JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. In this application the petitioner has prayed for quashing of order dated 8.1.1991 issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) whereby he was reverted back from the post of Branch Manager to the post of Assistant Branch Manage; the order dated 22.8.1989 issued by the Zonal Manager' of the respondent-Corporation whereby he was posted as Assistant Branch Manager (Sales), under Bhagalpur Division as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application); the order dated 31.1.1991 whereby he was posted as Assistant Branch Manager (sales) in the Purnea Branch as contained in Annexure-3 thereto as also the charge-sheet issued against the petitioner under the signature of Zonal Manager (Disciplinary authority) in terms whereof a departmental enquiry has been initiated against him as also for quashing of the order dated 6.8.1993 as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application whereby the petitioner was intimated that he would retire from the services of the Corporation on 30.11.1993 on the ground of his attainment of age of 58 years as allegedly in the service records his date of birth is entered as 31.12.1939. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner was appointed as a Development Officer of the Corporation on 1.4.1967 at Kathmandu Branch and was later on transferred to Sitamarhi Branch. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Branch Manager/Administrative Officer in the year 1984 and by an order dated 22.8.1989 as contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application he was promoted to the post of Branch Manager in the said Branch. 3. According to the petitioner his career had all along been brilliant. He was transferred to Purnea Branch by an order dated 1.10.1990. The petitioner was informed that his salary as Branch Manager has been fixed in the scale of pay of Rs. 2940-4520/-. By the said letter he was also informed that he would be treated on probation of higher post for a period of one year from the date of taking charge on promotion i.e. 14.9.1989 and he shall be liable to be reverted without any notice during the period of probation. 4. However, by reason of the aforementioned order dated 8.1.1991 the petitioner was reverted to the post of Assistant Branch Manager. 4. However, by reason of the aforementioned order dated 8.1.1991 the petitioner was reverted to the post of Assistant Branch Manager. Aggrieved by the said order, he preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the Corporation but no order has been communicated to him. In the meantime, the aforementioned charge-sheet dated 17.2.1993 was issued by the Zonal Manager, Eastern Zone, Calcutta. The petitioner had submitted that however by a letter dated 6.8.1993 he has been informed that he would reach the age of superannuation on 30.11.1993. 5. Mr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has principally raised two contentions in support of this application. The learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of Regulation 14 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Staff Regulation 1960, it would appear that the petitioner in law could not have been reverted back after expiry of the aforementioned period of one year which was the period of probation without extending the same in writing. 6. The learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the cases reported in State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh reported in AIR 1968 S.C. 1210 , State of Gujarat Vs. Akhilesh C. Bhargav and others reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 2135 , M.K. Agarwal Vs. Gurgaon Gramin Bank reported in 1987 Suppl. S.C.C. 643 and Om Prakash Maurya. Vs. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories Federation reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 1844 . 7. It was submitted that if the order of reversion passed as against the petitioner and as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application is held to be illegal by logical corollary it has to be held that the departmental proceeding initiated as against the petitioner is illegal as a departmental proceeding as against a Branch Manager can only be initiated by the Corporation and not by the Zonal Manager. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation, on the other hand, submitted that upon correct interpretation of the Staff Regulation, it would appear that the period of probation can be extended to two years and in view of the fact that the petitioner cannot claim confirmation in service by way of legal right automatically on the expiry of the period of probation unless an order of confirmation is specifically passed in this regard, the petitioner could have been reverted to his parent post within the aforementioned period of two years. 9. The learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of this Court in R.J. Jha Vs. J.P. Choudhary reported in 1970 BLJR 447. 10 The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner cannot question the entry of date of birth in his service book upon coming to learn that he would superannuate on a particular date. 11. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say on the basis of the insurance policy etc that he was born on 30.12.1939 in derogation to the entry of his date of birth recorded in his service book, which is binding on him. 12. In this case, it is not necessary for us to decide the question as to what is the actual date of birth of the petitioner, as in this writ application, this court cannot enter into a disputed question of fact with regard thereto. 13. This Court can exercise its jurisdiction in such matters only when entry of the date of birth is altered to his disadvantage without complying with the principles of natural justice. 14. The question which principally falls for consideration in this application is the interpretation of Clause 14 of the Regulation which reads thus : "14(1) Persons appointed to posts belonging to Classes I & II shall, on the first appointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. (2) Persons appointed to posts belonging to classes III & IV shall, on the first appointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for six months. (2) Persons appointed to posts belonging to classes III & IV shall, on the first appointment in the Corporation's service, be required to be on probation for six months. (3) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force the appointing authority may, at its discretion, dispense with, reduce or extend the probationary period, but in no case shall the total period of probation exceed- (a) In case of employees belonging to classes I & II ... Two years. (b) In other cases ... One Year. (4) During the period of probation an employee shall be liable to be discharged from service without any notice." 15. In State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh reported in AIR 1968 S.C. 1210 , it has been held: "This court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. In such a case, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post, and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed. This view was taken in Sukhbans Singh V. State of Punjab, 1963-1 SCR 416 at pp. 424-426 ( AIR 1962 SC 1711 at pp. 1714-1715), G.S. Ramaswamy V. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1962, D/23-1-1964 (SC) D.A. Lyall V. Chief Conservator of Forests, U.P., Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1963, D/ 24.2.1965 (S.C.) and State of U.P. V Akbar Ali (1966) 3 SCR 821 at pp. 825-826 ( AIR 1966 SC 1842 at p. 1845). 1714-1715), G.S. Ramaswamy V. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1962, D/23-1-1964 (SC) D.A. Lyall V. Chief Conservator of Forests, U.P., Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1963, D/ 24.2.1965 (S.C.) and State of U.P. V Akbar Ali (1966) 3 SCR 821 at pp. 825-826 ( AIR 1966 SC 1842 at p. 1845). The reason for this conclusion is that where on the completion of the specified period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment of promotion or the service rules, is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implication. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period." 16. In State of Gujarat Vs. Akhilesh reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 2135 it has been held by the Apex court : "We arc of the view that the rules read with instructions create a situation as arose for consideration by this court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh (1968) 3 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ). The Constitution Bench of this court in that case interpreted the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Rules and found that there was a maximum limit of three years beyond which the period of probation could not be extended. When an officer appointed initially on probation was found to be continuing in service beyond three years without a written order of confirmation this court held that it tantamounts to confirmation. In view of what we have stated above we are in agreement with the High Court about the combined effect of the rules and instructions. We hold that the respondent stood confirmed in the cadre on the relevant date when he was discharged. For a confirmed Officer in the cadre, the Probation Rules did not apply and therefore, proceedings in accordance with law, were necessary to terminate service. That exactly was the ratio of the decision in Moti Ram Deka Vs. General Manager, NEF Railways, Maligaon, Pandu (1964) 5 SCR 683 : ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ). For a confirmed Officer in the cadre, the Probation Rules did not apply and therefore, proceedings in accordance with law, were necessary to terminate service. That exactly was the ratio of the decision in Moti Ram Deka Vs. General Manager, NEF Railways, Maligaon, Pandu (1964) 5 SCR 683 : ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ). On the analysis indicated above, the net result, therefore, is that the respondent No. 1 had become a confirmed officer of the Gujarat I.P.S. cadre and under Rule 12 (bb) of the Probation Rules his services could not be brought to an end by the impugned order of discharge." 17. In Om Prakash Maurya Vs. U.P. Coop. Sugar Factories Fedn. reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 1844 it was held by the Supreme Court : "In view of the above discussion it is manifestly clear that the appellant's services were regulated by the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. Since under those Regulations appellant's probationary period could not be extended beyond 'the maximum period of two years, he stood confirmed on the expiry of maximum probationary period and thereafter he could not be reverted to a lower post treating him on probation. The order of reversion is illegal." 18. In M.K. Agrawal Vs. Gurgaon Gramin Bank reported in 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 643 it was again held: "The period of the probation was one year, in the first instance. The employer could extend it only for a further period of six months. The limitation on the power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the service of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged render the inference inescapable that if the probationer was not discharged at or before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication. (See. State of Punjab V. Dharam Singh, Om Prakash Maurya Vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow)." 19. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication. (See. State of Punjab V. Dharam Singh, Om Prakash Maurya Vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow)." 19. It is now a trite law that a question as to whether an employee would be confirmed in a promoted post upon completion of the period of probation essentially depends upon the phraseology used in the offer of appointment or the concerned rules or regulation. 20. The letter dated 17.10.1990 as contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application, reads thus : "In accordance with Regulation 16 of the (Staff) Regulation, 1960, you shall be treated as on probation in the higher post for a period of one year from the date of your taking charge on promotion viz 14.9.89 and you shall be liable to be reverted without notice at any time during the period of probation. Your confirmation in the higher post on the expiry of the probationary period will depend on the manner in which you have discharged your duties during this period." Evidently no letter of confirmation has been issued in favour of the petitioner. 21. In R.J. Jha Vs. J.P. Choudhary reported in 1970 BLJR 447, this court upon taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme court reported in State of Punjab V. Dharam Singh, it has been held as follows : "That, if under the rules or the order of appointment it can be called (sic) out that a probationer on the expiry of his period of probation will be deemed to have been confirmed by necessary implication, then and then only, there will be automatic confirmation. In other cases it would not be so. A person placed on probation remains as a probationer when his period of probation is extended by an express order or in absence of any such order, by necessary implication, if the ease is not covered by the type just indicated above. On the facts and circumstances of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not confirmed automatically on the expiry of his period of probation fixed by annexure-7. He remained a probationer. On the expiry of his period of probation, he asked for an express order of his confirmation by Annexure-8. Such an order was never passed. He continued on probation. He remained a probationer. On the expiry of his period of probation, he asked for an express order of his confirmation by Annexure-8. Such an order was never passed. He continued on probation. That being so, his services could be terminated at any time with a notice, as observed by S.R. Das C.J. in Dhingra's case and that notice does not mean a notice to show cause as argued on behalf of the petitioner, but it means a notice of termination of the services. The Government cannot terminate the services even of a probationer by passing an order in its file only. The order must be communicated to the incumbent. In other words, notice of termination must be given to the incumbent. No period of notice of termination is necessary, as the service of a probationer or a temporary servant can be terminated without giving him any period of notice or pay for that period. In that view of the matter, I have no difficulty in rejecting the third submission made on behalf of the petitioner. I may also say that learned counsel for the petitioner did not pursue this point and had to concede that the correct position of law is as has just been mentioned by me." 22. In K.A. Barot Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 287 it has been held that probationer cannot claim automatic confirmation unless a specific order in this regard is issued. 23. The petitioner in view of Regulation 14(3) aforementioned could not be automatically confirmed only because the original period of probation had expired. The phraseology used in Regulation 14 as such do not justify .an interpretation that the petitioner would automatically be confirmed in the service only because his initial period of probation one year had expired. Clause 3 of Regulation 14 clearly stipulates that the period of probation could not be extended for a period of more than two years, thus only on the expiry of the said period of two years, the petitioner could be treated to have been confirmed in the post of Branch Manager automatically. If the petitioner has been reverted to the post of Assistant Branch Manager within the aforementioned period of two years by which time he was not confirmed in the service, in my opinion, no exception can be taken to the said order. 24. If the petitioner has been reverted to the post of Assistant Branch Manager within the aforementioned period of two years by which time he was not confirmed in the service, in my opinion, no exception can be taken to the said order. 24. However, we may hasten to add that in this application we have not applied our mind with regard to the question as to whether on facts, the petitioner should have been reverted back to the post of Assistant Branch Manager from the post of Branch Manager during the period of probation. As the appeal against the said order is pending before the higher authority, the said authority would dispose of the appeal of the petitioner on merits without in any way being prejudiced by this order, as the appellate authority is bound to take into consideration the entire service record of the petitioner and his conduct during the period of probation. In view of the fact that the petitioner has at this stage failed in his first submission, admittedly the Zonal Manager of the Corporation has jurisdiction to initiate a departmental proceeding as against him, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner cannot, therefore, be said to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and thus it is not a fit case where we can exercise our discretionary jurisdiction at this stage. 25. We have also not considered the submission of Mr. Mukherjee to the effect that a departmental proceeding cannot continue as against an employee after he is allowed to superannuate, inasmuch as such a question does not arise in this case. 26. The respondent-Corporation, cannot be said to have finally applied its mind as to whether the petitioner would be allowed to superannuate or the disciplinary proceeding as against the petitioner would continue. Such a question therefore does not arise for consideration in this application. As and when cause of action therefor arises, the petitioner may raise his grievances before an appropriate forum. 27. This application is, therefore, dismissed with the aforementioned observations but without any order as to costs. Gurusharan Sharma, J. - I agree.