Judgment :- 1. The Writ petition is for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the proceedings of the 1st respondent in X-1/81722/92 dated 11.6.93 and to direct the respondents to transfer the licence of the building bearing door No. 67, Hunters Road, Choolai, Madras in favour of the petitioners wife Tmt. Chandra Hannah. 2. The petitioner, who is a practising advocate of this Court and who had been the City Public Prosecutor for about four years and Special Public Prosecutor in certain specific cases till 1991, has been allotted Door No. 67, Hunters Road, Choolai, Madras and has been in occupation of the same ever since 1970. It is alleged in the affidavit filed in support of this petition/the petitioner had made a request to the first respondent to transfer the licence of occupation of the said building in the name of his wife Smt. Chandra Hannah as she became a Government servant by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 131 Education, dated 1.2.91 treating the staff of the Education Department of Corporation of Madras as Government servants. In the meanwhile, the first respondent herein has passed the impugned order negativing the request of the petitioner holding that the wife of the petitioner, who is working in the Corporation of Madras, cannot be treated as a Government Servant. Thereupon the petitioner has preferred an appeal to the 2nd respondent and the same is pending before the 2nd respondent. Since the petitioner has been given time till 10.9.1993 and as the appeal preferred by the petitioner is pending on the file of the 2nd respondent, apprehending eviction, the petitioner has filed this writ petition with the abovesaid prayer. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the 1st respondent has failed to see the effect of the Government Orders in G.O.Ms. No. 131 Education dt. 1.2.91 and G.O.Ms. No. 402 Education Department dt. 23.5.1986, wherein the teaching staff of the Corporation of Madras as Government employees and the reasons given by the 1st respondent in rejecting the request of the petitioner are not sustainable. No. 131 Education dt. 1.2.91 and G.O.Ms. No. 402 Education Department dt. 23.5.1986, wherein the teaching staff of the Corporation of Madras as Government employees and the reasons given by the 1st respondent in rejecting the request of the petitioner are not sustainable. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate, who takes notice, states that the petitioner was only an allottee while he was functioning as City Public Prosecutor and Special Public Prosecutor and it is well settled that when once the petitioner ceases to be a Prosecutor consequent upon the expiration of the term, he is liable to be evicted and he is not entitled to be in occupation of the premises in question. In this connection it is relevant to quote the provision contained in S. (9)(a) (ii) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 and it runs as follows:— “Any such officer as is referred in sub-Clause (i) or under sub-S(1-A) may summarily dispossess any officer, local authority or public institution continuing to occupy or failing to deliver possession of, any building in respect of which the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant by virtue of this Section after the termination of his or its licence to occupy such building and take possession of the building including any portion thereof which may have been sub-let”. 4. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned-Government Advocate. On a perusal of the entire materials placed before this court and on a consideration of the impugned order, I am of the view, that the petitioner is not entitled to continue to be in occupation of the premises in question, especially after the termination of his office as City Public-Prosecutor or Special Public Prosecutor. Whether the petitioner who had been allotted to occupy the said building, when he was functioning as City Public Prosecutor, is a Government servant or is holding the public office as such, is a different thing, which need not be gone into in this case. But admittedly he is not holding the office of any Prosecutor for Government now. Whether the petitioner who had been allotted to occupy the said building, when he was functioning as City Public Prosecutor, is a Government servant or is holding the public office as such, is a different thing, which need not be gone into in this case. But admittedly he is not holding the office of any Prosecutor for Government now. In matters of appointment of the Government Pleaders or Government Counsel, in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. AIR1991 S.C. 537 the Supreme Court has held that: “A brief reference to some decisions of this Court, in which the character of engagement of a Government Counsel was considered, may be made, In Mahadeo v. Shantibhai 1969 2 SC 422, it was held that a lawyer engaged by the Railway Administration during the continuance of the engagement was holding an office of profit. The engagement of the Railway Counsel was similar to that of the Government counsel in the present case. It was pointed out that by office is meant the right and duty to exercise an employment or a position of authority and trust to which certain duties, are attached, and such an engagement satisfied that test. Even though the decision was rendered in the context of disqualification under the Election law by holding an office of profit yet, it is useful for appreciating the nature of such an engagement or appointment of a counsel by an Government In Mundrika Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar 1980 I SCC 759= AIR 1979 SC 1871 the nature of appointment of Government Pleaders came up for consideration and it was said that the office of a Government Pleader, as defined in S. 2(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is a public office, Krishna Iyer, J. in that decision also pointed out that the Government under our Constitution shall not play with law offices, on political or other impertinent consideration as it may affect the legality of teaching and subver the rule of law itself. In that decision, an earlier Madras decision was quoted with approval, wherein, it was clearly held that the duties of the Government Pleader are of a public nature and that the office of a Government Pleader is a public office. The relevant extract is as under (at pp. 1874-1875 of AIR): “A Government Pleader is more than an advocate for a litigant. The relevant extract is as under (at pp. 1874-1875 of AIR): “A Government Pleader is more than an advocate for a litigant. He holds a public office. We recall with approval the observations a Division Bench of the Madras High Court made in Ramachandran v. Alagiriswami AIR 1961 Madras 450 and regard the view there, expressed about a Government Pleaders office, as broadly correct even in the Bihar set up. “The duties of the Government Pleader, Madras are duties of a public nature. Besides, as already explained the public are genuinely concerned with the manner in which Government Pleader discharges his duties because, if he bandies his cases badly, they have ultimately to foot the bill. ***** “I consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erle, J. in (1951) 17 QB 149. The three criteria are source of the office, the tenure and the duties, I have applied that test and I am of opinion that the conclusion that the office is a public office is irresistible.” Similarly in Mukul Dalal v. Union of India (1988) 3 SCC 144 , it was held that the office of the Public Prosecutor is a public one, and the primacy given to the Public Prosecutor under the Scheme of the Code (Cr.P.C.) has a social purpose. I have stated whether a Public Prosecutor can be said to be a government servant to get an allotment under the Act is doubtful. Now the question before this court is whether the order of the Ist respondent can be sustained in view of the Government Orders as referred to above treating the employees of the Corporation of Madras as Government servants and the petitioners wife is a corporation employee. Though the 1st respondent has rejected the request of the petitioner, the matter is now under appeal before the 2nd respondent, as stated in the affidavit. The claim of the petitioner can be agitated before the appellate authority in the appeal. Therefore, instead of granting the prayer as found in the petition, I direct the 2nd respondent to dispose of the appeal stated to have been filed by the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and till such time, the order of the Collector of Madras dt. Therefore, instead of granting the prayer as found in the petition, I direct the 2nd respondent to dispose of the appeal stated to have been filed by the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and till such time, the order of the Collector of Madras dt. 11.6.1993, shall stand stayed, the Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.