JUDGMENT M.V. Tamaskar, J. 1. Respondent No. 2, Messrs. Sethi Wine Stores, Bhopal, was an assessee dealing in the business of foreign liquor. There was a deed of partnership in the name of Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant in which Kamlal Sethi, Vikramjit Sethi and Inderjit Sethi were equal partners. This deed was made effective from June 16, 1961, and respondent No. 2, Messrs. Sethi Wine Stores, was run as a branch of Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant. In the return filed in the name of Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant, the income from the hotel business as well as the wine business was shown and the status was claimed as that of a registered firm. The assessing Income-tax Officer for the years concerned noted that since the licence for running the wine business was in the name of Ramlal Sethi, no legally constituted firm came into existence because of Rule 6 of the Excise Rules, according to which no transfer or sub-lotting of the licence was permissible without the written permission of the Collector. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, rejected the claim of registration by the assessee and assessed the income from the wine and hotel business in the status of an "association of persons". 2. The matter came up to the Tribunal and by its order dated February 21, 1972, it allowed registration in respect of the hotel business. 3. The Income-tax Officer passed a consequential order and assessed the assessee, Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant, in respect of its hotel income in the status of a registered firm. 4. In respect of the assessment year 1965-66, the Income-tax Officer initiated action under Section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act in respect of the income of respondent No. 2 for the period from April 1, 1964, to February 28, 1965. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred and the Appellate Tribunal, vide its order dated October 6, 1976, held that the assessment has been made on a non-existent firm since Messrs. Sethi Wine Stores came into existence only from March 1, 1965, and earlier to that, i.e., from June 23, 1961, to February 28, 1965, the person to be assessed was Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant of whom Messrs. Sethi Wine Stores was only a branch. 5. Sethi Wine Stores came into existence only from March 1, 1965, and earlier to that, i.e., from June 23, 1961, to February 28, 1965, the person to be assessed was Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant of whom Messrs. Sethi Wine Stores was only a branch. 5. After the order of the Tribunal, the Income-tax Officer again initiated action under Section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act on respondent No. 2. He completed the assessment, vide order dated March 27, 1981, in respect of the assessment years 1962-63 to 1965-66. Against the order of the Income-tax Officer, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. It was urged before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that no person of the name of Sethi Wine Stores existed during these assessment years as the Income-tax Officer has already assessed the income from the wine business in the status of an "association of persons" and, therefore, there was no justification for taking action under Section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act. It was also contended that the notice under Section 148 was beyond the time-limit and the levy of interest was also challenged. 6. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, vide its order dated September 21, 1972, held that the income from the wine business could not be clubbed with the income of the other firm, viz., Messrs. Pagoda Hotel and Restaurant, and as such the income from the wine business remained the income of the "association of persons" consisting of the partners of the firm. The Tribunal, therefore, directed the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order in respect of the wine business. The Income-tax Officer took up action under Section 148 after obtaining prior approval of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The Tribunal, by its order dated December 20, 1982, held that the action of the Income-tax Officer under Section 147(a) and the subsequent issue of notice under Section 148 of the Act was quite proper and valid. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal further directed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to deal with the other grounds as contended by the respondent/assessee about the liability regarding the levy of interest under Sections 139(8), 215 and 217 of the Income-tax Act and thus the appeals filed by the respondent/assessee were partly allowed by one consolidated order of the Tribunal for the above four assessment years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has also passed one common order for all the four years dated December 20, 1982. 7. The petitioner filed an application under Section 256 of the Income-tax Act before the Tribunal requiring it to refer a common question of law arising out of the consolidated order of the Tribunal dated December 20, 1982, in appeals for the assessment years 1962-63 to 1965-66. 8. The question sought to be referred was whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee is entitled to take up the ground of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax on the question of levy of interest under Sections 139(8), 215 and 217 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the said authority is bound in law to take the point and to adjudicate it. 9. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, vide its order dated August 12, 1983, rejected the application for reference on the ground that the combined application for all the four assessment years together is not competent. The said order was sought to be challenged before this court and a writ was prayed for to direct the Tribunal to decide the reference application filed under Section 256 of the Income-tax Act on the merits and for referring the question of law to the High Court, whether the order passed by the Tribunal rejecting the application to make a reference as there was a consolidated application made for different assessment years, was tenable. 10. It has to be seen whether when common questions of law arise out of a single order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in respect of different orders or for different parties, one application under Section 256(1) or 256(2) of the Income-tax Act would be maintainable. 11. From a reading of Sections 253, 254, 256(1), 256(2), 259 and 260(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, it is clear that by the reference which is made to the High Court, the Appellate Tribunal seeks its opinion on the questions of law which arise from its orders passed under Section 254 of the Income-tax Act. The jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court is neither appellate nor revisional. The jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court is neither appellate nor revisional. The High Court exercises an advisory jurisdiction and that is why Section 259(1) provides that the case which has been referred shall be decided according to the opinion of the judge of the High Court. The language of Section 256 indicates that when there is one order which is passed by the Tribunal even though it may be dealing with different assessment years and possibly different assessees, nevertheless one application for reference is maintainable. Only when common question of law or fact arise and the Tribunal passes a single or common order, it must necessarily follow the question of law which arise from such orders which are referred under Section 256(1) or they arise from a common order (sic). The reference application is tenable irrespective of the fact whether the order under Section 254 deals with one or more parties or assessment years. We may refer the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kusum Ansal v. CIT [1991] 190 ITR 24 [FB] in this connection. We may refer also to the decision of this High Court in Union of India v. ITAT [1987] 164 ITR 600, in which it was held as under (headnote) : "In the absence of any specific rule under the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957, and there being no bar against it under Section 27 of the Act, one consolidated reference application could be filed in such a case. Moreover, respondent No. 2 was unable to point out that any prejudice would be caused or was likely to be caused to him in such a case. The order of the Tribunal was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice and was also not well-founded, because the Tribunal had not given any finding to the effect that the proposed question of law did not arise at all. Even assuming that one consolidated reference application was not maintainable in respect of the nine cases, it ought to have been treated as proper and valid in accordance with the prescribed form at least for one assessment year because there was no bar to treating the said reference application for a particular year and deciding the same on merits. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the reference application of the Department on a hypertechnical ground that the procedure was not legal." 12. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the reference application of the Department on a hypertechnical ground that the procedure was not legal." 12. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was wrong in rejecting the application to make a reference. It is, therefore, directed that the Tribunal shall decide the reference application filed under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act on the merits for referring the questions of law to this court.