JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is by the Jaipur Cinema Karmchari Union (for short, the Union) of Amber Cinema which was in existence since February, 1974 and was exhibiting films but now it has been closed and has been converted into commercial complex. The Union has challenged the decision dated January 24, 1990 by the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur (for short, the JDA) under which the JDA has approved the commercial complex at Sansar Chandra Road, of Goenka Exhibitors Pvt. Ltd. respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 used to run a cinema in the aforesaid building but had sought the approval for establishment of commercial complex and the said approval was accorded as aforesaid. The petitioner Union claimed that the management of the cinema be handed over to it and further that the members of the petitioner union as well as the employees of the canteen and restaurant should be continued to be the employees of the respondent No. 2 and direction may be given to that effect. 2. According to the petitioner- Union when the cinema was in operation and 100 persons were functioning, but a notice dated February 10, 1990 was published in 'Dainik Nav Jyoti' dated February 11, 1990 and under it, it was notified that the Board of Directors of respondent No. 2 Goenka Exhibitors (P) Ltd. Proprietor of Amber Cinema, has decided that the work of cinema being uneconomical, the cinema is dosed w.e.f. February 10, 1990 and the employees were called upon to get their accounts settled from the office and their termination orders and compensation amount was ready to be paid. On enquiry the petitioner union came to know that the JDA in its 146th BPC (Building Plan Committee) meeting held on January 24, 1990, took a decision to approve the proposed commercial complex at Sansar Chandra Road by the respondent No. 2. As a result of the aforesaid decision the Union apprehended that the cinema building will be demolished and commercial complex shall be raised on the same. 3. According to the petitioner union there is a Master Plan of Jaipur in operation which was published vide notification of the Government of Rajasthan bearing No. F 1 (6) TP/72 dated June 4, 1976 published in Rajasthan Gazette dated June 10, 1976, and it was prepared under the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (for short, the UIT Act). According to the petitioner Union after the constitution of the JDA under the provisions of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 (for short, the JDA Act) as provided under Section 27 of that Act, the Master Plan prepared by the UIT became the Master Plan prepared under the provisions of the JDA ACt and was to remain in operation after the preparation of new Master Plan by the JDA Act. In the Master Plan the land use has been shown and the provisions of JDA Act for making modification in the Master Plan have not been complied with. The petitioner union has challenged the alleged change of the land use from cinema to commercial complex. 4. The petition is contested by the respondents and it has been said that there is no violation/deviation of the Master Plan and the decisions to close the cinema was taken by the respondent No. 2 because any owner has right to close his business and the right to close the business cannot be interfered with and the employees are only entitled to compensation under the provisions of Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for shot, the ID Act) and so far as the decision to close the business i.e. the cinema is concerned, the petitioner union has no locus standi. A plea has also been taken that the writ petition is belated. There were 38 employees and not 100 as alleged by the petitioner union and each of them was offered one month's pay, retrenchment compensation, amount of gratuity payable and the arrears of pay through account payee cheques alongwith notice under Section 25-FFF of the ID act on February 10, 1990 and on the employees' refusal to accept the same, the respondent No. 2 remitted the same by registered post on February 15, 1990. A notice was published on February 12, 1990 offering the employees to accept the notices and cheques as aforesaid and only on failure of the employees to accept it, the respondent No. 2 had to send them by registered post, but the envelopes were returned back as the employees did not accept the same. It is further the case of the respondent No. 2 that there has been no violation of the provisions of the ID Act as well as the JDA Act. The cinema land consisting of an area of 3002 sq. It is further the case of the respondent No. 2 that there has been no violation of the provisions of the ID Act as well as the JDA Act. The cinema land consisting of an area of 3002 sq. yards is a part of the Khandela House, Sansar Chandra Road, Jaipur. Before the purchase of that land by the respondent No. 2, it had been purchased by 7 persons from the erstwhile thikanedar of Khandela and the said Khandela House was the residence of thikanedar and it was never assessed to land revenue. The respondent No. 2 had purchased the same from seven owners thereof in the year 1971 and the names of the owners have been given in para 7(A) of the reply. After having purchased the land as aforesaid and only after obtaining NOC from the Collector, Jaipur under the Rajasthan Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952 for locating a permanent cinema building and after receipt of the permission on June 16, 1971 the cinema building was constructed and a licence to run the cinema was granted on February 5, 1974. According to the respondent No. 2 prior to July 17, 1974, when Section 73-B was inserted in the UIT Act, there was no provision for seeking permission for change of land use for a particular land and building. Therefore, the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (Change of Use of Residential Land or Premises for Commercial Purpose) Rules, 1974 (for short, the Rules) which came into force on October 14, 1974 were not attracted. It is further the case of the respondent No. 2 that it was called upon under the aforesaid Rules as far back as in September, 1976 to pay conversion charges, but an objection being filed by it and after considering the same, the State Government had taken a decision that the Rules were not applicable to the case of the respondent No. 2. 5. The respondent No. 2 has also come out with the case that it was on June 19, 1989 on the application filed by it that the JDA granted NOC to modify the building from cinema to commercial complex (Annr. R/12), and only thereafter it had submitted its building plan which was approved on September 19,1989. 5. The respondent No. 2 has also come out with the case that it was on June 19, 1989 on the application filed by it that the JDA granted NOC to modify the building from cinema to commercial complex (Annr. R/12), and only thereafter it had submitted its building plan which was approved on September 19,1989. The permission to demolish the existing building of the cinema was also granted on November 27, 1989 and modified building plan was submitted and it was finally approved by the JDA on January 24, 1990. According to the respondent No. 2 even after the change of cinema building to commercial complex, the land will still remain as commercial. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the relevant provisions of the UIT Act, JDA Act and ID Act and also other relevant provisions of law. 7. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner union that there has been modification/deviation of the master plan inasmuch as the land use has been changed from cinema to commercial and it has been done without following the procedure prescribed under Section 25 of the JDA Act, I find no substance in it. It will be seen that he cinema had been constructed before 1974 and started exhibiting film even as per the case of the petitioner union of February 22, 1974 before the Rules came into force. The land was never agricultural and was residential and had been sold by the erstwhile thikanedar of Khandela House to seven persons for construction of houses and those seven persons then had sold the land to the respondent No. 2 and thereafter completing the formalities the respondent No. 2 had constructed a cinema building and also started exhibiting films. When cinema building was constructed and it started exhibiting films, it could not be said to be continued to be residential. It will be seen from Annr. R2/10 that in the subject "regarding conversion charges of the land of Amber Cinema, Jaipur" the Government took a decision and informed the Secretary of the then UIT Jaipur that the provisions of the rules are not applicable. It will be seen from Annr. R2/10 that in the subject "regarding conversion charges of the land of Amber Cinema, Jaipur" the Government took a decision and informed the Secretary of the then UIT Jaipur that the provisions of the rules are not applicable. A perusal of the Master Plan 1971-91 will show that Sansar Chandra Road has been shown as commercial and even if assuming for the sake of arguments though not accepting, that the land use from cinema to commercial will change the land use, because in the Master Plan it has been, as said earlier, the land use shown was commercial, it cannot be said that there was any deviation of the land use in contravention of the Master Plan. In such a situation, in my opinion, the provisions of Section 25 of the JDA Act can hardly be attracted. So far as argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on earlier occasion also there had been orders for change of residential accommodation to commercial and recourse to the provisions of Section 25 of the JDA Act was taken by the JDA, learned counsel in this connection made a reference to Annr. 4 a news paper, in which the said order dated January 23, 1990 of the JDA was published that no objections had been received and therefore the permission was granted to M/s United Hotel Jaipur to use land for establishment of a hotel is concerned in a case where in the Master Plan the land use has been shown as residential recourse to Section 25 of the JDA Act for conversion of the land use from residential to commercial, may be necessary, but so far as Sansar Chandra Road is concerned, it can hardly be disputed that even in the Master Plan the land use was commercial and therefore if the respondent No. 2 had constructed commercial-complex and the JDA granted permission to it the petitioner union can have no grievance about it and it cannot be said that there has been contravention of Section 25 of the JDA Act or the land has been used for the purposes other than specified in the Jaipur Master Plan for 1971-91. That apart, unless there is some prohibition under any Act, and it could be under JDA Act, UIT Act or any other Act, the owner has a right to close its business, of course, there have been some impediments under the provisions of the ID Act which shall be discussed at the later stage of this order. 8. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner union is that the Building Committee has no power to approve the plan, rather to approve the construction of commercial complex under its 146th BPC-II meeting (Building Plan) held on January 24, 1990. According to the learned counsel under Section 10 of the JDA Act before a committee is constituted for the purposes mentioned in that section, it was necessary that regulations must have been made under Section 96 of the JDA Act and the same should have been published in the official gazette. But no such regulations have been framed and published in the official gazette and therefore the constitution of the committee was not in accordance with law and the decision taken in respect to agenda item No. 9 in the aforesaid meeting of the BPC is without jurisdiction, unconstitutional and null and void. The aforesaid ground is contested by the learned counsel for the respondents on the ground that the power to sanction a plan or to make any improvement under Section 17 of the JDA Act is vested in the JDA and the said power has been delegated to the Commissioner. The Commissioner of the JDA has power by virtue of Section 8(2), (3) and (4) of the JDA Act to seek the aid and services of any person. It was the Commissioner who presided over the meeting and has taken the final decision in the matter. The various members of the BPC are simply to assist the Commissioner in taking the final decision as contemplated under Section 8 of the JDA Act and thus the decision taken by BPC in its meeting dated January 24, 1990 is legal and suffers from no infirmity. The various members of the BPC are simply to assist the Commissioner in taking the final decision as contemplated under Section 8 of the JDA Act and thus the decision taken by BPC in its meeting dated January 24, 1990 is legal and suffers from no infirmity. It will be seen that under Section 17 of the JDA Act no person or authority except with the previous permission of the JDA shall undertake any development within the Jaipur region of the type as the JDA may from time to time specify, by notification published in the official gazette, and which is likely to adversely affect the overall development of the Jaipur region and any authority or person desiring to undertake development as aforesaid has to apply in writing to the JDA for permission to undertake development. In exercise of the powers conferred upon the JDA under Section 97(2) of the Jaipur Development Authority Ordinance, 1982, the JDA in their meeting dated August 5, 1982, had resolved that the powers of the JDA be delegated to various authorites/officers, etc. as stated in the statement annexed to the order No. JDA/Estt/(6)/82/2760 dated September 4, 1982. At S. No. 2, the power under Section 18 of the JDA Act to grant permission to undertake development within Jaipur region has been delegated to the Jaipur Development Commissioner. It will therefore be clear that the Commissioner acts as the authority under the power delegated to him and he simply takes the assistance and aid of some persons and the BPC was constituted by him for that purpose. Therefore, this argument has no force. 9. It has already been said in the earlier part of this order that the owner of a business/establishment has a right to close his business unless there is bar under some statute. It is the case of the respondent No. 2 himself that it had complied with the provisions of Section 25-FFF of the ID Act, but the members of the petitioner Union had not taken the amount which was offered to them and even the money which was sent to their address through registered envelopes was not accepted and the registered envelopes were not accepted and the registered envelopes were received back with the endorsement 'refused to take service'. Though, it is the case of the petitioner union that 100 persons were employed in the cinema, but this fact is not admitted by the respondent No. 2 and it will be seen from the reply to para 5 of the writ petition that the respondent No. 2 has not only emphatically denied the averments of para 5 of the writ petition in respect of number of employees, but has also clearly said that it was employing only 38 persons and they have been retrenched as a result of closure of the cinema. The respondent No. 2 has come out with the case that in fact only 38 persons had been employed and the aforesaid fact has been admitted by the petitioners themselves in the notice served on the State of Rajasthan, JDA, Collector and the Chief Town Planner on January 25, 1990 styling it as a notice for demand of justice and in para 3 the petitioner's counsel Shri R. P. Garg has mentioned that in the Amber Cinema 43 workers are working at present'. Again in para 8 of the notice it has been mentioned that 'the workers employed in the Cinema are only 43'. No rejoinder to the reply has been filed. It is common knowledge that documentary evidence is available and it could be available about the number of employees. Various returns which must have been filed under various Acts including Shops and Commercial Establishment act where the number of employees must have been shown by the employer could be shown. Therefore, it cannot be said that number of employees was 100 or even 50 or more than that so far as Amber Cinema is concerned when it was functioning, or at any rate it is disputed question of fact. An application has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2 on July 24, 1992 wherein it has been stated that there were 38 employees in the Amber cinema, out of which 23 mentioned in that application, have accepted the payment and they have accepted the payment in full and final settlement of their dues. Despite a copy of the same having been given to the learned counsel for the petitioners, no reply appears to have been filed by the petitioners, no doubt such an application was filed after the arguments were heard and the order was reserved. Despite a copy of the same having been given to the learned counsel for the petitioners, no reply appears to have been filed by the petitioners, no doubt such an application was filed after the arguments were heard and the order was reserved. Be that as it may, as said earlier, it cannot be said as a matter of fact that there were even 50 or more than 50 employees what to say 100 in the establishment of Amber cinema. 10. A case has been set up by the petitioner union that the closure of the cinema was against the provisions of the ID Act but even the respondent No. 2 has come out with a case that it is a case of closure of the establishment and further as said earlier it was case covered by Section 25-FFF. Under Section, 25-FFA(1) of the ID Act which was inserted by Act No. 32 of 1972, Section 2, an employer who intends to close down an undertaking has to serve, at least sixty days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, a notice in the prescribed manner on the appropriate Government stating dearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking, but under the proviso nothing contained in the aforesaid sub-section (1) shall apply to (a) an undertaking in which (i) less than fifty workmen are employed, or (ii) less than fifty workmen were employed on an average per working day in the preceding twelve months. As said earlier, there is no material that in the Amber Cinema 50 or more than 50 persons were employed and therefore Section 25-FFA in my opinion will not be attracted in the absence of pleading and even in the absence of factual foundation. There appears to be no dispute that Section 25-FFF of ID Act is applied and the amount was offered to each of the members of the petitioner union, but they did not accept it. It has already been said that after filing of the writ petitions as many as 23 persons are said to have received the amount. The remaining members of the petitioner union, which according to the respondent No. 2 are 15, do not appear to have received the amount, they may be more but do not appear to be 50 or more than 50. The remaining members of the petitioner union, which according to the respondent No. 2 are 15, do not appear to have received the amount, they may be more but do not appear to be 50 or more than 50. Therefore, there can be no dispute that remaining members of the petitioner union are entitled to payment of the amount under Section 25-FFF of the ID Act as a result of closure of the cinema. This position is not disputed even by Mr. G. L. Pareek counsel for the respondent No. 2. Closure of the undertaking (Amber Cinema) appears to have taken place sometime in the year 1990, in February, 1990 or near about it. It will be seen from a perusal of Anr. R2/1 that the Board of Directors of Amber Cinema had taken a decision on February 10, 1990 to close the undertaking and to pay the amount of compensation etc. as required under Section 25-FFF of the ID Act. May be, the remaining members of the petitioner union might not have accepted the amount, but it can be said that as a result of not accepting the amount, the respondent No. 2 has used or might have used it for its own benefit, for construction of commercial complex and therefore, I am of the opinion that on the amount which was payable to the remaining members of the petitioner union interest may also be awarded and looking to the presently prevalent rate, I deem it proper that interest at the rate of 15% p.a. on the amount payable to the members of the petitioner union under section 25-FFF of the ID Act from the date in became payable, should be awarded. 11. Consequently, this writ petition is partly allowed only to the extent that the remaining members of the petitioner who have not been paid the amount of compensation or who have not taken the amount under Section 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entitled to such amount alongwith the interest thereon at the rate of 15% p.a. from the date it became due till the said amount is remitted to them. In case the amount on being remitted is not accepted, from the date of remission of the amount as aforesaid they will not be entitled to any interest. Costs made easy.Petition partly allowed. *******