Judgment : The petitioner in all the three petitions along with two others borrowed from the respondent a sum of Rs.1,08,000. On 1. 1990 he gave a cheque for the repayment of the above amount and the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, on 13. 1990 he entered into an agreement with the respondent for the repayment of the said amount and postdated cheques bearing Nos.16908, 16909 and 16910 were handed over to the respondent. When presented for the payment, the first cheque was returned with an endorsement of “refer to drawer” on 17. 1990. The next cheque was returned with a similar endorsement on 8. 1990 and the last cheque was returned on 9. 1990. Thereafter, the respondent issued notices on 27. 1990, 18. 1990 and 19. 1990 respectively. These notices were served on the petitioner on 27. 1990, 18. 1990 and 19. 1990. Since there was no response, the respondent lodged three complaints under Sec.142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioner before the Judicial Magistrate No.3 at Erode on 19. 1990 for the first two cheques and on 110. 1990 for the third cheque. They are C.C.Nos.765, 766 and 767 of 1990. In these petitions, the petitioner who is the accused in the cases seeks to quash the complaint against him under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. 2. Under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt is returned by the banker unpaid for want of sufficient funds standing to the credit of that account or funds arranged by agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The pre-requisites for making such person liable under that section are: (i) the cheque should have been presented to the bank for payment within a period of six months from the date it bears. (ii) the holder makes a demand for the payment of the amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information from the bank on dishonour. (iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of that notice. (ii) the holder makes a demand for the payment of the amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information from the bank on dishonour. (iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of that notice. In this case, there is ho dispute that these conditions are satisfied. 3. Sec.142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure: (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sec.138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Sec.138; (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class is competent to try an offence punishable under Sec.138. 4. Learned counsel for the quash petitioner submits that the abovesaid provisions of Sec.142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. So under clause (b) of Sec.142 no court can take cognizance of a complaint contemplated under Sec.138 if it is made within one month of the date of the arising of cause of action. Learned counsel points out that in case of cheque No.16910 the notice was served on the petitioner on 19. 1990. And under clause (c) of the proviso to Sec.138, the cause of action arises on the failure of the drawer to make the payment on the fifteenth day of the receipt of the said notice which falls on 10. 1990. And under clause (b) of Sec.142 the complaint should have been filed only on the expiry of one month from 10. 1990. Similarly, in the other two cases also the complaints are not maintainable since they have been lodged within a month from the date of cause of action and not on the expiry of one month from the date of arising of cause of action. However, there is no warrant for such a view in the interpretation of the expressions used in Sec. 142. A combined reading of Secs. However, there is no warrant for such a view in the interpretation of the expressions used in Sec. 142. A combined reading of Secs. 138 and 142 would indicate that the drawer can make payment within fifteen days of receipt of the notice of demand, and only if he fails to do so, the cause of action arises. And the other limit for initiating prosecution against him is one month from the date. The expression “no court shall take cognizance of any offence” pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner occurs only in clause (a) of sec.l42and not in Clause (b) of that section. Even if that expression is imported in Clause (b), it is not possible to interpret the same in the manner in which learned counsel for the petitioner desires. A plain reading of Sec.142 is to the effect that an offence contemplated under Sec.138 could taken cognizance of by a court only on a written complaint from the drawer and such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises. The word “such” occurring in clause (b) of Sec.142 refers to the complaint in writing mentioned in clause (a) of Sec.142. By no stretch of imagination it could be held that the court is competent to take cognizance of the offence if only the concerned complaint is preferred on the expiry of one month from the date of cause of action. So, I find no substance in the claim of the quash petitioner. 5. In the result, all the three quash petitions are dismissed.