JUDGMENT : B.M. Lal, J. By instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Petitioners have prayed, for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari declaring impugned notification dated 1-6-1991 (Annexure 5) to petition) as void and violative of Constitution and quashing the same along with another notification dated 16-12-71 (Annexure 12 to petition) and for issuance of another writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents not to charge society's commission” from the Petitioners at a rate exceeding 70 paise per quintal of sugarcane and not to issue any recovery certificate for the same and further declaring that the Petitioners are free to purchase sugarcane directly from sugarcane growers. 2. It would not be out of place to mention here that on 20-7-1993 this petition was argued by learned senior advocate Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behalf of Petitioners. Learned senior advocate Mr. Murlidhar and learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the Respondents prayed for and were granted time to file counter affidavit with the consent of learned counsel appearing for respective parties, case was fixed for 3-8-93 but on account of strike of lawyers case could not be taken up on that date. In the mean time affidavits were exchanged and thereafter having heard learned counsel for respective parties at length case was closed for judgment. 3. Mr. Murlidhar, learned senior advocate and Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the Respondents, raised preliminary objection about the maintainability of the petition as framed and filed, on the ground that in respect of same subject matter earlier writ petition No. 33139 of 1991 had been withdrawn without permission to file fresh petition, consequently on the analogy of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code, instant petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 4. Learned counsel further contended that the notification dated 24-4-92 (Annexure 7 to petition) came into force for stipulated period with effect from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92 and expired on 30-9-92 by efflux of time consequently, the temporary-rules contained in notification dated 24-4-92 suspending principal Rules and substituting other rules came to an end, not by repeal of the temporary notification dated 24-4-92 but by the efflux of the prescribed time, at a result of which the moment temporary notification expired, the earlier existing rule automatically resumed its full force. As such on 1-10-92, temporarily substituted Rules contained in notification dated 24-4-92 ceased to;. exist and earlier existing rules contained in notification dated 1-6-91 (Annexure 5 to petition) came into full force automatically. 5. Before deciding the preliminary objection as raised by the learned counsel, it would be better to have relevant facts of the case in this regard. 6. The Petitioners are engaged in the business of production and sale of sugar. They purchase sugarcane through cane growers co-operative societies. For regulating purchase of sugarcane 'U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act 1953' (for short the Act) was enacted. Under the Act 'Cane growers co-operative society' may be formed and registered. The main objects and functions of such societies are to promote the welfare of the individual growers. 7. In exercise of powers conferred u/s 28 of the Act, Government of Uttar Pradesh framed 'U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply & purchase) Rules 1954' (for short the Rules) and powers and duties of societies have been provided under Rules 52 to 63 of the Rules. 8. Section 18 of the Act provides for payment of society's commission by the sugar factories to the cooperative societies, a share of which is also transferred to the Cane Development Councils. The remaining share of commission covers administrative expenses and other connected activities. However, under the Act, the rate of commission is to be prescribed by the State Government. Under Rule 49 of the Rules, Government of U.P. prescribed the rate of Commission. Till the year 1985, paise per quintal. 9. In exercise of powers conferred u/s 28 of the Act, Government of U.P. used to prescribe the rate of commission, considering hike in prices and other relevant circumstances, by amending the Rules from time to time. 10. Accordingly Government, of Uttar Pradesh vide notification dated 1-6-91 (Annexure 5 to petition), with a view to maintain uniformity in the rate of commission, prescribed the same at the rate of 5 percent of the minimum Statutory cane price, fixed by the Government of India. 11. However, vide another notification dated 24-4-92 (Annexure 7 to petition) Government of Uttar Pradesh again amended the Rules for certain period specifying therein that they shall remain in force with effect from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92. 12. 11. However, vide another notification dated 24-4-92 (Annexure 7 to petition) Government of Uttar Pradesh again amended the Rules for certain period specifying therein that they shall remain in force with effect from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92. 12. Under these circumstances, Cane Commissioner Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 5-1-93 made it clear that since notification dated 24-4-92 was effective only till 30-9-92 hence commission shall be payable at the rate prescribed vide earlier notification dated 1-6-91. 13. Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Sudhir Chandra vehementally contended that since the notification dated 24-4-1992 (Annexure 7) superseded earlier notification dated 1-6-91 (Annexure 5) hence after the lapse if notification dated 24-4-92 by efflux of time, there remains no notification in this regard consequently order dated 5-1-93 (Annexure 8 to petition) is without jurisdiction as Cane Commissioner is not empowered under the Act to prescribe the rate of commission. 14. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further contended that once the repeal takes place, it takes place for all purposes and the repealed Act or Notification does not review automatically because in view of Section 7 of U.P. General Clauses Act 1904, (for short U.P. Act), it shall be necessary, for the purpose of reviving any enactment repealed, expressly to state that purpose. 15. Learned counsel for the Respondents contended that in the instant case no repeal has taken place expressly rather by implication, vide notification dated 24-4-92 existing Rule 49 was suspended temporarily for certain period and only for that period it was substituted by some provisions and as such it was not a case of express repeal consequently there was no question of express revival. In alternative learned counsel for the Respondents contended that the provisions of Section 7 of the U.P. Act are applicable in the cases where the repeal takes place permanently and it will not apply in the cases where repeal takes place temporarily for stipulated period. 16. When a temporary statute effects a repeal of an existing statute, a question arises whether the repealed statute revives on the expiry of the repealing statute. The cases of repeals of repealing enactment have no application to a case of expiry of repealing enactment. 16. When a temporary statute effects a repeal of an existing statute, a question arises whether the repealed statute revives on the expiry of the repealing statute. The cases of repeals of repealing enactment have no application to a case of expiry of repealing enactment. Although the language of Section 7 of U.P. Act is slightly different yet, having regard to the context and the setting of the Section it also appears to be inapplicable to a case of expiry of a repealing statute. The answer, therefore, to the question, whether a statute which is repealed by a temporary statute revives on the expiry of the repealing statute, will depend upon the construction of the repealing statute. 17. In this connection observations of Gajendragadkar. J. in State of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, are very relevant, which are as under: The intention of the temporary Act in repealing the earlier Act will have to be considered, and no general or inflexible rule in that behalf can be laid down. 18. In Gooderham and Worts v. C. B. Corporation AIR 1949 PC 90 , the Privy Council observed that (sic) para 15) the repeal affected by the temporary legislation was only 'a temporary repeal. When by” the fiat of Parliament (he temporary repeal expired the original legislation automatically resumed its full force. No re-enactment of it was required. 19. In R. v. Rogars, (1809) 103 ER 891, p. 893 it was held that the repeal expired with the expiry of the Act reviving the operation of the earlier Act. 20. In the instant case it is relevant to have intention of temporary amendment made by notification dated 24-4-92. Clause 2 of the notification dated 24-4-92 makes its intention crystal clear that it was intending to amend the existing Rules only for the period from 1-10-91 to 30-9-92 and not thereafter. With this express intention existing Rules were temporarily amended for stipulated period with the expiry of which operation of existing rules stands revived automatically. la other words on 1-10-92 the amending Rule (notification dated 24-4-92) ceases to exist, reviving the amended Rule (Notification dated 1-6-91). 21. With this express intention existing Rules were temporarily amended for stipulated period with the expiry of which operation of existing rules stands revived automatically. la other words on 1-10-92 the amending Rule (notification dated 24-4-92) ceases to exist, reviving the amended Rule (Notification dated 1-6-91). 21. Learned counsel for the Respondents contended that in view of provisions of Sections 24 and 6C of U.P. Act which pertains to 'law,, the expiration of notification dated 24-4-92 by efflux of time (not by repeal) would revive automatically the notification dated 1-6-91 whereas learned counsel for the Petitioners contended that the provisions of Sections 6C and 24 of U.P. Act have no application to the notification rather they have application only to Acts of the Uttar Pradesh therefore, in view of provisions of Section 6 of U.P. Act the expiration of notification dated 24-4-92 would not revive automatically the notification dated 1-6-91. 22. As regard the aspect of applicability of the provisions of U.P. Act, it has to be considered from two angles. Firstly it has to be considered from the angle of one being notification or the Act and secondly from the angle of one being a case of repeal or the case of expiration by efflux of time. 23. For the purposes of considering applicability of U.P. Act from the angle of notification or the Act, provisions of Section 20 of U.P.Act are very relevant. Sub clause 2 of Section 20 makes it crystal clear that the provisions of Sections 6, 6A, 6B & 7 etc. shall MUTATIS MUTANDIS, apply in relation to any statutory instrument issued under any Uttar Pradesh Act. The Latin words 'MUTATIS MUTANDIS' 'mean with the necessary changes in points of details. The words 'statutory instruments' have been defined under sub Section 42B of Section 4 of U.P. Act and they mean any notification, order, scheme, rule, or bye-law issued under any enactment and having the force of law. As such the provisions of Sections 6, 6A, 6B and 7 etc. have full application to the notifications and Rules. Section 6B makes the provisions of Section 6 and 24 also applicable to the notifications and Rules. Therefore, from this angle of one being notification or the Act, the provisions of Sections 6 & 24 etc. apply to the notifications and Rules also. 24. have full application to the notifications and Rules. Section 6B makes the provisions of Section 6 and 24 also applicable to the notifications and Rules. Therefore, from this angle of one being notification or the Act, the provisions of Sections 6 & 24 etc. apply to the notifications and Rules also. 24. Now coming to the applicability aspect of the matter from the angle of one being a case of repeal or the case of expiration by efflux of time, as observed above, we are of the considered opinion that there is difference between repeal and expiration of temporary enactment. In the case of repeal there may not be automatic revival of the repealed provisions, at the time of repeal of repealing provision but position becomes different in the case of expiration of temporary provision by efflux of time. Thus the provisions of Section 6 and 7 of U.P. Act, being limited to the cases of repeal, though applicable to the notifications and Rules also, yet have no application to the impugned notification on the Court of it being a case of expiration of temporary notification by efflux of time (and not repeal). 25. Reverting to the applicability of provisions of Section 6C of U.P. Act to the notifications, suffice it to say, the Section 6C speaks of law. The word 'law' is very comprehensive. Law is meant to serve the living and does not beat its abstract wings in the jurai void. Its functional, fulfilment as social engineering depends on its sensitized response to situation, subject matter and the complex of realities which require ordered control. Law in its legislative sense is of much wider import then the juristic notion of law as the command of a sovereign or as a rule laying down a general course of conduct. Statute law and judge made law are not the only laws. Though theorists may not find it easy to define a law as distinguished from executive orders, the main features and characteristics of law are well recognised. Stated broadly, a law generally is a body of rules which have been laid down for determining legal rights and legal obligations which are recognised by courts. By virtue of it's comprehensive nature the term “Law” also includes subordinate legislation. Similarly Rules, Regulations and orders made by the administrative order, however, would not come within the purview of law. Stated broadly, a law generally is a body of rules which have been laid down for determining legal rights and legal obligations which are recognised by courts. By virtue of it's comprehensive nature the term “Law” also includes subordinate legislation. Similarly Rules, Regulations and orders made by the administrative order, however, would not come within the purview of law. Similarly statutory notifications would be law in force whereas executive notifications would not. (See The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar and Others Vs. The State of Ajmer and Another, AIR 1955 SC 25 , State of Assam v. Naresh AIR 1983 Gauhati 24 , and in re Ranganaya-kulu AIR 1956 Andhra 161. 26. The orders and notifications to have the force of law must be legislative in nature. A notification issued by the State Government imposing tax in exercise of a statutory power is law. A notification or order fixing price of commodities in exercise of a statutory power is also legislative in nature. Therefore, the notifications in question dated 1-6-91 and 24-4-92 prescribing rate of society's commission, issued by the Government of U.P. in exercise of statutory powers conferred by Section 28 of the Act, are 'law'. (See The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar and Others Vs. The State of Ajmer and Another, Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Cynamide India Ltd. and Another etc., AIR 1987 SC 1802 , Kalyani Stores Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1686 , H.S.S.K. Niyami and others Vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1990 SC 2128 . 27. The term 'law' used in Section 6C of U.P. Act is not defined u/s 4 of U.P. Act. Therefore, taking wide sense of term 'Law,' as discussed above, we are of considered opinion that 'law' includes Rules and notifications too. Most probably this is the reason for not mentioning Section 6C in Section 20 of U.P. Act while making other Sections of U.P. Act applicable to statutory instruments. The other Sections of U.P. Act which speak of Act have been made applicable to statutory instruments expressly providing therefore and since Section 6C speaks of 'law' which includes notifications having force of law hence there was no need of mentioning Section &C in Section 20 for its application to notifications having force of law. The other Sections of U.P. Act which speak of Act have been made applicable to statutory instruments expressly providing therefore and since Section 6C speaks of 'law' which includes notifications having force of law hence there was no need of mentioning Section &C in Section 20 for its application to notifications having force of law. Thus Section 6C has full application to the notifications having force of law, by reason of there being included in the comprehensive term 'law' as it speaks of term 'law'. 28. However, assuming not admitting that the provisions of U.P. Act have no application (o the eventuality of a -notification having expired by efflux of time, basic principles of interpretation or construction of Statutes cannot be lost sight of. The basic principle in this regard is that the intention of temporary notification in repealing the earlier notification will have to be considered and no general or inflexible rule in that behalf can be laid down. In the instant case intention of temporary notification dated 24-4-92 is apparent in sub clause 2 of the notification itself. Sub clause 2 of notification dated 24-4-92 expressly intends to substitute the provisions contained in notification dated 24-4-92 temporarily for the period with effect from 1-10-1991 to 30-9-1992. After expiry of this notification dated 24-4-92, earlier existing provisions stand revived automatically by operation of law. 29. Learned counsel for the Petitioners while giving reference to the decisions of apex Court in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. Vs. State of Madras and Another, AIR 1963 SC 928 , contended that once the notification dated 1-6-91 (Annexure 5) has been substituted by another notification dated 24-4-92 (Annexure 7), the former ceased to exist and notwithstanding the fact that notification dated 24-4-92 expired by efflux of time, the notification dated 1-6-91 does not stand revived automatically 30. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the case referred to above but in that case, the effect of expiration of a temporary notification by efflux of time was not under consideration. There is clear distinction between the repeal and expiration by efflux of time. In the event of expiration by efflux of time, the earlier existing provision stands revived automatically: (See State of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 , and India Tobacco Co. Ltd. Vs. There is clear distinction between the repeal and expiration by efflux of time. In the event of expiration by efflux of time, the earlier existing provision stands revived automatically: (See State of Orissa Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 , and India Tobacco Co. Ltd. Vs. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bhavanipore and Others, AIR 1975 SC 155 31. Apart from above, in this petition Petitioners have specifically prayed for quashing the notification dated 1-6-1991 (Annexure 5) and the same notification was subject matter of challenge in earlier writ petition No. 33139 of 1991 which was withdrawn on 21-1-92 without reserving any right to fife the same subsequently consequently although the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 of CPC are not applicable to writ jurisdiction, in its terms, yet applying the analogy of the same, the notification dated 1-6-91 cannot be challenged in the instant petition again. 32. The ratio laid down by the apex Court in Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Others, AIR 1987 SC 88 , fully applies in the instant case. In the aforesaid case their lordships have held that petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, withdrawn without permission to institute fresh petition, cannot be filed again in respect of the same cause of action and the rule of public policy contained under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC applies to such cases. 33. In any view of the matter, the moment Petitioners decided to withdraw earlier petition for any reason whatsoever, the proper course open to them was to reserve their right of filing fresh petition but they having failed in doing so exhausted their right of filing fresh petition against same cause of action challenging impugned notification dated 1-6-1991 again in the instant petition. 34. In view of the premises aforesaid, preliminary objection raised on behalf of Respondents succeeds and the petition is dismissed at the admission stage being not maintainable.z