D. K. Jain ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Section 115 read withsection 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) by the State Bankof India (for short the bank) and others is directed against the appellateorder dated 28/06/1993oftbeld. Senior Sub Judge, Delhi allowing theappeal against the order dated 26/04/1993 of the Id. Sub. Judge andsetting aside the latter s order made in respondent s/employee s applicationunder Order 39 Rules 1 A 2 of the Code in Suit No. 199/93 and directing thebank not to transfer the respondent from one of its Delhi branches todehra-dun and further directing the bank to assign regular duties to him asper his status in the same branch, he was working prior to his transfer, andto report to the Court within three days the compliance of ifs order. ( 2 ) THE respondent was working as Junior Management Grade IOfficer in the bank s branch at Sonepat (Haryana ). He was transferred assuch on 14/10/1991 to Delhi and was given extension in service upto 19/01/1984 i. e. upto the age of 55 years, and while serving at Green Parkbranch of the bank, was promoted to Middle Management Grade Scale II (MMGS II) on 18/12/1991. He was transferred to bank s Greaterkailash-l branch on II November 1992 and on 22/01/1993 was servedwith an order transferring him from Delhi module to Dehradun module,which be did not join. ( 3 ) ON 27/03/1993, the respondent filed a suit for perpetual andmandatory injunction along with an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2of the Code for adinterim relief against the bank and others, seeking adirection to the bank to withdraw the transfer order dated 22/01/1993and for restraining it from transferring him to Dehra-dun. The said trensferorder was sought to be challenged primarily on the ground that it had beenissued by petitioner No. 4 (Asstt. The said trensferorder was sought to be challenged primarily on the ground that it had beenissued by petitioner No. 4 (Asstt. General Manager, G. K.-I) at the instanceof petitioner No. 3, (Asstt.- General Manager, Parliament Street), who hadheld out threats to him; the order is illegal and mala fide, not passed bycompetent authority; made as a measure of victimisation; the order violatesthe transfer policy of the bank because an officer cannot be transferredagainst his will from one module to another unless he has completed fiveyears of service in agrade in that module, and further that a person aboutto attain the age of superannuation cannot be transferred without seeking bischoice for a particular station and the representation made against thetransfer order was not beeded to. ( 4 ) THE bank opposed the suit as misconceived, being barred undersection 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act and the application for interim ordernot covered by Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code and both being notmaintainable. It was stated that the respondent as a bank employee wasgoverned by statutory rules, namely, SBI Officers (Determination of Termsand Conditions of Service) Rules, 1979, under which an employee has novested right to remain posted in a particular module; the post beingtransferable, a transfer order can be and was made considering the administrative exigencies of the service; the transfer order was passed by thegeneral Manager (Operations), who is the competent authority to make itand there was no mala fides whatever; the transfer policy is a mere executiveinstructions/guidelines, having no statutory force and its compliance is notmandatory ; that Haryana being a Delhi module and the respondent havingserved for long within the Delhi module, and he having not attained the ageof 55 years, his transfer does not offend condition No/vi or X of the transferpolicy; the respondent did not join duty at Dehra-dun, and made a representation against the transfer order, he was not given personal hearing by thechief General Manager, who directed that the respondent must join hisposting on transfer which he did not comply and was not entitled to discretionary relief. It was, thus, stated that the suit as well as the applicationunder Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the. Code were without any merit and wereliable to be dismissed. It was, thus, stated that the suit as well as the applicationunder Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the. Code were without any merit and wereliable to be dismissed. ( 5 ) WHILE disposing of the respondent s application under Order 39rules 1 and 2, the learned Sub Judge examined the transfer policy and came tothe conclusion that the bank had not deviated from it in transferring therespondent from Delhi to Debra-dun module and the order of transfer badbeen passed by the competent authority. Allegations of mala fide wereconsidered by him to be not prima facie supported. He accordingly declinedto grant ad-interim relief to the respondent. ( 6 ) ON appeal, the learned Senior Sub Judge has set aside the orderof the learned Sub Judge. In the absence of any other order being placed onrecord, he has assumed the letter dated 20/01/1993 to be the transferorder, and the same having not been issued or made by the General Manager (Operations) nor shown to have been issued under competent authority sdirection or approval, has held it to be not legal and valid. He has furtherheld that the transfer order violates the transfer policy and is mala fide. Bank s contention that the transfer order was made by the General Manager (Operations), as conveyed in bank s letter dated 19/01/1993 has beenturned down by him holding, in view of some banks in it etc. , the saidletter is an after thought, manipulation by petitioners 3 to 5 and as suchtotally mala fide. He, thus, issued directions to the bank to withdraw thetransfer order, post and keep posted the respondent in Greater Kailash-1branch and not transfer him in view of the transfer policy of the bank. ( 7 ) I have heard learned Counsel for the parties who have urged thesame pleas which were raised before the Senior Sub Judge and have takenme through the records. I am of the view that there is good ground toallow the revision petition. To me it appears that the approach of the Idappellate Court is improper. He has completely overlooked the preliminaryobjections in the written statement about the suit being misconceived andthe suit as also the application for stay not being maintainable. I am of the view that there is good ground toallow the revision petition. To me it appears that the approach of the Idappellate Court is improper. He has completely overlooked the preliminaryobjections in the written statement about the suit being misconceived andthe suit as also the application for stay not being maintainable. In a lengthyorder, instead of taking a prima facie view of the matter at this stage heseems to have decided the merits of the case, which has not gone so farbeyond the pleadings stage. Issues have yet not been framed, completedocuments not filed, the matter has not gone to trial but the Id. Appellatecourt has held the letter dated 22/01/1993 to be the transfer order,mala fide made as a measure of punishment and bad in law as it violates thetransfer policy. Similarly he has exceeded his jurisdiction in holding bank sletter dated 19/01/1933 to be collusive act of petitioners 3 to 5 and aforgery. All these findings of tacts have been recorded before the trial. ( 8 ) BESIDES, the order suffers from legal infirmity. The legal positionin regard to transfer of employees stands settled by acatena of decisions ofthe Supreme Court and various High Courts, some of which have been reliedon by the parties, and I do not propose to burden the judgment bymakingreference to each of them. Suffice it to say that the Courts have been atpains to reiterate that transfer is an incidence of service and a person holdinga transferable post has no legal right to remain posted at one place or theother ; guidelines for transfer are neither statutory nor exhaustive and/ormandatory, but meant only for the guidance of the transferring authority andmerely because an order of transfer is not strictly in terms of guidelines, itwould not per se be sufficient ground for interference by the Courts unlessthe transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rulesor on the ground of mala fide , the burden of establishing the same is veryheavily on the person who alleges it and the Court should be slow to drawdubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it. After hearingthe parties I am not. convinced prima fade, that the transfer has been inbreach of the transfer policy. After hearingthe parties I am not. convinced prima fade, that the transfer has been inbreach of the transfer policy. Even otherwise, examined in the light of theabove, respondent s transfer, if it be against any policy, cannot, withoutsome thing more, be; treated as illegal and liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) DEALING with the question of mala fides, the Supreme Court in arecent case reported as Rajendra Roy v. Union of India and. Another, JT 1992 (6) SC 732 observed that it may not always be possible to establish malice,in fact in a straight out manner. In an appropriate case it is possible todraw reasonable inference of mala fide action from the pleadings andantecedents of facts and,circumstances. But for such inferences, there mustbe firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Such inferences cannotbe drawn on the basis of insinuations and vague suggestions. It is only wherea strong case of mala fide is made out that the Court may bejustified ininferring that order of transfer as malafide and bad in law. ( 10 ) THE case is, therefore, to be examined in the light of the afore said legal position. Though apparently conscious of the legal position, thelearned Senior Sub Judge seems to have misdirected himself and recordedfindings offacts on wrong premises, ignored the legal aspect in the pleadingsand has laboured hard to,make out a case for interfsrence in the matter oftransfer of the respondent. The appellate order cannot, therefore; besustained. ( 11 ) FOR the purpose of application for interim. stay the crucial issuebefore the Trial Court as also the learned Appellate Court was to identifyand examine the transfer order and see if the respondent herein had a primafacie caseon the pleas raised in the plaint, warranting interference at thisstage namely whether the transfer order had been made by the competentauthority or with his approval. Question on the plea of mala fide mayrequire evidence and would, therefore, have little bearing at this stageunlessthe same was shown as patent on the record or there is firm foundation offacts pleaded and established. The impugned letter dated 22/01/1993is admittedly a communication of the transfer order to the respondent andit is not a transfer order by itself. Question on the plea of mala fide mayrequire evidence and would, therefore, have little bearing at this stageunlessthe same was shown as patent on the record or there is firm foundation offacts pleaded and established. The impugned letter dated 22/01/1993is admittedly a communication of the transfer order to the respondent andit is not a transfer order by itself. The letter dated 19/01/1993 is alsoin the form of a communication of some transfer order having been madeby the General Manager (Operations) who, by common consent, is thecompetent authority to make such an order in the case of the respondent. Confronted with this position learned Counsel for the petitioners REFERRED TO tosome office notings dated 8/01/1993 for the transfer, in the filecontaining the approval of the General Manager (Operations), which wasneither produced before the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court. Exceptionto its production here was taken by learned Counsel for the respondent,especially because the Courts below have had no opportunity to commentthereon. It is not understandable why it was not produced before thecourts below. I am constrained to remark that the handling of the matterby and on behalf of the bank in the Courts below has been rather casualand negligent. Without the said approval having been placed on recordand its examination, any comment on the office order (fated 19/01/1993or on the validity and otherwise of the transfer order by the Courts below isfutile and meaningless. ( 12 ) HAVING considered the matter thoughtfully, I am of the view thatnon-production of the order of the competent authority by the bank and itsconsequent non-consideration by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court hasresulted in grave error and serious miscarriage of justice, for which the blamesquarely rests on the petitioners. ( 13 ) TO arrive at the just decision in the matter, it is necessary that therelevant transfer order/documents containing the approval of the competentauthority are placed on record for a fresh decision by fhe Trial Court inaccordance with law. The Courts below have acted on the assumption thatbank s letter dated 22/01/1993 and/or. 19/01/1993, REFERRED TO toabove, are the transfer order (s) and taking one of these to be the transferorder, which factually is not so, have recorded their findings: the Trialcourt holding that it is avalid order and the Appellate Court that it is not,each of them have laboured under the mistaken belief of it being thetransfer order. 19/01/1993, REFERRED TO toabove, are the transfer order (s) and taking one of these to be the transferorder, which factually is not so, have recorded their findings: the Trialcourt holding that it is avalid order and the Appellate Court that it is not,each of them have laboured under the mistaken belief of it being thetransfer order. The order of the Trial Court as also the Appellate Courtsuffer from this infirmity. Consequently, the orders of the Courtsbelow are not sustainable and are set aside and the matter is remandedback to the Trial Court for reconsideration and a fresh decision on therespondent s application for stay, after giving Opportunity to the parties tofile documents, if any, including the stated approval of the competentauthority dated 8/01/1993, relied upon by the petitioners before me. The application for interim relief shall be disposed of asexpeditiously aspossible, in any case within two months from today. ( 14 ) THE parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 21. 2. 1993. Trial Court records be sent back forthwith along with a copy of this Order so as to reach there within a week from today. ( 15 ) THE petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. ( 16 ) LAPSE in not producing the relevant documents by the bank at the appropriate stage has resuited in wastage of time of the Courts and I feel that it is a fit case where costs should be imposed on the petitioners, which are quantified at Rs. 2000. 00. The costs shall be deposited by the petitioners with the High Court Legal Aid and Advice Committee, Chamber No. 4, Lawyers Chambers Delhi High Court, New Delhi within a week from today.