers with or without their minor children, they will be commonly known as brothers residing together and not sons residing together. Similarly, if a joint family consists of an uncle and his nephew or nephews or uncles and their nephew or nephews, people will not style that family as that of sons residing together. The words like brother, nephew and the like have acquired fixed meanings and notions in our common parlance. It is not necessary to assign any different shades of meanings to these words de hors the context. ( 22 ) IT is true that the word son interpreted in the context of a living parent for the purposes of sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act might create some hardship or difficulties for a joint family consisting of brothers or uncles and nephews. That is however no relevant consideration in construing it differently from its plain meaning in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra ). A statute like the. Act is likely to produce some hardship in operation. ( 23 ) AT this stage the avowed object behind the enactment in question cannot be lost sight of. It is designed to achieve some social goals. The concept of the State in our modern times has no longer retained its original character of the Police State. It has now become a Welfare State. The Government has often to take some welfare measures for the benefit of the down-trodden. It cannot be gainsaid that the country abounds in quite a large number of landless persons. As against them, certain persons have a very large holding of lands. It has now become a Welfare State. The Government has often to take some welfare measures for the benefit of the down-trodden. It cannot be gainsaid that the country abounds in quite a large number of landless persons. As against them, certain persons have a very large holding of lands. The State of Gujarat is no exception to this fact-situation. As a part of the Welfare State, the Legislature might not have thought it fit to remain a silent spectator to this fact-situation. It might have thought of ameliorating the lot of landless persons. With that end in view, the Act has come to see the light of the day. The ceiling limit of the holding of agricultural lands is fixed and no person is made to hold any land beyond the ceiling limit fixed thereunder. The land found in excess of the ceiling limit has to be declared surplus as provided in Sec. 6 (4) of the Act. The avowed object of the Act is distribution of the surplus lands among landless people. The operation of this Act might therefore prove harsh and produce hardship in certain cases. That is, however, no ground to allow the object of the Act to be defeated or frustrated. ( 24 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that in a democratic polity the Legislature comprises of representatives, mostly elected, of people. In that case, it is presumed to know their necessities and needs and to be aware of their aspirations and expectations. Such awareness on its part is often reflected in its legislative pronouncements or statutory enactments. The State Legislature responsible for the statutory enactment under consideration in this case cannot be an exception to his generalisation. It can safely be presumed that at the relevant time it was aware of its peoples aspirations and expectations and knew of their needs and necessities. Its awareness about the social fabric can also safely be presumed. A joint family has remained no uncommon phenomenon in our Indian cultural milieu. A joint family consisting of major brothers with or without their progeny or an uncle and his major nephews or a grandfather and his major grandsons is not unknown in the Indian society. Despite this knowledge, the State Legislature has chosen to bring on the statute book, by the Amending Ac4 the relevant provisions in Sec. 6 of the Act more particularly sub-sec. (3c) thereof. Despite this knowledge, the State Legislature has chosen to bring on the statute book, by the Amending Ac4 the relevant provisions in Sec. 6 of the Act more particularly sub-sec. (3c) thereof. If it wanted to confer benefit thereunder on a joint family consisting of major brothers with or without their progeny or an uncle and his major nephews or uncles and their major nephews or a grandfather and his major grand-sons, it could not have failed to do so by an appropriate linguistic phraseology. Sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act could have very well been enacted so as to read "where a family or a joint family, irrespective of the number of its members, includes a major son or a major male member, as the case may be, then each major son or major male member shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-sec. (1)" (emphasis supplied) or it could have added the necessary explanation to Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act so as to read a major son in the context of a joint family would mean a major male member therein. It has not chosen to do so. It would be too much to presume that the State Legislature at the relevant time was unware of the existence of a joint family consisting of major brothers with or without their progeny and a uncle and his major nephews or uncles and their major nephews or a grandfather and his major grand-sons in the State of Gujarat. In that view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the legislative intent of not conferring benefit on such families is very much found reflected in the way Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act has come to be drafted. Such legislative intent is too manifestly clear to be missed or overlooked. ( 25 ) IT is true that the provisions contained in sub-sees. (3a), (3b) and (3c) are introduced with a view to avoiding undue hardship on account of lowering of the ceiling limit effected by the Amending Act. The Legislature appears to have kept in mind the patriarchal form of society in that context. ( 25 ) IT is true that the provisions contained in sub-sees. (3a), (3b) and (3c) are introduced with a view to avoiding undue hardship on account of lowering of the ceiling limit effected by the Amending Act. The Legislature appears to have kept in mind the patriarchal form of society in that context. It has taken care for a major son in the family or the joint family for the purpose of giving an extra ceiling unit for holding the land Even for a minor son some extra care is taken to see that the holding is suitably added. In a given case, it might prove beneficial even to a small family consisting of only two members, the father and the major son. Both of them would be entitled to have a separate ceiling unit qua their holding for the purposes of the Act. A family consisting of two parents and their female children, irrespective of the number, would not get more than one ceiling unit for holding agricultural lands Largeness of the family is not the dominant consideration in introducing more particularly sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act. It may be the dominant consideration for bringing on the statute book sub-sec. (3b) thereof. In that case also what has been envisaged by the Legislature is, as aforesaid, the patriarchal form of society. A family consisting of minor sons in excess of five in number will stand to benefit as against a family consisting only of female children irrespective of the number of persons in the family beyond five. This hardship created by the operation of the law is no ground to construe plain words occurring in a statutory provision differently from their accepted meanings. ( 26 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, a family consisting of the father and his four major sons might get five ceiling units for the purpose of the holding of agricultural lands. As against that, a joint family of major brothers might get only one ceiling unit for holding of agricultural lands. It would also be so in the case of a joint family of an uncle and his major nephews or uncles and their major nephews. As against that, a joint family of major brothers might get only one ceiling unit for holding of agricultural lands. It would also be so in the case of a joint family of an uncle and his major nephews or uncles and their major nephews. As ordained by the supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Nasiruddin (supra), plain and unambiguous words occurring in a statute need not be construed differently irrespective of such harsh consequences flowing from its operation. ( 27 ) IT would be quite proper at this stage to look at the provision on acceptance of the interpretation of sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act canvassed by and on behalf of the land-holders. It has been urged that the word "son" occurring therein should be read as a male member. So read, the provision will have to be read as "where a family or a joint family, irrespective of the number of members, includes a major male member, each male member shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-sec. (1)". Such interpretation might fit in qua a joint family but certainly not a qua a family. As pointed out hereinabove, a family is understood in the context of the scheme of Sec. 6 of the Act as a unit of parents and their children. If the family has a major son, the plain meaning given to the word "son" will take care of the holding of that family for the purpose of the Act. It will not envisage existence of a brother as a male member in that family. In that view of the matter, the word "son" occurring in the statutory provision will have to be understood differently in the context of a family and a joint family. It will have to be understood as connoting a son in the context of a family and a male member in the context of a joint family. I am afraid, the same word cannot be understood to convey different meanings in different contexts. ( 28 ) IT is true that the same word occurring differently in a statutory provision may be construed differently in different contexts. The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context if occurring differently in the same provision or in different provisions in the same statute. ( 28 ) IT is true that the same word occurring differently in a statutory provision may be construed differently in different contexts. The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context if occurring differently in the same provision or in different provisions in the same statute. The word "evidence" occurring differently in Sec. 207a (6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 has been construed differently as found occurring in different contexts by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Ramnarayan Mor and Am. v. State of Maharashfra, reported in AIR 1964 SC 949 . In the same way, the word "term occurring at two places in Sec. 7 (3) of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 has been construed differently in different contexts by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Biswanath sonar, reported in AIR 1967 SC 77 . The same was the case with the word "regulating" occurring in Sees. 3 (1) and (2) of the Essential commodities Act in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Ramnathan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Am reported in AIR 1985 SC 660 . ( 29 ) THE position obtainable in the present case is however different. The word "son" occurs twice in Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act in the same context. The context does not change with its second occurrence. That very word cannot be construed differently in the context of a family and a joint family as suggested by and on behalf of the land-holders. The same word cannot mean a son in the context of a family and a major male member in the context of a joint family. This can be done only by violating the plain meaning assigned to that word. ( 30 ) IN fact, the submission urged on behalf of the land-holders would require me to re-write sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act as where a family or a joint family, irrespective of the number of members, includes a major son or a major male member, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-sec. (1)". I do not think i possess a power to re-write any statutory provision. (1)". I do not think i possess a power to re-write any statutory provision. That is the legislative function except when the literal construction results into absolute absurdity. The substance of the submission urged on behalf of the land-holders, to put it differently, wants me to add some kind of Explanation to Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act reading as "the word major son occurring in sub-sec. (3c) hereinabove shall mean a major male member in the context of a joint family". No such addition in a statutory provision can be made in this fashion. It is admittedly a forbidden fruit. ( 31 ) IN this connection, my attention has rightly been invited by the learned Advocate-General to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 96 . It has been held therein :"it is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make lip the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and" comitty of instrumentalities. "the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (supra) is obviously bundung to this Court. It would not be possible for me to accept the aforesaid submissions urged by and on behalf of the land-holders for the purpose of interpretation of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act so as to read something more therein. ( 32 ) ). It would not be possible for me to accept the aforesaid submissions urged by and on behalf of the land-holders for the purpose of interpretation of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act so as to read something more therein. ( 32 ) ). It is obvious that a family or a joint family consisting of the mother and her major son or sons would difinitely get the benefit of sub-sec. (3c) of Sec. 6 of the Act. AS aforesaid, the word "son" has to be understood in the context of a living parent. Such a living parent could either be such sons mother or father. If either parent is living, a major son in the family will be regarded as a son and nothing else. The family unit, though the mother may not be the head of the family for all purposes, will be headed by the mother and none else. In that context, a son will have to be recognised as a son of that mother who is found living. It thus becomes clear that the existence of the male parent alone is not necessary for the purpose of giving benefit of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act to a major son in the family. A family consisting of the mother and her major son or major sons, irrespective of the size of the family, would be entitled to the benefits flowing from Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. ( 33 ) ). The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors. , reported in air 1985 SC 716 as relied on by the learned Advocate-General in support of his contention that a family consisting of the mother and her major son or sons would be entitled to only one ceiling unit and no separate unit for her major son or each of her major sons is distinguishable on its own facts. , reported in air 1985 SC 716 as relied on by the learned Advocate-General in support of his contention that a family consisting of the mother and her major son or sons would be entitled to only one ceiling unit and no separate unit for her major son or each of her major sons is distinguishable on its own facts. In that case, the contention of the land-holders was that, on the death of the Karia of the joint family, the properties devolved on the heirs by virtue of the relevant provisions contained in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and such heirs, therefore, became separate owners of their properties and each such heir would become entitled to his or her separate holding for the purposes of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Maharashtra Act for brief ). That contention has been negatived by the Supreme Court in view of the fact-situation obtainable in that case to the effect that, even after the death of the Karta of the joint family, the members continuing to reside together could have constituted one family unit only. It must be clarified at this stage that the aforesaid ruling was given in the context of the Maharashtra Act. In Sec. 2 (11) thereof, the term "family" is meant to include a Hindu Undivided Family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which, by custom or usage, are joint in estate or possession or residence" and the term "person" occurring in Sec. 2 (22) thereof is meant to include a family. These provisions are practically similar to the provisions contained in Secs. 2 (16) and 2 (20) of our State Act. In that context, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Rao Sham Rao deshmukh (supra) is binding. If Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act was not there, it would not be possible for this Court to have taken a different view. Sub-section (3c) of Sec. 6 thereof is, however, quite clear. It speaks of a family or a joint family in which a major son is also a member. That operates irrespective of the size of the family. Sub-section (3c) of Sec. 6 thereof is, however, quite clear. It speaks of a family or a joint family in which a major son is also a member. That operates irrespective of the size of the family. Even if the family consists of only the mother and her major son, as a family it will be entitled to have a separate ceiling unit and because of a major son as a member thereof such major son would also be a person for the purposes of Sec. 6 (1) of the Act and would therefore be entitled to a separate ceiling unit therefor. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts while construing Sec. 6 (3c) of our State Act. ( 34 ) ). This will now bring me to individual cases. In Special Civil application No. 5276 of 1984, the family consisted of two brothers and their deceased brothers widow as on 1st April, 1976. The holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 116 Acres 30 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed under the Act for that local area is 54 Acres. The majority decision has held that the holding of the family was not in excess of the ceiling area. In view of my aforesaid conclusion, the family would be entitled to only one ceiling unit of 54 Acres and the excess will be to the tune of 62 Acres 30 Gunthas. In that case, the majority decision in revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 647 of 1982 will have to be upset and the order under challenge before the Tribunal will have to be restored. In that view of the matter, this petition will have to be accepted. ( 35 ) ). So far as Special Civil Application No. 5277 of 1984 is concerned, the family consisted of an uncle and his nephew as on 1st April, 1976. The exact holding of the family does not appear to be on record in terms of acreage or hectreage. The matter is remanded to the first authority as no opportunity of hearing was given to the parties before passing the judgment after keeping the matter pending for some 3 years. The exact holding of the family does not appear to be on record in terms of acreage or hectreage. The matter is remanded to the first authority as no opportunity of hearing was given to the parties before passing the judgment after keeping the matter pending for some 3 years. This order will have to be maintained as no opportunity of hearing was found given to the parties. The matter will have to be decided by the first authority in the light of this judgment. It appears that the uncle and the nephew have resided together after the death of the father of the nephew. In that case the effect of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme court in the case of Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh (supra) will have also to be kept in mind. Since no declaration under Sec. 8 of the Act appears to have been obtained, in view of addition of the name of the individual made in the revenue records after 24th January, 1971 but before 1st April 1976, the provisions contained in proviso (c) to Sec. 15 will have to be kept in mind. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 36 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5278 of 1984, the family appears to be consisting of the mother and her major son as on 1/04/1976. The matter is remanded by the Tribunal to the first authority for examining the case whether or not the mother had any share in the property on the death of her husband. I do not propose to interfere with this order of remand at this stage for the simple reason that the relevant facts will have to be ascertained. The case will have to be decided by the first authority in the light of this judgment of mine. Besides, if the mother has resided with the son after the death of her husband, the aforesaid ruling of the supreme Court in the case of Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh (supra) will have to be kept in mind. This writ petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 37 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5279 of 1984, the joint family was found consisting of two brothers as on 1/04/1976. The holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 73 Acres 17 Gunthas. This writ petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 37 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5279 of 1984, the joint family was found consisting of two brothers as on 1/04/1976. The holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 73 Acres 17 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed under the Act for that local area is 54 Acres. The family would thus be found holding lands to the tune of 19 Acres 17 Gunthas in excess of the ceiling area. Shri Sheth for the respondents has, however, urged that the family has three minor sons as its members and in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji Talasji (supra), the petitioners will be entitled to be added to their holding the one-fifth of the ceiling area for each minor son. The fact that the family has three minor sons is not before this Court. Shri Sheth for the respondents states that, in the revisional application before the Tribunal, the relevant orders of the lower authorities were produced. In that view of the matter, it would be desirable to send the matter back to the Tribunal for revival of Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 446 of 1981 for its fresh decision according to law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Since the Tribunal has declared the holding of the family not beyond the ceiling area on the basis that each brother would be entitled to the benefit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act, that part of the decision will have to be upset. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 38 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5280 of 1984, the family was found consisting of three brothers with their mother alive and residing with one brother as on 1/04/1976. It appears that they were joint in estate. Their holding was found to be to the tune of 68 Acres 14 Gunthas. The ceiling area for that local area fixed under the Act is 54 Acres. Since the mother is found alive, each brother as her son would be entitled to a separate unit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act as interpreted by me in this judgment. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal will have to be upheld. Since the mother is found alive, each brother as her son would be entitled to a separate unit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act as interpreted by me in this judgment. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal will have to be upheld. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 39 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5281 of 1984, a curious situation arises. The majority and the minority decisions agreed that Revision application No. TEN. B. A. 930 of 1982 should be returned to Court No. 1 of the Tribunal for its decision according to law in the light of the majority decision. The facts of that revisional application are not on record. In that view of the matter the order passed by the Tribunal will have to be maintained provided the revisional application in question is still pending. It is obvious that the fate of the revisional application in question, if pending, will have to be decided in the light of this judgment of this Court. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 40 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5282 of 1984, the family was found consisting of the mother and her two major sons as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 90 acres 12 Gunthas. It is not in dispute that the ceiling area for that local area fixed under the Act is 54 Acres. By virtue of this judgment, both the brothers would be entitled to a separate unit each, over and above one unit for the family. In that view of the matter, the landholders are not found to be holding any land in excess of the ceiling area. The impugned decision of the Tribunal will, therefore, have to be upheld. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. . ( 41 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5283 of 1984, the family consisted of the mother and her son as on 1/04/1976. Their holding was found to be to the tune of 81 Acres 18 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. . ( 41 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5283 of 1984, the family consisted of the mother and her son as on 1/04/1976. Their holding was found to be to the tune of 81 Acres 18 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. If the mother and the son constituted a family or a joint family by sharing food, worship and shelter, the son would be entitled to the benefits under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act by virtue of this judgment of mine. However, in absence of any such material on record, the direction of the Tribunal for remanding the matter to the first authority will have to be accepted. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 42 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5284 of 1984 the respondents revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1835 of 1982 was ordered to be sent back to Court No. 1 for its fresh decision according to law in the light of the majority decision of the Tribunal. There are no material facts on record as to the size of the holding or the size of the family or the joint family, as the case may be. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal will have to be maintained subject to the rider that the case, if pending, has to be decided in the light of this judgment of mine and not in the light of the majority decision of the Tribunal. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 43 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5285 of 1984, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her three major sons as on 1/04/1976. The family was found holding lands to the tune of 72 acres and 35 Gunthas as on that date. The ceiling limit fixed for that local area under the Act is indisputably 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, since the mother was alive on the relevant date, the three brothers as sons would be entitled to claim the benefit of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. In that case, there will be no excess land beyond the ceiling area with the family. In view of this judgment of mine, since the mother was alive on the relevant date, the three brothers as sons would be entitled to claim the benefit of Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. In that case, there will be no excess land beyond the ceiling area with the family. The decision of the Tribunal to the effect that the three brothers as sons of the living mother are entitled to the benefit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act will, therefore, have to be accepted. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 44 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5286 of 1984, the respondents revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1152 of 1981 was ordered to be sent back to Court No. 4 for its fresh decision in the light of the majority decision. This direction of the Tribunal will have to be maintained subject to the rider that the case, if pending, will have to be decided in the light of this judgment of mine instead of the majority decision of the Tribunal. This petition will, however, have to be rejected. ( 45 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 5287 of 1984 is concerned, the joint family was found consisting of two brothers as on 1/04/1976. They were found holding agricultural lands to the tune of 71 Acres 2 Gunthas as on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, they will not be entitled to the benefit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. They will be entitled to hold only one ceiling unit of 54 Acres. That will render 17 Acres and 2 Gunthas of their lands to be surplus. In that view of the matter, the majority decision accepting their revision and upsetting the orders passed by both the lower authorities will have to be quashed and set aside. The orders under challenge in their Revision Application No. TEN B. A. 1398 of 1982 will have to be restored. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted. ( 46 ) SO for as Special Civil Application No. 5288 of 1984 is concerned, the joint family consisted of two brothers and their parents as on 1/4/1976. It does not become clear whether the parents were residing separately or with the brothers or with either of them. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted. ( 46 ) SO for as Special Civil Application No. 5288 of 1984 is concerned, the joint family consisted of two brothers and their parents as on 1/4/1976. It does not become clear whether the parents were residing separately or with the brothers or with either of them. There is no material no record as to the size of the family or as to its holding. The Tribunal has remanded the matter to the first authority for ascertaining whether the parents of either brother had any interests in the agricultural lands held in the name of only one brother. I do not propose to interfere with the order remand made by the Tribunal. It is rather clarified that the first authority shall decide the case in the light of this judgment of mine and not in the light of the majority decision of this Tribunal. If the brothers or either of them and their parents are residing together, the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Jat Laxmanji Talasji, reported in AIR 1988 SC 825 : [1988 (2) GLR 1036 (SC)] will have to be kept in mind. Subject to this ride, the order of remand passed by the Tribunal will have to be maintained. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 47 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 5289 of 1984 is concerned, the Tribunal has found that the inquiry mad by the first authority was perfunctory. It appears that no notice of hearing was ordered to ascertain heirs of deceased Prabhatsinh Naharsinh. I do not think it necessary to interfere with the order of remand at this stage. It will, however, be clarified that the first authority shall decide the remanded case in the light of the majority decision of the Tribunal. If the parties are residing together, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji talasji (supra) will have to be kept in mind. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 546 of 1981 is maintained. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. If the parties are residing together, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji talasji (supra) will have to be kept in mind. In that view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 546 of 1981 is maintained. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 48 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3577 of 1985 is concerned, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her three major sons and their children as on 1/04/1976. They were found holding lands to the tune of 130 Acres 9 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. By virtue of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to three separate ceiling units for three major sons over and above one ceiling unit for the family. In that view of the matter, the permissible holding of the family would be to the tune of 216 acres 9 Gunthas, very much within the permissible limit. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has held so It will, therefore, have to be maintained. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 49 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3578 of 1985 is concerned, the joint family consisted of two major brothers with their mother alive as on 1/04/1976. Their holding is found to be 64 Acres 30 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, each major son will be entitled to a separate ceiling unit of 54 Acres over and above one unit for the family. The holding of the family is very much within the ceiling limit under the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has taken that view. It calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 50 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3579 of 1985 is concerned, the joint family was found consisting of two major brothers with their mother alive as on 1/04/1976. Their holding was found to be 60 Acres 24 gunthas as on that date. The ceiling area for that local area fixed under the act is 54 Acres. ( 50 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3579 of 1985 is concerned, the joint family was found consisting of two major brothers with their mother alive as on 1/04/1976. Their holding was found to be 60 Acres 24 gunthas as on that date. The ceiling area for that local area fixed under the act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, each brother as a major son in the family would be entitled to the benefit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the act, In that view of the matter, there will be no surplus land with the respondents. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has taken that very view. It calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 51 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3580 of 1985 is concerned, the family was found consisting of the mother and her major son as on 1/04/1976. The holding of the family was to the tune of 65 Acres 32 Gunthas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. By virtue of this judgment of mine, the family will be entitled to an additional unit for the major son. The family would thus be entitled to hold the lands upto two ceiling units. In that view of the matter, no lard is fourd surplus with the family. In its impugned decision, the tribunal has taken this view. It calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 52 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3581 of 1985 is concerned, the family was found consisting of the mother and her major son as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was 51 Acres 19 Gunthas as on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act appears to be 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to two units, one for the family and the other for the major son therein. The permissible holding would, therefore, be 68 Acres. As against this, the holding of the family is found to be 51 Acres 19 Gunthas. The tribunal has taken this view in its impugned decision though on a different reasoning. The permissible holding would, therefore, be 68 Acres. As against this, the holding of the family is found to be 51 Acres 19 Gunthas. The tribunal has taken this view in its impugned decision though on a different reasoning. The impugned decision of the Tribunal calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 53 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 3583 of 1985, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her three major sons and one major grandson as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 300 Acres 2 Gunthas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the three sons in the family would be entitled to one ceiling unit each over and above one ceiling unit for the family. The family would thus be entitled to hold 4 ceiling units under the Act. They would thus be entitled to hold 216 acres of land. Their holding was found to be 300 Acres 2 Gunthas as on 1/04/1976. The Tribunal has taken this very view in its impugned decision. It calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 54 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 3584 of 1985, the joint family consisted of the mother and her four major sons as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 70 Acres 24 gunthas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to one ceiling unit each for its four major sons over and above one ceiling unit for the family itself. The total holding of the family is found to be very much within the ceiling area under the Act. In its impugned decision, the Tribunal has taken this very view though on a different reasoning. The impugned decision of the Tribunal deserves to be upheld in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. The total holding of the family is found to be very much within the ceiling area under the Act. In its impugned decision, the Tribunal has taken this very view though on a different reasoning. The impugned decision of the Tribunal deserves to be upheld in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 55 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 3585 of 1985 is concerned, the family consisted of the mother and her major son as on 1/04/1976. The first authority found the excess of land holding to be to the tune of 2 Acres 22 Gunthas whereas the Deputy Collector found it to be to the tune of 8 Acres 36 Gunthas. By virtue of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to one separate unit for the major son over and above one unit for the family. By no stretch of imagination the family could be said to be holding any land beyond the ceiling area on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. In its impugned decision, the Tribunal has reached this very conclusion. It, therefore, calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 56 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 6976 of 1985 is concerned, the family was found consisting of the widow, her two daughters, three younger brothers of her deceased husband and two nephews of her deceased husband as on 1/04/1976. All of them were major. In view of this judgment of mine, the word "son" occurring in Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act cannot be treated as a male member in the family. This interpretation of mine will all the more be applicable for interpretation of the word "son" occurring in Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act for the simple reason that a male member in the family for the purpose of that provision would certainly include a grandson whether his parents are alive or not and a grandson whose neither parent is alive is very much mentioned in the specified category in Clause (iii) thereof. If a son is treated as a male member, a grandson whether his parents are alive or not is certainly a male member in the family. If a son is treated as a male member, a grandson whether his parents are alive or not is certainly a male member in the family. That does not appear to be the intention of the Legislature in view of the specific category provided for a grandson whose neither parent is alive. A minor male child in the family who is not falling under any of the specified categories qua the main member of the family is not entitled to obtain any benefit under Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. In the present case, no member of the family is found falling within the specified categories. No separate holding for any such member can, therefore, be available even under Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. Section 6 (3c) of the Act is not applicable in the present case in view of this judgment of mine. The first authority found the land-holders holding not to be in excess of the ceiling area though the family held in all 61 Acres 35 Gunthas of land and the ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. A copy of the order of the first authority in that regard is at Annexure a to this petition. The Deputy Collector in suo motu revision under Sec. 37 of the Act, however, came to the conclusion that the holding of the family was in excess of the ceiling area by 7 Acres 35 Gunthas. This decision of the Deputy Collector is at Annexure b to this petition. In exercise of its revisional powers, the Tribunal by its decision rendered on 15/10/1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1395 of 1982 upset the suo motu revisional order at Annexure b to this petition. Its copy is at Aonexure c to this petition. The decision of the Tribunal at Annexure c to this petition has been based on its majority decision under challenge in this petition. By this judgment of mine, I have come to the conclusion that the majority decision of the Tribunal under challenge in this petition is not correct. The decision at Annexure c to this petition based on the majority decision will, therefore, have to be upset. By this judgment of mine, I have come to the conclusion that the majority decision of the Tribunal under challenge in this petition is not correct. The decision at Annexure c to this petition based on the majority decision will, therefore, have to be upset. The order passed by the Deputy Collector in exercise of his suo motu revisional powers under Sec. 37 of the Act at Annexure b to this petition will, therefore, have to be restored. This petition will therefore have to be accepted. ( 57 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 535 of 1986, the joint family consisted of the mother and her two major sons as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 80 Acres 25 Gunthas as on that date. The ceiling area for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to a separate ceiling unit for each major son over and above one ceiling unit for the family. In that view of the matter, the family would be entitled to hold in all 162 Acres of land. As against this, its holding was 80 Acres 25 gunthas. That was very much within the ceiling area for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal has come to this conclusion though on a different reasoning in its impugned decision. It calls for no interference by this Court in this petition. This petition will have therefore to be rejected. ( 58 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 551 of 1986, the joint family consisted of three brothers with neither parent alive on 1/04/1976. Their holdings were declared to be in excess of the ceiling area by 33 acres 1 Guntha of land. That decision of the first authority came to be affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector at Tharad on 30/10/1982 in Ceiling Appeal No. 84 of 1982. Its copy is at annexure a to this petition. By its decision rendered on 29/11/1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1424 of 1983, the Tribunal quashed and set aside the order at Annexure a to this petition in view of its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal rendered on 29/11/1984 in revision Application No. TEN. By its decision rendered on 29/11/1984 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1424 of 1983, the Tribunal quashed and set aside the order at Annexure a to this petition in view of its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal rendered on 29/11/1984 in revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1424 of 1983 is at Annexure b to this petition. The aforesaid majority decision of the Tribunal under challenge in this group of petitions has been found incorrect by me in this judgment of mine with respect to interpretation of the word "a major son" occurring in Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. In that view of the matter the impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure b to this petition will have to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the first authority as affirmed in appeal by the appellate authority at Annexure a to this petition will have to be restored. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted. ( 59 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 552 of 1985 is concerned, the respondents as two brothers had partitioned their ancestral lands some time on 31/12/1972 and had sold some lands some time on ll th April, 1967. They had also filed an application under Sec. 8 of the act for a declaration that the transfer by sale and partition was not with a view to defeating the object thereof. That application came to be rejected by the Assistant Collector at Dhrangadhra by his order passed on 1 6/08/1983. Its copy is at Annexure a to this petition. By its decision rendered on 29/01/1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1532 of 1983, the Tribunal upset the order at Annexure a" to this petition on the ground that by its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions it was held that a major brother in the joint family would be entitled to a separate ceiling unit and the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 8 of the Act was also interpreted to include a major brother as a major son in the family. A copy of the decision of the tribunal rendered on 29/01/1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1532 of 1983 is at Annexure b to this petition. A copy of the decision of the tribunal rendered on 29/01/1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 1532 of 1983 is at Annexure b to this petition. The majority decision of the Tribunal under challenge in this group of petitions has been found erroneous in this judgment of mine. The decision at Annexure b to this petition will, therefore, have to be upset as it has relied only on the aforesaid majority decision of the Tribunal under challenge in this group of petitions. It, however, transpires from the decision at Annexure b to this petition that the merits of the case have not been considered by the tribunal. The matter will, therefore, have to be remanded to the Tribunal with the direction to restore the Revision Application culminating into its decision at Annexure b to this petition to file and its fresh decision on its merits according to law uninfluenced by its majority decision under challenge in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 60 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 3738 of 1986, the joint family was consisting of the mother and the son and his wife and six minor children including three minor sons as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 65 Acres 39 Gunthas on that date. The ceiling area for that local area fixed under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to one separate ceiling unit for the major son over and above one ceiling unit for the family. In that case the total permissible holding with the family could be 108 Acres of land. As against that, its total holding was found to be 65 Acres 39 Gunthas of land. It was very much within the permissible limit under the Act. Even otherwise, in view of three minor sons in the family and in view of the fact that the family consisted of in all nine members, the main land-holder, that is, the father of the minor sons would be entitled to be added to his holding in all the three-fifths of the ceiling area. The one-fifth of the ceiling area would be 10 Acres 32 Gunthas and the three-fifths would be 32 Acres 16 Gunthas. The one-fifth of the ceiling area would be 10 Acres 32 Gunthas and the three-fifths would be 32 Acres 16 Gunthas. In that case the family would be entitled to hold 86 Acres 16 Gunthas. The holding of 65 Acres 39 Gunthas can, therefore, be said to be very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal has taken this view though on a different reasoning. It, therefore, deserves to be affirmed in this petition. This writ petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. . ( 61 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 199 of 1987, the family was found consisting of in all ten members including the mother and her major son and his wife and children including four minor sons as on 1/04/1976. By virtue of this judgment of mine the major son in the family would be entitled to one separate unit. The ceiling area fixed under the Act for that local area is 54 Acres. The total holding of the family was found to be 60 Acres 31 Juntas as on 1/04/1976. In that view of the matter, the family had no excess land beyond the ceiling area. Even otherwise, the land-holder individually would be entitled to be added to his holding the four-fifths of the ceiling area in view of his having four minor sons with the size of his family to be of 10 members in view of Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. The Tribunal has found that the land-holder did not hold any land beyond the ceiling area. This decision of the Tribunal deserves to be affirmed in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 62 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 200 of 1987, the joint family was found consisting of two brothers and their progeny with neither parent alive on 1/04/1976. Their total holding was found to be to the tune of 66 acres 9 Juntas of land. The ceiling unit for that local area fixed under the act is 54 Acres. The first authority declared 12 Acres 9 Juntas of land to be surplus with the family by his order passed on 28/12/1982. Its copy is at Annexure a to this petition. It came to be affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Assistant Collector at Bharuch on 31/03/1984. Its copy is at Annexure b to this petition. The first authority declared 12 Acres 9 Juntas of land to be surplus with the family by his order passed on 28/12/1982. Its copy is at Annexure a to this petition. It came to be affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Assistant Collector at Bharuch on 31/03/1984. Its copy is at Annexure b to this petition. By its decision rendered on 29/04/1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 856 of 1983, the Tribunal upset the order at Annexure a to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure b to this petition on the basis of its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions. A copy of the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal rendered on 29/03/1985 in revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 856 of 1983 is at Annexure c to this petition. In view of this judgment of mine, the decision at Annexure c to this petition will have to be quashed and set aside. There is no material on record to show the size of the family of the land-holder as on 1/04/1976. It does not become clear whether or not the land-holder had any minor son in the family as on 1/04/1976 and whether or not the number of members in his family exceeded five. In that view of the matter, the case will have to be remanded to the first authority for restoration of the inquiry proceedings under Sec. 21 of the Act to file and to consider the case afresh for the purpose of availability of benefit, if any, under Sec. 6 (3b) thereof in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji talasji (supra ). This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 63 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 205 of 1987, the joint family consisted of the father, his major son and his five major grandsons and other family members totaling 22 as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 132 Acres 9 Juntas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to two units, one for itself and the other for one major son in the family. The total holding of the family was found to be 132 Acres 9 Juntas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to two units, one for itself and the other for one major son in the family. The grandson in the family would not qualify for any benefit under Sec. 6 (3c) of the Act. The family does not qualify for any benefit under Sec. 6 (3b) thereof though the number of members in the family is 22. The two ceiling units would come to 108 Acres of land. As against that, the holding of the family is found to be 132 Acres 9 Juntas. Its holding is thus found to be in excess of the ceiling area by 24 Acres 9 Juntas. The Tribunal has found the holding of the family not to be in excess of the ceiling area in any manner in view of its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions. That majority decision of the Tribunal no longer holds the field in view of this judgment of mine. The impugned decision of the Tribunal at Annexure c to this petition will, therefore, have to be quashed and set aside. The holding of the family is found to be in excess of the ceiling area by 24 Acres 9 Juntas. The case will have to be remanded to the first authority for the limited purpose of ascertaining which lands of the family need to be declared surplus under the Act. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 64 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8016 of 1988, the family was found consisting of the mother and her major son and his wife and children totaling 10 members in the family as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 82 Acres 17 Juntas on that date. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son in it. The ceiling area fixed under the Act for that local area is 54 acres. The family would, therefore, be entitled to 108 Acres of land. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son in it. The ceiling area fixed under the Act for that local area is 54 acres. The family would, therefore, be entitled to 108 Acres of land. As against that, its holding was found to be 82 Acres 17 Juntas. It is not found to be in excess of the ceiling area for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal has taken this very view in its impugned decision. It, therefore, deserves to be affirmed. This petition, therefore, deserves to be rejected. ( 65 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8018 of 1988, the joint family consisted of the mother and her son with his wife and three minor sons as on 1/04/1976. The total holding was found to be to the tune of 53 Acres 13 Juntas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 48 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son therein. In that view of the matter, it could not be said to have held any land in excess of the ceiling area as on 1/04/1976. Even otherwise, the family would be permitted to hold the excess land in view of Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. The number of members in the family as on 1/04/1976 was six including one minor son. The land-holder would be entitled to be added to his holding the onefifth of the ceiling area for his minor son. The one-fifth of the ceiling area would be 9 Acres and 24 Juntas. The land-holder would, therefore, be entitled to hold 57 Acres 24 Juntas of land as on 1/04/1976. As against that, the holding was found to be 53 Acres 14 Juntas. It was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The tribunal has in its impugned decision found the holding of the family not in excess of the ceiling area. This decision of the Tribunal deserves to be affirmed. This petition has, therefore, to be rejected. It was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The tribunal has in its impugned decision found the holding of the family not in excess of the ceiling area. This decision of the Tribunal deserves to be affirmed. This petition has, therefore, to be rejected. ( 66 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8019 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of three major brothers and their wives and children in all numbering 15 as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 98 Acres 37 Juntas on that date. The ceiling limit prescribed for that local area under the Act is 54 acres. In its impugned decision, the Tribunal has relied on its majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions and allowed three ceiling units for three brothers and declared the holding of the family not to be in excess of the ceiling area. In view of this judgment of mine, the majority decision of the tribunal in the aforesaid Revision Application would no longer hold the field. The case however requires to be considered in the light of Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. The family had in all 15 members as on 1/04/1976. The family had in all 4 minor sons of 3 different brothers. Since their parents were alive, the family would be entitled to get the one-fifth for each minor son added to its permissible holding under the Act. The fourfifths of the ceiling area of 54 Acres would be 44 Acres 8 Juntas. The permissible holding of the family under the Act would, therefore, be 97 acres 8 Juntas of lands. As against that, its hold was found to be 98 acres 37 Juntas. The excess holding beyond the ceiling area was thus found to be 1 Acre 24 Juntas, that is, less than 2 Acres. It would result into a fragment. In view of Sec. 18 of the Act, the family will have to be permitted to hold this fragment. In that view of the matter, the impugned decision of the Tribunal will have to be affirmed though on a different reasoning. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 67 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8020 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her five major sons and their children as on 1/04/1976. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 67 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8020 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her five major sons and their children as on 1/04/1976. The holding of the family on that date was found to be 95 Acres 30 Juntas. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold in all six ceiling units, one for the family and five for the five major sons therein. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. Its holding of 95 Acres 30 Juntas was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has taken this very view. In that view of the matter, that decision deserves to be affirmed in this petition. This petition has, therefore, to be rejected. ( 68 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8021 of 1988, the family was found consisting of the mother and her major son and his wife and children as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family on that date was found to be 131 Acres 11 Juntas. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son therein. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. The family was thus found entitled to hold 108 Acres under the Act. The total holding of the family was found to be 131 Acres 11 Juntas. Its holding was found to be in excess of the ceiling area by 23 Acres 11 Juntas. The Tribunal has taken this very view in its impugned decision. It, therefore, deserves to be affirmed in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 69 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8022 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her son and his wife and children as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family as computed for the purpose of the Act was 63 Acres 21 Juntas as on 1st April, The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. The total holding of the family as computed for the purpose of the Act was 63 Acres 21 Juntas as on 1st April, The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold lands upto two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son therein. In that view of the matter, the family could not be said to be holding any land beyond the ceiling area under the Act as on 1/04/1976. The tribunal in its impugned decision has taken this very view. It, therefore, deserves to be affirmed. Even otherwise, the family was found consisting of 7 members with two minor sons of the landholder on 1/04/1976. In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji Talasji (supra), the family would be entitled to hold the two-fifths of the ceiling area in excess of the ceiling area for the two minor sons of the land-Adder. The two-fifths of the ceiling area would be 21 Acres 24 Juntas. The total permissible holding of the family would, therefore, be 75 Acres 24 Juntas. As against that, its holding was found to be 63 Acres 21 Juntas. In that view of the matter also, the holding of the family could not be said to be in excess of the ceiling area on the relevant date. This petition, therefore, deserves to be rejected. ( 70 ) LA Special Civil Application No. 8023 of 1988, the joint family consisted of the brother and two widows of his two deceased brothers and their children as on 1/04/1976. The brother had also his major son alive on that date in the family. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for one major son therein. The total holding of the family was found to be 172 Acres 01 Guntha. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the act is 54 acres. The family would thus be entitled to hold the land to the tune of 108 Acres under the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has considered the family consisting of three brothers, the other two brothers being represented by their widows. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the act is 54 acres. The family would thus be entitled to hold the land to the tune of 108 Acres under the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has considered the family consisting of three brothers, the other two brothers being represented by their widows. In view of its impugned majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions, the Tribunal has awarded one unit each to each brother though not alive and, therefore, came to the conclusion that the excess land in the family was to the tune of 10 Acres and 01 Guntha. The majority decision of the Tribunal has been upset by this Court by this judgment of mine. In that view of the matter, the impugned decision of the tribunal under challenge in this petition will have also to be upset. The family involved in this case would be entitled to hold the lands to the tune of 108 acres. Its holding was to the tune of 172 Acres 01 Guntha. The surplus land would be to the tune of 64 Acres 01 Guntha. The matter will have to be sent to the first authority for deciding which lands of the family should be declared surplus under the Act. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 71 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8025 of 1988, the joint family was consisting of three major brothers and their progeny as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be to the tune of 190 Acres 8 Juntas. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the act is 54 Acres. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has held that the family would be entitled to hold three ceiling units as there were three major brothers in it in view of its impugned majority decision under challenge in this group of petitions. That majority decision of the Tribunal has been found to be incorrect by this judgment of mine. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to only one ceiling unit for itself and no separate ceiling unit for the other two major brothers in the family. The impugned decision of the Tribunal in this petition will, therefore, have to be quashed and set aside. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to only one ceiling unit for itself and no separate ceiling unit for the other two major brothers in the family. The impugned decision of the Tribunal in this petition will, therefore, have to be quashed and set aside. It transpires from the order of the first authority that only male members in the family have been taken into consideration for the purpose of Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act. It does not transpire from the material on record whether or not the family consisted of any female members. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jat Laxmanji talasji (supra), the members of the family would include female members for the purpose of Sec 6 (3b) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the case will have to be remanded to the first authority for restoration of the inquiry proceedings to file for the purpose of considering the benefit, the family would be entitled to under Sec. 6 (3b) of the Act after ascertaining the exact number of its members including female members as on 1/04/1976. This petition will, therefore, have to be accepted to the aforesaid extent. ( 72 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8026 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of the brother, his wife, his three sons (one major and two minor) and his brothers daughter and other members in the family as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was found to be 68 Acres 17 Juntas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the Act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for the family and the other for the major son therein. The family would thus be entitled to hold lands to the tune of 108 Acres under the Act. As against that, the holding was found to be 68 Acres 17 Juntas. It was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has come to this very conclusion though on a different reasoning. The impugned decision of the Tribunal will, therefore, have to be affirmed in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. It was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The Tribunal in its impugned decision has come to this very conclusion though on a different reasoning. The impugned decision of the Tribunal will, therefore, have to be affirmed in this petition. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 73 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 8027 of 1988, the joint family was found consisting of the mother and her son and his wife and children as on 1/04/1976. The total holding of the family was 90 Acres 4 juntas on that date. The ceiling area fixed for that local area under the act is 54 Acres. In view of this judgment of mine, the family would be entitled to hold two ceiling units, one for itself and the other for the major son therein. It would therefore be entitled to hold in all 108 Acres. As against that, its holding was found to be 90 Acres 4 Juntas. It was very much within the permissible limit for the purposes of the Act. The tribunal has reached this very conclusion in its impugned decision. It will have, therefore, to be affirmed. This petition will, therefore, have to be rejected. ( 74 ) IN the result Special Civil Application Nos. 5276 of 1984, 5279 of 1984, 6976 of 1985, 551 of 1986, 552 of 1986, 200 of 1987, 205 of 1987, 8023 of 1988 and 8025 of 1988 are accepted to the extent indicated in this judgment. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent in each of them with no order as to costs. The remaining petitions are rejected. Rule issued in each of them is discharged with no order as to costs. .