Judgment :- 1. The respondent filed O.S. No. 187 of 1987 on the file of Sub Court, Namakkal for partition and separate possession of 1/6th share. The petitioners were set ex parte on 18-12-1988 and a decree was passed on that date. The petitioners filed I.A. No. 247 of 1989 for condonation of delay of four days in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree and I.A. No. 248 of 1989 for setting aside the ex parte decree. The petitioners were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 150/- by way of costs as condition for setting aside the ex parte decree. Time was granted till 9-9-1991. The petitioners did not pay the costs and the application was dismissed on 19-11-1991. It is the said order dated 19-11-1991 which is sought to be challenged in this revision petition. 2. The revision petition was presented only on 11-12-1992. Before going into the merits of the application for condonation of delay of 292 days in filing the revision petition, a preliminary objection is raised by learned counsel for the respondent. He contends that this application for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition should be dismissed in limine. According to him, the petitioners applied for certified copies of fair and decretal orders of the Court below in I.A. No. 247 of 1989 only on 30-10-1992, which is beyond the period of 90 days from the date of order i.e. 19-11-1991. It is contended by him that if a party applies for certified copies or printed copies of the order challenged in appeal or revision beyond the period of 90 days, he will not be entitled to file an application for condonation of delay in the appellate Court or in the revisional Court in filing the said appeal or revision. According to him, S. 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked only by a person who applies for certified copies or printed copies of the orders within the time prescribed for preferring the appeal or revision. 2 -A. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the respondent, on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The Land Acquisition Officer v. Kannan Piliai and others (1992-2-L.W. 28). 2 -A. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the respondent, on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The Land Acquisition Officer v. Kannan Piliai and others (1992-2-L.W. 28). In that case, there was a delay of 640 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree in L.A.O.P. No. 29 of 1981 on the file of Sub Court, Salem. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition originally, there was no explanation at all as to why the application for copies was made after a period of about eight months from the date of judgment and decree viz. 7.12.1984. An opportunity was given to counsel for the appellant to file an additional affidavit. In the additional affidavit an explanation was attempted, but the Bench held that the said explanation was wholly unacceptable. It was also held by the Bench that the averments made in the additional affidavit were not substantiated by production of relevant documents. The Bench look the view that the delay of 640 days has not been explained at all by the appellant and consequently dismissed the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In the course of their judgment, the Bench referred to a judgment of this Court in Ramalingam Pillai v. Arunachalam Piliai ((1988) II M.L.J. 139) which had extracted the following passage from the judgment in Parthasarathy v. State of A.P. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 38):— “In compuling or calculating the period of limitation from particulate point the sub-Section enables the exclusion of a time from that period caused by an event that intervened between the commencement and the termination of the said period. It has no concern with any events anterior to the commencement of the period of limitation or posterior to the said period. After quoting the said passage, the Bench observed that the delay in that case was not simply 640 days but more by about 105 days, which was the period between the date of the copy application viz., 5-8-1985 and the date when the copy was made ready viz., 20-11-1985. The Bench held that the said delay of about 105 days also stood unexplained. The Bench held that the said delay of about 105 days also stood unexplained. Again the Bench quoted another passage from the same judgment, which reads thus:— “S. 5 of the Limitation Act contemplates cases where a party having obtained all the required copies well before the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for preferring an appeal has been unable to do so even on the last day owing to circumstances beyond his control and thus viewed, the petitioner cannot be permitted to approach this Court and ask for the condonation of the delay of 159 days.” The Bench expressed its concurrence with the view found in the above passage. Relying on this part of the judgment, learned counsel contends that the Bench held that no application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable, if an application for copies of judgment and decree had been made in the trial Court after a period of 90 days, which is the period prescribed for appeal or revision. Reliance is placed on the Head Note in the report, which reads thus:— “Appeal sought to be filed by Land Acquisition Officer with petition to excuse delay of 640 days Condonation of delay declined - S. 5 contemplates cases where a party having obtained certified copy of judgment and decree before expiry of period of limitation was unable to prefer appeal due to circumstances beyond control.” 3. I am unable to agree with this contention. The interpretations of the judgment of the Bench given by learned counsel for the respondent is wholly erroneous. The Bench has not held that no application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable, if applications for certified copies of judgment and decree are made beyond the period of 90 days. On the other hand, the Bench has only held that the period taken by the Court for issuing certified copies of judgment and decree should not be excluded under the provisions of S. 12 of the Limitation Act when the delay in filing the appeal or revision is calculated by the appellant or petitioner, Thus, in that case, the Bench held that the delay was really 640 days plus 105 days and not merely 640 days as contended by the appellant therein. The view taken by the Supreme Court in Parthasarathis case (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 38) and by this Court in Ramalingam Pillais case ((1988) II M.L.J. 139) was also the same. It was not in any way different. It was held that for the purpose of calculating the delay, the computation must be made from the 90th day after the date of judgment on which day the time prescribed for preferring the appeal or revision expires. If the application for copies of the judgment and decree are filed after the period of 90 days from the date of judgment, naturally, the time taken by Court for issuing certified copies cannot be excluded under S. 12 of the Limitation Act. The Division Bench has only held that S. 12 cannot be invoked by the patty. On the other hand, the Division Bench has not held that S. 5 cannot be invoked by a party who has applied for certified copies of judgment and decree after the expiry of a period of 90 days. The party has to explain that period also as part of the delay. Hence, the preliminary objection is overruled. 4. In this case, the delay is sought to be explained by the petitioner that after the order was passed by the trial Court, he was advised that an application should be filed in the trial Court itself for extension of time to pay the costs and to set aside the order dated 19-11-1991. According to him, such an application was filed, but it was not numbered and it was returned on 18-8-1992 as not maintainable. According to the affidavit, he filed for certified copies of fair and decretal order an application on 30- 10-1992 and the copies were delivered on 5-11-1992. The revision was presented in this Court on 11-11-1992. The above explanation is wholly unsatisfactory. The affidavit of the petitioner has carefully and deliberately omitted to disclose the date on which the application was filed in the trial Court for setting aside the order dated 19-11-1991 and extend the time for payment of costs. The copies of the affidavit and the petition have been included in the typed set by the petitioner. They disclose that such an application was filed only on 3-8-1992. There is no explanation whatever as to why the petitioner did not file the application in the trial Court between 19-11-1991 and 3-8-1992. The copies of the affidavit and the petition have been included in the typed set by the petitioner. They disclose that such an application was filed only on 3-8-1992. There is no explanation whatever as to why the petitioner did not file the application in the trial Court between 19-11-1991 and 3-8-1992. The entire period remains unexplained. Again, there is no explanation for the delay between 18-8-1992 and 30-10-1992. As per the judgment of the Division Bench, the period between 30-10-1992 and 5-11-1992 cannot be excluded. In the circumstances, there is no explanation whatever for the entire delay of 292 days. The delay is inordinate and in the absence of valid explanation the petitioner is not entitled to get a relief in this Court. 5. This petition is dismissed.