SHAH,, J. ( 1 ) A public spirited social worker acting as anonymous informer to the Dist. Magistrate, Surat was instrumental in unearthing a systematic and well-organised activity of obtaining licence to deal in essential commodities and/or obtaining authorisation to run a fair price shop for supply of essential commodities, and thereafter illegally and unauthorisedly transferring for handsome considerations such licence or authorisation to unauthorised merchants or traders who would in their turn try to earn still higher profits-of course, at the cost and miseries of common menconsumers. The master-mind working behind this dubious devices is that of one Mr. Jayantilal Shah who was successful in obtaining number of licences and/or authorisation in diverse names to receive and sell kerosene at subsidised rates. Having obtained such licences and/or authorisation he had transferred for handsome consideration the rights flowing therefrom to other persons who in their turn are found to be making profit by selling such essential and scarce commodity at very high prices to unauthorised persons (persons other than card-holders ). It is also found that said Jayantilal shah was retaining partial control so as to usurp or share the profits resulting from blackmarketing of essential commodity like kerosene. ( 2 ) AFORESAID information supplied by the informant led to immediate investigation by a term of Supply Inspectors of the Office of District Supply officer at various places of business of said Jayantilal Shah and shocking revelations as aforesaid came to light. The persons in charge of the business, in absence of any licence or authorisation in their name, made confessional statements fully involving said Jayantilal Shah and themselves. Said Jayantilal Shah, however, escaped and avoided investigation and inquiry and was even successful in avoiding arrest for a long period pursuant to order of detention. The unauthorised transferees of such licences and authorisation are also detained by orders of detention passed on 21/05/1993 by the District Magistrate, Surat under Sec. 3 (2) of Prevention of blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. Along with said order of detention the grounds of detention duly formulated under Sec. 8 (1) of the said Act are supplied to detenu. Since the detenus of present four petitions are served with such orders of detention, and since common questions of law and facts arise in these petitions, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Since the detenus of present four petitions are served with such orders of detention, and since common questions of law and facts arise in these petitions, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 3 ) BLACKMARKETING has at its base a shortening of supplies because blackmarket flourishes best when the availability of commodities is rendered difficult. It has a definite tendency to disrupt supplies when scarcity exists or scarcity is created artificially by hoarding to attain illegitimate profits. Indulging in blackmarketing is a conduct which is prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies (vide Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 sc 1303 ). ( 4 ) IT is with a view to seeing that the essential commodities are available to all at market price and no scarcity of such commodities is created that various licensing and regulating orders are issued by the appropriate Government under Sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Consistent with this very objective and objective of making available the essential commodities at fair price to the weaker section of the society that the State of Gujarat has started the scheme of fair price shop with a view to seeing that the public distribution system is introduced and is effectively administered so that weaker section of the society get the essential commodities at fixed price from fair price shops which are (on paper) being run by the holders of authorisation. The aim of public distribution system is to provide essential commodities like foodgrains, kerosene, sugar, edible oil etc. to weaker section of the society at concessional rates. The Govt. of India is spending lacs of rupees by way of subsidy to provide kerosene at lower price. The kerosene is the only media of food cooking for the common-man in the cities and towns. That is the reason why kerosene is included in the list of essential commodities whose distribution is being controlled under the Licensing Order and the state Govt. is also controlling the distribution of kerosene to the cardholders at concessional rate from fair price shop. The objective is undoubtedly laudable to see that the needy people from weaker section of the society get the only cooking media of food at concessional rate from fair price shop of the Govt. is also controlling the distribution of kerosene to the cardholders at concessional rate from fair price shop. The objective is undoubtedly laudable to see that the needy people from weaker section of the society get the only cooking media of food at concessional rate from fair price shop of the Govt. The objective is bound to frustrate if the said machinery is not vigilent enough to see as to how a systematic and organised racket of the aforesaid nature is continued. It is high time that the said machinery gears up to overhaul the situation so as to locate the basic infirmities underlying the system so that in future such rackets are not repeated or are at least nipped in the bud. ( 5 ) IN these four petitions Bachhraji, Madhua Motiji Khatri, Bhuralal dalichand Jain and Maganiram Gagaram Chandel are the detenus against whom identical orders of detention dated 21-5-1993 are passed. The grounds of detention duly formulated of even date are supplied to the detenu in each case. The first paragraph of the grounds of detention which is almost common and which refers to information given to the collector of Surat, inter alia, refers to the fact that one individual of Varacha Road who desired to be anonymous and who claimed to be a social worker informed to the Collector that one Jayantilal Shah residing at Yogini Building on Varacha Road has obtained various authorisations of fair price shops and licence for kerosene either in his name or in the name of Co-op. Societies and that he has transferred such licences/authorisations to Rajasthani marwadis by collecting very huge amounts of premium and such marwadis are getting foodgrains, sugar, kerosene and edible oil at subsidised rates from the Govt. but are not selling the same to the ration card-holders and are selling the same at very high rates and are making huge profits therefrom. He has further informed that as per his information said Jayantilal Shah has obtained authorisation for kerosene shop of Yogini Consumer Stores and Fair Price shop in the name of Hira Udyog Grahak Sahakari Mandal and that such shops are transferred by him unauthorisedly to Rajasthani marwadis against-handsome considerations. He has further informed that through such shops huge quantity of essential commodities are being unauthorisedly disposed of in blackmarket and, therefore, he requested the Collecter to take immediate steps. He has further informed that through such shops huge quantity of essential commodities are being unauthorisedly disposed of in blackmarket and, therefore, he requested the Collecter to take immediate steps. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid information set the authority into motion and since the informer has given necessary details of prejudicial activities of said Jayantilal shah and other Rajasthani marwadis the detaining authority has set out the same in the grounds of detention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Common Submissions : 11. The aforesaid orders of detention are subjected to serious challenge by Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus. Since some of the submissions made by Mr. Kapadia are common to all the petitioners in this group of petitions, we first deal with said submissions and thereafter we shall proceed to deal with individual submissions relating to individual detenu. The common submissions made by Mr. Kapadia applicable to all the detenus are as under : i The continued detention of each detenu is vitiated in view of gross unexplained delay in considering the representation of the detenu both by the State as well as by Central Govts. (La) A submission which is subsidiary to main submission is also made and it is to the effect that there is constitutional obligation on the State as well as Central Govt. to decide successive representation of the detenu with usual, reasonable expedition and dispatch, and any lethargy or inaction in considering any successive representation would prove fatal to the order of detention. (I. b) Yet further subsidiary attack is on the ground that time consumed by the authority in calling for the parawise comments and/or translation should not be excused, especially, when the parawise comments are not called for by the officer who has power to consider the representation, and when there is no genuine need to call for parawise comments, mechanically calling for parawise comments by any subordinate officer would not save the time consumed in considering the representation and such period consumed in calling for parawise comments would be fatal to the continued detention of the detenu. (I. c) When the representation is sent through Jail authority, and when it is meant for detaining authority, State and Central Govts. , it should be transmitted to all the authorities at a time. (I. c) When the representation is sent through Jail authority, and when it is meant for detaining authority, State and Central Govts. , it should be transmitted to all the authorities at a time. The procedure of sending the same first to the detaining authority who after consideration thereof would send it to the State Govt. and after consideration thereof it in its turn would send to the Central Govt. is not permissible. The time consumed by all the authorities in sending the representation to one after another for consideration cannot be excused as the procedure followed is defective which would render the continued detention of the detenu illegal. The basis for this submission is that power of consideration of the representation vested in all these authorities is concurrent, and therefore, copies of representation should be forwarded to all the authorities at a time. II. The detention of the detenu in all these cases is vitiated as the detaining authority has failed to take into consideration the fact that the prosecution of detenus under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 7 of the Essential Commodities act was sufficient to prevent the prejudicial activities, and there was no need to take drastic action of preventive detention. III. The order of detention passed against each detenu is also vitiated inasmuch as the detaining authority has failed to consider the effect of provision of Sec. 12 (aa) of the Essential Commodities Act, which in substance provided less drastic measure, and since mind is not applied to such less drastic measure the detention of the detenu in each case is vitiated. IV The detention of detenu in each case is also vitiated inasmuch as the detaining authority was not alive to the fact that the licence of the licence holder could be cancelled and that in fact one of the persons has also tendered resignation. Cancellation of licence is a less drastic measure which would result into preventing the prejudicial activity and, therefore, also there was no need to pass the order of detention, and hence, the detention is vitiated. 12. We shall now proceed to deal with the aforesaid common submissions in seriatim. Re-Submission I : (i) The relevant facts which are common in all the petitions in connection with this and subsidiary submissions are stated hereunder. 12. We shall now proceed to deal with the aforesaid common submissions in seriatim. Re-Submission I : (i) The relevant facts which are common in all the petitions in connection with this and subsidiary submissions are stated hereunder. (ii) The detenu of each petition has made successive representations, the details of their submissions and the way in which they came to be disposed of are set out herein. First Representation : state Govt. : 11/06/1993 Submitted to the Jail authority with request to forward the same to the detaining authority. State Govt. and to Central Govt. 15/06/1993 - Representation is received by the State Govt. through jailor and on that very day the Section Officer prepared para-wise comments on the representation and put up the same before the under-Secretary. 16/06/1993 - The Under-Secy. put up the same before the Dy. Secy. and the Dy. Secy. cleared it on the very day and put up before the Addl. Chief Secy. June 17 to 21, 1993 - The Addl. Chief Secy. was on official tour to hyderabad and he resumed on 21/06/1993. J 22/06/1993 - The Addl. Chief Secy. considered the representation and rejected the same. Central Govt. : 16/06/1993 - Representation was received by the Central Govt. 17/06/1993 - The Central Govt. sent for translation by telegram. 18/06/1993 - Telegram was received by the State Govt. 19/06/1993 - The State Govt. sent the said representation for translation to the Director of Languages. 23/06/1993 - Representation duly translated was received from the Director of Languages. June 24 to 27, 1993 - Holidays 30/06/1993 - The Addl. Chief Secy. cleared the duly translated representation and remarks. 2/07/1993 - Translated representation with remarks were sent to central Govt. 5/07/1993 - Translated representation and parawise comments were received by the Central Govt. 6/07/1993 - Same were placed before the Director who cleared the same on that very day. 6/07/1993 - Placed before the Jt. Secy. who considered and rejected the same on the very day. Second Representation : state Govt. : 5/07/1993 - Date of representation. 7/07/1993 - Submitted to Jailor who forwarded the same on the very day to the State as well as Central Govts. 8/07/1993 - State Govt. received. On the very day the Section Officer prepared parawise comments and put up the same before the Under- secy. on 9/07/1993. 9/07/1993 - Under-Secy. cleared the file. : 5/07/1993 - Date of representation. 7/07/1993 - Submitted to Jailor who forwarded the same on the very day to the State as well as Central Govts. 8/07/1993 - State Govt. received. On the very day the Section Officer prepared parawise comments and put up the same before the Under- secy. on 9/07/1993. 9/07/1993 - Under-Secy. cleared the file. July 10 and 11, 1993 - Holidays. 12/07/1993 - Addl. Secy. rejected the representation. Central Govt. : 9/07/1993 - The Jailor sent the representation to the State Govt. for translation. 12/07/1993 - The State Govt. received the representation with request for translation and sent the same to Director of Languages who translated it. 15/07/1993 - Representation duly translated received back by State Govt. from the Director of Languages and sent to the Central Govt. on the same day. 20/07/1993 - Central Govt. received the representation. 23/07/1993 - Central Govt. rejected the representation in case of detenu of Spl. Cri. Appln. Nos. 947 and 948 of 199 3/07/1993 - Central Govt. called for parawise comments in case of detenus of Spl. Cri. Appln. Nos. 949 and 978 of 199 3/07/1993 - Letter of Central Govt. received. Since the matters were at that time pending in the High Court for final hearing the files were lying in the High Court and papers were received from the High Court. July 24 and 25, 1993 - Holidays. 28/07/1993 - Parawise remarks were sent to Central Govt. 3/08/1993 - Parawise comments were received by the Central Govt. 16/08/1993 - File was submitted to Director who in his turn submitted to Jt. Secy. on that very day. 17/08/1993 - The Jt. Secy. rejected the representation. On or after 4-8-1993 the Central Govt. made queries from the State Govt. as to whether the matters were finally heard in the High Court since they were returnable and were already pending for final hearing. After receiving instructions from the State Govt. the representation was decided. During these days four days, i. e. , 8, 11, 14 and 15th were holidays. Third Representation, dated 25-8-1993 : state Govt. : 27/08/1993 - Representation submitted to Dist. Magistrate. 30/08/1993 - It is received by Registrar. 31/08/1993 - Holiday. 1/09/1993 - Representation sent to concerned branch. 3/09/1993 - Files were received and parawise comments and notes were prepared. September 4 and 5, 1993 - Holidays. 6/09/1993 - Placed before Dist. Supply Officer. Third Representation, dated 25-8-1993 : state Govt. : 27/08/1993 - Representation submitted to Dist. Magistrate. 30/08/1993 - It is received by Registrar. 31/08/1993 - Holiday. 1/09/1993 - Representation sent to concerned branch. 3/09/1993 - Files were received and parawise comments and notes were prepared. September 4 and 5, 1993 - Holidays. 6/09/1993 - Placed before Dist. Supply Officer. 10/09/1993 - Dist. Supply Officer cleared the files. 10/09/1993 - Files were placed before the Collector. September 11 and 12, 1993 - Holidays. 13/09/1993 - Collector decided and rejected the representation. 16/09/1993 - State Govt. received the representation and files were placed before the Section Officer. 20/09/1993 - Addl. Chief Secy. rejected. Central Govt. : 15/09/1993 - State Govt. sent representation to Central Govt. 21/09/1993 - Received by the Central Govt. 27/09/1993 - Parawise comments were called for. 10/10/1993 - Parawise comments were received from State Govt, 15/10/1993 - Representation is rejected. (iii) From the aforesaid table setting out various dates and details as to how each representation was processed and decided it is submitted before this Court by the learned Advocate appealing for petitioners that at every stage there was avoidable delay which could have been avoided and that no reasonable explanation is tendered which would justify the delay in considering the representation. (iv) Before we undertake the exercise of deciding the question of delay in consideration of aforesaid three representations by the appropriate authority, we would like to state the position of law on the subject. (v) In this connection it will be necessary to reproduce Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India herein :"22 (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order. " (vi) The first part of Art. 22 (5) gives a right to the detenu to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be". The second right given to such person is of being offered "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order". " (vi) The first part of Art. 22 (5) gives a right to the detenu to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be". The second right given to such person is of being offered "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order". It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds, therefore, must be in existence when the order is made. The conferment of the right to make a reprsentation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds of detention and also obligation on the detaining authority to consider such representation with reasonable despatch (vide State of Bombay v. Atma Ram - AIR 1951 SC 157 ). From the various decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India and the right of detenu to make representation against his detentions and obligation of the concerned authority to consider such representation following principles emerge : (A) The use of the words "as soon as may be" in Art. 22 (5) is important. It reflects the anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu to know the grounds on which the order of his detention has been made so that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. The words "earliest opportunity" contemplate the opportunity to make a representation against a detention order to the Government. The ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy consideration of the representation by the authority concerned, for, without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic purpose of affording the earliest opportunity of making the representation is likely to be defeated. The representation must, therefore, be considered with due promptitude or expedition and without avoidable delay, in other words, with reasonable despatch. The representation must, therefore, be considered with due promptitude or expedition and without avoidable delay, in other words, with reasonable despatch. This right to represent and to have the representation considered at the earliest flows from the Constitutional guarantee of the right to personal liberty-the right which is highly cherished in our Republic and its protection against arbitrary and unlawful invasion (vide Rashid S. K. v. State of W. B. , air 1973 SC 824 and Durga Prashad Ghosh v. State of W. B. , AIR 1972 sc 2420 ). (B) The law does not prescribe within what time after the grounds are furnished, the representation could be made. It is equally not provided as to within what time the representation should be considered. The time in each case appears deliberately unprovided for expressly, because circumstances vary in each case and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the exercise of each of these two rights (vide State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, AIR 1951 sc 157 ). (C) The reason for immediate consideration of the representation is too obvious to be stressed. The personal liberty of a person is at stake. Any delay would not only be an irresponsible act on the part of the appropriate authority but would also be unconstitutional because the Constitution enshrines the fundamental right of a detenu to have his representation considered and it is imperative that when the liberty of a person is in peril, immediate action should be taken by the relevant authorities (vide Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W. B. , AIR 1970 SC 675 ). (D) Where delay in consideration of the representation is alleged, it is for the authority to explain the reasons which caused the delay preferably by filing a counter-affidavit, stating, as far as possible, the facts and circumstances, which caused delay. In appropriate cases the Court may also permit resort to files or record which caused delay. (E) Whether or not the concerned authority has in a given case considered the representation made by the detenu with reasonable despatch, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it being neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time unlnformly applicable to all cases. (E) Whether or not the concerned authority has in a given case considered the representation made by the detenu with reasonable despatch, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it being neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time unlnformly applicable to all cases. The Court has in each case to consider judicially on the available material if the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the concerned authority is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay offered by the concerned authority so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal (vide Rasid S. K. v. State of W. B. (supra) ). Very recently in the case of Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaikh v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1403 Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian speaking for the Court laid down the law on the subject in the following words :"it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases within which period the representation of a detenu has to be disposed of with reasonable expedition but it must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Since a representation should be considered with reasonable expedition, it is imperative on the part of every authority, whether in merely transmitting or dealing with it, to discharge that obligation with all reasonable promptness and diligence without giving room for any complaint of remissness, in-difference or avoidable delay because the delay caused by slackness on the part of any authority will ultimately result in the delay of the disposal of the representation which in turn may invalidate the order of detention as having infringed the mandate of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. " (F) The delay caused in transmitting the representation to the appropriate authority may also assume importance inasmuch as such delay also deprives the detenu of his right of his representation being considered expeditiously by the appropriate authority. The position or law on this aspect of delay is summarised in the following words by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaykumar v. Slate of J. and K. , reported in AIR 1982 SC 1023 and the said quotation is further approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Ahmed (supra ). The position or law on this aspect of delay is summarised in the following words by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaykumar v. Slate of J. and K. , reported in AIR 1982 SC 1023 and the said quotation is further approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Ahmed (supra ). The following observations of the Court provide necessary guidance :"the jail authority is merely a communicating channel because the icpresentation has to reach the Government which enjoys the power of revoking the detention order. The intermediary authorities who are communicating authorities have also 10 move with an amount of promptitude so that the staiutoly guarantee of aftording earlier opportunity of making representation and the same reachmg the Government is translated into action. The corresponding obligation of the state 10 cunsider the representation cannot be whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit. If the Government euacis a law like the piesent Act empowering certain authorities to make the detention older and also simuliantously makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity to [he detenu 10 make his representation against his detention, 10 the Government and not the detaining authority of necessity the State Government must gear up hs own machinely to see that in these cases the representation reaches the Governmeint as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with equal promptituae. Any slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the protection conferred by the Statute and would result in invalidation of the order. " (G) The question whether the representation submitted by a detenu has been dealt with all reasonable promptness and diligence is to be decided not by the application of any rigid or inflexible rule or set formula nor by a mere arithematical counting of dates, but by a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of each case. 11 on such examination, it is found that there was any remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the concerned authority in dealing with the representation, the Court will undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating me continued detention of the detenu. 11 on such examination, it is found that there was any remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the concerned authority in dealing with the representation, the Court will undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating me continued detention of the detenu. On the other hand, if the Court is satisfied that the delay was occasioned due to unavoidable cirumstances or reasons entirely beyond his control, such delay will not be treated as furnishing a ground for the grant of relief to the detenu against his continued detention (vide Rasiuddin v. Slate of U. P. , 1983 (4) scc 537 = AIR 1984 SC 46 ). (H) However, the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive and there has to be lee-way, depending upon the necessities of the case (not the circumstances of the case ). But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference or needless procrastination, though allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The burden of explaining the necessity for the slightest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority (vide Franciss Coralic Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, 1980 (2) SCC 275 ). In the aforesaid case the representation was made to the detaining authority on 22-12-1979 and the same was received by the authority on 26-12-1979. Without any loss of time the representation was sent to the Customs authorities for their remarks as they had led the information leading to the order of deletion. The comments of the Customs Authorities were received on 4-1-1980. Thereafter legal opinion of the Secretary (Law and justice) was also obtained as the representation posed many a legal and constitutional questions. It is in this context that the Court made aforesaid observations. The Supreme Court also relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Nagendranath Jain v. State of W. B. , reported in 1972 (1) scc 498 . The Court upheld the time consumed by the Government by observing that the Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time, especially in a case where another authority (like D. M.) has passed the questioned order. The Court held that the government might have to make enquiries as to the circumstances under which the detention was found necessary, previous history of the person detained etc. The Court held that the government might have to make enquiries as to the circumstances under which the detention was found necessary, previous history of the person detained etc. The consultations, therefore, with the Sponsoring Authority and calling for the comments from the Sponsoring Authority is an exercise which is held to be not unnecessary and time consumed in calling for such comments is excluded. Similarly, in the case of Harish Pahwa v. State of U. P. , reported in AIR 1981 SC 1126 the Court ruled that the representation must betaken for consideration by the concerned authority as soon as it is received and unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance, it must be dealt with continuously until final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. (I) When the representation is in vernacular and is to be considered by authority like Central Govt. or its authorised officer who is not conversant with the language of the representation he is justified in calling for translation of the representation either in English or in Hindi. It is a matter of absolute necessity. Such a decision should be taken by the concerned authority itself or some responsible officer on his behalf, but if under general instructions requiring calling of translations in cases where representations are in languages other than Hindi and English, i. e. , local or regional languages, translation is called for by subordinate officer, it would still fall in the area of "absolute necessity" for proper consideration of representation and time consumed in such process must be excused. (J) Similarly, necessary consultation is held permissible where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. Calling for comments of sponsoring authority is a step towards necessary consultation. The authority can wait for reasonable period for necessary assistance. It is in conformity of this principle that the Supreme Court of India has in the case of L. M. S. Immu Saleemia v. B. B. Gujral, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1191 observed that time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The occasional observations made by the Supreme Court that each days delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. The occasional observations made by the Supreme Court that each days delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Accepting this principle the Supreme Court did not find period of four to five days consumed by Custom Authorities in furnishing their parawise comments on the representation to be unreasonable so as to invalidate continued detention in the case of Masuma v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1753 . (vii) Aforesaid are propositions of law which can be easily deduced from various decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present cases we fail to understand as to how there can be said to be any delay by any authority in considering the first representation. In fact, the first representation is very expeditiously dealt with and the way in which the file has travelled from officer to officer in the official heirarchy without any loss of time is clear from tabular position of the journey of the representation to the concerned authority. Said representation is considered with equal expedition and despatch by the Central govt. and we do not find any force in the submission of Mr. Kapadia that there is unreasonable delay in considering the first representation of the detenu made under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Re-Submission I (a)-Snccessiye Representation : (i) Mr. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus has, however, very vehemently submitted before this Court that constitutional obligation to consider the representation of the detenu with reasonable expedition and despatch applies to all the successive representations which may be made by the detenu or any authorised person on his behalf and that any unreasonable delay in considering such successive representations would vitiate continued detention of the detenu. He has, on the facts of the case, submitted that there is unreasonable delay in considering the representation of the detenu, namely, third representation, dated 27-8-1993 and said delay must result into rendering the continued detention of the detenu invalid. (ii) Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Central Govt. Standing Counsel as well as Mr. He has, on the facts of the case, submitted that there is unreasonable delay in considering the representation of the detenu, namely, third representation, dated 27-8-1993 and said delay must result into rendering the continued detention of the detenu invalid. (ii) Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Central Govt. Standing Counsel as well as Mr. K. V. Shelat, learned A. G. P. for respondent-State have, on the other hand, very vehemently submitted before this Court that in fact there is no constitutional obligation on the authority concerned to consider expeditiously the successive representation and delay, if there is any, caused in considering successive representation should not and must not result into rendering continued detention invalid. (iii) The aforesaid rival submissions of the learned Counsels would necessitate this Court to go into the question as to whether there is any constitutional obligation on the concerned authority to consider every successive representation with same reasonable speed and despatch as is expected of it while considering the first representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution speaks of an opportunity to any person detained of making a representation against the order to the authority making the order. Such authority by corresponding Constitutional obligation is expected to decide such representation at the earliest with reasonable despatch. Obviously, therefore, the Constitutional guarantee guaranteed to the person detained and the corresponding constitutional obligation on the authority to consider the representation expeditiously extends to or is referrable to the very first representation which a detenu may make against the order of his detention. From the scheme of Art. 22 (5) of the constitution it is difficult to read that such constitutional obligation to consider all the successive representations with same speed and expedition with which the first representation was expected to be considered. However, the law on the subject is no longer res Integra and the Supreme Court in the case of Rom Bali Rajbhar v. State of W. B. , reported in AIR 1975 SC 623 was called upon to decide the question of successive representation. The Supreme court in the said decision observed that the State Govt. can revoke or modify the detention order if it is satisfied on new or supenfriirig conditions or facts coming to light that a revocation or modification bad become necessary, it (an exercise power. The Supreme court in the said decision observed that the State Govt. can revoke or modify the detention order if it is satisfied on new or supenfriirig conditions or facts coming to light that a revocation or modification bad become necessary, it (an exercise power. It nay be mentioned that such a view is taken by the Supreme Court in the context of power of revocation which was confened on the State Govt. under the preventive detention stature before the Supreme Court. Observations were made by the Supreme Court in the context of power of revocation which a statute may confer upon the authority and when a representation is made to said authority and the authority is called upon to exercise such power of revocation. It was in the context of said power of revocation that the Supreme Court simply observed that there is obligation on the authority to consider such representation provided new or supervening conditions or facts have come to light. It is thus deer that there is no obligation either en the State Govt. or the Central Govt. exercising power of revocation under the statute to consider a successive representation on the same facts, circumstances and grounds on which earlier representation was already rejected However, if new facts or supervening conditions have come to light, case can be said to have been made out for exercising power of revocation. The question is yet required to be answered as to whether there should be any time limit within which such power should be exercised or as to whether consideration of such successive representation which must appropriately fall under the exercise of statutory power of revocation should be with the same speed, expedition and reasonable despatch as is expected of the authority at a time while considering the first representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, it is not necessary for the authority to consider all successive representations with same speed and expedition with which it was expected to act while considering the first representation. However, at the same time, callousness and/or disregard of obligation to consider revocation of the order on subsequent representation or any remissness, negligence or indifference is not expected. In fact, in a similar situation one another step was taken by the Supreme Court and that may throw light on the course of action which the authority may lake. However, at the same time, callousness and/or disregard of obligation to consider revocation of the order on subsequent representation or any remissness, negligence or indifference is not expected. In fact, in a similar situation one another step was taken by the Supreme Court and that may throw light on the course of action which the authority may lake. It was in the case of samir Chatterji v. State of W. B. . reported in AIR 1975 SC 1165 that once again the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether there was any delay in considering the subsequent representation made to the state Govt. The Supreme Court instead of deciding the question directed the state Govt. to consider said second representation and we are sure that the supreme Court would not have given such direction if time imperative was to be applied for consideration of second representation. (iv) However, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Zavad Zama Khan. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1095 is a direct answer to the proposition submitted by Mr. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus. Before the Supreme Court identical question was raised as to whether there is any Constitutional obligation on the authority to consider subsequent (successive) representation as expeditiously and speedily as the authority is expected to consider first representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. The subsequent representations calling for revocation of order of detention more appropriately fall within the area of revocation conferred on the authority. In the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential commodities Act, 1980 there is power conferred upon the authority to revoke the order of detention and such power is to be found in Sec. 14 of the said act. Said power is conferred on the State Govt. as well as on the Central govt. It is in invocation of such power that subsequent or successive representations are made by the detenu. Said power is conferred on the State Govt. as well as on the Central govt. It is in invocation of such power that subsequent or successive representations are made by the detenu. It was in the context of such representations calling for revocation of order of detention under Sec. 14 of national Security Act, 1980 that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case speaking through Justice A. P. Sen made following pertinent observations :"the principle that emerges from all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under Sec. 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Goveinment under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 3 or from the detenu in the form of a petition for representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case. In the present case the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Sec 8 (1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the central Government under Art. 22 (5) and there was no duty cast on the State government to forward the same to the Central Government nevertheless the State government forwarded the same forthwith. The Central Government duly considered that representation which in effect was nothing but a representation for revocation of the order of detention under Sec. 14 of the Act. That being so it was not obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under Sec. 14. " (v) It is thus clear that there is no obligation on the authority to consider successive representation unless new facts and circumstances are brought to the notice of the authority or unless supervening and subsequent facts calling for revocation of order of detention are brought to the notice of the authority. Secondly, there is no Constitutional obligation to consider said subsequent request or representation for revocation with same speed and expedition which is expected of the authority while deciding first representation in discharging of Constitutional obligation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Secondly, there is no Constitutional obligation to consider said subsequent request or representation for revocation with same speed and expedition which is expected of the authority while deciding first representation in discharging of Constitutional obligation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. We do not find any substance in the second submission of mr. Kapadia that for each and every representation same amount of speed and expedition shall have to be exhibited by the authority which the authority is required to exhibit while discharging constitutional obligation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. In the aforesaid view that we are taking we are also fortified by the recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court. In the decision taken in Spl. Cri. Appln. No. 1243 of 1991 (Noor Mohmad abdulla Kara v. Joint Secretary to Govt. of India) the Division Bench comprising of K. J. Vaidya and J. M. Panchal, JJ. , reiterated this position of law in para 6 of the judgment rendered on 23/07/1992. Since the same view about successive representation is taken by the Division Bench we do not think it necessary to quote any observations from the said judgment. Re-Submission I (b) : time Spent in Calling for Comments of Sponsoring Authority or Other authorities : (i) Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus has, however, alternatively submitted before this Court that while considering the representation or successive representation executive lethargy or bureaucratic approach of whiling away time in unnecessary exercise, such as, calling for comments in a routine manner or calling for translation in a routine manner is required to be deprecated and continued detention of the detenu because of such lethargy or indifference must be rendered invalid. In our opinion, the very submission in the context of first representation and in the context of subsequent representation shall have to be examined differently and by applying different standards of strictness. However, assuming for the time being that the same standards of strictness would apply we shall have to examine as to whether the time consumed by the authority in calling for necessary comments or instructions or in consulting the sponsoring authority is required to be excused or not. (ii) From the principles of law which are summarised hereinabove if reference is made to factor Nos. (ii) From the principles of law which are summarised hereinabove if reference is made to factor Nos. H, I and J it would become at once clear that the Supreme Court has time and again stated the law very clearly that there has to be some lee-way depending upon the necessities of the case. The Supreme Court has also stated that some allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The Supreme Court also observed that if it is necessary to wait for some assistance, the authorities would be justified in waiting for some assistance. The Supreme Court has also accepted the practice of calling for comments from sponsoring authority and has in fact approved the same in the case of L. M. S. Immu Salcmia v. B. B. Gujral (supra) as well as Masuma v. State of Maharashtra (supra ). In our opinion, therefore, when the representation is being considered by authority other than the detaining authority there is justification in calling for comments of sponsoring authority and time consumed in calling for and in receipt of such comments shall have to be lawfully granted to the authority. Similarly time consumed in calling for translation of representation when the representation is in regional language; the Supreme Court has excused the delay and has regarded such consumption of time as permissible exercise. Simply because parawise comments are called for by the authority empowered to consider the representation and the time is consumed in receiving such parawise comments it cannot be said that delay caused in calling for such parawise comments would be fatal. However, Mr. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus has very strenuously urged before this Court that it is only for the authority which has power to consider the representation to call for comments on his own satisfaction that the comments are necessary and that no other officer can call for such comments. He very strenuously urged before this Court that it is only that authority alone which shall have to apply its mind and shall have to decide whether the comments should be called for or not and mechanically calling for comments on representation by any other authority would not justify the time consumed in calling for comments. Mr. He very strenuously urged before this Court that it is only that authority alone which shall have to apply its mind and shall have to decide whether the comments should be called for or not and mechanically calling for comments on representation by any other authority would not justify the time consumed in calling for comments. Mr. Kapadia has in this connection invited the attention of this Court to various decisions of the Division Benches of this Court and it would be necessary at this stage to make reference to said decisions. We may at once state that all the decisions are of one Division Bench only and i. e. , of g. T. Nanavati and N. B. Patel, JJ. In Spl. Cri. Appln. Nos. 717 of 1988, decided on 6-2-1989, in Spl. Cri. Apppln. No. 865 of 1988 decided on 15-2-1989 and in Spl. Cri. Appln. No. 1058 of 1989 decided on 23-12-1989 this very Division bench has made following observations :"when a person is put behind the bars, without a trial, each days delay is required to be justified and he cannot be kept under detention for a day more than it is necessary. If this is the correct legal position, then it would necessarily follow that as soon as an application for revocation, or a representation of the detenu, is received by the central Government it must consider the same with reasonable expedition. This duty to consider the representation with reasonable expedition further obliges the authority to explain, when the detention is challenged, why it could not deal with the representation earlier. It is really for this reason that it has been held that if there is a delay in considering the representation of the detenu, then it is required to be explained and, if it is not explained, then the delay should be regarded as unreasonable. We cannot go by number of days and say that these many days should be regarded as reasonable or unreasonable for considering the representation of the detenu. Even a smaller period may be regarded as unreasonable, if no explanation is coming forth as to why the detenus representation could not be considered earlier. With a proper explanation, even a longer time taken for consideration of the representation of the detenu may be regarded as reasonable. Even a smaller period may be regarded as unreasonable, if no explanation is coming forth as to why the detenus representation could not be considered earlier. With a proper explanation, even a longer time taken for consideration of the representation of the detenu may be regarded as reasonable. "having made the aforesaid observations, the Division Bench proceeded to observe in para 5 of the judgment as under :"in view of the drastic nature of this power to detain, meagre procedural protection available to the detenu and the purpose of conferring power on the Central government to revoke detention orders, it will have to be held that its officers cannot be permitted to waste time and keep back the said representation from the officer empowered to deal with the same. The Central Government cannot be permitted to take shelter behind the fact that the officer who is mainly entrusted with scrutiny of papers thought it fit to call for parawise comments. Whether parawise comments are necessary or not should have been decided by the officer authorised to deal with the representation. If this work is left to a subordinate officer and delay occurs because of his inaction it cannot be said that the Central government had dealt with the representation with reasonable expedition. " (iii) From the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench it becomes clear that the Division Bench took the view that officers of the Govt. cannot be permitted to waste time and keep the representation from officer empowered to deal with the same. It took the view that question as to whether parawise comments are necessary or not should be decided by the officer authorised to deal with the representation and not by any-other officer. If decision is taken by any other officer, even if responsible officer, to call for parawise comments, time consumed in calling for such parawise comments and in receiving the same cannot be excused. This very view is reiterated by the Division Bench in the aforesaid three judgments and we do not think it necessary to reproduce the very observations made in different judgments. (iv) The question is as to whether the aforesaid proposition of law still holds the field and should decide the fate of these petitions. This very view is reiterated by the Division Bench in the aforesaid three judgments and we do not think it necessary to reproduce the very observations made in different judgments. (iv) The question is as to whether the aforesaid proposition of law still holds the field and should decide the fate of these petitions. In our opinion, since the question of calling for comments in the present group of petitions arise in connection with second and third representations the very pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of A. P. reported in AIR 1968 SC 227 referred to in Spl. Cri. Appln. No. 865 of 1988 shall have to be kept in mind. These representations are subsequent/successive representations made under statutory power of revocation to the concerned authorities. There is no right in favour of detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be disposed of again. Even no period of limitation is fixed for disposal of applications under Sec. 14. Since the second and third representations made by the detenus in the present group of petitions would fall in the nature of applications under Sec. 14 of the said Act, no period of limitation in considering said representations would apply. However, in our opinion, the division Bench was not absolutely right in observing that the officer authorised to deal with representation alone can decide whether parawise comments or translation should be called for from the sponsoring authority. Consultation of sponsoring authority, calling for remarks of the sponsoring authority are held to be permissible exercise by the Supreme Court and time consumed in said exercise is excused by the Supreme Court. Very recently in the case of Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1640 the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether there was delay in considering the representation of the detenu, dtd. 18-12-1989. Same was rejected on 30-1-1990. The representations were delivered to the Jail authority on 20-12-1989 and the Jail authority despatched them by registered post and in between 23, 24 and 25/12/1989 were non-working days. Representations were received by COFEPOSA wing on 28-12-1989 and on the very next day, i. e. , on 29-12-1989 they were forwarded to the sponsoring authority for comments. Again 30 and 3 1/12/1989 were non-working days. Representations were received by COFEPOSA wing on 28-12-1989 and on the very next day, i. e. , on 29-12-1989 they were forwarded to the sponsoring authority for comments. Again 30 and 3 1/12/1989 were non-working days. Comments were forwarded to cofeposa wing on 9-1-1990. It was in this context that it was alleged that there was delay in considering the representation of the detenu. While dealing with the submission that the views and comments of the sponsoring authority are not at all necessary, Justice A. M. Ahmadi speaking for the Court made following pertinent observations :"the contention that the views of the sponsoring authority were totally unnecessary and the time taken by that authority could have been saved does not appeal to us because consulting the authority which initiated the proposal can never be said to be an unwarranted exercise. " (v) From the aforesaid observations it becomes clear that there is every justification in consulting the sponsoring authority when representation is being considered by authority other than detaining authority. Therefore, we are of the opinion that even if comments are called for by the authority other than the authority empowered to consider the representation, since said consultation is essential, the time consumed in calling for such comments shall have to be excused, and to the aforesaid extent the views of the division Bench expressed in the aforesaid judgment shall have to be treated as impliedly overruled. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Kapadia that the delay caused in calling for parawise comments while considering third representation would render continued detention of the detenus invalid as in our opinion it being a successive representation there was no time imperative which the authority was required to adhere to. Secondly, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamrunnissa (supra) calling for comments from sponsoring authority cannot be said to be absolutely unwarranted. Secondly, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamrunnissa (supra) calling for comments from sponsoring authority cannot be said to be absolutely unwarranted. In fact, calling for comments by the authority which is other than the detaining authority is regarded as a necessary step of consultation when it is required to consider the representation, and since such an exercise is not unwarranted exercise, in this group of petitions the comments are called for by no less an officer than the Director who is immediate subordinate to the authority who was empowered to consider the representation, and therefore, also we do not find any substance in the aforesaid submission. Re-Submission : I (c) : (i) We are further called upon to decide one another fact of delay which, in the submission of Mr. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus, would vitiate the continued detention. He has submitted before this Court that the first two representations were tendered to the jailor with a request to forward the copies thereof to the detaining authority, the State and Central Govts. Since the State and central Govts. both have power to revoke the order of detention under Sec. 14 of the said Act, and since in every representation request was made to revoke the order of detention the jurisdiction/power which the authorities were called upon to exercise was concurrent jurisdiction. Therefore, immediately on receipt of such representation it ought to have been sent to all the three authorities. As regards third representation, it is to be noted that the same was tendered to the Dist. Magistrate (detaining authority) with request to forward the copies thereof to the State and Central Govts. The grievance made by Mr. Kapadia before this Court is that said representation is considered by the detaining authority first and after codsidering the same it is despatched to the State Govt. which in its turn considered the same and after rejecting the same sent to the Central Govt. This exercise undertaken by the authorities is not permissible. In fact, the Dist. Magistrate ought to have forwarded the representation simultaneously to the State and Central Govts. The State Govt. also ought not to have waited for onward transmission of the representation to the Central Govt. till it took decision on the representation. This exercise undertaken by the authorities is not permissible. In fact, the Dist. Magistrate ought to have forwarded the representation simultaneously to the State and Central Govts. The State Govt. also ought not to have waited for onward transmission of the representation to the Central Govt. till it took decision on the representation. In fact, since the power to revoke the order is concurrent, it is expected that once a request is made by the detenu to forward the copies thereof to the detaining authority, the State and Central Govts. such representation should be despatched to all the authorities simultaneously and the detaining authority is not justified in first undertaking the exercise of deciding the representation, and thereafter to send it to the State and Central govts. and the State Govt. is not justified in undertaking the exercise of deciding the representation once again and thereafter sending it to the central Govt. (ii) In Spl. Cri. Appln. No. 1185 of 1993 decided by this very Division bench on 2-11-1993 one of us, i. e. , S. M. Soni, J. speaking for the division Bench has depricated the aforesaid practice and accepted the proposition that such representation shall have to be simultaneously despatched to all the authorities as desired by the detenu and said authorities shall have to consider the same concurrently. (iii) However, from the aforesaid decision it can only be said that hitherto prevalent practice is required to be departed. Though usual expedition and speed is not expected of authority while considering successive representations, a sense of total inaction, remissness or callous disregard of duty cannot be tolerated. Once a representation is received to be considered by all competent authorities, copies thereof should be forwarded as far as possible, to all the authorities and one authority should not wait till it decides and thereafter to forward it to another authority. (iv) In the facts and circumstances of the case this practice is not followed in the case of first representation. It is also not followed in the case of second representation. However, in the case of third representation, this practice is followed which has resulted into some delay as representation is despatched to the Central Govt. only after it was considered by the state Govt. It is also not followed in the case of second representation. However, in the case of third representation, this practice is followed which has resulted into some delay as representation is despatched to the Central Govt. only after it was considered by the state Govt. In view of our finding that delay in considering successive representation shall not always be fatal and in view of the explanation tendered by the State and Central Govts. explaining the period consumed in considering the representation we are more than satisfied that the authorities have acted diligently and have not been lethargic or callous in discharge of duty. (v) However, we impress upon the authorities that as and when a representation is received together with copies thereof or with a request to get copies thereof the jailor and/or competent authority must despatch such representation urgently to the concerned authorities, i. e. , the detaining authority, State and Central Govts. or anyother authority, as the case may be. It should not wait till the representation is considered by one authority and thereafter only to send it to another authority. We direct that in future the State authorities, more particularly, the Ministry of Home Affairs, State of Gujarat as well as Ministry of Civil Supplies dealing with prevention of blackmarketing cases shall follow the guidance given by us hereinabove. Re-Submission II: criminal Prosecution v. Preventive Detention : (i) Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus has strenuously urged before this Court that for the alleged irregularities and/or illegalities arising from the breach of licensing order, launching of criminal prosecution was the proper and most appropriate remedy. He submitted that criminal prosecution cannot be circumvented or shortcircuited by ready resort to preventive detention and the power of detention cannot be used to subvert, supplant or substitute the law of the land. He was at pains to point out to the Court that excepting confessional statements of the detenu in each petition there was no material to establish existence of any exceptional reasons which would justify recourse to preventive detention in the present case, such as witnesses being afraid to depose against the detenu in the court or other genuine difficulties in bringing the culprits to book in a criminal Court under the ordinary law of the land. He, therefore, submitted that it was not competent for the detaining authority to make order of detention so as to bypass the criminal prosecution. Mr. K. V. Shelat, learned a. G. P. appearing for respondent-State and Mr. B. B. Naik, Standing Counsel for respondent-Union, on the other hand, stoutly resisted the submission by submitting that the matter is no longer res Integra and is covered by various authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the effect that the jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences. In support of their submission various authorities are cited. (ii) In order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions, we shall have to state at the outset that the matter is no longer res-Integra and is finally covered by various authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme court. In the case of Sahibsingh Dugal v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1966 SC 340 order of preventive detention was passed under defence of India Rules. An identical contention was raised before the supreme Court and while repelling said contention the Supreme Court observed that it may not be possible to obtain a conviction for a particular offence, but the authorities may still be justified in ordering detention of a person in view of his past activities, which will be of a wider range than mere proof of a particular offence in a Court of law. Once again the very principle was reiterated in the case of Mohd. Salim Khan v. C. C. Base. reported in AIR 1972 SC 1670 . Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Borjahan Gcrey v. State of W. B. , reported in AIR 1972 SC 2256 . Observations made by the Supreme Court in this decision are most pertinent and apposite for the purpose of this case. The Supreme Court observed as under :"the preventive detention provided by the Act is apparently designed to deal urgently and effectively with the more serious situation, inter alia, affecting the security of india and the maintenance of public order as contemplated by Sec. 3 of the Act. The liability of the detenu also to be tried for commission of an offence. . . do not in any way as a matter of law affect or impinge upon the full operation of the Act. The reason is obvious. The liability of the detenu also to be tried for commission of an offence. . . do not in any way as a matter of law affect or impinge upon the full operation of the Act. The reason is obvious. Judicial trial for punishing the accused for the commission of offence is a jurisdiction distinct from that of detention under the Act, which has view, the object of preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial inter alia to the security of the State or maintenance of public order. The fields of these two jurisdictions are not co-extensive nor are they alternative. The jurisdiction under the act may be invoked, when the available evidence does not come upto the standard of judicial proof but is otherwise cogent enough to give rise to suspicion in the mind of the authority concerned that there is a reasonable likelihood of repetition of past conduct which would be prejudicial inter alia to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or even when the witnesses may be frightened or scared of coming to a Court and deposing about past acts on which the opinion of the authority concerned is based. This jurisdiction is sometimes called the jurisdiction of suspicion founded on past incidents and depending on subjective satisfaction. . . . . . The grounds of detention relate to the past acts on which the opinion as to the likelihood of the repetition of such or similar acts is based and these grounds are furnished to the detenu to inform him as to how and why the subjective satisfaction has been arrived at so as to enable him to represent against them. The fact, therefore, that a prosecution under the Code could also have been launched is not a valid ground for saying that it precludes the authority from acting under the Act. "immediately thereafter in the case of Mohmed Subrati v. State of W. B. , reported in AIR 1973 SC 207 once again the Supreme Court was called upon to decide identical contention and in this context the Supreme Court made following pertinent observations :"it is quite clear that this section carries out the statutory purpose of preventive detention and it has nothing to do with trial and punishment of persons for commission of offences. Indeed, it is precisely because the existing law providing for the punishment of persons accused of commission. of offences, and for prevention of offences, is not found adequate for dealing with the situation for effectively preventing, in the interest of national security, etc , the commission of prejudicial acts in future, that the provisions of this Act were enacted and are intended to be utilised. If, therefore, for any reason it is not possible to successfully try and secure the conviction and imprisonment of the persons concerned for their past activities, which amount to an offence, but which are also relevant for the satisfaction of the detaining authority for considering it necessary that the detention order under Sec. 3 be made for preventing such persons from acting in a prejudicial manner as contemplated by that section, then, the Act would indisputably be attracted and a detention order can appropriately be made The detention order in such cases cannot be challenged on the ground that the person ordered to be detained was liable to be tried for the commission of offence or offences founded on his conduct on the basis of which, the detention order has been made or that proceedings under Chapter VIII Criminal Procedure Code could be initiated against him. The object, scheme and the language of the Act is clearly against the petitioners submission. The Act creates in the authorities concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction of grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community , in general. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would, therefore, not operate as a bar to a detention order, or render it mala fide. The matter is also not res Integra. "coming still nearer to the recent past in the case of Shri Ratan Makim v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1986 SC 610 Chief Justice P. N. Bhagwati speaking for the Supreme Court recited the law in following terms :"even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate the order of detention, because as pointed out by this Court. in Mohd. in Mohd. Subrati v. State of W. B. ( AIR 1973 SC 207 ) the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter the order of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. It was pointed out by this Court in that case that the Act creates in the authority concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offence. Even unsuccessful judicial proceedings or trial would, therefore, not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it wo/a fide. If the failure of the criminal prosecution can be no bar to the making of an order of detention, a fortiorl the mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention. If an order of detention is made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may be Irksome because of inconvenience of proving guilt in a Court of law, it will certainly be an abuse of power of preventive detention and the order of detention would be bad. But if the object of making the order of detention is to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the community, it would be perfectly a legitimate exercise of power to make the order of detention. " (iii) All the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in almost all the eases starting from 1966 leave no room for doubt that the jurisdiction vested in the authority under Preventive Detention Law is altogether different from the jurisdiction vested in the executive to launch the prosecution. The fields of these two jurisdictions are not co-extensive nor are they alternative. The jurisdiction under the Act may be invoked when the available evidence does not come upto the standard of judicial proof but is otherwise cogent enough to give rise to suspicion in the mind of the authority that there is a reasonable likelihood of repetition of past conduct. It is, therefore, called suspicion jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under the Act may be invoked when the available evidence does not come upto the standard of judicial proof but is otherwise cogent enough to give rise to suspicion in the mind of the authority that there is a reasonable likelihood of repetition of past conduct. It is, therefore, called suspicion jurisdiction. This jurisdiction may also be invoked even when the witness may be frightened or scared of coming to a Court and deposing about past acts on which the opinion of the authority concerned is based. The Preventive Detention law creates in the authorities concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction of grounds based on suspicion of commission of prejudicial acts in future. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order. The purpose of preventive detention being different would not operate as a bar to a detention order. The purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the criminal trial the orders of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. Therefore, if failure of criminal prosecution can be no bar to the making of an order of detention, we fail to understand as to how a mere possibility that a criminal prosecution can be instituted can operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention. The only requirement of law is that authority clamping down an order of detention must be aware and conscious of possibility of launching of criminal prosecution. Once awareness of such possibility is shown resort to preventive detention action is permissible as objective is to immediately prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities. Even in cases where prosecution is already launched resort to preventive detention is upheld by the Supreme Court. In case where no resort to prosecution was made and preventive detention remedy was directly resorted to, the Supreme court has upheld the resort to preventive action. We, therefore, cannot subscribe to the view that in the present case launching of prosecution was the only remedy available to the executive and that the authority was not justified in resorting to preventive detention. We, therefore, cannot subscribe to the view that in the present case launching of prosecution was the only remedy available to the executive and that the authority was not justified in resorting to preventive detention. We may mention at this stage that widespread systematic and well-organised activity continuing in the town of Surat openly since last more than 18 months would not have been unearthed in the absence of any information supplied by a well-spirited citizen. The roots of the activity were so deep and it so miserably eroded the system of public distribution of essential commodities that but for such information, perhaps, these blackmarketing activities would have continued and would have flourished. The launching of prosecution, its pendency for long period and offenders being very often at large would not have any preventive effect inasmuch as such offenders would be at large to continue such nefarious activities which would miserably erode and corrode the very system of public distribution which in its turn would, once again, deprive helpless citizens of the society of the commodity which is procured by the union Govt. by paying foreign currency and which is made available at subsidised rates for weaker section of the society. The recent reports reveal that the foreign currency being spent by the Union Govt. for purchasing and making available Kerosene, Oil and Cooking Gas is so large that on economic front the Union Govt. is considering necessary steps and measures to withdraw cooking gas from the list of subsidised items which would render most essential commodity beyond reach of the citizens of this country. The Kerosene is also such an essential commodity which is also being made available by the Union Govt. to the State Govt. at subsidised rates for the purpose of public distribution and if such commodity is made scarce by such systematic and well-organised activity of these detenus and other persons, its prevention by detention was the only effective remedy which could be thought of and in our opinion no fault can be laid at the doors of executive for exercising such a power. which was very badly needed in the facts and circumstances of the present case. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission and reject the same. Re-Submissions III and IV : (i) Mr. which was very badly needed in the facts and circumstances of the present case. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission and reject the same. Re-Submissions III and IV : (i) Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Advocate for detenus has very vehemently urged before this Court that though in the grounds of detention the detaining authority has made reference to the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 the said reference is made in the wrong context of prosecution and launching of prosecution and the said provision is not considered as a less drastic measure which could be resorted to by the authorities in substitution of exercise of power of preventive detention. Non-consideration of such less drastic remedy which would have effectively curtailed or restricted the prejudicial activities of the detenus has resulted into non-application of mind to a very vital factors, namely that availability of less drastic measure before resorting to a drastic measure of preventive detention. Since the preventive detention is detention without trial and is based on suspicion only, resorting to criminal prosecution coupled with availability of provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential commodities Act was sufficient safeguard towards safeguarding the public interest and towards restricting the prejudicial activities of the detenu. In the alternative he has also submitted that suspension and/or cancellation of licence in case where concerned co-operative society was the holder of a licence to deal in Kerosene and cancellation of authorisation to run a fair price shop were also the remedies immediately available to the executive to prevent and control the prejudicial activities of the detenus without resorting to the action of preventive detention. (ii) Mr. B. B. Naik, learned. Addl. Central Govt. Standing counsel and Mr. K. V. Shelat, learned. A. G. P. on the other hand submit that remedy of cancellation of licence or authorisation of fair price shop was not one to which resort can be made as in these cases the licences were held by authorised co-operative societies and they were illegally and unauthorisedly transferred to the detenus. Before resorting to such remedy the procedure of giving notice and following rules of natural justice is required to be followed and very often at the stage of issuance of show cause notice itself orders of stay are obtained from the Courts of law. Before resorting to such remedy the procedure of giving notice and following rules of natural justice is required to be followed and very often at the stage of issuance of show cause notice itself orders of stay are obtained from the Courts of law. The cancellation of licence is held to be a quasijudicial act open to judicial review by the Courts of law and at every stage the possibility of stay or injunction being granted by the Courts of law cannot be ruled out. The resultant effect will be that initiation of such steps do not help the authorities in immediately preventing and curbing the prejudicial activities of persons dealing in essential commodities like kerosene. It was further submitted that persons like detenu may even continue their prejudicial activities by making secret arrangements with other licence-holders and action of cancellation of licence may not have desired result. They, therefore, submitted that the said remedy is never regarded as effective less drastic remedy and in this connection they have referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court to which reference will be made at an appropriate stage. As regards resort to Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act, it is their submission that the said provision does not indicate any remedy available to the executive. Section 12 (AA) of Essential Commodities is a provision whereby the legislature has inter alia provided for special Court for dealing with offences under the essential Commodities Act and in Sec. 12 (AA) (l) (d) it is inter alia stipulated that on person accused of or suspected of commission of offence under this Act shall be released on bail by any Court other than the special court or the High Court. The procedure to be followed by the special court for releasing the accused person on bail is thereafter provided under proviso and therefore they have submitted before this Court that in substance the remedy is that of opposing the grant of bail or that of moving the Court for cancellation of bail. In their submission, despite enactment of such provision, the Courts of law are releasing the accused persons in such offences on bail albeit with conditions. In their submission, despite enactment of such provision, the Courts of law are releasing the accused persons in such offences on bail albeit with conditions. Such conditions very often do not have deterrent or preventive effect and in fact power of releasing the accused persons in such offences on bail is being exercised by the special Courts also as liberally as they used to release even before the enactment of this provision. Therefore, they have submitted that the fact that the authority was conscious of such provision and that it is found that resort to said provision would not be sufficient to prevent the detenus from indulging in their prejudicial activities was itself sufficient to justify the order of detention, and therefore, the orders of detention are not required to be quashed and set aside. Cancellation Or Suspension of Licence Or Authorisation : (iii) In order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submissions it would be necessary to refer to some of the binding authorities cited before this Court. (iv) Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Counsel for petitioners has very heavily relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramaniklal Mohanlal Pandit v. C. J. Jose, Dy. Seey. , Food and Civil Supplies Dept. and Am. , reported in (1981) XXII GLR 797. In the said case the order of preventive detention passed under Sec. 3 of prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential commodities Act, 1980 was under challenge. The detenu has surrendered his licence for dealing in crude oil regarding both his Depots. There was no scope for any future activity in the nature of blackmarketing in crude oil, so far as the detenu was concerned. It was only because he was a dealer licensed to deal in curde oil that he got an opportunity of carrying on blackmarketing in crude oil. Since the licence was surrendered, it was urged before the Court that there was no possibility of the detenu carrying on the prejudicial activity and therefore it was urged that such a person could be prosecuted, and if found guilty, punished, but resort to action of preventive detention was not permissible. It was in this context that the Court was called upon to decide as to whether resort to preventive detention would be justified when the licence was already surrendered. It was in this context that the Court was called upon to decide as to whether resort to preventive detention would be justified when the licence was already surrendered. It was in this context that the Division bench made following observations on which heavy reliance was placed by Mr. Kapadia :"in the instant case, once the petitioner has surrendered his licence as a dealer in crude oil, it is clear that so far as future activity is concerned or prognosis is concerned, the petitioner would not be in a position to deal in crude oil or to indulge in blackmarketing in crude oil because there would be no possibility for him to get supplies of crude oil from bulk suppliers of crude oil. If that is so. it is obvious that the detaining authority must satisfy the Court why instead of prosecuting the petitioner and his employee, the State Government thought it fit to detain the petitioner by preventive detention under the provisions of the Act. The question whether with a view to preventing him from indulging him in similar activities in future it is necessary to detain him does not appear to have been examined by the State Government, the detaining authority. The files of the case of each detenu must show that the other alternative or less drastic remedies were considered and rejected and ultimately the decision for preventive detention was taken. If these alternatives do not appear on the files and the application of mind to these alternatives, does not appear on the files, it would be a clear case of non-application of mind because preventive detention has to be resorted to only when it is necessary to detain the particular individual concerned so as to prevent him from indulging in obnoxious activities which are sought to be prevented by resorting to preventive detention under the relevant Act providing for such detention. If those alternatives do not appear to have been considered and the reason why the more drastic remedy, namely, preventive detention was resorted to rather than a less drastic penalty, is not shown on the files, it is obvious that the order of detention cannot be justified and it is the duty of the Court to set aside the order of detention. " (v) From the aforesaid observations it becomes clear that the Division bench found that the authority which passed the order of detention has not examined the possibility of resorting to less drastic measure. The Court found that in the case before it, in fact, the licence was already surrendered and, therefore, the detenu was not in position to deal in crude oil at all. He was, therefore, not in a position to indulge in blackmarketing in crude oil as he was not getting supply of crude oil from bulk suppliers of crude oil. From the files, the Court found that alternative or less drastic measures were not at all considered and rejected by the detaining authority and the application of mind to these alternatives does not appear on the files, and, therefore, the court held that resort to preventive deletion was not permissible. In the case before us it shall have to be noted that the detenu in each case is neither a licence-holder nor the person holding the authorisation to run fair price shop. The detenus are the persons to whom the right to deal in the commodity is transferred by the holder of licence or by the holder of fair price shop authorisation. Cancellation of licence or authorisation of fair price shop therefore was not a remedy available to the executive, vis-a-vis, the detenus as they were dealing in commodity without any licence or without any authorisation. In fact, the detenus are the persons who act as agents or representatives and who continue their unauthorised activities. The possibility of their resorting to the very device or arrangement with other licence-holders or persons holding authorisation to run the fair price shop cannot be controlled or provided against. In fact, in subsequent decision in the case of Parshottambhai navalaram Khemani v. Stale of Gujarat and Ors. The possibility of their resorting to the very device or arrangement with other licence-holders or persons holding authorisation to run the fair price shop cannot be controlled or provided against. In fact, in subsequent decision in the case of Parshottambhai navalaram Khemani v. Stale of Gujarat and Ors. , reported in 1985 (2) GLR 620 another Division Bench of this Court comprising of S. B. Majmudar, S. (as His lordship then was) and S. L. Talati, J. considered the aforesaid view of the division Bench in the case of Ramniklal (supra) and also considered the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and has stated the law succinctly and very convincingly in the following words :"it is obvious that whether less drastic remedies which can serve the purpose of preventing the petitioner from indulging in alleged nefarious activities can be resorted to will be a vital aspect of the matter which should enter the subjective satisfaction exercised by the detaining authority before the detention order is passed. Alternative remedies may be by way of prosecution under the Essential Commodities Act by way of departmental action against the concerned licence-holders by way of cancellation of licence, suspension of licence, confiscation of stock etc. This vital consideration must permeate the process of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority before the orders of detention are passed. If these vital considerations have not entered in exercise, the exercise would not be comprehensive enough and would be liable to fail on account of non-application of mind to all the material vital aspects having direct impact on the subjective satisfaction to detain the concerned petitioner. But the aforesaid attack on the subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order is miles away from the submission that even after subjective satisfaction is properly arrived at on existing material and on consideration of vital facts and aspects merely because subsequently the licence got cancelled or surrendered the subjective satisfaction would get retrospectively effected or vitiated. Such an extreme contention cannot be countenanced. It is submitted that once the licence of a dealer is cancelled or surrendered or can be surrendered or cancelled, the preventive detention of the petitioner cannot be ordered by the detaining authority as in such a case, cancellation would by itself be an effective remedy to keep the concerned detenu out of harms away. It is submitted that once the licence of a dealer is cancelled or surrendered or can be surrendered or cancelled, the preventive detention of the petitioner cannot be ordered by the detaining authority as in such a case, cancellation would by itself be an effective remedy to keep the concerned detenu out of harms away. Such a universal proposition cannot be accepted for the simple reason that if that is so. then in no case, where a licenced fair price shop owner or dealer who is permitted to deal in an essential commodity commits misconduct armed with such a licence, such a person can never be detained under Sec. 3 (1) of the Act as in every such case, licence can always be cancelled on the ground of such misconduct. This would amount to putting a total embargo on the power of the detaining authority to detain such dealers. Power of preventive detention would become totally non-existent in all such cases of misconducting licenced fair price shop owners. We do not find any such general exception supposedly made by the legislature while enacting Sec 311) To accept this submission would amount to engrafting an exception or a proviso to Sec. 3 (1) of the act to the effect that power of preventive detention would not be available in case of misconducting licensed fair price shop holders. Such an extreme contention put forward cannot be countenanced as that would amount to an act of legislation on the part of the Court. On the basis of this case, therefore, it must be held that the detaining authority had considered the vital question as to whether cancellation of licence of the petitioner would be sufficient on the facts of the case to remove him from harms way and secondly whether criminal prosecution would be sufficient in this case. Therefore, those vital considerations have entered the exercise of subjective satisfaction permeating the impugned detention order. On the facts of this case, it cannot be said that those vital considerations were not considered or kept in view by the detaining authority while it passed the orders against the petitioner. It is, therefore, well settled that this Court cannot sit in appeal and reverse the subjective satisfaction on the ground that another view was possible. This is entirely the function of detaining authority. It is, therefore, well settled that this Court cannot sit in appeal and reverse the subjective satisfaction on the ground that another view was possible. This is entirely the function of detaining authority. Subjective satisfaction can be challenged only on the well established grounds, i. e. , that there was no genuine satisfaction based on relevant data or that there was no evidence whatsoever to support it or that was arrived at in colourable exercise of power or in a mala fide manner or that it was not based on consideration of vital factors and hence it involved non-application of mind. If such objections or any of them are well made out, the detention order will obviously fail. If such grounds are not made out, it cannot be urged by the detenu that the Court should take a different view of the matter on reassessment of the material before the detaining authority, and come to a conclusion that the detaining authority ought not to have been satisfied on such scanty material and, therefore, the detention order should be quashed and set aside. Such an exercise would take the Court in the forbidden field and would indirectly lead to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under the guise of testing subjective satisfaction on the ground of its alleged genuineness. " (vi) Mr. Kapadia, learned Counsel for detenus has also invited our attention to yet another decision of another Division Bench in the case of Dalpatbhai bhikhabhai Patel v. Dist. Magistrate, Swat, reported in 1983 (2) GLR 849 where the detenu was an Asst. Engineer in the Irrigation Dept. of the State Govt. who was closely connected with the distribution and utilisation of Cement indented for the irrigation project where he was discharging his duties. Since he and other co-detenu in collusion with each other were disposing of the cement received by them for irrigation project in blackmarket the order of detention was passed. The detenu was meanwhile suspended and the question was as to whether such public servant who was suspended from service pending departmental enquiry is in a position to misuse his authority and indulge in similar prejudicial activities. Justice P. D. Desai (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench observed as under :"an order of interim suspension has the. Justice P. D. Desai (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench observed as under :"an order of interim suspension has the. effect of preventing a public servant from performing the duties of his office though he might continue to enjoy the status of a public servant. Such suspension prevents him from doing anything in the discharge of the duties of his office. The purpose of such suspension, inter alia, is to ensure that pending departmental enquiry or criminal prosecution, or both, which might have been instituted or which might have been under contemplation such public servant is not in a position to misuse his authority in the same way in which he might have been found to have done in the past. The order of suspension, passed against the petitioner, therefore, served the same purpose and had the same effect which was sought to be attained by his detention. The petitioner was thereby put out of the harms way and prevented from indulging in future in his objectionable activities detrimental to the maintenance of supply of an essential commodity. " (vii) In our opinion the principle enunciated in the aforesaid case has no direct application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the cases before us the detenus are the persons who entered into arrangement, for consideration, either with the licence-holders or with persons holding authorisation to run fair price shop, to run such fair price shop or to deal in essential commodities on their behalf and having so obtained management and control of business they are resorting to blackmarketing by charging prices higher than fixed by the Govt. and secondly by selling such commodity to persons other than the ration cardholders at higher price. The remedy, therefore, of suspending their licences or suspending authorisations of fair price shops is not directly available against such detenus inasmuch as such persons can with their modus operandi continue such nefarious activities by approaching other licenceholders or other persons holding authorisation of fair price shop. In fact, such persons, if let-loose, may prove to be more dangerous to the public distribution system of essential commodities, and their immediate prevention being the goal in the larger public interest, in our opinion, resort to such power was absolutely essential as found by the authority in the cases before us. In fact, such persons, if let-loose, may prove to be more dangerous to the public distribution system of essential commodities, and their immediate prevention being the goal in the larger public interest, in our opinion, resort to such power was absolutely essential as found by the authority in the cases before us. (viii) That brings us to another aspect, namely, that of permissible resort to Sec, 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act. Mr. Kapadia, learned counsel for the detenus has relied upon the two unreported decisions of the Division Bench of this Court and one reported decision of the Division bench of this Court which have directly decided the point on issue. (ix) In Spl. Cri. Appli. No, 1777 of 1991 decided by C. V. Jani and s. D. Dave, JJ. on 3-4-1992 the detenu before the Divn. Bench was holding authorisation to run a fair price shop and since during the inspection carried out by the Civil Supplies Officer large scale irregularities were noticed, he was detained. It was noticed that in the grounds of detention the detaining authority did refer to the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential commodities Act, 1955 and did mention that resort can be had to such provision, but sufficient weightage to such provision was not given and the order of detention was passed. The detention was challenged before the Divn. Bench, inter alia, on the ground that the detenu could have been dealt with under relevant provision, namely, Sec. 12 (AA) of the essential Commodities Act, 1955 with a view to keeping him from harms way and that very recital in the grounds of detention that the authority was alive to such provision was not sufficient and would vitiate the continued detention. The Divn. Bench referred to the decision of the divn. Bench of this Court in the case of Zarin Noormamad Kasaom v. State of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in 1986 GLH 1145 and held that there is obligation on the detaining authority to satisfy itself that it bad in mind the question, whether the prosecution launched against the detenu and whether the launching of prosecution would be sufficient to keep him from harms way. , reported in 1986 GLH 1145 and held that there is obligation on the detaining authority to satisfy itself that it bad in mind the question, whether the prosecution launched against the detenu and whether the launching of prosecution would be sufficient to keep him from harms way. The Court also noticed that the mere recital of such statutorily sanctified phrases would not be sufficient but the subjective satisfaction must be real and rational, not random divination, must flow from an advertance to relevant factors not be a mock recital or mechanical chanting of statutorily sanctified phrases. (Sadhu Roy v. State of W. B. AIR 1975 SC 919 ). In the facts of the case the Division Bench found that except making reference to Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and possibility of launching of prosecution the detaining authority has not recorded any satisfaction. It was in view of this finding that the Division bench has quashed and set aside the order of detention holding that the detaining authority was not alive to the possibility of resorting to provisions contained under Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities. (x) The very Division Bench in Spl. Cri. Appli. No. 59 of 1992 decided on 9-4-1992 has reiterated the very position. The Division Bench in fact found that the detaining authority was not alive to resorting to penal provisions of essential Commodities Act, 1955 to prevent the detenu from carrying on his prejudicial activities and since the real question regarding the possibility of penal action against the detenu with a view to curbing his future offending activities was not considered the detention order was set aside. (xi) In the aforesaid case the Division Bench set aside the order of detention on the ground that it suffered from non-application of mind as the detaining authority has not considered the possibility of resorting to less drastic remedy available to it under Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential commodities Act. The Division Bench in terms found that Sec. 12 (AA) of the Act was potent enough to prevent an erring person from indulging into prejudicial activities, and therefore, in such cases resort to action of preventive detention is not permissible. The Division Bench speaking through a. N. Divecha, J. observed as under :"we find considerable force and substance in the aforesaid submission raised before us. The Division Bench speaking through a. N. Divecha, J. observed as under :"we find considerable force and substance in the aforesaid submission raised before us. It would be quite proper to look at the relevant provisions contained in the Act of 1955 in this connection. It has, inter alia, been provided therein that no person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence thereunder shall be released on bail by any Court other than a special Court or High court. Again it has been enjoined on the special Court not to release any such person on bail without giving the prosecution an opportunity to oppose application for such release on bail and on prima facie finding that there appears reasonable ground for believing that such person has been guilty of the offences concerned when the application for bail is opposed by and on behalf of the prosecution. It, thus, becomes clear that the release of a person charged with an offence punishable under the Act of 1955 is not a matter of course. Release on bail for an offence punishable under the Act of 1955 is not a rule but an exception in view of the aforesaid relevant provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of the Act of 1955. They are undoubtedly stringent. In that view of the matter, a person charged with an offence punishable under the Act of 1955 can be prevented from indulging into his objectionable or offending activities with respect of black-marketing and maintenance of supplies of essential commodities by contesting his bail application. If the ordinary law in that regard is capable of taking care of such situation, resort to the Act of 1980 for the purpose would hardly be justifiable in absence of any cogent or convincing reasons in that regard. " (xii) From the propositions of law which emerge from the aforesaid three decisions of the Division Benches of this Court it is submitted before this Court that resort to Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential Commodities Act is regarded as availability of less drastic measure and detaining authority is expected at least to remain alive of such less drastic measure. Mere mechanical recital in the grounds of detention of the fact that the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential Commodities Act are considered would not be sufficient if it is found that real satisfaction is not reached by the detaining authority. Mere mechanical recital in the grounds of detention of the fact that the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of Essential Commodities Act are considered would not be sufficient if it is found that real satisfaction is not reached by the detaining authority. (xiii) Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Central Govt. Standing. Counsel and Mr. K. V. Shelat, learned A. G. P. have, on he other hand submitted that Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act can never be regarded as a remedy, much less, a less drastic remedy. They have very vehemently submitted before this Court that Sec. 12 (AA) came to be introduced in the Essential Commodities Act with a view to providing special Courts prescribing special procedure for conducting offences under Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In their submission, Sec. 12 (AA)atthe most deals with the remedy of prosecution, i. e. , prosecuting a person for offences punishable under the Essential Commodities Act and if prosecution is no bar to preventively detain a person, simply because Sec. 12 (AA) is introduced in the Essential Commodities Act, the position of law would not change. Secondly, they have submitted that even if reference is made to clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12 (AA) it prescribes the procedure to be followed by a special Court before releasing the offender under Essential Commodities Act on bail. To that extent it can be said that the special Court is expected to follow such procedure before releasing a person on bail and to that extent obtaining of bail by offender of such offence can be said to be conditioned or restricted. However, it cannot be said that such offenders can never be released on bail or would never be released on bail by special Courts after following the procedure prescribed by cl. (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12 (AA), and therefore, they submitted that it would not be correct to set aside the order of detention. (xiv) At this stage it would be necessary to make reference to Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act. (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 12 (AA), and therefore, they submitted that it would not be correct to set aside the order of detention. (xiv) At this stage it would be necessary to make reference to Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act. Said provision is reproduced hereunder :"12 (AA) Offences triable by special Courts : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, (a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more special courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court. (b) Where a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a Magistrate under sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (2a) of Sec. 167 of the Code, such Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days in the whole where such Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate. . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) The Special Court may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) of this subsection, exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b) the same power which the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under Sec. 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section. (d) Save as aforesaid no person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail by any Court other than special Court or high Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) Save as aforesaid no person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail by any Court other than special Court or high Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) A special Court may, upon a perusal of Police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act (or upon complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned) for any person aggrieved or any recognised consumer association) take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial; (f) All offences under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Sees. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial. (2) When trying an offence under this Act. a special Court may also try an offence other than an offence under this Act with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial. (3) A special Court may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person suspected to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence under this act. tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission thereof and any pardon so tenered shall, for the purposes of Sec. 308 of the Code, be deemed to have been tendered under Sec, 307 thereof. (4) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Sec. 439 of the Code and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under the clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of that section as if the reference to "magistrate" in that section included also a reference to a "special Court" constituted under Sec. 12a. " (xv) In our opinion there is much substance in the submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondents. (1) of that section as if the reference to "magistrate" in that section included also a reference to a "special Court" constituted under Sec. 12a. " (xv) In our opinion there is much substance in the submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondents. As noted hereinabove, Sec. 12aa of the act simply provides for establishment of special Courts for trying offences under the said Act and for special procedure to be followed by such special Courts. In substance, it can be said that for offences punishable under the said Act a prosecution can be launched which is to be tried by special Court by following special procedure. Nonetheless it is a prosecution. Question which is required to be examined is that if prosecution as such is no bar to an action of preventive detention, how can a prosecution before a special Court under special procedure be regarded as a relevant factor to be kept in mind while passing order of detention. We have, hereinabove, while dealing with the submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner as regards possibility of resort to a prosecution held that permissible resort to prosecution is no bar against exercise of power of preventive detention. In fact, the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has in the case of Haradhan Saha v. State of W. B. and Ors. , reported in AIR 1974 sc 2154 pithily brought out the position of law in no uncertain terms :"the power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. " (xvi) In view of the aforesaid statement of law made by the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court we are of the opinion that non-consideration of possibility of filing prosecution under Sec. 12 (AA) of the said Act would not ipso-facto result into rendering the order of detention null and void for the following reasons : (1) Section 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 simply constitutes special Court for trying offences under the Act. Sub-clause (d) of Section, infer alia, provides that no person accused or suspected of an offence under the Act shall be released on bail by any Court other than special Court. The special Court is expected to give an opportunity to prosecution to oppose an application for bail. The special Court, at the same time, is empowered to release the accused person on bail by recording reasons in writing. At the most, it can be said that the special Court may not release accused person on bail liberally, but these provisions do not suggest that there is no power to release accused person on bail. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that prosecution to be filed under Sec. 12 (AA) is like any other prosecution which could be filed against the offender. (2) Consistent with the stand we have taken under head re-submission-II-Criminal Prosecution v. Preventive detention we are of the opinion that the order of preventive detention can be validly made before commencing the prosecution. Preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous, their purposes are different, their authorities are different, nature of proceedings are different. In a prosecution the accused is sought to be punished for past act, in a preventive detention the past act is merely for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of detenu. Therefore, in our opinion, detaining authority is not expected or is not required to consider resort to prosecution under Sec. 12 (AA) as a less drastic measure. Therefore, in our opinion, detaining authority is not expected or is not required to consider resort to prosecution under Sec. 12 (AA) as a less drastic measure. (3) The Full Bench of this Court in the case of valjibhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Police, ahmedabad, reported in 1992 (2) GLH 144 : [ 1992 (2) GLR 1538 (FB)] has now taken the view that the authority passing an order of detention is not required to consider the possibility of less drastic measure, such as, externment, etc. In our opinion, the prosecution is an independent remedy to which resort can be had, but since prosecution is no bar to passing of an order of preventive detention, in our opinion, the authority is not required to focus its attention to resorting to a remedy of prosecution under Sec. 12 (AA) of the said act. (xvii) In view of the aforesaid, ordinarily, since we differ from the view taken by the learned Judges of the aforesaid two Division Benches, we would have referred the matter to the Larger Bench as there is conflict between the reasons which have found favour with the two Division benches of this Court on one hand and the reasons which have found favour with us. (xviii) However, in the facts and circumstances it is not necessary to make reference to the larger bench as in all cases before us not only the authority was alive to the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential commodities Act but the authority was also alive to the fact that launching of prosecution against such detenus may not prevent them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance and supply of essential commodities, and therefore, on the facts of this case also no interference of this Court is called for. In the facts of the case before us and more particularly after going through the grounds of detention we are more than satisfied to hold that the detaining authority was absolutely alive to the provisions of Sec. 12 (AA) of the Essential Commodities Act, and was also alive to the fact that launching of criminal prosecution was not sufficient to prevent the detenus from carrying on their prejudicial activities. We do not find that necessary recitals contained in the grounds of detention in each case is a mere mechanical recital of statutorily sanctified phrases but we hold that it is a real satisfaction reached by the detaining authority which was more alive to its duties and which wanted to curb the nefarious activities of the detenus. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. M. C. Kapadia, learned Counsel for detenus. The aforesaid discussion would now bring us to the individual submissions made by Mr. M. C. Kapadia as regards the detenu of each petition and the said submissions are dealt with herein petition-wise. . . . . . . . . . . . . Since all the common as well as individual submissions made in this group of petitions fail all this group of petitions fail and are dismissed. Rule in each petition is discharged. No costs. .