JUDGMENT S. K. Chattopadhyaya, J. - The petitioner in this application invites the High Court to ride its chariot over the track of .investigation by quashing the first information report and further proceedings of the investigation so far it relates to the seizure of truck and the Saw Mill are concerned. 2. It is now wel1 settled by catena of decisions of the apex court that power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice but those powers should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 3. On the back drop of these principles of law, the question is to be decided as to whether the present case is of one of those rarest of rare cases where this Court should exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere by quashing the F.I.R. as prayed for by the petitioner. 4. The facts of the case can be discussed in brevity, as fol1ows : A raid was conducted on 1.2.92 in the Saw-Mill named Adiwasi Timbers Enterprises by the Area Forest Officer and he found some timbers were loaded in a truck and some timbers were being sawn. The driver was apprehended and the truck and the timbers were brought to the Forest Office after being seized. F.I.R. discloses that the driver stated before the authority that he was carrying those timbers loaded in the truck in the house of one Wazi'd Mian. Several raids were conducted in the aforesaid Saw Mil1 and it was found that two persons were getting timbers loaded in the truck who, on seeing the Raiding Party, fled away. It is alleged that those timbers were being il1egally cut and were being transported. The Raiding Party seized the Ara machine in the aforesaid Mill and F.I.R. was lodged for an offence under section 414 of the Indian Penal Code and different sections of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as well as under Indian Forest (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1989 against the driver of the truck Sheikh Rajak, Mansur Alam and Sarful Alam. 5. The petitioner has contended that he is the owner of the truck as well as the aforesaid Saw Mill. 5. The petitioner has contended that he is the owner of the truck as well as the aforesaid Saw Mill. It is admitted by the petitioner that he is not an accused in this case. Further case of the petitioner is that in his aforesaid Saw Mill, different persons bring timbers for sawing and petitioner does this job after taking charges for the same. The Saw Mill has no concern with the timbers in question as the petitioner does not claim the timbers. It is further stated that one Sivlang Dung cut the timbers from his own land, brought to the Saw Mill for sawing and were loaded in the truck. An application alleged to have been filed by the said Sivlang Dung before the Divisional Forest Officer, Gumla, has been annexed as Annexure-2 in order to show that timbers were cut from his own land by Sivlang Dung. Similarly, timbers which were seized by the authority were brought to the Saw Mill by different persons for sawing which were brought from their respective lands. On the basis of aforesaid statement of facts, the petitioner has asserted that he has no concern whatsoever with the seized timbers and he is only doing the business of Saw Mill, as aforesaid. 6. It appears from the records that on 22.4.92, an application for amendment was filed by challenging the vires of section 52 of Indian Forest (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1989. On such petition being filed, it appears that by order dated 22.4.92 this Court admitted this application for hearing along with Cr.W.J.C. No. 125 of 1991 (R) in which similar points were involved. By the same order, it appears, seized truck was released to the petitioner on furnishing security. 7. Counter affidavit has been filed in this case on 28.4.92 in which specific stand has been taken on behalf of the Respondents that the petitioner is carrying on business of Saw Mill without obtaining any licence from the appropriate authority as required under the law. The authority was competent to seize and confiscate the truck and the Saw Mili as it was found that the petitioner was operating the same Saw Mill without any valid licence as well as transporting timbers illegally. The authority was competent to seize and confiscate the truck and the Saw Mili as it was found that the petitioner was operating the same Saw Mill without any valid licence as well as transporting timbers illegally. For such illegal act, it is further stated that the truck and the Saw Mill were liable to be seized and confiscated under sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 even if the woods did not belong to the Forest Department. It is further contended that section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 empowers the Range Officer in the capacity of a Forest Officer to seize any commercial vehicle transporting any illegal forest produce. In a nut-shell, stand of the Respondents is that as the petitioner was operating the said Saw Mill without obtaining any licence, he is liable under the Bihar Saw Mills (Regulation) Act, 1990 (in short as Act 19 of 1990) and the seizure affected was not against any provision of law. 8. It appears that a reply to the counter affidavit was tiled on behalf of the petitioner in which it is stated that petitioner was a Grade I Contractor of the Forest Department and has got permanent registration from Industrial and Technical (Education) Department (Rural Industrial Project), Ratu Road, Ranchi for Small Scale Industry in the year 1975. The said registration of the petitioner's Saw Mill was renewed by the Government for 1992 under the Bihar Factories Act and Rules, 1950. Stand has been taken in the reply that the petitioner applied for registration of the petitioner's Saw Mill and Divisional Forest Officer, Gumla directed him for obtaining a 'No Objection Slip' from the Forest Department for renewal of licence of the depot. Pursuant to aforesaid direction, petitioner filed an application on 24.8.91 before the Divisional Forest Officer for getting "No Objection Slip". The Saw Mill was inspected and after verifying all related papers, grant of licence was recommended. It has been admitted by the petitioner that though the petitioner complied with all the formalities for grant of licence, he did not receive any reply from the Department till the filing of the reply to the counter affidavit. 9. The Saw Mill was inspected and after verifying all related papers, grant of licence was recommended. It has been admitted by the petitioner that though the petitioner complied with all the formalities for grant of licence, he did not receive any reply from the Department till the filing of the reply to the counter affidavit. 9. Further stand of the petitioner in his reply is that though he is the owner of the Saw Mill as well as the truck in question, the same are not in control of the petitioner and the petitioner is not in charge of the day to day affairs in respect thereof. It is stated that by virtue of an agreement •dated 29.2.92 between the petitioner and one Maksud Alam (one of the accused), the Saw Mill and the truck were given to said Maksud Alam for running the business on rent basis. Monthly rental was fixed at the rate of Rs. 6000/- per month. 10. During the course of argument, a supplementary affidavit on behalf of the petitioner was filed on 26.7.93 annexing a letter dated 16.6.93 issued by the Principal Chief Conservator, Bihar, Ranchi. On the basis of this letter, it is stated that the provisions of the Act 19 of 1990 are not applicable because required notification under the said Act has not yet been issued. 11. It appears from the records of Cr.W.J.C. No. 125 of 1991 (R) that by order dated 12.2.93, the said writ application was disposed of as in-fructuous in view of the fact that the petitioner of that case had died. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Gadodia has submitted that as the petitioner's Saw Mill was registered under the Factories Act, and in view of Annexure-5 annexed to the Supplementary affidavit, the petitioner was not obliged to obtain any licence as there was no notification appointing any licensing authority. It is further submitted that as the petitioner was not concerned with the timbers loaded in the truck and those found in his Saw Mill, his Saw Mill or the truck could not have been seized. Advancing his argument, Mr. It is further submitted that as the petitioner was not concerned with the timbers loaded in the truck and those found in his Saw Mill, his Saw Mill or the truck could not have been seized. Advancing his argument, Mr. Gadodia has submitted that as at the relevant time, accused Maksud Alam was in charge of the said Saw Mill as well as the truck on the basis of the agreement dated 29.2.92, the petitioner's Saw Mill could not have been sealed and truck could not have been seized. It is further contended that section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 is ultra vires to the Constitution, inasmuch as, whereas under section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, no power was conferred upon the Forest Officer to confiscate the vehicles or any other articles allegedly used in committing the offence, the amended provisions incorporated under section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 empowers the authority concerned to confiscate such vehicles and articles in view of sub-section (3) of section 52 of the said Act. 13. Mr. V. Shivnath, learned Government Pleader No.1, appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that from the different stands t3ken on behalf of the petitioner in the main writ application and his reply to the counter affidavit, this Court should be loath in deciding the question of facts. It is further submitted that whereas the petitioner has taken the plea in the main writ application that he is the owner of the, Saw Mill as well as the truck but in reply he has stated that as the said Saw Mill and the truck were given on rent" to one Maksud Alam, he was not in-charge of the day to day affairs of the said Saw Mill. According to Mr. Shivnath, these assertions necessarily involve an investigation into the fads. Continuing his argument, M r. Shivnath has submitted that whereas in the main writ application, the petitioner has nowhere whispered about applying for any licence before the appropriate authority but after receiving the counter affidavit he has taken a stand that he did apply for such licence but has admitted that the same was not granted to him till date. Regarding constitutional validity of section 52 of Bihar. Regarding constitutional validity of section 52 of Bihar. Amendment Act, 1989, he has submitted that the provisions being regulatory in nature, the State Legislature is empowered to make such legislation. It is further submitted that the petitioner is not an accused in this case and if actually the said Saw Mill and the truck have been given to Maksud Alam on rent, it was Maksud Alam who should have approached this Court and not the petitioner. 14. On the premises of these rival contentions of the parties, it has to be seen as to whether this Court can exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to cut -short the normal process of a criminal trial. 15. From the averments made on behalf of the petitioner in the writ application as well as in his reply to the counter affidavit, it appears that the petitioner is the real owner of the Saw Mill and the truck in question. It further appears that for the purpose of sawing, the petitioner did not obtain any licence as required under the law for his Saw Mill. Whereas the petitioner has asserted that he was under no obligation to obtain any licence under Bihar Act 19 of 1990, on the same breath, he has taken a stand t hat he had applied for licence of the Saw Mill. He applied before the Divisional Forest Officer for getting 'No Objection Slip' on 24.8.91. He has admitted that till date he was not given the licence. On the other hand, a different stand has been taken by him that by dint of an agreement, the Saw Mill and the truck were given to Maksud Alam for running the business on monthly rental basis of Rs. 6000/-. The petitioner has also asserted that being a Grade-I contractor of Forest Department, he obtained permanent registration Certificate for small scale industry and under the Bihar Factories Act and Rules, the registration of the petitioner's Saw Mill was renewed. 16. In my considered opinion, all these stand of the petitioner are belated which were not averred in the main writ application. 16. In my considered opinion, all these stand of the petitioner are belated which were not averred in the main writ application. Secondly, though the petitioner has stated about grant of certificate for small scale industry, order of renewal under the Factories Act, his filing of application dated 24.8.91 for 'No Objection Slip' as well as the alleged agreement dated 29.2.92 entered into between the petitioner and Maksud Alam, but surprisingly no document to this effect has been annexed in his reply to the counter affidavit to substantiate these facts. On these circumstances, it is very difficult for this Court to enter into the question of facts. Moreover, if the contention of the petitioner, that he was not obliged to obtain any licence under the law, is to be accepted as correct I find no reason for the petitioner applying for the licence in 1991 that is only after coming into force of the Bihar Act 19 of 1990. This fact clearly goes to show that the petitioner was aware of the position in law and thus had applied for licence. In my considered opinion the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. 17. In this connection, it will be helpful to look into some of the 'provisions of law as contemplated in Bihar Act 19 of 1990. In my considered opinion the petitioner cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. 17. In this connection, it will be helpful to look into some of the 'provisions of law as contemplated in Bihar Act 19 of 1990. Section 5 of the Act 19 of 1990 read thus: Application for licence on and from the appointed day: (a) no person shall establish a saw mill or a saw pit except under the authority and subject to the conditions of a licence granted in that behalf under this Act; (b) no person shall operate a mill or a saw pit in existence on the said date, unless he is granted a licence in that behalf under this Act on •an application made by such person within a period of thirty days from such date; Provided that for the period of thirty days and thereafter the period during which the application is pending for consideration, it shall be deemed as if such person was granted a licence under this Act and he was operating the saw mill or saw pit accordingly." Proviso to section 5 is a deeming clause which "contemplates that if for the period of 30 days and thereafter the period during which the application was pending for consideration, it will be deemed that such person was granted a licence and he was operating the saw mill or saw pit accordingly. But, as observed earlier, there is no document to show that the petitioner ever applied for such licence and on the other hand, the petitioner has asserted emphatically that he was not obliged to obtain any licence. If the petitioner would have applied for licence. It is obvious that he would have taken this plea in the main writ application by annexing the relevant documents. The deeming provision as aforesaid certainly would have helped the petitioner and petitioner would have taken this point in the writ application itself. But it appears that in this writ application he has asserted that he was not obliged to obtain any licence whereas in a later stage he has stated that he had applied for the licence in 1991. In my view, these two contradictory stands raise a question of facts to be investigated which is outside the domain of High Court. 18. The next limb of attack of Mr. In my view, these two contradictory stands raise a question of facts to be investigated which is outside the domain of High Court. 18. The next limb of attack of Mr. Gadodia regarding constitutionality of section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989, in my opinion, is misconceived. The petitioner was obliged under the Bihar Act 19 of 1990 to obtain a licence for his, Saw Mill, and admitted fact is that no licence was granted to him. If this is the factual provision, then section 8 of the Bihar Act 19 of 1990 comes into play, which contemplates as follows : "Power of entry, inspection, search, seizures etc. - (1) For the purpose of ascertaining the position of examining the working of any saw mill or saw pit or with a view to secure compliance of the provisions of this Act and the rules made there-under, the licensing officer or any other person authorised by the licensing officer in this behalf may- (a) enter and inspect any saw mill and saw pit; (b) examine and for this purpose order the production of any document, book, register or records in the possession or power of any person having the control of or employed in connection with, any saw mill and saw pit; (c) search any person or search any premises, vehicle, machine, tools and equipments used or intended to be used in contravention of the provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder and may stop any vehicle or person for this purpose; (d) seize any wood, plants and machinery, tools, vehicle and any other article which he suspects is already involved or used or is about to be involved or used in contravening the provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder. (2) The provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), relating to search and seizure shall so far as may apply to searches and seizure under this section." 20. The petitioner, in my view, cannot take help of section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989, inasmuch as, the Saw Mill and the truck were seized by the competent officer under section 8 of the Bihar Act 19 of 1990 and not under section 52 of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989. Under these circumstances, the constitutional validity of section 52 of Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 need not be gone into. 21. Under these circumstances, the constitutional validity of section 52 of Bihar Amendment Act, 1989 need not be gone into. 21. Mr. Gadodia has strongly relied on Annexure-5, the letter issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest, annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed during the course of argument and has contended that the petitioner was not obliged to obtain any licence as there was no specific notification appointing any licensing authority. In my opinion, Annexure-5 has to be read as a whole. The letter is nothing but a direction of the Chief Conservator of Forest to its subordinates to the effect that the State Government has been requested to appoint licensing authority to publish the regulation as soon as possible. The letter further shows that the Chief Conservator of Forest has specifically directed his subordinates that unless any order is passed by the High Court in the case of Ranchi Timber Traders Association, the regulation has to be followed. The argument made on behalf of the petitioner is contrary to his stands taken earlier that he applied for licence before the concerned authorities, meaning thereby that he accepted the position that after coming into force of Bihar Act 19 of 1990, he was required to apply for licence. 22. Next limb of the argument of Mr. Gadodia is that the petitioner is not at all concerned with the seized timbers as those were brought to his saw mill for cutting and getting it sized by different persons who brought them from their own land. In my view, this argument is also devoid of any merit. 23. Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act empowers the State Government to make rules, to regulate transit of timbers and other forest produces and it cannot be disputed that in exercise of powers vested by section 41, the State Government has framed transit rules for movement of timbers. Even assuming for the sake of argument that• the timbers which were seized from the truck and saw mill of the petitioner belong to different persons but even then for transporting those timbers, a transit permit was required to be obtained by those persons. It is not the case of the petitioner that those persons had any transit permit as such. 24. It is not the case of the petitioner that those persons had any transit permit as such. 24. In the case of Kasi Prasad Sahu vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1963 (Orissa) 24, a Division Bench of that Court after interpreting the expression "Forest Produce" as used in the Indian Forest Act has observed that there was an implied power in the Government to regulate transit of timber even if it may not be property of Government. The Forest Act, the Division Bench further held, gives power to the State Government to make rules regulating the transit of all timber in such terms as enables the Government to prescribe that even private timber other than forest timber, could be carried or transported within a certain area only with a transit permit. The aforesaid decision of the Orissa High Court has been followed by the Gauhati High Court in the case of State of Tripura and Sashimohan Malakar and others (1977 Cr.L.J. 1663) and later by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vishnu Sharma vs. The State of Bihar & another reported in 1993 BBCJ 528 . 25. Moreover, there is nothing on the record to show that those persons whose timbers alleged to have been brought to the saw mill of the petitioner, have applied for release of those timbers before any appropriate authority or court. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has taken the stand which is not consonable to reason. 26. From the aforesaid discussions. it is clear that the petitioner has not been able to substantiate his assertion that he has applied for any licence as required under the law or that he actually gave out his Saw Mill and truck to accused Maksud Alam on hire. This Court, in my opinion, in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot go into the question of facts for quashing the investigation. The law, on the subject, is now very clear. 27. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. This Court, in my opinion, in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot go into the question of facts for quashing the investigation. The law, on the subject, is now very clear. 27. In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan (1989 SC 1), the apex court, while discussing the scope and jurisdiction of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has observed that jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and has given a word of caution that in exercising that Jurisdiction, the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. 28. Similarly, in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 29. For the reasons aforesaid, in my opinion, the relief sought for by the petitioner in this writ application cannot be granted and as such the petition is dismissed. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. N. S. Rao, J. - I agree.