JUDGMENT Appellants challenge their conviction under section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment awarded vide judgment, dated 14.7.1986, passed in Sessions Trial No. 222/83 of Jabalpur Sessions Division. The material facts are that on 23.6.1983, at about 10.30 p.m., Santosh Kumar (P.W. 2), Rajkumar Deshwani (P.W. 5) and Ganesh Punjabi (the deceased) after t.1king tea at a stall were returning to their houses, when they reached near the house of Dr. Abdulla behind Andherdeo mosque both the appellants came from the opposite direction, stopped Ganesh Punjabi and after hurling filthi abuses at him, started stabbing him with knives. Ganesh fell down at a short distance even then he was assaulted. In the meantime, one or two persons came that way and the appellants ran away. Both the aforesaid eye-witnesses then fled from the spot. Some unknown aforesaid eye-witnesses then fled from the spot. Some unknown person reported this incident to the police on telephone. The message was recorded in Rojnamacha Sanha (Ex. P. 11). Town Inspector, Shri R.C. Tiwari (P. W. 9) reached the spot with force. He sent the injured man alongwith Sub-Inspector, Vishwanath Dube (P.W. 7) to Victoria Hospita1 with requisition for his medical examination (Ex. P. 6/2). Where he was reported dead. Santosh Kumar gave report which was registered as Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P.S). After recording Marg, Inquest Was held vide Ex. P. 6/1 and the body was sent for post-mortem examination, vide requisition Ex. P. 12. Since no report from Chemical Examiner or the Serologist is on record the seizure of allegedly blood-stained articles from the scene of occurrence, the dead body and the possession of the appellants needs no mention hilving no evidentiary value. Dr. AK. Yadu (P.W. 1) who performed autopsy, found vide report Ex. P. 119 incised wounds on various parts of the body. The heart and left lung were involved. There is no doubt that the assailants intended to kill Ganesh. The trial Judge placing reliance on the testimony of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses, recorded the impugned conviction. Appellants' learned counsel consiled the evidence of Santosh Kumar and Rajkumar Keshwarni as unreliable in view of their suo emcuest conduct and the material inconsistency between their statements. There is no doubt that the assailants intended to kill Ganesh. The trial Judge placing reliance on the testimony of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses, recorded the impugned conviction. Appellants' learned counsel consiled the evidence of Santosh Kumar and Rajkumar Keshwarni as unreliable in view of their suo emcuest conduct and the material inconsistency between their statements. His submission is that both these witnesses who claim to have seen commission of murder of their friend in their very presence, instead of taking steps to inform the police and to rush the victim to the hospital, went away from the spot and slept till the arrival of the police. Since the evidence indicates that they were not terror striken as a result of the assault this subsequent conduct of these two witnesses becomes so unnatural that their entire testimony was liable to be thrown over board. Santosh Kumar, in paras-7 and 8 of his evidence, has stated that after seeing the assault he and Rajkumar ran to the house of this witness which is at a distance of about one furlong from the scene of occurrance and returned to the spot after some time when they became sure that the police had arrived there. It was then, as per this witness, that he reported the matter to the police officer which was recorded in Ex.P.S. From his evidence it appears that the body of Ganesh was sent to the hospital thereafter. Whereas Rajkumar Kesharwani has stated that after the assault he and Santosh fled to the house of Shrikant and returned to the spot the same night after arrival of police. The learned counsel has tried to canvass that from the statement of this witness it appears that the police had arrived in the house of Shrikant where both these witnesses were hiding and they came to the spot only thereafter. Even if this interpretation is not accepted the fact remains that this witness during his cross-examination in para-3 has given entirely different version than what he stated earlier in the Court. There he is claiming that after the assault he and Santosh were terrified and ran to their respective houses for safety. While going to his house from the scene of occurrance though this witness had to cross Lordganj police station he filed to make a report and on reaching his house went to sleep. There he is claiming that after the assault he and Santosh were terrified and ran to their respective houses for safety. While going to his house from the scene of occurrance though this witness had to cross Lordganj police station he filed to make a report and on reaching his house went to sleep. As per him, at about 2.00 a.m. the same night the police sent for him and thus he became available to the police for interrogation. He claims that he reached Kotwali police station when he was called by the police wherefrom he was taken to the scene of occurrence by the police at about 2.45 a.m. The dead body of the deceased was sent to the hospital by the police in his presence. He has disowned portion marked 'A' & 'B' in his case-diary statement (Ex. D. 1) to the effect that after the assault the and Santosh had gone to the house of the later wherefrom they returned to the spot. It is very difficult to accept the submission of the learned Government Advocate that the aforesaid inconsistency between the statements of these two eye-witnesses is of a minor nature and should be overlooked. In our opinion, the irreconcilable divergence pointed out above in the evidence of these two witnesses coupled with their unnatural conduct in omitting to take any steps either to help the victim or to report the matter to the police renders their testimony highly doubtful. See: State of Maharashtra v. Kalu Shivram ( AIR 1980 SC 878 ). This is· more so because there is no indication that the assailants had tried to intimidate any of them. The evidence also reveals that other persons had arrived on the scene of occurrence which scarred the assailants who took to their heels. As such there was nothing which could have created such terror in the minds of these two witnesses as to incapacitate them from doing something positive to help the victim and the process of law. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the inquest (Ex. P. 6/1) and the requisition for medical examination (Ex. P. 6/2) which appear to have been prepared in the presence of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses, do not disclose the names of the appellants. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the inquest (Ex. P. 6/1) and the requisition for medical examination (Ex. P. 6/2) which appear to have been prepared in the presence of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses, do not disclose the names of the appellants. Placing reliance on Mathura Prasad v. State of M.P. ( 1991 JLJ 690 , sq, it was argued that from the omission of the names of the appellants in these two documents it has to be inferred that Dehati Nalishi is not a reliable document. Admittedly, there is no evidence to indicate any motive for the crime. Therefore, in view of all this, contends the learned counsel, the learned trial Judge was in error to hold the charge proved in the face of the aforesaid infirmities in the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses. We do not see as to how the State can press that in view of Lakhwinder Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1993 SC 87 ) the aforesaid two eye-witnesses were rightly held reliable by the trial Judge because in the present case there is no other incriminating circumstance like recovery of blood-stained weapon of offence or blood-stained clothes from the possession of the appellants to connect them with the crime. We agree with appellants' learned counsel that the infirmities in the statements of the two eye-witnesses render their testimony so doubtful that the same could not have been used to base the conviction on. Since there is nothing else than their evidence which could be said as incriminating the appeal is liable to be allowed. In result we allow the appeal, set aside appellants' aforesaid conviction and sentence and order that they be released forthwith, if still in custody. 1991 JLJ 690 (SC) and AIR 1993 SC 87 followed.