JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal arises out of the suit by the plaintiff appellant for a declaration of her title to the suit land and other declarations and for permanent injunction. 2. THE plaintiffs case was that during her minority her father took lease of the suit lands measuring 4. 59 acres on her behalf on payment of a selami of Rs. 1076/- from Bejoy Kumar Bera and possession was delivered by an amalnama executed by him on 28th Falgun, 1348 B. S. corresponding to 4th march, 1943. Since then the plaintiff was in possession, subsequently, a jama of Rs. 19/1/3 pies was fixed for the suit lands. Another jote with a jama of Rs. 2/6/6 pies was started in respect of 52 decimals of land in plot No. 1194 of mouza Birulia. She paid rent of the two jamas till 1365 B. S. in the landlord's sherista. In the mean time, the plaintiff was married to the landlord Bejoy bera's son Bidyut Bera, defendant No. 2. Excepting plot No. 445 all other plots in dispute were recorded in her name in the current R. S. record of rights. The revenue Officer without any jurisdiction initiated a proceeding under Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act in respect of the suit lands. Transfer by lease to the plaintiff was found to be not bona fide and the entries in R. S. record-of-rights were cancelled and the suit plot was recorded in the name of plaintiffs husband Bidyut Bera. The suit lands were recorded as vested lands of government inasmuch as Bidyut Bera did not retain the same. The order of. the Revenue Officer is not only without jurisdiction but was illegal. As the order of the Revenue Officer clouded the plaintiffs title to suit-lands, the suit was instituted to clear that cloud after service of notice under Section 8 C.P.C. Defendant No. 1, State of West Bengal contested the suit. The material allegations in the plaint were denied. The defence case was that the Amalnama, receipt and dakhilas were all collusive and fictitious documents fabricated for the purpose of the suit. In the proceeding under Section 5a the alleged settlement was found to be mala fide and accordingly the R. S. record-or-rights were corrected, and the suit-lands were recorded in the name of defendant No. 2 who was a big raiyat. In the proceeding under Section 5a the alleged settlement was found to be mala fide and accordingly the R. S. record-or-rights were corrected, and the suit-lands were recorded in the name of defendant No. 2 who was a big raiyat. As he had not retained the suit land by submitting B form, these lands vested in the State of West Bengal. According to this defendant, the order passed by the Revenue Officer under Section 5a of the proceeding was with jurisdiction and legal and binding. 3. THE learned Munsif has found that the Amalnama, receipt and dakhila are all genuine documents. The suit lands were genuinely leased out to the plaintiff by Bejoy Kumar Bera and she was all along in possession. As the transfer was effected before 5.5.53 the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding under Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act and, therefore, his order passed in that proceeding was without jurisdiction and illegal. The entries in the R. S. record-of-rights made on the basis of the order passed under Section 5a of the Act were erroneous. Upon these findings he has decreed the suit. 4. THE defendant No. 1, State of West Bengal preferred Title Appeal No. 712/67. The lower Appellate Court has accepted the contention of State of west Bengal that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and question the order passed by the Revenue Officer in the proceeding under section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act inasmuch as the Revenue Officer had the authority to initiate the proceeding. According to lower Appellate Court the scheme of the Section clearly shows that the jurisdiction created by Section 5a is a complete one setting up a complete machinery for the investigation to those matters which are provided for in the Act and there is implied bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to examine whether the authorities dealing with the particular matter has jurisdiction to deal with the same. If a special jurisdiction to decide a question has been conferred on an authority by an Act, it cannot be questioned in Civil Court even if it is wrongly decided. It has further been held that. If a special jurisdiction to decide a question has been conferred on an authority by an Act, it cannot be questioned in Civil Court even if it is wrongly decided. It has further been held that. Section 5a would be meaningless unless the enquiring authority has also the jurisdiction to determine whether an alleged document of transfer has been antedated for antedating is one of the devices to give a sham transaction a colour of reality and to take away the disputed transfer from the purview of Section 5a. Since the Revenue Officer has the jurisdiction to decide whether a transfer deed is antedated or effected after the statutory date, i.e. 5.5.53, in a proceeding under Section 5a, his decision cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order of the revenue Officer was not illegal and without jurisdiction and the transfer having been cancelled under Section 5a the plaintiff cannot be held to have any title in the suit lands. The appeal was, therefore, allowed mainly on this ground and the decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside. Being aggrieved the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. The learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the lower appellate Court has committed error in holding that Section 5a of the Estates acquisition Act has ousted the jurisdiction of Civil Court to determine the question of title. As the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the question of title the impugned order of the Revenue Officer does not bar the present suit and the question of title of the plaintiff including the question whether the impugned transfer was a genuine and valid one can be gone into by the Civil court. I am inclined to accept the contention of the appellant. 5. AS held in the case of Ambujakhya Mukherjee vs. The State, ILR 1966 (1)Cal 495, in the scheme of Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 the revenue Officers and the Appellate Authorities thereunder have not been conferred the function of a Court of law or of judicial tribunal. The enquiry under Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 is not a kind of finding on the title to the land but is only for a finding on the question whether there is a bona fide transfer within the limited meaning of bona fide as given in section 5a (7) of the Act. The enquiry under Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 is not a kind of finding on the title to the land but is only for a finding on the question whether there is a bona fide transfer within the limited meaning of bona fide as given in section 5a (7) of the Act. Enquiry and findings are, therefore, extremely limited. Hence the words used are "deem to be the land of transferee for the purpose of the Act" in Section 5a (3) (i) of the Act. In this context, the words "purposes of the Act" mean either the purposes of retaining the land, or getting compensation for the land, which rights are both recognised under this Act. It would, therefore, follow that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to embark upon a full-fledged investigation into the question of title has not been taken away by Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act. The suit was, therefore, maintainable. 6. THE lower Appellate Court has not considered the question of title and possession upon a consideration of the evidence of record. As the matter is very old I am not inclined to remit the case to the lower Appellate Court for a decision in this regard. The Trial Court has considered the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and upon a proper appreciation of the evidence has recorded a specific finding that the alleged settlement in favour of the plaintiff is a genuine one and that the plaintiff has all along been in possession on the basis of the said settlement. It has also been found that the transfer was effected long before 5.5.53. Upon consideration of the evidence on record I do not find any sufficient reason to differ from the Trial Court. It is true that the plaintiff was subsequently married to the son of the original landlord, defendant No. 2 who was a big raiyat but this fact at best may raise some suspicion but does not necessarily show that the transfer was not genuine and all the documents were manufactured subsequently after the prohibited date in order to frustrate the provisions of the Act. There is no doubt that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is to be considered with caution because of this circumstance. There is no doubt that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is to be considered with caution because of this circumstance. The plaintiff has adduced satisfactory evidence in support of the alleged settlement and her possession from the date of settlement and the finding of the Trial Court in this respect does not suffer from any infirmity. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the Trial Court are restored. I make no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.