Order C.W.J.C. No. 12153 was directed to be listed today along with other similar matters referred to above. By mistake it has not been listed. Let it be treated as on day's list along with other similar matters. All these matters are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. It is unfortunate that a controversy has been allowed to be raised on a point by a division Bench of this Court by way of differing from another earlier division Bench of this Court and that again after the earlier division Bench has been affirmed by the supreme court in an appeal arising out of the same. The question involved in all these matters before us and in earlier Division Bench an supreme court judgments is whether a person who is "Lohar" by caste is a member of "Scheduled Tribe" in view of notification issued by the President of India in the Year 1976. The first judgment to be noticed in this context is a judgement of the Supreme Court dated 12th September 1990 passed in civil Appeal no. 4631/90. We quote herein below the said judgment of the Supreme Court. "Order" Special leave granted. The short point raised in this appeal is as to whether the Central Administrative Tribunal was right in holding that the appellant did not belong to the Lohar community which has now been declared as a Scheduled Tribe in Chapra district of Bihar It is not in dispute that from 1976 onwards the community has been so included but according to the Postal department of Union of India, at the time when the appellant entered service, the community had not been so included and, therefore, the recruitment on the footing that he was a member of a scheduled Tribe entitled to reservation was bad. We have looked into the records and have heard counsel for the parties. In view of the accepted position that Lohar Community is included in the scheduled Tribe from the date of amendment of the list in 1976 and the dispute as to whether the community was known as "Lohar" or if sit was the latter, it has been so included before, we do not think the Tribunal was justified in holding the view it has taken. The appeal is allowed and the order of the tribunal is vacated. The appellant shall now return to duty. The appeal is allowed and the order of the tribunal is vacated. The appellant shall now return to duty. The period between 16.12.1986 when the order removing him was made and the date when he would join in terms of our decision now he shall be entitled to 50% of his salary. In regard to all other service benefits, his service shall be treated to be continuous. This decision may not be taken as a precedent. No costs. Sd/-Ranganath Misra New Delhi Sd/-M.M. Punchhi September 12, 1990. Sd/-K. Ramaswamy" This question again came up before a Division Bench of this Court in CWJC No.1034/91 which is reported in 1992(2) PLJR 594, Wherein by a judgment and order dated 28.2.92 the Division Bench decided that the caste "Lohar" has been include in such Presidential notification in the category of Scheduled Tribe. The relevant portion of the said judgment and order is as follows:- ‘From a bare reference to the facts mentioned above, it- appears caste Lohar has been included in the residential notification in the category of Scheduled Tribe Whether such benefits extended to the persons belonging to Lohar caste can be taken away by a notification issued by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms, placing Lohar in a category of other backward classes and not in the category of Scheduled Tribe? To solve this problem it may be noticed that similar controversy had arisen it a case of Shambhu Nath an employee ck Post & Telegraph department, who belonged to Lohar caste and was a resident of Bihar. He had claimed all the benefits of Scheduled Tribe after inclusion of the caste Lohar in the category of Scheduled Tribe by the presidential notification after 1976. Initially- his application for giving the said benefit was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal. There after, He filed Civil Appeal No 4631 of 1990 arising out of S.L.P. No 5684 of 1990. The Supreme Court by order dated 12.9.1990 (a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 14 with the Lup plementary Affidavit) has held that it was in dispute that from 1975 onwards, the caste Lohar has been declared as Scheduled Tribe. It would be proper to notice the relevant findings hereunder: - "We have looked into the records and have heard counsel for the parties. It would be proper to notice the relevant findings hereunder: - "We have looked into the records and have heard counsel for the parties. In view of the accepted position that Lohar community is included in the Scheduled Tribe from the date amendment of he list in 1976 and the dispute as to whether the community was known as "Lohar" or Lohra "and if it was the latter, It has been so included from before, we do not think the Tribunal was justified in holding the view it has taken." In view of the aforesaid judgment, now it is clear that the controversy regarding Lohar and Lohar has now come to an end from the date of amendment of the list in 1976 as per the Presidential notification contained in Annexure 6. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances, as mentioned above, we direct the respondent no. 2 to consider the claim of the petitioner for promotion in the light of the findings recorded above and issue consequential order/notification in accordance with law. In the result, with the observations and directions mentioned above, this writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above. " (Para 6, 7, 8 & 9) The State preferred an appeal against the same before the Supreme Court By a judgment and order dated 21st September, 1992 which is quoted herein below, the said appeal of the S ate was dismissed following the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1990 decide on 19th September,1990. (Shambhu Nath Vs. Union of India & Ors.): "Order" The matter was passed over once. No one appears on behalf of the petitioners when the matter was called again. The special leave petition is dismissed. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel, appears and makes as a prayer for recalling the above order. Learned counsel for the respondent raised no objection to it. There fore, the order is recalled. Heard on merits. In view of the decision of this Court in C.A. No. 4631/90 decided on 12th September, 1990 (Shambhoo Nath Vs. Union of India & anr.) which has been followed by the High Court, we find so ground to entertain this special leave petition. It is accordingly dismissed" The matter should have ended there; at least so far as this High Court is concerned; but unfortunately it has not. Union of India & anr.) which has been followed by the High Court, we find so ground to entertain this special leave petition. It is accordingly dismissed" The matter should have ended there; at least so far as this High Court is concerned; but unfortunately it has not. A complication has been created by a judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in C.W.J.C. No 10593 of 1992 dated 12.8.1993, that is, after the supreme Court decision. There also the question involved was whether the persons who were Lohar by caste, are member of Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of the Presidential order. Two judgments were delivered by the later division Bench. The learned senior Judge went into the question of merits. He went into various question relating to the scope of Article 342. The petitioners therein relied on the judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 1034 OF 1991 (Hari Shankar Thakur v. State of Bihar & ors) and the supreme Court which dismissed the appeal preferred against the same on merits. The state, on the other hand, contended that in terms of Constitution (Scheduled Tribe Order, 1950 "Lohars" are not member of the Schedule Tribe but only "Lohars". The Hon'ble senior Judge of the Bench referred to, in great details, the merits of the case and the scope of Article 342 and the difference in English text and Hindi version of the Notification The Hon'ble senior Judge came to the conclusion that a mistake has been committed in the Hindi version of the notification. The Hon'ble senior Judge also held that constitution (Scheduled Tribe) Order, 1950 as amended by 1976 Amendment Act having been published in English, the same would prevail over the Hindi translation thereto, he held that notification published in English, will prevail over the notification published in Hindi language. The Hon'ble senior Judge came to the conclusion on merits that in original" Lohra" and not" Lohar" is mentioned in Constitution (Schedule Tribe) Order, 1950. So far as decision in Sri Hari Shankar Thakur v. State of Bihar & ors decision by the earlier Division Bench of this Court and the Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1990 decided by the Supreme Court on 12th September, 1990, are concerned, the Hon'ble senior Judge held that several aspects of the matter was not considered therein. The Hon'ble senior Judge held that several aspects of the matter was not considered therein. The Hon'ble senior Judge held that several aspects of the matter was not considered therein. The Hon'ble senior Judge further held that the said judgments had not taken into consideration the relevant provisions of law or statute. It was further observe that the decision was based on sub-silencio". The Hon'ble second Judge of the Bench was in full agreement with the learned senior Judge in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of reservation as members of schedule Tribe but the learned Judge assigned certain different reasons of his own for the said conclusion. So far as the supreme Court judgement in Shambhu Nath v. Union of India & ors. Is concerned, the Hon'ble second Judge stated as follows:- Those cases have possible proceeded on the footing that the petitioners in those cases were the members of the certain tribes or tribal communists there is no discussion on this aspect either way in those judgment". The Hon'ble second Judge also held that there is obvious conflict between original English text and its translation in Hindi. Hon'ble second Judge agreed with the Hon'ble senior judge that the English version should prevail over Hindi translation but did not agree with the reasonings given by him for the same. He held that it is wrong to say that English version has always superiority over the Hindi version he had observed that the superiority of a particular text either in English or in Hindi is to be judged keeping in view as to which of the two texts is original. In this context it may be pointed out that having regard to the said decision of the Supreme Court passed on 21.9.92 in Appeal from the order dated 28.2.92 in C.W.J.C. 1034/91, sitting in division Bench in some other matters. We have also decided according to the judgment and order of the Supreme Court. This was done before the later Division Bench judgment referred to above. The learned Advocate appearing before us has contended that the later/division Bench particulars having regard to the judgment and order of the supreme court, instead of going into the merits of the question afresh. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State firstly contended that later judgment of the Bench in C.W.J.C. No.10593/92 delivered on 11.8.93 is correct on merits and we should follow the same. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State firstly contended that later judgment of the Bench in C.W.J.C. No.10593/92 delivered on 11.8.93 is correct on merits and we should follow the same. It was further submitted that Supreme Court decisions were not decided on merits. He bas further submitted that the said later judgment delivered on 11.8.93 being a Division Bench Judgment is binding on us. In our opinion, having regard to the judgment and order of the supreme court it is not necessary for us to go into merits of the case as to whether the "Lohars' are covered by the Presidential order or not or go into the question as to which of the judgments of the Division Bench is correct. In the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. & ors. v. The Agricultural Produce Market committee & ors. (1992) (2) P.L.J.R. 253, We have referred to this aspect of the matter wherein we have held as follows:- "It is well settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court that in the hierarchical system of Courts, each lower tier, including the court of Appeal, is bound by the decisions of the higher tiers. Particularly reference may be made in this connection to Shyamaraju v. U. V. Bhat A.I.R.(1987) S.C. 2323. It is also well settled that a Bench cannot differ trom a coordinate Bench. A Single Judge is bound by the decision of another single Judge. Is bound by the decision of another single Judge. Similarly, a Division Bench judgment is also binding on another division Bench of the same high court. It is also well settled that a Bench cannot differ trom a coordinate Bench. A Single Judge is bound by the decision of another single Judge. Is bound by the decision of another single Judge. Similarly, a Division Bench judgment is also binding on another division Bench of the same high court. If the subsequent co-ordinate Bench does not hold the same view, it is not open to the subsequent co-ordinate Bench to differ from the earlier judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench, but it must refer the same to a larger Bench, but it must refer the same to a larger Bench Reference may be made in this connection to the following : Mahadeolal Kanodia v. the Administrator General of west Bengal; A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 936, Jai Kaur and others v. Sher Singh and other :A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1119, A Raghavamma and another v. A Chenchamma and another : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136, Budhan Singh v. Babi Nux and another: A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1880, Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan and others: A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1365 and sundries Kanyalal Bhatia and others v. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra and others : (1989) 3 S.C.C. 396 . (Para 16) Had the matter rested there, that would have been end of the same so far as the main points are concerned. This position is not disputed before us. However, what is sought to be argued before us was that in view of the law laid downs by the Supreme Court in its decisions, some of which are subsequent to the Division Bench judgments of this Court, the aforesaid division Bench decisions of this Court are not binding on us they are not good law. However, what is sought to be argued before us was that in view of the law laid downs by the Supreme Court in its decisions, some of which are subsequent to the Division Bench judgments of this Court, the aforesaid division Bench decisions of this Court are not binding on us they are not good law. (Para 17) In that view of the matter we shall discuss some of the judgments of the Supreme Court, Particularly judgments subsequent to the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court indicated above, to ascertain whether such division Bench decisions had directly been overruled by the Supreme Court or whether by necessary implications those division Bench judgments had become unsustainable as pointed out in the Shyamaraju V.U.V. Bhat (ibid) and other decisions of Supreme Court" (Para 18) In our opinion it is not open to any Bench of any High Court to go into the question as to whether the supreme Court decision is correct on merits or not or whether the Supreme Court's judgment has considered of the matter or not. Whether any judgment of the Supreme Court has been passed "sub-sillenalo" or whether It had taken into consideration the relevant law and statutes or not, can only be gone into by the Supreme Court if the occasion so arises, but that is not matter for consideration or speculation so far as the High Courts are concerned. It is open to subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court to differ an earlier decision of the supreme Court on any ground whatever but so Bench of the High court can, under any circumstances, differ with a decision and order of the SI prem_ Court if it has decided on a point, In this particular case not only the supreme Court has given such a decision in 12th September, 1990 in Civil appeal no. 4631/90, but when subsequently a division Bench of this court in C.W.J.C. No. 1034/91 followed the same, this judgment of this Bench in C.W.J.C. No. 1034/91 was affirmed by the supreme court in the appeal preferred against the judgement of the High Court and that also following its earlier judgment/order on 12th September, 1990. It was specifically mentioned in the judgment and order of the Supreme Court in the second case, that it was heard on merit. It was specifically mentioned in the judgment and order of the Supreme Court in the second case, that it was heard on merit. Under these circumstances, it was no longer open for any High court to contend that the Supreme Court judgment was not based on merit on that relevant law or fact was not considered such argument could only be made before the Supreme Court and not before any High Court. In this connection we may also refer to two other decision of the supreme court. In the case of Ballabhdas Lakhani & ors v. Municipal committee, Malkapur, reported in A.I.R. 1970 SC 1002 the Supreme Court made it quite clear that a decision of the supreme Court was binding on the High Court and the High Court can not ignore it on the ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the supreme court. In the case of Asst. Collector v. Dunlop 1985 (1) SCC 260 the supreme Court observed as follows:- “We desire to all and as was said in Cassell & co. Ltd. v. Broome we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in our country, 'It is necessary for each lower tier' including the High Court, 'to accept loyally the decision of the higher tiers' "It is inevitable in hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary. But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. "The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the court above. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. V. Broome" commenting on the court of Appeal' comment that Rookes v. Bardnard was rendered per incuriam Lord Biplock observed; The court of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House in Rookes v. Bardnard by applying to it the label per incuriam. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. V. Broome" commenting on the court of Appeal' comment that Rookes v. Bardnard was rendered per incuriam Lord Biplock observed; The court of Appeal found themselves able to disregard the decision of this House in Rookes v. Bardnard by applying to it the label per incuriam. That label is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or the right of a judge of the High court to disregard a decision of the court of Appeal. It is needless to add that in India under Article 141 of the constitution of law declared by the supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India and under Article 144 all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of the supreme Court" For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the supreme Court decision, we reject the contention of learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the state Following the decision of the supreme Court we allow all these applications. The petitioners must be treated on the basis that "Lohars" come within the scope of the Constitution Scheduled Tribe Order, 1950 as amended in 1976 and they shall be entitled to all benefits accordingly, the respondents are directed to act accordingly and take all steps including issue of caste certificates. We make it quite clear that our decision is not based on fresh consideration on merits of the question, as we are of the view that the High court cannot go into the merits afresh for the reasons given above. We are only following the Supreme Court decision which has affirmed an earlier decision of this court and followed in earlier order of the Supreme Court itself. This judgment is being delivered and order passed, only on the basis that it is no longer open to any Bench of this High Court to reopen this question having regard to the Supreme Court decision and order and that only the supreme Court can examine the merits of the question afresh. Applications allowed.