STATE OF GUJARAT v. NIRMAL PULSE and ROLIER — 1993 DIGILAW 52 (GUJ)

J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENTS are the original accused persons who came to be acquitted from the offence punishable under section 9-A (a) read with section 37 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (the Act for short) by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Surendranagar in Summary Case No. 2361/83 on 26. 3. 1984. The appellant-State has questioned the legality and validity of the aforesaid acquittal order by raising the aids of the provisions of section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (Code for short ). ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS are the original accused persons against whom a criminal complaint was lodged by Mr. Malavia who was the Labour Officer and Superintendent under the Minimum Wages Act at the relevant time and was working at Surendranagar. Accused No. 1 is a factory which was run at Surendranagar at the relevant time and accused Nos. 2 and 3 were in charge of the management of the said factory. The said factory was run in two shifts the first shift from 7 A. M. to 3. 30 P. M. and the second shift from 3. 30 P. M. to 12 Mid-night. There was recess time between 12 to 12. 3 noon for the first shift and from 7 P. M. to 7. 3 P. M. for the second shift. The accused persons changed the timings on 24. 4. 1982 without observing the required procedure. According to the prosecution case the accused persons were guilty for the breach of the provisions of the Act punishable under sections 9-A (a) and 37 of the Act. ( 3 ) ACCUSED pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution relied on the evidence of the complainant Labour Officer at Ex. 8 and the documents of the said factory. ( 4 ) ON appreciation of the facts and circumstances the trial court reached to the conclusion that the complaint was filed after the period of limitation. Consequently the accused persons came to be acquitted from the charges alleged against them on 26. 3. 1984. Hence this acquittal appeal at the instance of the appellant-State. ( 5 ) IT was the prosecution case that change and alteration in the working hours in the shifts of the factory made in violation of the provisions of the Act is punishable under section 31 (2) of the Act. 3. 1984. Hence this acquittal appeal at the instance of the appellant-State. ( 5 ) IT was the prosecution case that change and alteration in the working hours in the shifts of the factory made in violation of the provisions of the Act is punishable under section 31 (2) of the Act. It would be therefore necessary to refer to the provisions of section 31 (2) which read as under:"31 for other offences.- (1) (2) Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall if no other penalty is elsewhere provided by or under this Act for such contravention be punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees". It could very well be seen that the maximum punishment prescribed under section 31 (2) of the Act is the sentence of fine of Rs. 500. ( 6 ) IN Chapter XXXVI of the Code limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences are prescribed. In the said Chapter under section 468 (2) there is a bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. It would be necessary to refer to the said provisions al this juncture. Section 468 (2) of the Code reads as under: 468 Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.- (1) (2) The period of limitation shall be (a) six months in the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. ( 7 ) IT could be very well seen from section 468 (2) of the Code that the period of limitation for filing criminal complaint for an offence which is punishable only with fine is six months. It is an admitted fact that the criminal case was not filed within six months as required under section 468 (2) of the Code Alleged contravention made by the accused occurred on 25. 4. 1982. Thus according to the prosecution the offence took place on 25. 4 Therefore the complaint was required to be filed within six months thereafter. However the complaint came to be filed on 3. 1 Thus admittedly the complaint was filed by the complainant after one year and six months. 4. 1982. Thus according to the prosecution the offence took place on 25. 4 Therefore the complaint was required to be filed within six months thereafter. However the complaint came to be filed on 3. 1 Thus admittedly the complaint was filed by the complainant after one year and six months. Obviously therefore the bar prescribed in section 468 (2) of the Code will be attracted. Therefore it is not competent for the trial court to take cognizance of such an offence after expiry of period of six months which is the limitation period prescribed for the offence which is punishable with fine only. ( 8 ) SECTION 469 of the Code provides commencement of the period of limitation. There is no dispute about this aspect in the present case. The courts could consider the extension of period of limitation in certain cases provided it is shown to the satisfaction of the courts on facts that the delay has been properly explained or it was necessary to do in the interest of justice. Nothing has been shown from the record of the present case which would warrant the exercise of the discretion of the court prescribed in section 473 of the Code. ( 9 ) NEEDLESS to state that there is a purpose and policy behind incorporating the period of limitation for lodging the complaint. It was finally contended that the delay has occurred on account of the fact that consent or sanction of the Government was required to he obtained. Thus it is contended that the delay in question is occasioned on account of taking requisite sanction for filing complaint. There is no evidence on record which would remotely even justify that the delay was attributable only to the said aspect i. e. for getting the previous sanction of the authority for filing the complaint. No material particulars are brought on record which would warrant the exclusion of the period taken for getting the so-called sanction from the authority concerned. It is nobodys case that it is a continuing offence and therefore the question of exercising the powers under section 472 of the Code would not arise. In fact the finding of the trial court that the complaint was filed beyond the period of limitation without any reasonable and sufficient ground appears to be fully justified and is required to be accepted. In fact the finding of the trial court that the complaint was filed beyond the period of limitation without any reasonable and sufficient ground appears to be fully justified and is required to be accepted. ( 10 ) THE acquittal is also recorded on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove that accused Nos. 2 and 3 were responsible and in-charge of the management of the said factory - accused No. 1 at the time of the commission of the offence. In view of the facts and circumstances the finding of the trial court that the accused persons are not guilty cannot be said to be unjust and perverse. ( 11 ) THE powers of this court again are restricted and limited in an acquittal appeal. Considering the facts and circumstances this court is of the opinion that this appeal is without any merits and it is required to be dismissed. In the result the appeal is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed. .