A. R. SINGH, P. S. I. MEHMEDABAD v. DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
1993-02-03
S.NAINAR SUNDARAM, SHARAD D.DAVE
body1993
DigiLaw.ai
S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the Learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 2925 of 1982. The appellant is the petitioner in the Special Civil Application. The respondents are the respondents in the Special Civil Application. The appellant in disciplinary action was visited with a penalty of decrease of one increment from the existing pay. Of the four charges levelled two were held proved. The Departmental Appeal and the Revision did not prove fruitful to the appellant. The order in revision is dated 8th January 1980 The appellant would claim that he received that order only on 20. 8 The Special Civil Application was preferred in May 1982. The Learned Single Judge obviously finding no merit in the Special Civil Application rejected it summarily. ( 2 ) I. S. Supehia learned counsel for the appellant was permitted to make his submission in full with reference to the points urged in the Special Civil Application since we made it clear to him that we are prepared to hear and consider the points taken eventhough summary rejection of the petition was meted out by Learned Single Judge to find out as to whether the disciplinary action taken and the penalty imposed require any interference at our hands Mr. I. S. Supehia learned counsel for the appellant made his submission exhaustively. He urged six points coveting interference at our hands. The first point is; the penalty imposed is one not at all contemplated in the rules. He would draw our attention to paragraph 436 of the Bombay Police Manual hereinafter referred to as the Manual concerning Departmental Punishments and would submit that the Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) Rules 1956 are also to the same effect and into none of the said provisions the present penalty fits in. In answer to this Ms. Rekha Doshit learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents would submit that as per clause 2 (c) of paragraph 436 of the Bombay Police Manual there could be reduction in pay and that is exactly what has happened in the instant case. Shorn of the verbalism used in the proceedings we have no ambiguity in our mind that the appellant was visited with only reduction in pay by decrease of one increment from the existing pay.
Shorn of the verbalism used in the proceedings we have no ambiguity in our mind that the appellant was visited with only reduction in pay by decrease of one increment from the existing pay. In this connection it is notified by the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents that the appellant himself quantified the amount for the purpose of implementing the penalty and when he himself felt no ambiguity in his mind it is puerile for him to make a grievance of this before this Court. We fully endorse the submission of learned Assistant Government Pleader in this behalf and rejected the first point. ( 3 ) THE second point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant demanded the assistance of a friend during the enquiry and that was denied to him. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that earlier the services of one Shri Shinde was permitted to be availed of by the appellant but it was subsequently withdrawn by the communication dated 24th Febuary 1975 by the District Superintendent of Police. Banaskantha district and the subsequent endeavours of the appellant to get the services of a friend were negated. In this connection learned counsel for the appellant draws our attention to paragraph 454 of the Manual which reads as follows:"in order to assist a member of the Constabulary in deparmental proceedings and to minimise any hardship to him the appearance on his behalf of a `friend who should be serving Police officer (either of his own rank or of a rank not higher than that of a Sub-Inspector) nominated by the officer conducting the departmental proceedings (i. e. including a Sub Divisional) Police Officer or a Circle Police Inspector ) is allowed if in the opinion of the Presiding Officer the delinquent is not likely to be able to represent his case properly. In nominating a `friend wishes of the delinquent concerned should be considered and acceded to if possible". This contention as pointed out by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents lacks substance if we take note of what acutally transpired in the instant case.
In nominating a `friend wishes of the delinquent concerned should be considered and acceded to if possible". This contention as pointed out by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents lacks substance if we take note of what acutally transpired in the instant case. By the communication dated 24th February 1975 the District Superintendent of Police Banaskantha District pointed out that Shri Shinde is from his district and appointing him as a friend for the delinquent namely the appellant would hamper the working of the administration of the concerned Police Station and hence he should be withdrawn from such service and a suitable person from the unit should be appointed as the friend. Thereafter we find that on 31st July 1975 the appellant was instructed to notify the names of three persons from the unit so that the choice could be made out of them and he was asked to name the three persons from his own unit. The reasons are obvious. The anxiety is not to obstruct the working of the administration elsewhere by any one being taken away from there for the purpose of assisting the appellant in the course of departmental proceedings. To this on 13th June 1975 the appellant replied that no one form his unit could defend him thereby meaning that the services of Shri Shinde alone was required for him. On 10th July 1975 the appellant was again informed that he could not insist for the services of Shri Shinde and inordinate delay is being caused on account of his non-choosing a friend to assist him in the departmental proceedings and if he does not indicate his choice within a period of 7 days it will be taken that he has no choice to make. There the matter rested. On the other hand the appellant chose to defend himself and this is obvious from the records. Paragraph 454 (2) is not in absolute terms to clothe any right for the delinquent either to insist for the services of a friend or to make his own choice without any room for the discretion of the Presiding Officer. The discretion is that the Presiding Officer to nominate taking note of the stated exigencies and the wishes of the delinquent have to be considered and acceded to if possible in so nominating. That does not mean the delinquent could act unreasonably and unrealistically as happened here.
The discretion is that the Presiding Officer to nominate taking note of the stated exigencies and the wishes of the delinquent have to be considered and acceded to if possible in so nominating. That does not mean the delinquent could act unreasonably and unrealistically as happened here. On facts we could not say that there had been substantial breach of the rules which resulted in manifest injustice or prejudice to the appellant. Furthermore we find that the appellant did not make any grievance over this in reply to the second show cause notice. Equally so no whisper of grievance was made either in the appeal memorandum or in the memorandum of revision before the departmental authorities. This point is being taken for the first time before this Court and this feature we are bound to take not of to observe that if in fact it had substance and bonafides it certainly would not have been omitted to be urged at the earlier point of time by the appellant. Thus we eschew the second point. ( 4 ) THE third point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that one Shri Balwant Singh who was not cited in the charge-sheet was examined during the enquiry. But from the record we find that Shri Balwant Singh was not at all examined to prove any allegation as such against the appellant and he was summoned only to produce the Diary. In the said circumstances the failure to mention the name of the said witness is not of any consequence and could not be stated to have caused any prejudice to the appellant. We do not think the grievance of the appellant with regard to this point deserves any acceptance for the purpose of interference by this Court with the disciplinary action. ( 5 ) THE fourth point taken by the learned counsel for the appellant is that some of the defence witnesses cited by the appellant were not examined in the course of the enquiry. The grievance is set out in paragraph No. 9 (G) of the petition. We find that the allegations are too vague and they deserve no scrutiny by us.
The grievance is set out in paragraph No. 9 (G) of the petition. We find that the allegations are too vague and they deserve no scrutiny by us. It is not stated as to how many defence witnesses were declined to be examined and if so what is the relevancy and material bearing of the evidence of those witnesses whom the appellant wanted to examine on the charges levelled. Admittedly the ground for decline was that their evidence was not relevant. It is not demonstrated before us as to the material bearing or the relevance of the evidence of those defence witnesses declined to be examined. Unless it is so demonstrated it is not possible to say that there was a denial of adequate opportunity to defend. We are left in the abstract level with reference to this grievance and in our view this grievance seems to be purely an after-thought. ( 6 ) THE fifth point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Inquiry Officer himself cross examined the witnesses. It is not demonstrated before us as to what type of cross examination the Inquiry Officer indulged in. No exception need be taken to the Inquiry Officer putting some questions for the purpose of getting a point clarified and getting at the truth and on that ground it is not possible to characterise that indulgence as reprehensible vitiating the whole departmental action. Here again there is lack of substantion of any prejudice caused to the appellant. Hence we eschew this point. ( 7 ) THE last and the sixth point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is even if the two charges are held proved that would not amount to any misconduct. We carefully persued the charges levelled and we find that they do make out that the appellant indulged in making false allegations with reference to checking of the weekly diary and further used improper language while he was asked to explain his conduct. We do not find any substance in this point. We must record that Ms. Rekha Doshit learned Assistant Governement Pleader appearing for the respondents raised a point by saying that the Special Civil Application deserves dismissal in liminie because the appellant is guilty of laches and has acquisced in the disciplinary action.
We do not find any substance in this point. We must record that Ms. Rekha Doshit learned Assistant Governement Pleader appearing for the respondents raised a point by saying that the Special Civil Application deserves dismissal in liminie because the appellant is guilty of laches and has acquisced in the disciplinary action. We did not go into this point since even on merits the case of the appellants deserved discounte hance as found by us as per our discussion supra. We therefore dismiss this Letters Patent Appeal with no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed. .