Judgment :- Sreedharan, J. Petitioner in O.P. No. 11364/92 is the appellant. She approached this Court for quashing Ext. P11 order issued by 5th respondent, Manager, M.G.M., English Medium School, Muthoor dismissing her from the service of the school. Learned single judge by judgment dated 24-9-92 dismissed the original petition holding that the management of the school is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner-appellant challenges this view taken by the learned single judge. 2. Short facts necessary for the disposal of this original petition are as follows: Petitioner claims to be fully qualified to hold the post of Nursery Teacher. She was appointed as a Nursery Teacher by the 5th respondent on 1-6-86. The school run by the 5th respondent is an unaided recognised institution. Petitioner has been working in the school from its very inception. The teaching staff of the school was not satisfied with the functioning and management of the school. Petitioner being the senior member of the staff used to make reasonable and lawful demands for improving the conditions of service of the staff. On 31-1-92, 5th respondent issued a memo of charges and called for explanation. Writ-petitioner, appellant submitted her explanation. Later, another memo of charges dated 28-2-92 was served on the petitioner. A reply to that was also furnished. Thereafter the Manager by letter dated 18-3-92 informed her that an enquiry was decided to be held on 26-3-92 into the earlier charges served on her. Petitioner could not attend the enquiry fixed on 26-3-92. Later she was informed of the posting of the enquiry to 31-3-92. On that day, petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer, who was an Advocate, and represented that she must be allowed to take part in the enquiry through an Advocate. Enquiry Officer did not grant that prayer; but adjourned the enquiry to 7-4-92. On 6-4-92, petitioner submitted a detailed representation to the Manager stating that she would not be attending the enquiry to be held by the Enquiry Officer who is conducting the enquiry. The Management thereafter served Ext. P11 order dated 20-4-92 on the appellant-writ petitioner dismissing her from service. This order is under challenge. 3. It is the common case of parties that 5th respondent is the Manager of an unaided recognised school. The Management thereafter served Ext. P11 order dated 20-4-92 on the appellant-writ petitioner dismissing her from service. This order is under challenge. 3. It is the common case of parties that 5th respondent is the Manager of an unaided recognised school. Chapter XI V(AA) of the Kerala Education Rules deals with conditions of service of teaching and non-teaching staff of recognised unaided schools. In view of the provisions contained in Chapter XIV (AA) of K.S.R.,learned counsel representing the appellant submitted that the management is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is his further case that institution run by the 5th respondent is one established to perform a public duty of imparting education and therefore a writ will lie against it. Consequently it is argued that this Court is to quash Ext. P11 by issuing a writ of certiorari. 4. It is true that the educational institution run by the 5th respondent is imparting education to students. The said school is supplementing the functions performed by the educational institutions run by the State and those aided by the State. It is contended that 5th respondent being an educational institution supplementing the effort of the State in educating the pupil, it must be treated that the institution is discharging a public duty and consequently amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. 5. There is considerable mixing up of slightly different but overlapping concepts of what is meant by the words "person" or "authority" for the purpose of Art.226 of the Constitution of India and what is meant by "other authorities" in the definition of State in Art.12 for the purpose of giving the benefit of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution of India. It is clear that relief under Art.226 could be granted for violation of statutory and also other rights which may not amount to fundamental rights. What is a State for the purpose of Art.12 will a fortiori be an "authority" for the purpose of Art.226 but the converse is not always true. 6. In Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court formulated certain tests for determining whether a Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government coming within the purview of Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. In Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court formulated certain tests for determining whether a Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government coming within the purview of Art.226 of the Constitution. They are: 1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. 2) Existence of 'deep and pervasive State control' may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. 3) It may also be a relevant factor:-Whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. 4) If the functions of the Corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 5) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. These tests are not exhaustive or comprehensive. But they give sufficient guidance for deciding whether a body is amenable to 'the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 S.C. 487, a question arose as to whether the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar is an authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench summarised the tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority's case for determining whether a Corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government. One such test highlighted by Their Lordships was: "The financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet ahnost entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with Government character". Later, similar issue came up before the Supreme Court in Manmohan Singh v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 364, wherein Their Lordships observed: "The matter can be viewed from a slightly different angle as well. Later, similar issue came up before the Supreme Court in Manmohan Singh v. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 364, wherein Their Lordships observed: "The matter can be viewed from a slightly different angle as well. After the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 the aided school receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public exchequer and whose employees have received the statutory protection under the 1969 Act and who is subject to the regulations made by the Education Department of the Union Territory of Chandigarh as also the appointment of Headmaster to be valid must be approved by the Director of Public Instruction, would certainly be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court". On the basis of these controls of Government over the institution and the staff, the Supreme Court held that the institution is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. 7. In Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. Rudani & others AIR 1989 SC 1607, Their Lordships had to consider whether a Trust registered under the Public Trust Act is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. Their Lordships took the view: "Art.226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writ in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Art.226, writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose". (emphasis supplied) Their Lordships went on to observe: "The term "authority" used in Art.226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Art.12. Art.12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art.32. Art.226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Art.226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The words "any person or authority" used in Art.226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied". In the instant case the 5th respondent is managing a unaided recognised school. The management is not discharging any statutory obligations. When an employee engaged by the management is dismissed, that employee cannot enforce a contract of personal service by resort to Art.226 of the Constitution. 8. The Jockey Club, incorporated by Royal Charter, exercised responsibility for the organisation and control of racing and training activities in Great Britain. The Disciplinary Committee of the Club found a jockey and her trainer guilty of misconduct and disqualified the jockey and imposed fine of her trainer. This action was ought to be judicially reviewed by the Court. The Court of appeal dismissed the claim for judicial review stating that although the Jockey Club exercised dominant control over racing activities in Great Britain its powers and duties were in no sense governmental but derived from the contractual relationship between the club and those agreeing to be bound by the Rules of Racing, (vide Regina v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club Ex parte AGA KHAN 1993 (1) W.L.R.909. According to us, the view taken by -the Court of appeal holds - good even under the provisions of Art.226 of the Constitution. The relationship between the management of unaided recognised school and its employee is one derived from contractual relationship and the dispute arising out of that is not to be judicially reviewed under Art.226 of the Constitution. 9. In Commissioner, Lucknow Division v. PremLata AIR 1911 SC 334, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the order of dismissal of a teacher engaged by the Colvin Taluqdars 'College, Lucknow run by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act can be interfered with under Art.226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. In Commissioner, Lucknow Division v. PremLata AIR 1911 SC 334, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the order of dismissal of a teacher engaged by the Colvin Taluqdars 'College, Lucknow run by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act can be interfered with under Art.226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The basic section of the college in which the teacher was working was not registered by the Government or affiliated by any local body, no grant in aid was being taken by the Society to run the basic section of the college. Their Lords hips took the view that the committee which manage the affairs of the college was not functioning as a statutory body discharging duties under the Act and are not governed by the regulations framed thereunder. Therefore the management was found not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the order of dismissal not open to challenge. In Dayanand Mahavidyalaya Degree College, Varanasi, an institution affiliated to the Banaras Hindu University was held by the Supreme Court was not a creature of a statute by an entity like a company or a co-operative society or other body which has been created under the operation of a statute. Therefore it was held that the court cannot order reinstatement of a servant who has been dismissed by the College authorities (Arya Vidya Sabha, Kashi & another v. Krishan Kumar AIR. 1976 SC 1073). 10. In the instant case, Government are not giving any aid whatsoever to this recognised unaided schools. They arc to find out their own means for running the institution. The provisions contained in Chapter XIV (AA) of K.E.R. merely state that Managers of recognised unaided schools should appoint only candidates who possess qualifications prescribed for the respective posts in Government Schools, that the teaching and non-teaching staff shall be paid salary by cheques and that the service of any member of the teaching or non-teaching staff shall not be terminated without conducting a domestic enquiry and without giving the member an opportunity of being heard in that enquiry. 5th respondent, management in the instant case, served the memo of charges on the petitioner and a domestic enquiry was conducted into those charges. Writ petitioner-appellant at first appeared before the enquiry officer and thereafter withdrew from the enquiry. 5th respondent, management in the instant case, served the memo of charges on the petitioner and a domestic enquiry was conducted into those charges. Writ petitioner-appellant at first appeared before the enquiry officer and thereafter withdrew from the enquiry. Therefore it cannot be held that the management did not comply with the provision of Chapter XIV (AA) in issuing the order of dismissal. 11. As stated earlier, the school run by the 5th respondent is a recognised unaided school. The school does not receive any financial aid from the Government. No Governmental control is exercised over it. The mere fact that the school is imparting education to the students cannot make the management a public authority amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 (1) SCC 645, the 5th respondent private educational institution merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the pupil. It clearly supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State. Their activities are closely alike and supplemental to the activity of the State. But the said activity of the management cannot make the management a body amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned single judge dismissed the original petition taking the view that a writ of certiorari will not issue to a purely private institution. We are in full agreement with the said observation. The Writ appeal is thus devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed.