Judgment :- SOMASUNDARAM, J. These writ appeals have been filed against the common order of the learned Single Judge dated December 24, 1992 dismissing Writ Petitions 9135 of 1992, 10318 of 1992, 11302 of 1992 and 9091 of 1992. Writ Petitions 9135, 11302 and 9091 of 1992 have been filed for the issue of writ of mandamus for directing respondents 2 and 3 to transfer the appellants temporarily from List-A to List-B as Supervisors and Record Clerks till such time they are reallocated to any other registered employer. The prayer in the Writ Petition 10318 of 1992, out of which Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 arises, is for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order of the second respondent in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 bearing No. 131/91 GP 4 dated July 7, 1992 and to direct respondents 2 and 3 to transfer the appellant in W.A. No. 360/93 to List-B as supervisor temporarily till such time he is reallocated to any other registered employer. 2. The case of the appellants in W.A. 119, 360 and 799/93 in their respective writ petitions is that they were employed under M/s. K. P. V. Shaikh Mohammed Rowther and Company (Private) Limited the 4th respondent in Writ Appeals 119 and 360 of 1993, as Supervisors and Receipt Clerks, that the 4th respondent has expressed his inability to continue with the same number of employees as the volume of his business as a stevedore with the Madras Port Trust has fallen down and that the 4th respondent retrenched the senior employees contrary to the provisions of Sections 25-FF and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the above circumstances, it is the further case of the appellants in W. As. In the above circumstances, it is the further case of the appellants in W. As. 119, 360 and 799 that under the provisions of the Madras Unregistered Dock General Pool Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme'), the Madras Dock Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') is bound to make provision for the employment of the appellants and that they should make allocations accordingly and till such allocation is made, the Board is bound to transfer the appellants temporarily from List A to List B. The case of the appellants in W.A. 800/93 is that they are the former employees of C. M. Natarajan & Brothers, who terminated their services but due to the total closure of his stevedoring business, that though the Board by the order dated May 14, 1992 re-allocated them to new listed stevedores, they refused to provide them with the employment, that the Board is bound to place them in List B till they are provided with suitable employment under any listed employer and that the Board in spite of their representations failed to take any action to place them in List B. Respondents 2 and 3 are resisted the writ petitions contending that unless a stevedore like the 4th respondent has closed his business, it is not necessary for the Board to make a reallocation of the employees of the 4th respondent and that the only right of the appellants is to take appropriate proceedings against their employer the 4th respondent, challenging the order of retrenchment and seek such reliefs as are available to them in law before the appropriate forum. 3. The learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petitions, took the view that the stevedore-employer cannot seek a mandamus directing the Board to transfer their employees even when the business of such stevedore-employer like the 4th respondent is continued by him, from List A to List B. Nor can an employee who has only been retrenched, claim that he has to be included temporarily in List B in order to be reallocated to some other registered employer, particularly when the petitioners in Writ Petitions 9135, 10318 and 11302 of 1992 have stated that their retrenchment is not in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is illegal. The learned Single Judge further held that the appellants have also reserved their rights to challenge the orders of their retrenchment in the appropriate forum and in such a case, it is not open to them to claim that they must be treated on par with the employees of an establishment which is closed and reallocated to some other employer. The learned Single Judge also held that the remedy of the appellants is only to take appropriate proceedings against their employer 4th respondent challenging the orders of retrenchment. Taking such a view, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions. The learned Single Judge dismissed W.P. 9091/92, out of which W.P. 800/93 arises, holding that by valid orders of the Board, the petitioners in W.P. 9091/92 were allotted to new listed employers and if their new employers refused to provide employment to them they must seek their remedies against their new employer and not against the Board. As already stated these writ appeals are directed against the said common order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions. 4. Before us Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the appellants were List A employees, that as per the provisions of the Scheme, the Supervisors and the Receipt Clerks were ordinarily to be attached to a listed employer in the monthly register, namely, List A and that in the event of the services of these Supervisors or Receipt Clerks being terminated due to total closure of the business of the employer or for any other compelling reasons and it is found valid by the Chairman, he may be retained in the General Pool, namely, List B under clause 18 of the Scheme till such time they are reallocated to any other employer. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that on October 25, 1991, the 4th respondent had written a letter to the Chairman of the Board that it has a very big establishment comprising of large number of Dock Workers and due to the fall in business, the 4th respondent is unable to retain the workers and requested the Board to implement the Scheme by finding employment for the retrenched staff of the 4th respondent found in List A. The said letter dated October 25, 1991 was followed by another letter dated November 15, 1991. It is the further contention of the learned for the appellants that after receiving the letters referred to above, the Board has not initiated any action to transfer the appellants to List B and in the mean time the 4th respondent had retrenched the appellants. The learned Counsel submitted that in the above circumstances, the Board is bound to transfer the appellants temporarily from List A to List B as Supervisors and Receipt Clerks till such time they are reallocated to any other employer. 5. Per contra, Mr. G. Venkataraman learned counsel for the Board, submitted that the appellants in WA 119, 360 and 799/93 have been the direct employees of the 4th respondent and they were on the pay rolls of the 4th respondent and that if the appellants have any grievance against the 4th respondent on the ground that they have been illegally retrenched, they have to proceed only against the 4th respondent in the manner known to industrial law and that they are not entitled to any relief in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the Board further submitted that the question of reallocating the appellants to some other registered employer after retaining them in the general pool would arise only if their services have been terminated due to total closure of stevedoring business of the 4th respondent or for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman of the Board, that the phraseology "for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman" is-ejusdem generis to the words "due to total closure of stevedoring business of the employer" found in clause 18 of the Scheme and that in the present case, inasmuch as the 4th respondent has not closed its stevedoring business the appellants in WA 119, 360 and 799/93 are not entitled to be placed in List B temporarily before reallocating them to another employer under clause 18 of the Scheme. The learned counsel for the Board again contended that when the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 and the 4th respondent made the joint application dated June 30, 1992 to the Board requesting the Board to retain the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 in the List B of the Scheme, the Board by the order dated July 7, 1992 refused to accede to the request made by the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 and his employer the 4th respondent and that the Board in the said order has given valid reasons for not retaining the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 in List B. 6. To appreciate the rival contentions of the counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to the relevant clauses in the scheme, namely, clause 18 and clause 22(3). Clause 18 of the Scheme reads thus : "The Supervisor and Receipt Clerk shall be ordinarily be attached to a Listed employer in the monthly register namely List 'A'. In the event of services of Supervisor or Receipt Clerk being terminated due to total closure of stevedoring business of the employer or for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman, he may be retained temporarily in the General Pool, namely List 'B' till such time he is reallocated to any other employer." Clause 22(3) runs as follows : " The Chairman or the Deputy Chairman may for sufficient and valid reasons allow the transfer of monthly worker to the general pool on a request in writing of the employer or the worker explaining fully the reasons for the transfer, provided that such transfer shall be subject to the fulfilment of any condition regarding termination of employment. No transfer shall take place without the prior approval of the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman." As already pointed out, the case of the appellants is that the 4th respondent who is carrying on the stevedoring business has a very big establishment comprising of large number of Dock Workers, that due to fall in business the 4th respondent was unable to retain the appellants in its service and in the above circumstances, the 4th respondent and the appellants submitted representations dated October 25, 1991, December 30, 1991, January 3, 1992 and January 23, 1992 to the Board requesting the Board to transfer the appellants to List B till such time they are reallocated to any other employer and that the Board failed to take any action on the representations of the appellants referred above. When the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 and his employer submitted a joint application dated June 30, 1992 before the Board requesting the Board to retain the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 in List B of the Scheme, the Board passed the order dated July 7, 1992 challenged in Writ Petition 10318 of 1992 in the following terms : "Madras Dock Labour Board Ref. : No. 131/91 GP 4 Dated. 7.7.1992. SUB : Supervisors and Receipt Clerks listed under 'A' List of G.P. Scheme for the 'Temporary transfer to List 'B' and reallocation to other employers - Request - Reg. Ref. : Your joint petition dated June 30, 1992 submitted to the Chairman, M.D.L.B. With reference to your above joint petition dated June 30, 1992 submitted to the Chairman, Madras Dock Labour Board, requesting to retain you in the List 'B' of the G.P. Scheme of the Madras Dock Labour Board till such time re-allocation is made to other registered employers, I am directed to inform you that the matter was examined in the light of of the various provisions of the G.P. Scheme, and the Dock Labour Board is unable to concede your request for the reason that the Dock Labour Board could interfere in the matter of rehabilitation to employees of the establishments where the stevedoring business is totally closed as per the provisions of the Scheme. Sd/- xxxx 7/7/92 Secretary." The reason given by the Board in the order dated July 7, 1992 for refusing to transfer temporarily the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 from List A to List B is that the establishment of the 4th respondent is not totally closed. A reading of the order dated July 7, 1992 shows that the Board is clearly under the mistaken view that it can transfer an employee from List A to List B temporarily under clause 18 only if the business of the establishment in which he is employed is totally closed. The above reason given by the Board in the order dated July 7, 1992 for refusing to transfer the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 temporarily from List A to List B of the Scheme is clearly erroneous, because, the said reason runs counter to the language of clauses 18 and 22(3) of the Scheme. Clause 18 of the Scheme specifically shows that not only when the business of the stevedoring establishment is totally closed but also for any other compelling reasons found valid by the Chairman of the Board, the employees of such. establishment carrying on stevedoring business can be retained temporarily in List 'B' till such time they are reallocated to any other registered employer. Similarly clause 22(3) of the Scheme empowers the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Board for valid and sufficient reasons to transfer the monthly worker to the General Pool on a request in writing made by the employer or the worker explaining the reasons to the transfer, provided that such transfer shall be subject to the fulfilment of any condition regarding termination of employment. In view of clauses 18 and 22(3) of the Scheme, when the appellants in Writ Appeals 119, 360 and 799 of 1993 and the 4th respondent by the letters dated October 25, 1991, December 30, 1991, January 3, 1992 and January 23, 1992 jointly requested the Board to transfer the appellants to list B temporarily till they are allotted to a registered employer, the Board is under an obligation to consider the request of the appellants and the 4th respondent and examine whether there are sufficient and valid reasons as contemplated in clause 22(3) of the Scheme to transfer the appellants to List B and send a suitable reply to the appellants. Again in such a case, the Board is also bound to consider the question whether there is actually any reduction in the volume of stevedoring business of the 4th respondent as claimed by the 4th respondent and the appellants and whether such a reduction in the volume of business if any and the retrenchment of the appellants by the 4th respondent constituted sufficient and valid reasons as contemplated in clause 22(3) of the Scheme or a compelling reason as laid down in clause 18 of the Scheme for transferring the appellants who were List A employees of the 4th respondent to the General Pool. No doubt the 4th respondent - the employer of the appellants in W.A. 119, 360 and 799 has not closed down his stevedoring business. However, the case of the appellants is that there was a fall in the volume of stevedoring business of the 4th respondent and that the 4th respondent was unable to retain all the workers and therefore, he had to retrench them. In the above circumstances, the Board before taking a final decision on the application submitted by the appellants and the 4th respondent to transfer the appellants to List B, it ought to have taken into consideration the volume of shipping business transacted by the 4th respondent, the volume of cargo handled by the 4th respondent during the relevant period. Thereafter on the basis of the materials available with the Board with regard to the business of the respondent, it should have decided the question whether there is any fall in the volume of business of the 4th respondent or whether there is any other valid, sufficient and compelling reason for invoking of clauses 18 and 22(3) of the Scheme. It is not the case of the Board that it had sent any reply to the appellants in Writ Appeals 119, 799 and 800 of 1993 for the various representations made by them either separately or jointly with the 4th respondent to place them in List B. It is also necessary to point out that before the Board decides one way or the other in respect of the claims made by the appellants, the principles of natural justice are to be complied with. The appellants are entitled to have an opportunity to meet the objection if any on the part of the Board not to place the appellants in List B.' The Scheme confers a right on the appellants to seek transfer from List A to List B, and they are entitled to such transfer if they satisfy the conditions prescribed in clauses 18 and 22(3) of the Scheme, as the case may be. Such a right cannot be denied without affording an opportunity to the appellants to meet the objection if any on the part of the Board in granting the request of the appellants to transfer them from List A to List B. On the question of the Board giving such an opportunity to the employees, after full discussion, we have taken a similar view in the judgment delivered by us today in W.A. 132/93 etc. batch.6(A). In view of the express provision contained in clauses 18 and 22(3) of the Scheme, it is not at all possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Board and the reasoning of the learned Single Judge that the remedy of the appellants is only to take appropriate proceedings against their employer and challenge the orders of retrenchment passed by the 4th respondent against the appellants in the W.A. 119, 360 & 799/93 before the appropriate forum under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the appellants are not entitled to any relief in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. As already pointed out, the reasons given by the Board in the order dated July 7, 1992 challenged in Writ Petition 10318 of 1992 for refusing to transfer the appellant in Writ Appeal 360 of 1993 to the General Pool is clearly erroneous and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 7. For all the reasons stated above, we are obliged to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing Writ Petitions 9135, 10318, 11302 and 9091 of 1993 and the orders of the Board dated July 7, 1992 challenged in Writ Petition No. 10318 of 1992 and remand all these matters to the Board for fresh disposal according to law. 8. 8. The appellants are directed to make their representations to the Board putting forth their case for placing them in the General pool namely List B till they are permanently allotted to a registered employer, within 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment in these writ appeals. The Board is directed to take into account the volume of the shipping business transacted by the 4th respondent and the volume of cargo handled by the 4th respondent during the relevant period and all other relevant materials and then decide the question, whether there is any such fall in the business of the 4th respondent during the relevant period. The Board is also to consider the question whether there is such a fall in the volume of business of the 4th respondent warranting retrenchment of its employees, namely, the appellants in W.A. 119, 360 and 799/93. The Board is further directed to decide the question whether there are sufficient, valid or any other compelling reasons for transferring the appellants to the General Pool either under clause 18 or under clause 22(3) of the Scheme and then pass orders on the representations of the appellants requesting the Board to transfer them to List B within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of the representations from the appellants after giving an opportunity to the appellants to substantiate their case put forth in their representations. In the absence of relevant materials regarding the volume of stevedoring business carried on by the 4th respondent, we ourselves are not in a position to dispose of the matters on merits and in the above circumstances, we are constrained to remand the matter to the Board with the directions indicated above. 9. In the result, the writ appeals are allowed, the order of the learned Single Judge dated December 24, 1992 dismissing writ petitions 9133, 10318, 11302 and 9091 of 1992 and the order of the Board dated July 7, 1992 challenged in writ petition 10318 of 1992 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Board for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. No costs.