Judgment : By invoking the power of this Court, empowered under Secs.389 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner/accused, while preferring the appeal in this Court is seeking the relief of suspension of the sentence imposed on him by the judgment rendered in C.C.No. 1 of 1992, dated 17. 1993 by the learned Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram Division and prays for the grant of bail till the disposal of the appeal. 2. But for the important question of law involved in this petition necessitating useful legal exercise, I do not propose to enter into the controversy in the midst of very many legal ratios held by the courts of law in this regard. 3. Short facts leading to the filing of the present appeal and consequent petition for suspension of sentence and bail are stated as follows: Petitioner/ appellant herein, along with two others, was tried for certain offences punishable under the Customs Act and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, in C.C.No. 1 of 1992 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram Division. After full trial, learned Sessions Judge, found the other accused namely, A-1 and A-3 not guilty for the charges framed and tried against them but however found the petitioner/ appellant (A-2) guilty under Sec. 135(1)(b)(2) of the Customs Act and Sec. 20(1)(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act and whereupon,convicted and sentenced him, to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence under Sec.135(1)(b) of Customs Act and rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs. 500 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, for the offence under Sec. 20(1)(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act. Aggrieved, petitioner/appellant has preferred the appeal as above referred and that has been numbered as Crl.A.No. 434 of 1993 and during the pendency of the same, suspension of the sentence and grant of bail for the appellant is sought for, as above referred. 4. Aggrieved, petitioner/appellant has preferred the appeal as above referred and that has been numbered as Crl.A.No. 434 of 1993 and during the pendency of the same, suspension of the sentence and grant of bail for the appellant is sought for, as above referred. 4. The substractum of the contentions raised by Mr.Loganathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/appellant, is that since the petitioner has paid the fine amount and is canvassing the correctness and the findings of the learned Sessions Judge in the appeal preferred by him, under Sec. 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the powers specifically in built in the above section of law, during the pendency of the appeal, High Court has every power to suspend, remit or grant bail and that the said power of the High Court has not since been ousted by any other provisions of the special enactments like the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act, and that the power of the High Court to grant suspension of the sentence in the instant case and grant the bail for the appellant, cannot be restricted by any of the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act and that as such, the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed therein. 5. Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent strongly objected the above said view, on the ground, that the rigour of Sec. 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act, is having an overall over-riding effect upon Sec. 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that therefore, even though the petitioner has preferred the appeal challenging the correctness and propriety of the impugned judgment rendered by the trial court, this Court, cannot grant the relief of suspension of sentence and bail and as such, the reliefs claimed on behalf of the petitioner are totally misplaced. 6. In the light of the above bone of contentions made on behalf of the respective parties, the only question which arises for consideration in this petition, is whether the High Court, during the pendency of an appeal preferred against the conviction and sentence rendered by a Special Judge for the proved offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act, has got power to suspend the sentence imposed and consequently grant the bail to the petitioner or not? 7. 7. Point: In so far as the merits of the appeal on factual or legal aspects are concerned, it cannot be decided in this petition. However, it is worthwhile to note at this stage, to say so, after the full trial, learned Sessions Judge, has found the petitioner guilty for the offences under the relevant provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act as well as Customs Act and therefore, the judgment rendered by the learned trial Judge ex facie raises a presumption that the petitioner/accused has committed the offences and accordingly, he is convicted and sentenced to. Unless and until the appeal is heard on merits and disposed of, with the result of, for or against, it cannot be under law presumed, that the petitioner/appellant is innocent. It is this cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence with regard to the presumption of innocence emerged till the impugned judgment was delivered and that has now been changed in view of the judgment of conviction and sentence and that therefore, it can be safely presumed, till the disposal of the appeal, the petitioner/appellant has committed the offence as provided under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act as well as Customs Act. 8. In the light of the above position, no argument was advanced by the Bar with regard to the merits, factual aspects and correctness of the impugned judgment in this petition. 9. To appreciate the controversy, which is legal and which assumes much more significance, adverting of Sec. 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has become absolutely necessary, which runs as follows: “Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail: (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and; also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. .(2) The power conferred by this section on an appellate court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a court subordinate thereto. .(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the court shall... .(2) The power conferred by this section on an appellate court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a court subordinate thereto. .(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the court shall... .(i) Where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or .(ii) Where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the appellate court under Sub-sec(1) and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. .(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment of life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced.” 10. A plain reading of the above section makes it clear that the power vested with the High Court, that pending any appeal by a convicted person for the reasons to be recorded in writing, the execution of sentence imposed by the impugned judgment can be suspended and that if the appellant has already been confined to jail, he can be released on bail and thus, the power vested with the High Court has become so wide. In this context, it has become necessary to advert to Sec. 32-A, of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotrophic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as N.D.P.S. Act), which reads as follows: “32-A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Sec.33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Sec. 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted.” At this juncture, it is relevant to note that this Sec. 32A has been insisted by the N.D.P.S. (Amendment) Act 2 of 1989 in the context and consideration that in the recent past, drug abuse and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and Psychotrophic substances has increased inspite of deterrent and stringent punishment provided in an old Act and to meet the difficulties, this section along with various other sections were incorporated by the Amended Act. 11. This section enjoins, that no sentence awarded under this Act other than Sec. 27 shall be suspended or remitted or commuted not withstanding anything contained in the Code as amended by Act 2 of 1974 or any other law for the time being in force with respect to the provisions of Sec. 33 of this Act. But, it is seen that Sec. 33 of the Act, makes Sec. 360 of the Code applicable, pertaining to the Probation of Offenders Act and that as such, the sentence awarded under Sec. 27 of the present Act has been saved from the operation of this Section the reason that the unholy alliance between the druglords and smugglers of the narcotic drugs and psychotrophic substances, if there is any, as claimed by some persons, would be broken by this provision because the power of the politicians to grant remission has been taken away. Secs. 432 to 435 of the Code empower the Central and the State Government to exercise the power of suspension, remission and commutation of sentences. However, it is manifest that this section takes away the power of the respective Governments to take the concept of suspension remission or commutation of sentences except under Sec. 27 of the Act and further except with the power vested with the President and Governor respectively under Arts. 72(1) and 161 of the Constitu-tion of India. However, it is manifest that this section takes away the power of the respective Governments to take the concept of suspension remission or commutation of sentences except under Sec. 27 of the Act and further except with the power vested with the President and Governor respectively under Arts. 72(1) and 161 of the Constitu-tion of India. Pertinent at this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Berlin Joseph alios Ravi v. State, (1992) 1 Crimes 1221. At Page 1223, the Bench has observed as follows: “Sec. 32-A No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),orany other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of Sec. 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Sec. 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted. 37.Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable: (1)Notwithstandinganythingcontained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) .(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; .(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and .(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposed the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. .(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Cl.(b) of Sub-sec(1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law f6r the time being in force on granting of bail.” 12. The contention based on Sec. 36-B is that since High Court has “all the powers” conferred by Chapters 29 and 30 of the Code, High Court has also power to suspend the sentence passed on a convicted person by excrising powers under Sec. 389 of the Code (Sec. 389) falls within Chapter 29 of the Code. Sec. 389 of the Code provides that pending appeal by a convicted person, the appellate court may order that execution of the sentence appealed against be suspended. Sec. 389 of the Code provides that pending appeal by a convicted person, the appellate court may order that execution of the sentence appealed against be suspended. According to the learned counsel, Sec. 32-A of the N.D.P.S. Act can have application, in the aforesaid background, only to suspension, remission and commutation of sentences“referred to in Secs.432 and 433 of the Code which fall within Chapter 32 of the Code. Counsel invited our attention to the main title given to Chapter 32 of the Code as “Execution, suspension, remission and commutation of sentences”. The sub-title given to the ‘E’ Division in the Chapter is suspension, commutation and remission of sentences”. As powers of the High Court while dealing with an appeal (provided in Chapter 29 of the Code) are well preserved, the legislative intention is not to whittle down the High Court’s power to suspend the sentence during pendency of appeal, according to the learned counsel. We will examine the tenability of this contention now. .13. Art.72 of the Constitution of India confers power on the President of India “to suspend, remit or commute sentence” in all cases where punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which executive power of the Union extends. Art.161 contains similar power which Governor of a State can exercise in relation to a person convicted of any offence against law relating to a matter which the executive power of the State extends. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held in Maru Ram v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2147 that power under Arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution cannot be exercised by the President or Governor on their own but only on the advice of the appropriate Government. The said ratio has been followed by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 653: 1989 Crl.L.J. 941: (1988) 4 J.T. 693 : (1989)1 S.C.C. 204 : 1989 S.C.C. (Crl.) 96. Thus, the position relating to Arts.72 and 161 of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is that the appropriate executive Government can advice the Head of the State to exercise powers thereunder and such advice is binding on him. Thus, the position relating to Arts.72 and 161 of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is that the appropriate executive Government can advice the Head of the State to exercise powers thereunder and such advice is binding on him. If the object of Sec. 32-A of the N.D.P.S. Act is to take away the power of the Government to suspend, remit or commute the sentence, the legislative exercise in enacting the said provision is practically of futility because even without Secs. 432 and 433 of the Code the appropriate Government can suspend, remit or commute the sentences in exercise of the constitutional functions. For this reason, firstly, we are not impressed by the contention that the sole object of incorporating a provision like Sec. 32-A in the N.D.P.S. Act was to impose curb on the executive power to suspend, remit or commute the sentence passed on a particular accused. 14. Next is, legislative intent in enacting Sec. 32-A of the N.D.P.S. Act is only to curb the governmental powers under Secs. 432 and 433 of the Code, clear and necessary words in Sec. 32-A would have been conveniently employed in the provision. Instead of saying "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code," Sec. 32-A could have been worded as "notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter 32 of the Code." That apart, the words for any other law "for the time being in force" in Sec. 32-A would further show that the sole aim of the provision is not to fetter exclusively the power envisaged in Secs. 432 and 433 of the Code. .15. Yet, a more catching indication gatherable from the Amendment Act is that Sec. 37 is specifically made applicable only to a person "accused of an offence" and not to a person convicted of an offence. The reasoning of Padmanabhan,J. on this score, is that the words "any person accused of an offence" would include a convicted person also. The provision reads thus: ."Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), no person accused or convicted of an offence under Sub-sec(1) or Sub-sec.(3) shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless-(similar conditions provided). 16. Thus in similar provisions in other statutes "convicted person" is also specifically included in addition to "accused person". 16. Thus in similar provisions in other statutes "convicted person" is also specifically included in addition to "accused person". This exclusion from Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, in that background, is not without any reason or rationale. It is because the case of a convicted person is covered elsewhere (in Sec. 32-A) that the legislature wanted to exclude him from the scope of Sec. 37. It cannot be assumed that Parliament wanted an accused person to be enmeshed under more stringent rigour than convicted persons. 17. In support of the argument that Sec. 32-A is not intended to take away the High Court’s power to suspend sentence, main thrust was laid on Sec. 36-B. The said section, no doubt, empowers, the High Court to exercise the powers envisaged in Chapter 29 of the Code. But does it empower the High Court to exercise all the powers envisaged in that said Chapter? It must be borne in mind that the section has advisedly used the rider words "so far as it is applicable" in order to indicate that the section is not intended to invoke all the powers envisaged in the chapter hook, line and sinker. If that part of Sec. 389 of the Code which deals with discretion of the High Court to suspend the sentence is not applicable, then Sec36-A of the N.D.P.S. Act is not a carte blanche to exercise all powers conferred on the appellate court by virtue of Chapter 29 of the Code. 18. To which the legislative intent, it is permissible for courts to take into account "objects and reasons" presented while introducing the Bill before the legislature. Such a course was considered not desirable a decade ago, but "the recent trend in jurisdic thought in western countries" has led our courts also to take into account "everything which is logically relevant" while interpreting the provisions of a statute (vide K.P. Varghese v. I.T. Officer, Ernakulam, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922: 1981 Tax.L.R. 1448: (1981) 131 I.T.R. 597: (1981) 4 S.C.C. 173 and Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited v. Government of Kerala, 1985 K.L.T. 915. Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Bill No. 125 of 1988 in the Lok Sabha (which later became Act 2 of 1989) was published in the Gazette of India-(6th December, 1988). Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Bill No. 125 of 1988 in the Lok Sabha (which later became Act 2 of 1989) was published in the Gazette of India-(6th December, 1988). One of the statements is thus: "Even though the major offences are non bailable by virtue of the level of punishment, on technical grounds, drug offenders were being released on bail. In the light of certain difficulties faced in the enforcement of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 the need to amend the law to further strengthen it, has been felt." 19.The aforesaid statement, when read along with the scheme of the amended provisions helps to discern that Sec. 32-A is intended to provide an embargo against suspension, remission and commutation of sentence of a convicted person, whether it is during the pendency of appeal or otherwise. 20. Sri.M.N.Sukumaran Nayar, learned counsel tried to show that the aforesaid interpretation would lead to hazardous consequences. He cited one possibility like this: Even binder Sec. 37 bail can be granted in cases where the offence is punishable for a term of less than five years, but if he is convicted of that offence, his sentence (which may be a short term imprisonment) cannot be suspended, when his appeal is pending. In this context, we have to make a special note of a parenthetical clause included in Sec. 32-A which reads thus: “(other than Sec. 27)”. The said words in parenthesis make it clear that a’ sentence passed for an offence under Sec. 27 can be suspended in exercise of powers under Chapter 29 of the Code. Sec. 27 deals with punishments for relatively minor offences under the N.D.P.S. Act. In fact, a reading of the aforesaid parenthetical clause fortifies the interpretation that Sec. 32-A in its generality is intended to separate against suspension of sentence at any stage either by the High Court or by any other authority. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we agree with the view adopted by Pareed Pillay, J. in Phasalu v. State of Kerala, (1991) 2 K.L.T. 787 , that application of Sec. 32-A cannot be confined to governmental powers and it applies to suspension of sentence during the pendancy of appeal also. High Court has no power to suspend the sentence of convicted person either during the pendency of his appeal or revision, unless it relates to the offence under Sec. 27“. High Court has no power to suspend the sentence of convicted person either during the pendency of his appeal or revision, unless it relates to the offence under Sec. 27“. Thus, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, after having elaborately discussed the pros and cons and ambit of Sec. 32-A in the context of Sec. 36-B of the N.D.P.S. Act and Sec. 389 of the Code has pronounced the law, that Sec. 32-A cannot be confined to the governmental powers alone and that for the said reasoning the High Court has no power to suspend the sentence of a convicted person either during the pendency of an appeal or a revision unless it relates to an offence under Sec. 27 of the N.D.P.S. Act. 22. While dealing with a similar application for suspension of sentence and release on bail pending disposal of the appeal filed by an accused, who was convicted under Sec.8 read with 21 of the N.D.P.S. Act, in Kantilal Jain v. Assistant Collector, C.I.U., Madurai, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 563, a Division Bench of this Court, has declined to grant the relief of suspension of sentence and release on bail pending disposal of the appeal, as was held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, but however, the Division Bench of this Court came to the said conclusion on different but quite contra reasonings. My learned brother, Somasundaram, J. speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, in the above referred case law, has observed (at page 566) as follows: “In view of the ruling of the Apex Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishanlal, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 (S.C.). it has to be held that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in P.T. Oliver Fernando v. Assistant Collector of Madras, 1990 L.W.(Crl.) 357, is no longer good law so far as the law as stated by the Division Bench of this Court in the answer rendered with regard to the 1st question referred to them which is extracted supra. However, the law as laid down by the Division Bench in the answer to the second question extracted supra is not affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Narcoties Control Bureau v. Kishanlal, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 (S.C.). However, the law as laid down by the Division Bench in the answer to the second question extracted supra is not affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in Narcoties Control Bureau v. Kishanlal, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 (S.C.). We are also in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench with regard to the question No. 2 that Sec. 32-A of the act is not a bar for the High Court exercising its powers in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of an appeal and that the powers of suspension under Sec. 389 of the Code are preserved by Sec. 36-B of the Act. While answering the second question referred to the Division Bench, Sivasubramaniam, J., has further observed as follows: “Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the power available under Sec. 389 of the Code to suspend the sentence is not taken away by Sec. 32-A of the Act. However, we must add that the limitations contained in Sec. 37 of the Act will have to be borne in mind by the High Court while suspending the sentence and enlarging the accused on bail. Even at this stage, the High Court will have to bear in mind the object of the Act and it should exercise its powers with great care and caution, so that the very object of the Act is not defeated.” However, the Apex Court in Narcotics Control ureau v. Kishanlal, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 (S.C.). has held that: “Consequently, the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act.” From the above observations of the Supreme Court it follows that the powers of the High Court to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the Act. Consequently we have to hold that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Sec. 389 of the Code are also subject to the limitations and restrictions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the Act. Consequently we have to hold that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Sec. 389 of the Code are also subject to the limitations and restrictions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court in P.T. Oliver Fernando v. Assistant Collector of Madras, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 357, also nowhere says that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Sec. 389 of the Code pending disposal of the appeal against conviction for offences under the Act, are not subject to the restrictions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the Act. On the other hand, the Division Bench clearly says that the High Court, will have to bear in mind the object of the Act and it should exercise its powers with great care and caution so that the very object of the Act is not defeated and that the limitations contained in Sec. 37 of the Act will have to be borne in mind while suspending the sentence and enlarging the accused on bail. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the limitations prescribed by Sec. 37 of the Act will apply only to a person who is accused of an offence under the Act and not to a person who is convicted for offences under the Act and who has filed an appeal against the conviction and sentence and moves for suspension of the sentence and bail under Sec. 389 of the Code, cannot be countenanced because, as rightly contended by the Central Government Public Prosecutor that a person does not cease to be a person accused of an offence under the Act merely because he has been convicted by the trial court for offences under the Act and the appeal filed by him against the conviction and sentence is pending before the High Court. Further Sec. 389 of the Code deals with the power of the High Court to order suspension of sentence pending appeal and release of the convicted person on bail. As already pointed out, the Apex Court in clear terms has laid down that the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec. 37of the Act. As already pointed out, the Apex Court in clear terms has laid down that the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec. 37of the Act. From the above discussion it emerges that Sec. 32-A is not a bar for the High Court exercising its powers in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal, in as much as the powers of suspension under Sec. 389 of the Code are preserved by Sec. 36-B of the Act and that Sec. 32-A will refer only to the Government and not to the courts. However, the powers of the High Court in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal under Sec. 389 of the Code are also subject to the restrictions contained in Sec. 37 of the Act.” Thus, a plain reading of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court stated supra, makes it abundantly clear that the power of the High Court to suspend the sentence imposed upon an accused and grant bail during the pendency of the appeal preferred by him is restricted by virtue of Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act and that therefore, during the pendency of the appeal, no sentence awarded under the N.D.P.S. Act can be suspended and bail granted. If the cumulative effect of the decisions rendered by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court and the Division Bench of this Court stated supra are juxtaposed, it is made clear that during the pendency of an appeal, filed canvassing against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed under N.D.P.S. Act, the sentence cannot be suspended and no bail can be granted and that was the consensus of law held by both courts, however, on different reasonings. 23. It has also become necessary to refer to the decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Velu Thevar v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, N.I.B., C.I.D., Theni, 1992 L. W. (Crl.) 187, while dealing with the scope of Secs. 23. It has also become necessary to refer to the decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Velu Thevar v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, N.I.B., C.I.D., Theni, 1992 L. W. (Crl.) 187, while dealing with the scope of Secs. 32-A, 33 and 37, of the N.D.P.S. Act in the context of Sec. 437 of the Code, my learned brother, Janarthanam, J. has held in the above citation as follows: “The N.D.P.S. Act, being a special enactment to make stringent provision for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotrophic substances in our motherland, special provisions have been made relating to the release on bail of offenders accused of an offence under the Act, in the shape of enactment of a provision, namely, Sec. 37, which provides for certain stringent limitations in the matter of grant of bail to such offenders. By a cursory look and glance of Sec. 32-A, although it may appear that the section does empower the court to grant suspension of sentence, it is not really so and the same will be patent if a little bit of further probe is made therefor. It may be recapitulated at this juncture that two specific provisions in the shape of Secs. 432 and 433 had been enacted in the Code as respects suspension, remission and commutation of sentence. Those two sections recognise the power of the State Government to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of persons convicted of an offence and undergoing the incarceration in jail. It is with a view to curtail the executive power of the Government in the matter of suspension, remission and commutation of sentence of persons convicted of an offence under this Act, a special provision under Sec. 32-A of the Act has been enacted by the introduction of a non obstante clause in the said section namely, "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)", obviously in a bid to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotrophic substances. As such, there is no express exclusion of the power of this Court in the matter of suspension of sentence of offenders convicted of offence, which had been recognised under Sec. 389 of the Code. As such, there is no express exclusion of the power of this Court in the matter of suspension of sentence of offenders convicted of offence, which had been recognised under Sec. 389 of the Code. It has to be borne in mind at this juncture that simply because the power of this Court under Sec. 439 of the Code has been preserved, it does not mean such a power can be exercised de hors stringent provisions contained in Sec37 of the Act regulating the grant of bail to offenders accused of offences under the Act inasmuch as suspension of sentence of offenders convicted under the Act pending appeal involves grant of bail. 13. It is to be remembered that the materials available as against a person accused of an offence under this Act prior to and during the stage of trial can, in the eye of law, be construed as prima-facie materials capable of proving the alleged commission of the offence during trial. After the stage of trial, such materials get sanctified as evidence proving the commission of the offence by the offenders till their conviction and sentence are set aside on appeal. In such state of affairs, it cannot be stated that there are reasonable grounds, at the stage of consideration of suspension of sentence pending appeal, for coming to the conclusion that he is not guilty of the offence in respect of which he had been convicted and sentenced, leave alone the other ground that he is not likely to commit any offence while on such bail. 14. In this view of the matter there is no justification for the suspension of sentence imposed on the petitioner herein and order for his release on bail pending disposal of the appeal." 24. In the context of the case laws at above referred on this subject, my attention was drawn to an order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in held between one Muruganandam v. State by Assistant Commissioner of Police, Royapuram Range, Madras, Crl.M.P.No. 1797 of 1993 in C.A.No. 169 of 1993, dated 27. 1993. In the context of the case laws at above referred on this subject, my attention was drawn to an order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in held between one Muruganandam v. State by Assistant Commissioner of Police, Royapuram Range, Madras, Crl.M.P.No. 1797 of 1993 in C.A.No. 169 of 1993, dated 27. 1993. For the same relief claimed therein and by referring the above case laws on the subject involving Secs.32A, 33 of the N.D.P.S.Act with Sec. 389 of the Code on the one hand and Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act on the other hand, my learned brother, Bellie, J. though agreed that during the pendency of any appeal or revision, as provided under Sec. 32-A of the N.D.P.S. Act, no sentence awarded under the N.D.P.S. Act can be suspended, remitted or commuted by virtue of Sec. 389 of the Code, however, referred the matter to be considered by a Full Bench of this Court to decide the point whether the High Court can or cannot, in view of Sec. 32-A of the N.D.P.S. Act suspension the sentence awarded in that case under Sec. 21 of the Act, in exercise of its power under Sec. 389of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While saying so, learned Judge in the above order dwells his mind upon the observations made by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Berlin Joseph v. State (1992-11 Crimes 353) regarding Sec. 36-B of the Act and Chapter 29 of the Code, pertaining to the following observation: "It must be borne in mind that the section has advisedly used the rider words "so far as it is applicable" in order to indicate that the section is not intended to invoke all the powers envisaged in the Chapter Hook, line and sinker." In this context, however the reasonings given by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court and the Division Bench of this Court as above referred in the context of the clear finding given by a single Judge of this Court, it has to be seen that courts of law in all the above cases, are unanimous in their conclusion that during the pendency of appeal or revision preferred against the conviction of an accused for the offences under the N.D.P.S. Act, no sentence of imprisonment can be suspended, remitted or commuted for the reason of the total embargo provided either by Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act or Sec. 32-A of the said Act. By scanning and following the above case laws, I am able to identify that courts of law have differed in their opinion in giving reasons for arriving at such conclusion but however, they are all unanimous in the conclusion that no sentence awarded for the offences under the N.D.P.S. Act can be suspended remitted or commuted during the pendency of the appeal or revision. Therefore, in this context, I am of the firm view, that the reference made by my learned brother Bellie, J. for the consideration of the Full Bench is of no consequence in following the same line as enunciated by the cease laws above quoted. 25. It is significant to note that while dealing with the scope and object of Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Apex Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishanlal & others, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 (S.C.), has observed as follows: “Sec. 37 as amended starts with a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the conditions contained therein were satisfied. The N.D.P.S. Act is a special enactment and as already noted it was enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operation relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. That being the underlying object and particularly when the provisions of Sec. 37 of N.D.P.S. Act are in negative terms limiting the scope of applicability of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code regarding bail, in our view, it cannot be held that the High Court’s powers to grant bail under Sec.439 Crl.P.C. are not subject to the limitation mentioned under Sec. 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. The non-obstante clause with which the section starts should be given its due meaning and clearly it is intended to restrict the powers to grant bail. In case of inconsistency between Sec.439, Crl.P.C. and Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, Sec. 37, prevails. In this context Sec.4, Crl.P.C, may be noted which reads thus: “(4) Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws: (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.“ 26. It can be seen that when there is a special enactment in force relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing with such offences, the other offences under Criminal Procedure Code should be subject to such special enactment. In interpreting the scope of such a statute the dominant purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind. In Lt.Col.Prithi Pal Singh Beedi etc., v. Union of India and others, (1983)1 S.C.R. 393 , regarding the mode of interpretation, the Supreme Court observed as follows: ”The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by way of correct expression and unless there is ambiguity in the language of the provisions, the court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity.“ 27. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by way of correct expression and unless there is ambiguity in the language of the provisions, the court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity.“ 27. As already noted Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act starts with a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the conditions contained therein are satisfied. Consequently the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Sec. 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act.” 28. In view of the declaration of law by the Apex court, as above extracted, it is clinching, that the power of the High Court under Sec.439 of the Code in the matter of grant of bail to persons accused of an offence under this Act is subject to the limitations that have been provided under Sec. 37 of the Act. 29. If the above position is necessarily to be accepted and followed by all the High Courts in the light of the clear declaration by the Apex Court in the above ruling, then in the context of the non obstante clause provided in Sec. 32-A “Notwithstandinganythingcontained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Sec. 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Sec. 27) shall he suspended or remitted or commuted.” It has to be followed that the same rationale cane be adopted in so far as Sec. 32-A also and its special mandate built therein over the powers vested under Sec. 389 of the Code. It is seen that there cannot be any controversy that the N.D.P.S. Act does not contain any provision as regards the suspension of sentence of persons accused of an subsequently convicted on trial pending appeal, and if it all any provision is there, it is only traceable to the general provision as regards the appeal and revision, as had been provided for under Sec. 36-B of the Act. As was held by a learned single Judge of this Court, the two chapters referred to in Sec. 36-B of the Act, namely, Chapters 29 and 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, deal only with the procedural aspects in the matter of appeal reference and revision and nothing more and that besides there is more apt provision contained in Sec. 32-A dealing with the suspension, remission or commutation of the sentences. Of course, it is true that Sec. 32-Aof the Act does not empower the Court manifestly to grant suspension of sentence. But in reality it can be recapitulated the scope of provisions of Secs.432 and 433 of the Code with regard to suspension, remission and commutation of sentences and that the said Sections recognise the power of the State Government only to suspend, remit or commute the sentences of persons convicted of offences. As was held in the above rulings, it was made only with a view to curtail the executive power of the Government in the matter of suspension, remission and commutation of sentence of persons convicted of offences under this Act. But however, it is seen, that a special provision under Sec. 32-A of the Act has been enacted by the Parliament by the introduction of the non obstante clause as above referred, in an effort to make stringent provisions for maintaining the objects and preamble adumbrated in enacting the N.D.P.S. Act. It is thus seen, after having carefully considered and scanned the legal aspects and ratios enunciated in the above case laws regarding the scope of Secs. 32-A and 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. I am entirely in agreement with the views of my learned brother Janarthanam, J. In this view of the matter above discussed with reference to case laws, I am of the firm view that there is no justification for suspending the sentence imposed on the petitioner herein and order for his release on bail pending disposal of the appeal. The point is answered accordingly. 30. In the result, the petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.