JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:—Is Sainik School, Satara, which runs under the aegis of the Sainik School Society—a Society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860—a State Government or Central Government and hence entitled to the benefit of extended period of 30 years limitation for filing a suit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, is the point of law that needs to be determined in this litigation. 2. Sainik School imparts required education to young lads interested in making Regular Armed Forces as their career. Scholarships are also awarded to the students who are admitted by selection process. Quantum depends upon income of the guardian. Course is for five years. Admission is given on certain terms and conditions. The guardian has to execute a surety bond to the effect that if for any reason, not beyond the control of either the student or the guarantor, the student fails to pursue his studies at the said school before appearing for selection for entry to any Institution, the guarantor shall be liable to pay to the Governors of the School in cash the amount received from the School or the value of the scholarships received for the period the student was taking education in the school. 3. Gopal Banahatti (the original defendant) had executed such bond dated 10-3-1965 (Exh. 32) as a guarantor for his son Dilip who was admitted to the school on 15-3-1965. Dilip pursued studies for three years and thereafter discontinued. The Defendant communicated by a letter dated 8-2-1968 that the name of Dilip should be removed from the rolls as he was being withdrawn from the said school since he was not keeping good health and was having liver problems at Satara. The Principal of the school wrote back calling upon the Defendant to pay back the value of the scholarship amounting to Rs. 4,875/- for three years also the fees of Rs 410/- for the months of January and February 1968. Since the amount was not paid and Dilip ceased to attend the school, the State of Maharashtra and the Government of India as plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 have filed this suit on 10-7-1972 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 4,875/-. 4. Since the amount was not paid and Dilip ceased to attend the school, the State of Maharashtra and the Government of India as plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 have filed this suit on 10-7-1972 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 4,875/-. 4. This suit was defended on various grounds including (i) that withdrawal of Dilip from the school was on account of ill-health which was beyond the control of Dilip or his guardian and (ii) that the suit was barred by time in view of Article 30 of the Limitation Act, not having been filed within 3 years of the breach of conditions of bond. 5. The trail Court relying on the evidence adduced by the defendant including that of Dr. Degalurkar, the medical practitioner, came to the conclusion that the factual defence was correct. Liver of Dilip was affected, it was not advisable for him to continue his studies at Satara and hence the withdrawal from the school was for reason beyond the control of Dilip or his guardian. The trail Court also dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation, since the suit was not filed within three years from the breach of the condition of the bond . In trial Court's view, there was no privity of contract between the defendant on one hand and the State Government or the Central Government on the other, the privity of contract was with the Society and, therefore, the State Government and/or the Central Government could not file this suit Article 112 could not be attracted. 6. The plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Satara, which was transferred to Second Extra Assistant Judge, Satara. The appeal was allowed and a money decree as prayed for was granted taking a view (i) that there was no justification for withdrawing Dilip from the school; (ii) that the Society was nothing but a Government and hence Article 112 of the Limitation Act applied and not Article 30. Aggrieved thereby, this Second Appeal has been filed. 7. The finding that there was no justification for withdrawing Dilip from the school, is based on appreciation of evidence. No case for interference in Second Appeal with that finding exists. 8. The second question is certainly a question of law. Aggrieved thereby, this Second Appeal has been filed. 7. The finding that there was no justification for withdrawing Dilip from the school, is based on appreciation of evidence. No case for interference in Second Appeal with that finding exists. 8. The second question is certainly a question of law. The principal points are (i) whether there was a privity of contract between the defendant on one hand and the Central Government and/or the State Government on the other (ii) whether Sainik School could be treated as Central or State Government. 9. From Exh. 32, it is clear that privity of contract is between the Defendant the Society. Now, the Society quite obviously is a separate legal entity to sue or be sued in its own name. Only because it has received extensive aid from the Governments and out of those funds scholarship is paid, it does not follow that its financer could maintain a suit for getting back the amount for breach of conditions of bond executed in its favour. This suit therefore could not legitimately be suit by or on behalf of the Central/State Government so as attract Article 112 of the Limitation Act. 10. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that in view of the object of the Society, its constitution and the source of finance, the Society is nothing but a Central/State Government. Certain positions are admitted before me. The object of the society is “ to establish Sainik Schools in various parts of India providing special school education of a high standard with the aim of preparing boys academically physically for entering into National Defence Academy and other walks of life.” The broad constitution of the Sainik Schools Society is that the Union Minister for Defence is its Chairman and the I.A.S. Officer deputed by the Government is its Honorary Secretary. Ex-Officio Members are (i) Secretary to Chief Minister or Education Minister of the State in which the School is situated; (ii) Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence; (iii) Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Education; Financial Adviser, Ministry of Finance (Defence); Government of India; (iv) Chairman, University Grants Commission; (v) Joint Secretary in the Union Ministry of defence dealing with education; (vi) one official representative to be nominated by each Government of the State where the Schools are located; (vii) Chairman, Joint Training Committee, Armed Forces Head-quaters; (viii) eminent Educationists, not exceeding four, to be nominated by the Chairman; and (ix) eminent persons not exceeding two, to be nominated by the Chairman. The Society is funded by State Government or the Central Government in the form of scholarship amount to the boys and other grants – in – aid for maintenance of the School. No private funding or donation is allowed. Other source of finance is the fees received from the students. Serving defence personnel are posted on deputation to the Sainik School for a period of 3-4 years to fill in posts of: (A) Principal , (B) Head Master, (C) Registrar, (D) Army Physical Training Instructors and (E) National Cadet Corps Instructors. Certain rules of the Central Government have been made applicable to the employees of the Society. 11. It is thus apparent that the Society is an independent legal entity, which is largely controlled and liberally aided by the Central Government as well as by the State Government. But it is difficult to see how this extensive nature of the control and funding can change the legal character of the Society and raise its status to the level of the Government. Certain rules of the Central Government apply but that is because of the adoption and not ipso facto by reason of operation of law. 12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has invited my attention to the case of (All India Sainik Schools Employees Association v. The Defence Minister-Cum-Chairman Board of Governors, Sainik School Society, New Delhi other)1, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 88, in which it is held that this Society is a “State” as contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, was amenable to writ jurisdiction. Having regard to the object, the constitution, the extensive funding, the answer to the question was obviously in the affirmative and was so given by the Supreme Court. There is nothing in the said decision from which it can be said that it was held to be either a State Government or Central Government. The distinction between the “State” as contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution and the Central/State Government is too obvious to be elaborately stated. Far from supporting the case of the respondents, certain observations in his judgment militate against the theory propounded. Those observations are : “It follows out of this fact that the employees of the Sainik School cannot be treated as Central Government employees nor can they be treated as at par with the employees of K.V.S. They are a class by themselves and, therefore, the stand on the basis of Article 14 by pleading discrimination against the guarantee of equality is not available. To put unequals as equals is against the objective of Article 14; in the same way is to discriminate between equals. The later, however, is on the hypothesis that the two are equals. In view of the position that the employees of the Society are a distinct class by themselves, we do not think that there is any merit in the claim that there has been discrimination. 13. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has produced before me in the course of hearing a copy of the communication which she has received from the Principal of the Sainik School, Satara. Since Shri. Kanade, learned Counsel for the appellant has no objection for taking it on record and indeed has relied upon the said document, I have taken that document on record by consent. The Principal has taken a stand that the School is a deemed Government Institution and for all practical purposes a Government School, though it is being run by a Sainik School Society. This stand, as indicated earlier, is incorrect and cannot be legally sustained. 14. This suit, therefore, is clearly barred by time has to be dismissed on that score. 15. To conclude, this Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Satara is quashed set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. No costs. Appeal allowed. -----