Judgment :- Varghese Kailiath, J. This is a revision by a tenant under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act). Respondent herein who was the petitioner before the Rent Control Court, filed an application for eviction. Revision petitioner filed objection to the petition contending that the petitioner is not the owner and that there is no landlord-tenant relationship. The case of the tenant was that there is no tenancy arrangement between herself and the respondent herein. At present, we are not very much concerned about the rival contentions raised by the landlady and tenant. 2. To prove the rent deed, landlady examined Pws.3 and 4 on 21-6-1993. Tenant did not cross examine the above witnesses on that day due to the non-availability of her advocate and so she prayed for time to cross examine the witnesses after lunch. It is stated in the revision memorandum that the witness, Pw.3, expressed some inconvenience and the examination of the above witness was adjourned to 3-7-1993. It is also stated in the revision memorandum that on 3-7-1993, the matter was taken up immediately after the roll call. Since nobody cross examined the witnesses, the Rent Control Court recorded in the deposition no cross'. 3. Revision petitioner filed an application for review of the endorsement of no cross made by the court in the deposition of Pw.3. But the review petition was dismissed. Tenant filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority found that the appeal is not maintainable and dismissed the appeal in limine. Tenant has now filed this Civil Revision Petition. 4. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised two points before us. He submitted that the finding of the appellate authority that no appeal is maintainable is incorrect. Further he submi tied that the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to dispose of an appeal in limine in the sense that without issuing notice to the respondent. Learned counsel argued these two points elaborately. We shall take up the second question first, viz., whether the appellate authority has got power and jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal without sending notice to the respondent and without calling for the records of the case. 5. S.18 of the Act provides for appeal. Learned counsel argued these two points elaborately. We shall take up the second question first, viz., whether the appellate authority has got power and jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal without sending notice to the respondent and without calling for the records of the case. 5. S.18 of the Act provides for appeal. S.18(1)(b) of the Act reads thus: - 18(1)(b): "Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court, may within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction, in computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded". Assuming that the order challenged is an appealable order whether the appellate authority is bound in all circumstances to issue notice to the respondent and call for the records of the case. In 1991 (1) KLT 453 (Sumathi v. Devasan) and 1991 (2) KLT 487 (Luiz v. sadanandan) this court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. In 1991 (1) KLT 453, considering the very question under S.18 of the Act, the Court observed thus: "It is not that this distinction is kept in mind by the appellate or revisional authorities functioning under the Act with the result orders of the nature impugned in this case are subjected to appeal. A weeding out of such frivolous appeals or revisions at the threshold before issue of notice is called for lest parties arc enabled to protract the proceedings against the very avowed philosophy of the enactment enjoining expeditious disposal of proceedings under the Act". In 1991 (2) KLT 487, a Division Bench of this. Court, considering the question whether this Court exercising the jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act is bound to issue notice to the respondent in all cases, said: "It is not as if this Court should issue notice or call for the records in all cases before declining to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. When the power of interference is limited, this court has to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case warranting interference, in which case alone this court is bound to issue notice or to call for the records. When the power of interference is limited, this court has to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case warranting interference, in which case alone this court is bound to issue notice or to call for the records. This power to weed out frivolous matters is inherent and can be exercised even without an express provision as under Order 41 Rule 11 when the power is otherwise inherent in this court". It is pertinent to notice that though the Division Bench was considering a question regarding the in limine dismissal of the revision, the Division Bench specifically said that whenever a power of appeal is given that power carries with it an inherent power to dispose of the appeal without issuing notice to the respondent. This inherent power is necessary to weed out frivolous appeals, This is the power that inheres with an appellate authority for the purpose of discharging its appellate power in meaningful and realistic mode of procedure. 6. The Division Bench in the above case, we will say rightly, said that it is not necessary to trace the power to a provision like Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the power is otherwise inherent in this Court. This observation is applicable to appeals filed under S.18 of the Act. The Division Bench has relied on the decision reported in 1986 KLT 553 (New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Pathumma). In this decision, the court recognised the power of this Court to scrutinize appeals arising under S.110d of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 at the admission stage and to decide whether to entertain it or not and said that the absence of a provision like Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude this court from prescribing its own rules of procedure and to scrutinize the appeal to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case, and to dismiss the appeal in limine if no such prima facie case is made out. 7. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that both the above decisions did not refer to Rule 16(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979. R.16 of the Rules is the rule prescribing the procedure when an appeal is entertained. 7. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that both the above decisions did not refer to Rule 16(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979. R.16 of the Rules is the rule prescribing the procedure when an appeal is entertained. Of course, it is stated in the rule that when an appeal is preferred, the appellate authority shall fix a day for hearing the appeal and send notice thereof to the appellant or appellants and the respondent or respondents mentioned in the appeal and shall also send a copy of the appeal petition along with the notice to the respondent or respondents. This provision, to our mind, does not impinge upon the right of the appellate authority to weed out frivolous appeals and appeals which are not maintainable at all. If this power is not recognised, certainly it will lead to undesirable results. We respectfully agree with the decisions reported in 1991 (1) KLT 453 and 1991 (2) KLT 487 and hold that there is no merit in the contention that the appellate authority has no power to dismiss the appeal at threshold. 8. The other question that has to be answered in this case is whether an appeal under S.18 of the Act is permissible against recording in the deposition of a witness 'no cross . In this case, when the court recorded 'no cross' in the deposition of the witness, petitioner filed an application for review. That application also was dismissed. Learned counsel submitted that it is not clear whether the appellate authority was considering the appeal as if it is an appeal against the order dismissing the review petition or not. The short judgment of the appellate authority reads thus:-"Heard counsel for the appellant. The appellant is the tenant in a petition coming under B.R.C. Act. Now he is aggrieved by an order of Rent Controller which is interlocutory in nature. That order does not affect the right of the parties and it is only procedural when the lower court stated "no cross". The appellant is aggrieved can agitate the matter in appeal after final disposal of the matter by the Rent Controller. Hence admission refused and R.C.A. dismissed". 9. From the revision memorandum we feel that the appeal that has been filed is against the order passed in the application for review. The appellant is aggrieved can agitate the matter in appeal after final disposal of the matter by the Rent Controller. Hence admission refused and R.C.A. dismissed". 9. From the revision memorandum we feel that the appeal that has been filed is against the order passed in the application for review. In the revision memorandum, revision petitioner has produced the order dated 31-7-1993. That is the order on the review application. Learned counsel argued the case on the basis that the endorsement of the Rent Control Court in the deposition of the witness 'no cross' is an order which will affect the right of the tenant and as such, it is appealable. In the alternative, learned counsel submitted that every order passed by the Rent Control Court is appealable under S.18 of the Act. Learned Counsel goes to the extent of submitting that even an order refusing an application for adjournment is an order which can be the subject matter of appeal under S.18 of the Act. In order to substantiate the case that an order declining an opportunity to cross examine the witness is an important matter affecting the vital rights of the parties and it is of momentous consequence in the prosecution of the case, counsel cited several decisions in order to impress this Court about the importance of cross examination of the witnesses. We are ill afford to say that cross examination of the witnesses is of no importance. We are of the view that cross examination of the witnesses are of utmost importance in prosecuting a case, since in the adversary system of dispensation of justice cross examination of witnesses has got a pivotal role. Learned counsel referred us to the following decisions; (1) AIR 1927 Madras 524 (Sreenivasa v. Ranga ), (2) AIR 1972 Andhra Pradesh 216 (Ramesh v. bhagwandas) (3) AIR 1974 Orissa 114 (B.C. Swain v. Secretary, W& T Department) and (5) AIR 1975 Goa 27 (C.A. Fernandez v. A.L.P. Furtado). These decisions do not touch the crucial point involved in the case, though these decisions shed exuberant light on the importance of cross examination. 10. The real question we have to consider in this case is whether the endorsement of 'no cross' made in the deposition of the witness if considered as an interlocutory order, is that an order which can be challenged in appeal under S.18 of the Act. 11. 10. The real question we have to consider in this case is whether the endorsement of 'no cross' made in the deposition of the witness if considered as an interlocutory order, is that an order which can be challenged in appeal under S.18 of the Act. 11. In AIR 1967 SC 799 (The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. GokalChand), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of filing appeals under the Houses and Rents - Delhi Rent Control 'Act (59 of 1958). The court said that S.38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act contemplates appeal only from order which affects right or liability of party and that no appeal lies thereunder from interlocutory orders which are merely procedural and do not affect rights or liabilities of parties. Further the court said that if however, any error, defect or irregularity is found in any interlocutory order, it can be taken as ground in of objection in appeal from final order in main proceeding. In the Supreme Court, the question that was considered was whether an appeal would lie against the order refusing to issue commission for inspection and preparation of plan of particular premises of landlord, in proceedings for eviction. The court found that it is not appealable as the same was mere procedural order not affecting any right or liability of party. This decision has been followed in almost all subsequent decisions relating to this subject. The vital question that has to be considered is whether the order is one which is procedural and not affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties. In AIR 1967 SC 1360 (Bant Singh Gill v. ShantiDevi), the Supreme Court observed thus: "The principle was thus recognised that the word "order" used in such context is not wide enough to include every order, whatever be its nature, and particularly orders which only dispose of interlocutory matters. In the case before us also, all that was done by the application presented by the appellant on the 13th March, 1961, was to raise a preliminary issue about the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the suit had abated by virtue of S.50(2) of the Act of 1958. The Court went into that issue and decided it against the appellant. The Court went into that issue and decided it against the appellant. If the decision had been in favour of the appellant and the suit had been dismissed, no doubt there would have been a final order in the suit having the effect of a decree (see the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Ram Charan Das v. Hira Nand, AIR 1945 Lah 298 (F.B.)). On the other hand, if as in the present case, it is held that the suit has not abated and its trial is to continue, there is no final order deciding the rights or liabilities of the parties to the suit. The rights and liabilities has yet to be decided after full trial has been gone through. The decision by the court is only in the nature of a finding on a preliminary issue on which would depend the maintainability of the suit. Such a finding cannot be held to be an order for the purpose of S.34 of the Act of 1952, and consequently, no appeal against such an order would be maintainable. It was indicated by this Court in the case of the. Central Bank of India Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 1339 of 1966, D/-12-9-1966; (reported in AIR 1967 SC 799) that, in such a case, it is open to the appellant to canvass the error, defect, or irregularity, if any, in the order in an appeal from the final order passed in the proceedings for eviction. In the present case also, therefore, it is clearly open to the appellant to raise this plea of abatement of the suit, if and when he files an appeal against a decree for eviction passed by the trial court". Following the above observation, Viswanatha Iyer, J. in 1991(1) KLT 453 observed that an order of whatever nature made by the Rent Control Court is not made appealable under S.18 of the Act merely because it is an order passed by the Rent Control Court, Further the learned judge observed that the expression "an order" cannot be construed as making each and every order, interlocutory or otherwise, appealable. 12. We are of opinion that S.18 of the Act only contemplates for the purpose of appeal such orders which would affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. 12. We are of opinion that S.18 of the Act only contemplates for the purpose of appeal such orders which would affect the rights and liabilities of the parties. Orders which are necessary for the proper prosecution of the litigation and pertaining to matters merely of procedure or evidence or steps in the proceedings are not appealable. 13. In 1983 (II) M.L.J. 293 (Mani v. T.K. Jacob), the High Court of Madras held that a direction by the Rent Control Court not to try a particular point as a preliminary issue does not affect the rights of parties and was therefore, not appealable. Dealing with the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the Madras High Court had occasion to deal with similar provisions. S.23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, provided for a right of appeal against any order of the Rent Control Court. In Chinnaraju Naidu v. Bavani Bai (1981(11) M.L.J. 354) the order that was challenged was one amending the rent control petition by correcting door number of the plaint schedule premises from 36 to 37. The appeal by the tenant before the appellate authority was challenged as not maintainable. Ratnavel Pandian, J. as he then was, went into the question in great detail. The learned judge considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India and Bank Singh Gill and some other earlier decision of the High Court of Madras Santhanam Iyer v. Somasundara Vanniyar, (1958(1) M.LJ.4Q Qand Maria Goundan v. Ramaswami Goundan, 1962(1) M.L.J. 106 and observed: "The quintessence of the above discussion, in the light of the observations made in the various decisions referred to above, is to the effect that all interlocutory orders passed during the proceedings under the Act cannot be said to be orders coming within the meaning of S.23(1)(b) of the Act but only the orders which affect the right and liabilities of the parties, in the sense that they become final orders though passed on interlocutory applications, such as refusing to set aside an ex parte order etc.,. However, it is open to the parties to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any in such an order as a ground of objection in the appeal from the final order in the main proceedings". However, it is open to the parties to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any in such an order as a ground of objection in the appeal from the final order in the main proceedings". In 1962(1) M.L.J. 106, Ramachandra Iyer, J. has stated that the words v every decision' occurring in S.9(2) of the Madras Fair Rent Act of 1956 could only mean a final decision and that it could not include interlocutory orders such as the determination of a preliminary point by the Rent Control Court. It is true that in a way every order passed by the court has got an effect in the final disposal of the case and in that way it may affect the rights of the parties in one sense or other. But that character alone is not sufficient to make an order subject to appeal. Even a refusal of an adjournment or fixing a date for hearing or refusing to issue a commission for inspection and preparation of a plan of the premises in question are all orders which may have some effect in the final result of the litigation. But those orders an; not found to have the attribute of being an appealable orders. 14. learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the decisions of Retnavel Pandian, J., as he then was, in 1981 (II) M.L.J. 298 (Habib Khan v. Arogya Mary Shanthi Lucien). It was a question of admitting a document and the court said that since the admission of a document is once accepted and not challenged has got the attribute of an order affecting the rights of the parties so as to give rise to a right of appeal, in 1991(1) KLT 453, Viswanatha Iyer, J. has noticed this decision also. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the decision reported in I.L.R.1970(2) Kerala 310 (Krishnan Narayanan v. ShertallaiMuttathyPallikkariam and two others). In this case of course, the court held that there is no distinction between 'an' and' any'. The two adjectives indicate one and the same situation. S.11(1)(b) of the Act even if read as "any person aggrieved by "any order"; instead of "any person aggrieved by "an order"", the meaning cannot change. In this case of course, the court held that there is no distinction between 'an' and' any'. The two adjectives indicate one and the same situation. S.11(1)(b) of the Act even if read as "any person aggrieved by "any order"; instead of "any person aggrieved by "an order"", the meaning cannot change. In the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 799 the words used are, an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller and the Supreme Court said that "every order of the Controller made under this Act, though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the right or liabilities of the parties". 16. Taking evidence is essentially an important step taken towards the final adjudication of the litigation. Examination and cross examination in that respect are procedural steps for the final adjudication of the controversy. It should be taken only as steps in the prosecution of the case to reach a finale. We do not think that everything that has happened during the cross examination like not allowing a question to be asked or ultimately recording that there is no cross examination are all matters which can be considered only as steps in the process of reaching final adjudication of the litigation. In this view, we have no hesitation to hold that the recording of endorsement 'no cross' in the deposition is not a matter which can be challenged in appeal under S.18 of the Act. 17. It was contended that the original order, viz., the endorsement in the deposition was subjected to review and an order declining to review must be considered as an appealable order. We find it difficult to accept this contention. If an interlocutory order, which is not appealable and that order was subjected to review and the statutory authorities declined to review, that will not give a different status to the order on the question of appeal ability and so the party cannot acquire a right of appeal. In fact, the appellate authority has gone into the substance of the order and dismissed the appeal at the threshold reserving a right to the party to agitate the matter after final disposal of the case. We do not find any error in the disposal of the appeal. In fact, the appellate authority has gone into the substance of the order and dismissed the appeal at the threshold reserving a right to the party to agitate the matter after final disposal of the case. We do not find any error in the disposal of the appeal. In the result, there is no merit in the Civil Revision Petition and it is only to be dismissed. We do so.