JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J.--1. The tenant, dissatisfied by the decree of eviction under section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (For short 'the Act'), allowed by the trial Court on 22.12.1980 by Fifth Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore in C.O.S. No. 3-N87 and affirmed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 27.3.91 in Civil First Appeal No. 19/90, has approached this Court under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, seeking dismissal of the suit. 2. Factual matrix is jejune. In House No. 371 situated at Saket Nagar Colony, Indore owned by the respondent-landlord, the appellant was inducted as a tenant in the entire portion of ground floor on 1.5.1983 for residential purposes on monthly rental of Rs. 2,100/-, inclusive of furniture and fittings, for 11 months after execution of a rent-note on 30.4.83. The appellant made interest free deposit of Rs. 8,400/- and was obligated to pay monthly rent every month in advance between 1st and 5th. The respondent instituted suit for eviction of the appellant on grounds enumerated under sections 12(1) (a), 12(1) (c) and 12 (1) (e) of the Act. Irregularity in payment of rent was asserted. The appellant resisted the suit and contended that in reality rent of the accommodation was Rs. 1,600/- because the sum of Rs. 500/- pertained to the charge of ceiling fans fitted in the accommodation under lease. The respondent held deposit of Rs. 8,400/- available for adjustment. Set off on account of repairs was also claimed. Grounds of eviction were shown to be meretricious and malafide. 3. We have heard Shri A.M. Mathur, learned Sr. counsel with Shri Brajesh Pandya for the appellant and Shri S.D. Sanghi, learned Senior counsel with Shri N.K. Sanghi for the respondent. 4. The trial Court, on evaluation of evidential material concluded that (a) the monthly rent was Rs. 2,100/-(b) the respondent held the sum of Rs. 8,400/- in deposit liable to be adjusted and (c) the appellant incurred liability of eviction under the ground specified in section 12 (1) (o) of the Act. 5. In First Appeal, the learned Single Judge of this Court, on scrupulous scrutiny of all the objections raised in oppugnation against the decree, found that the conclusion was fault-free and rested on the linch-pin of proper appreciation of facts and application of law. 5. In First Appeal, the learned Single Judge of this Court, on scrupulous scrutiny of all the objections raised in oppugnation against the decree, found that the conclusion was fault-free and rested on the linch-pin of proper appreciation of facts and application of law. The contention about absence of pleading as regards non-availability of alternative accommodation, as essential in terms of the later part of the relevant provision, and deficiency in that behalf in cross-examination, was specifically raised but studiedly repelled. 6. Undaunted by unsuccess in two Courts, the appellant has sought he protective umbrella of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 7. The jurisdiction, so conferred under the stated clause presents a queer question in that the judgment rendered by Subordinate Court in Civil First Appeal - under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code') is treated to be final on facts for bidding further appeal except on involvement of substantial questions of law in terms of section 100 of the Code. It is really the intention of the legislation to place the judgment of Subordinate Court (District Court or Additional Court of District Court) on higher footing, in proclaiming its finality on facts, in comparision to the one rendered by one judge of this Court, albeit under same section i.e. section 96 of the Code and to accord its greater weightage in the matter of appeals is there any inconformity or incongruity in the scheme of law.? 8. To our mind, such appeals, in ignorance of the spirit associated with section 100 of the Code, perhaps sustain life on account of mandate, embodied in section 4 (1) of the Code, in the following terms:- "4. (1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force." 9. We have posed the pertinent points but deem it apt to leave the same open and determine them, as and when occasion arises, in some other case involving more serious issues as in the instant case, answer can squarely rest on the evaluation of evidence available on the record. 10. We have posed the pertinent points but deem it apt to leave the same open and determine them, as and when occasion arises, in some other case involving more serious issues as in the instant case, answer can squarely rest on the evaluation of evidence available on the record. 10. The necessary facts were pleaded in para 10 of the plaint as under:- ^^;g fd okfnuh ds ifr tks jkT; ‘kklu ds eq[; vfHk;ark ¼flapkbZ foHkkx½ ds in ij Hkksiky esa Fks] fnukad 31-10-86 ¼bdÙkhl vDVwcj fN;klh½ dks lsokfuo`Ùk gks pqds gSaA okfnuh vius ifjokj lfgr vc bankSj esa viuk fuokl djuk pkgrh gS] tgka budk dksbZ mi;qDr fuokl LFkku ugha gSA bl rjg okfnuh dks vius Lo;a ,oa ifjokj ds fy;s oknksDr LFkku dh ln~Hkkouk iwoZd ,oa okLrfod :Ik ls vko’;drk gS vkSj bl dk;Z gsrq okfnuh ds dCts esa ‘kgj bankSj esa okfnuh dh ekfyfd;r dk dksbZ mi;qDr LFkku ugha gS flok; ,d dSejs ds ftlesa dh okfnuh dk yM+dk fuokl dj jgk gSA** -o- -o- -o- 11. There is no obscurity. It was inculently averred that the accommodation was required by the respondent for occupation for herself and members of her family and that she or such person had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of her own in the city concerned. The gist was that it was cogently the question of 'felt need', yielded by retirement of husband on 31.10.86 and founded on the compulsion to reside at Indore where alternative suitable accommodation was unavailable. We were unable to appreciate as to what "more" was required to be pleaded in terms of Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of section 12 (1) (e) of the Act and in what way the appellant suffered any surprise at the trial.? In para 9 of the written-statement, the appellant did not contend about availability of any alternative accommodation. The submission thus, was without factual foundation. 12. The respondent did not perjure when she pleadged her oath to depose that earlier she lived at Bhopal with her husband on account of service and shifted to Indore after retirement and acquired rented roof over her head in expectation of obtaining her own house, occupied by the appellant, soon enough. But the procedural wrangle and judicial system, providing tier upon tier brought mirage, not mirth. But the procedural wrangle and judicial system, providing tier upon tier brought mirage, not mirth. The case on hand reminds us of the observation of the Apex Court made some seven years before that "Judicial cries in silence for long, far too long". It is indeed a sad tale of the landlord, residing in tenanted accommodation, where she was required to wait and wait for so long.? Was she really asking for the moon.? Must a lis of this nature hibernate in this fashion.? 13. We have read the statements of the respondent and corroborative evidence furnished by PW-2 Kishorechand together with documents Ex. P11 to Ex. P/6. We have also gone through the statements of the appellant and DW-2 Sharad Shrivastava. On our scrutiny too, we find that the conclusion is on firm foundation warranting on dislodgement or demolition. The learned Single Judge rightly concluded in favour of the respondent. 14. Delay, a modem giant, hell-bent to operate as speed breaker on the road to justice, must be by all concerned if rule of law is not to be replaced by the despicable doctrine of 'might is right'. In pursuit of justice, it would be awkward to create injustice. The ideal position is to ensure and render each one his due. 15. Way back in 1987 in Nair's case, the Apex Court exhorted and enssampled as under in AIR 1987 SC 2117 (Prabhakaran Nair etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and others):- "Tier of appeal should be curtailed, Laws must be simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants. Litigations must come to end quickly. Such new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an all India basis with quicker procedure should be examined. This has become an urgent imperative of today's revolution. A fast changing society cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial attitude." -x- -x- -x- 16. The idea of Rent Tribunal, as suggested, seems to be taking a concrete shape. It is different matter that in an urge to avoid delays even concretion claimed as many as six years since then in the process. 17. The findings, unimpeachable on evidence, are concurrent. The idea of Rent Tribunal, as suggested, seems to be taking a concrete shape. It is different matter that in an urge to avoid delays even concretion claimed as many as six years since then in the process. 17. The findings, unimpeachable on evidence, are concurrent. Following the decision rendered in ILR 1948 Nag 203 (Tulsiram and another v. Badriprasad), the Division Bench of this Court held in 1964 MPLJ 114 N (Shyamlal Mishra v. Padmavati) that- "In a Letters Patent Appeal, a concurrent finding of fact cannot be disturbed. " 18. In a later decision too, this Court in 1977 WN (I) 562 (DB) (Kalicharan Shukla v. State of M.P. and Ors) held as under:- "Thus, the finding that the appellant acted with gross negligence arrived at by the learned Single Judge, with which this Court agrees, is purely a finding of fact which cannot be made a subject of challenge in the present appeal. Appeal dismissed. " -x- -x- -x- 19. The Court, acting reasonably and judiciously, has to assess the justness of the cause, as presented, and to adjudge as to who has wronged and who is wronged, Lord Wright pulled the blinkers of our eyes when he once elegantly observed- "The truth is that the Court decides the question in accordance with what seems to be just or reasonable in its eyes. The Judge finds in himself the criterion of what is reasonable." -x- -x- -x- 20. The litigation under the Rent Legislation does not require legal acrobates and issue is usually nodus-free. The object is to see finality. In AIR 1977 SC 429 (The Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. The Income-Tax Officer) it is held that"At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the policy of law is that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres of human activity." -x- -x- -x- 21. As noticed above, it can be summed up that the learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any infirmity or illegality and as such the impugned verdict remains non-interferable. As noticed above, it can be summed up that the learned counsel for the appellant was unable to point out any infirmity or illegality and as such the impugned verdict remains non-interferable. We are, thus satisfied that the ground of eviction under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act was rightly held to be proved. However, even after disposal of First Appeal, fruits of the decree suffered in-accessibility for about two and a half years by now and proceedings after proceeding pendulated on the pattern of' 'King is dead, long live the King". Who can dispute that litigations must come to an end quickly.? But the congestion of the calendar of the Courts creates situation, almost beyond the control, where tardy pace dictates the course. 22. In the ultimate analysis, we find that the contentions are achromatic and lustre-less. The appeal is thus, held to be acarpous. 23. This is, however, not the end of the matter in that the appellant prayed, that in the event of dismissal of this appeal, grant of reasonable time to vacate may kindly be considered. The tenancy was alleged to be for limited period of 11 months. The quit notice was sent on 20.10.86. The suit was filed on 8.1.'87. Happily enough, the trial Court determined the suit in less than three years i.e. on 22.12.1989 and even the first appeal was decided in little more than two years. The present appeal claimed about two and a half years. Even with all this speed, the /is consumed more than six and a half years. 24. Yet the prayer for some respite in matter of eviction deserves consideration. Considering the dearth of accommodation, it is directed that the execution of eviction part of the decree shall remain postponed subject to the condition that the appellant files an undertaking in the Executing Court within a period of 15 days from today, promising as under:- a) The appellant shall vacate and handover the vacant possession of the suit-accommodation to the respondent on or before 31st January, 1994. b) The appellant shall pay to the respondent or deposit in the Executing Court the entire arrears of rent upto date, if not already deposited, within a period of 15 days from today. b) The appellant shall pay to the respondent or deposit in the Executing Court the entire arrears of rent upto date, if not already deposited, within a period of 15 days from today. c) The appellant shall continue to pay or deposit as above the mesne profits every month by 15th of each succeeding month in terms of Sec. 13 (1) of the Act. d) The appellant shall not sub-let or transfer the possession of the suit-premises to any-one. 25. In the event of failure to file an undertaking as above, or on infringement of any of the aforesaid conditions, the decree of eviction shall become executable and enforceable atonce. 26. In the circumstances, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Time to vacate is, however, granted as above. The appellant shall bear his own costs of this appeal and pay the costs of the respondent. Counsel fee on certification shall be Rs. 1,500/-. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly.