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1993 DIGILAW 527 (GUJ)

DHIRAJLAL SHAMJI v. BABUGAR NATHUGAR

1993-11-20

J.N.BHATT

body1993
BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision, under Sec, 401 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (the Code for short, hereinafter), the petitioner-original complainant has questioned the legality and validity of the order of acquittal, recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class), at Bhanvad, in Criminal case No. 205 of 1981, for the offences punishable under Secs. 447, 323, 404 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (ipc for short ). ( 2 ) A short resume of the factual aspect may. shortly, be narrated, at this stage. According to the prosecution case, in the evening, on 25/07/1981, the complainant and his brother had gone to their field. At that time, the opponent No. 1, who is the original accused, had ploughed the road side of the field. Consequently, they had scolded him, which resulted into enragement on the part of the accused and culminated into offences. In that, it was alleged that the accused abused them and committed criminal tresspass in the field and thereafter, inflicted axe-blow to the complainant, Dhirajlal, on the head. On raising the alarm by the complainant, the accused had fled away from the venue of offence. While running away, the accused had also threatened the complainant to kill him. On the aforesaid facts and allegations, the complainant had lodged a complaint which was investigated into. Ultimately, the accused came to be charge-sheeted, in the trial Court, for the aforesaid offences, to which, he denied and pleaded not guilty. ( 3 ) ON appreciation of the facts and circumstances and the evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Magistrate reached to the conclusion that no offence is established against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and consequently, he was pleased to acquit the accused from the aforesaid charges against him, on 6/11/1982, Hence, this revision, at the instance of the original complainant, under Sec. 401 of the Code. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel, Mr. Popat, has taken this Court through the impugned order of acquittal and the evidence relied on by the prosecution. He has forcefully contended that the impugned order is totally bad in law as the learned trial Magistrate has misappreciated the facts. It is also contended that the view taken by the trial Court, in recording the acquittal against the opponentaccused is not reasonable and justified. He has forcefully contended that the impugned order is totally bad in law as the learned trial Magistrate has misappreciated the facts. It is also contended that the view taken by the trial Court, in recording the acquittal against the opponentaccused is not reasonable and justified. ( 5 ) AT this stage, firstly, it may be reiterated that the powers and scope in the revision are very much circumscribed. The jurisdictional sweep of this court in a revision like one on hand, is very much limited. No perversity is, successfully, pointed out. No illegality is, successfully, spelt out, which would warrant the interference of this Court, in this revision, under Sec. 401 of the Code. ( 6 ) IT is a settled proposition of law that acquittal should be, sparingly, interfered with in a revision under Sec. 401 of the Code. It is only in glaring cases of injustice, resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial Court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. Needless to mention that the powers under Sec. 401 by this Court are required to be exercised sparingly and with care and circumspection. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the quashing of the order of acquittal. ( 7 ) EVEN in acquittal appeal, under Sec. 378 of the Code, the powers of this Court are very much limited, and it is a settled proposition of law that unless and until perversity is successfully pointed out or unreasonableness in the assessment of the evidence is successfully spelt out, it would not be advisable and safe for the Appellate Court to interfere with the acquittal recorded by the trial Court. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Awadhesh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1988 SC 1158 , the acquittal should not be interfered with lightly unless the view taken by the trial Court appears 10 be perverse or unreasonable. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Awadhesh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1988 SC 1158 , the acquittal should not be interfered with lightly unless the view taken by the trial Court appears 10 be perverse or unreasonable. ( 8 ) NOT only that, it is also a settled proposition of law, that if two views on appreciation of evidence are possible, one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, the Appellate Court should not in such a situation reverse the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. This proposition is very well expounded by the Apex Court in Tara Singh v. Stale of M. P. , AIR 1981 SC 950 . ( 9 ) WHEREAS in the present case, the acquittal is impugned by invoking the aids of the provisions of Sec. 401 of the Code. The revisional powers, of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. This proposition of law is also very well settled by the Highest Court in Bansi Lal v. Laxman singh, AIR 1936 SC 1721. It is clearly held in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court that even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not have been justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted, and therefore, the decision of the Delhi High Court was reversed, by the Apex Court, in that decision. ( 10 ) HAVING carefully gone through the entire record of the present case and after dispassionately scrutinising the facts emerging from the evidence, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned acquittal order cannot be characterised as unreasonable, unjust or illegal. In the circumstances, the another aspect about the intervening time factor which is, almost more than a decade, since the date of occurrence of the unfortunate alleged incident, does not require any consideration, as this Court is inclined to dismiss the revision, on the aforesaid grounds. ( 11 ) IT may also be stated that no detailed reasons are required to be given while confirming the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, and there is no necessity to reiterate the reasons which weighed with the trial Court while passing the impugned order. ( 11 ) IT may also be stated that no detailed reasons are required to be given while confirming the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, and there is no necessity to reiterate the reasons which weighed with the trial Court while passing the impugned order. This proposition of law is also extensively explained and very well settled in a decision of the Apex court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 . ( 12 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, the present revision merits straightway rejection. ( 13 ) IN the result, this revision is dismissed. Rule is discharged. .