JUDGMENT 1. This is a habeas corpus petition in which the order Annexure-1 dated 6th November 1992 issued under sub- section(3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short NS Act) has been challenged. 2. The said order may now be read as under : fu:) vkns'k vr% eq>s Jh lR;kukjk;.k iq= ckypan tkfr [kVhd mez 32 o"kZ fuoklh pspV Fkkuk pspV ftyk dksVk ds laca/k esa bl ckr dk iw.kZ lek/kku gks x;k gS fd mldh xfrfofo/k;ka yksd O;oLFkk ds izfrdwy gSa vkSj bls bl izdkj dh xfrfof/k;ksa ls fu/kkZfjr djus dh n`f"V ls fu:) djuk vko';d gSA vr% eSa vkj0ih0 tSu ftyk eftLV~sTV dksVk jk"V~h; lqj{kk vf/kfu;e 1980 dh /kkjk 3 dh mi /kkjk 3 esa iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3 dh mi/kkjk 2 ds varxZr Jh lR; ukjk;.k [kVhd dks fu:) dj ftyk dkjkx`g dksVk esa j[kus ds vkns'k nsrk gwaA g0@& ( vkj0ih0 tSu ) ftyk eftLV~sV] dksVkA 3. A bare reading of the aforesaid extracted order will show that it has been made by the District Magistrate, Kota in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the State Government under sub~section(3) of Section 3 of the NS Act. After the passing of the aforesaid detention order as required under sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the NS Act, the order remained in force after a period of 12 days because it was approved by the state Government vide its order dated 17th November 1993, within a period of 12 days of the making of the aforesaid order, Alongwith the order of detention the grounds of detention were also communicated, to the detenue. It will be seen from a bare reading of the aforesaid extracted detention order that the said order has been made and the petitioner has been detained on the District Magistrate being satisfied that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It will be seen from a bare reading of the aforesaid extracted detention order that the said order has been made and the petitioner has been detained on the District Magistrate being satisfied that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A perusal of the grounds simultaneously formulated in support of the detention order and served to the detenue will show that number of grounds have been contained therein and the activities of the detenue in between the period from 26th October 1984 to 8th July 1992 have been stated therein wherein the detenue was found to be involved in various cases, many of them are still pending, but in one he was acquitted because none was willing to come forward against the detenue to give evidence, the detenue being terror to the society in the village. 4. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid detention order on the various grounds, but we may not deal with other grounds of challenges as we are of the opinion that the petition is likely to succeed on one ground about the jurisdielion of the detaining authority (District Magistrate, Kota) in making the detention order Annexure- 1. We had called upon the learned Government Advocate to place before us the authorisation made by the Slate Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act if favour of the District Magistrate. As said above, the detention order was made on 6th November 1992 and, therefore, it will be proper to refer to the authorisation of the State Government which was made under its order No. P.2/17(l)Grah-5/80 dated 5th September 1992 which reads as under:- vkns'k jk"V~h; lqj{kk vf/kfu;e] 1980 ( 1980 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e la[;k 65 ) dh /kkjk 3 dh mi&/kkjk ( 3 ) ds v/khu 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, jkT; ljdkj ,rn~ }kjk jkT; ds leLr ftyk eftLV~sVksa dks mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3 dh mi/kkjk ( 2 ) esa of.kZr 'kfDr;ksa dk fnukad 7-9-1992 ls 6-12-1992 rd iz;ksx djus dk funsZ'k nsrh gSA jkT;iky ds vkns'k ls] g0@& ( v:.k dqekj ) izeq[k 'kklu lfpo] x`g " 5. A bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act under which the aforesaid authorisation in favour of the District Magistrate in Rajasthan has been made by the State Government will show that the said order can be made in two contingencies cither having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local jurisdiction of District Magistrate. From the latter part of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act it will be seen that by an order in writing the State Government can direct the District Magistrate that during such period which period cannot be more than three months, likely to be extended for a similar period on the District Magistrate being satisfied as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NS Act he can make an order. A bare reading of the aforesaid extracted order/authorisation issued by the State Government to the District Magistrate Kota will show that it is not mentioned therein whether the authorisation is because the Stale Government is satisfied as a result of the circumstances prevailing or it Is satisfied that the circumstances likely to prevail in the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate, Kota that it is necessary to do so and, therefore, had directed the District Magistrate to exercise the aforesaid power under Sub-section (2) of the Section 3 of the NS Act, if satisfied as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NS Act. We had an occasion to deal with an identical question in a batch of Habeas Corpus petitions Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 7048/92 which was decided alongwith three other Habeas Corpus petitions under order dated 19th August 1993. A perusal of the order/authorisation issued by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act will show that it was identical to the order/authorisation in the present case. A perusal of the order/authorisation issued by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act will show that it was identical to the order/authorisation in the present case. It was said by us as under:- "A bare reading of the aforesaid extracted order of the State Government will show that there is no mention that the Slate Government was satisfied that having regard to the circumstances prevailing or even likely to prevail in any area within the local jurisdiction of District Magistrate Jaisalmer it was satisfied that it was necessary to do so and, therefore, it by order directs the District Magistrate that within the period specified in the order he may, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 3 exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section." 6. In the aforesaid case we had referred to the case of Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar v. S.V. Bhave, Commissioner of Police and others, AIR 1991 SC 397 . The Apex court dealt with the conferment of power as to be specific either with regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail and not for both. The Apex Court further said that there are two independent circumstances, namely - (i) the prevailing circumstances, and (ii) the circumstances that are likely to prevail. The Apex Court further said that the former evidently means circumstances in present that is prevalent on the date of order and the latter means the anticipated circumstances in future. The Apex Court further said that if the Government wants that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police should also exercise the powers for the current period, it has to satisfy itself with the prevailing circumstances. In the Government wants that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police should also exercise the powers during the future period, it must be satisfied with the circumstances that are likely to prevail during that period and this seems to be the mandate of sub-section (3). The Apex Court said that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be lightly recorded by reproducing both the alternative clauses. The Apex Court said as under: " The use of the word or signifies either of the two situations for different periods. The Apex Court said that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be lightly recorded by reproducing both the alternative clauses. The Apex Court said as under: " The use of the word or signifies either of the two situations for different periods. That however, is not to say that the power cannot be exercised for a future period by taking into consideration circumstances prevailing on the date of the order as well as circumstances likely to prevail in future. The latter may stem from the former. For example, there may be disturbances on the date of the order and the same situation may be visualised at a future dale also in which case the power may be conferred on the subordinate officers keeping both the factors in mind, but in that case the two circumstances would have to be joined by the conjunctive word and not the disjunctive word or. The use of the disjunctive word or in the impugned Government order only indicates non-application of mind and obscurity in thought." 7. It will be seen from the perusal of the extracted order that so far as authorisation under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NS Act, so far as in the present case, is concerned, that no satisfaction of the State Government whatsoever has been recorded. The order has been drafted casually without even going through the language of sub- section (3) of Section 3 or even sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NS Act. It is a case which shows total non-application of mind so far as conferment of power under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NS Act on the District Magistrate is concerned. 8. It was contended by the learned Government Advocate that in view of the aforesaid ease of Apex Court the order/authorisation of sub-section (3) of Section 3 cannot be held to be bad and in this connection learned counsel has referred to the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Valley, AIR 1993 SC 1460 . We fail to understand how that case is attracted to the present case. Even in the aforesaid case the Apex Court said that the powers of the State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3 can only be delegated to the Commissioner of Police if the circumstances prevail or are likely to prevail and necessitate to issue such order. We fail to understand how that case is attracted to the present case. Even in the aforesaid case the Apex Court said that the powers of the State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3 can only be delegated to the Commissioner of Police if the circumstances prevail or are likely to prevail and necessitate to issue such order. It will, therefore, be clear that no departure has been made so far as aforesaid case of Abhay Shridhar (Supra) is concerned. In the case of Valley (Supra) there was already an order of the State Government delegating its powers on the date on which new order for delegation of powers was passed and new order was passed immediately after the expiry of the existing order. The Apex Court said that by virtue of earlier order the Commissioner of Police had already powers to issue detention order, there was no illegality. That case has no application to the present case. 9. We are of the opinion that the decision of this court in the case of Ram Singh v. State of Rajasthan D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 7045/1992 decided on 19th August 1993 applies on all fours to the present case. In the aforesaid case we have made some observations about the functioning of the department/authorities dealing with the detention cases. On the basis of experience and on the basis of various orders which have come to the notice of the court and which came to this court in the case of Ram Singh and three other cases, as well as in the present case, we can say that the cases of detention are being casually dealt with by the detaining authorities, the note-sheets are prepared by the clerks and the authorities simply put signatures showing non-application of mind. We have said that a separate cell for dealing with such cases and for compilation of all cases be created so that in future the detaining authorities may apply their mind and act in accordance with law. We have said that a separate cell for dealing with such cases and for compilation of all cases be created so that in future the detaining authorities may apply their mind and act in accordance with law. But no heed is being paid to the orders/observations passed by this court in the case of Ram Singh and others as well as by the Apex Court and the result is as being seen in the present case and other cases of Ram Singh and others that the detenues are being released as the detailing authorities do not act properly, do not apply their mind, do not act in accordance with law and the cases are going against the Stale and it is the society which has to suffer in such a case. 10. Consequently, we hereby hold that the authorisation under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act to the District Magistrate is not proper and under it no jurisdiction is conferred on the District Magistrate to make the detention order under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the NS Act. The order Annexure-1 dated 6th November 1992 is hereby set aside. The detenue shall be set at liberty, shall be released forthwith it not wanted in any other case. Any how, if the detaining authority feels that in future there is any case, it has to and must act in accordance with law.Petition Allowed. *******