Judgment :- Plaintiff's suit against the defendant for declaration that the assessment of building tax of his building in the defendant Municipality is without any basis was decreed by the Munsiff, Kayamkulam. Injunction was also granted in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendant from realising the building lax from him on the basis of the assessment. Defendant's appeal was not allowed by the Additional District Judge - I, Mavelikara. Aggrieved by the findings of the Courts below, the appellant (defendant) has filed the above second appeal. 2. Plaintiff was served with a notice on 14-12-1978 demanding payment of Rs. 234/- as half yearly tax for the building. He contended that he has filed a petition on 11-1-1979 stating that the assessment was arbitrary. It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiff received many notices asking him to pay the lax, that on 18-5-1981 he received a notice dated 30-4-1981 calling upon him to pay the entire tax arrears for the period 1978-79 to 1980-81 to the tune of Rs. 1404.50, that he had filed a petition dated 11-1-1979 contending that the assessment of the building lax is highly arbitrary and without any basis, that the defendant had disposed of the petition in a thoroughly arbitrary manner, that he had filed appeal on 17-8-1981 before the Municipal Council against the order of dismissal of his petition dated 11-1-1979, dial his appeal was disposed of by the Council on 10-3-1982 without considering his valid objections and that the tax levied is not based on actual data necessary for the determination of the tax but on surmises and so it cannot be sustained legally. 3. Defendant filed written statement contending that the assessment of the building tax cannot he questioned before the civil court. Defendant also denied the allegation of arbitrariness or any other high-handedness in determining the building tax. 4. Counsel for the defendant submitted that the Courts below patently overlooked S.398 of the Kerala Municipalities Act while decreeing the suit. The trial Court held that the assessment of the building was effected even prior to the completion of the construction of the building and so the assessment is illegal and wrong. The lower appellate count has confirmed that finding. In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, it has to be considered whether S.398 of the Act operates as a bar to the institution of the suit. The lower appellate count has confirmed that finding. In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, it has to be considered whether S.398 of the Act operates as a bar to the institution of the suit. 5. S.398 makes the position clear that assessment or demand made as per the assessment cannot be challenged before any Court of law unless in a case where the provisions of the Act have not been in substance and effect, complied with. In view of S.398, an assessee cannot impeach the assessment RU demand made as per the assessment by the Municipality by reason of any clerical error or mistake in respect of name, residence, place of business or occupation of any person or the description of any property or thing or in respect of the amount demanded or charged. But there cannot be any doubt that the assessee can impeach the assessment, if the provisions of the Act have not been complied with in substance and effect. From a reading of S.398, it is not possible to hold that the civil court is completely ousted of its jurisdiction to try the suit challenging any assessment or demand pursuant to it. Whenever it is established that the provisions of the Act have not been in substance and effect complied with, S.398 cannot be held to be a bar in impeaching the assessment or the notice following it. To hold that assessment made by the Municipality or demand pursuant to it is completely free from challenge in a civil court is beyond what has been provided under the section. As both the Courts have found that the assessment was made even before the completion of the construction of the building, defence contention that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under S.398 is not tenable. 6. 11 is next contended by the defendant that in view of S.392(3) of the Act the suit filed by the plaintiff is hopelessly time-barred. S.392 mandates issuance of notice which should explicitly State the cause of action, nature of the relief sought etc. Though the plaintiff received intimation from the defendant Municipality on 14-12-1978 calling upon him to pay half yearly tax within 15 days, he did not challenge the same by issuing notice contemplated under S.392. S.392 mandates issuance of notice which should explicitly State the cause of action, nature of the relief sought etc. Though the plaintiff received intimation from the defendant Municipality on 14-12-1978 calling upon him to pay half yearly tax within 15 days, he did not challenge the same by issuing notice contemplated under S.392. It is not stated in the plaint that plaintiff had sent the notice within a period of six months as provided under S.392 of the Act. As issuance of notice to Municipality is contemplated under S.392, the plaintiff ought to have produced a copy of the notice which was allegedly sent to the defendant. That notice was also not produced before the Court. Plaintiff has produced Ext. R3 postal receipt and Ext. A-4 postal acknowledgment card. As notice under S.392 should explicitly state the cause of action, the nature of relief sought etc., the plaintiff ought to have produced it before the Court. The failure to produce the notice is not properly explained by the plaintiff. 7. S.392(3) provides that every such suit shall be commenced within six months alter the date on which the cause of action arose or in cases of continuing injury or damage during such continuance or within six months there-after. Averments in the plaint itself show that plaintiff paid the entire arrears of tax for the period 1978-79 to 1980-81 and it is only thereafter that he had sent notice to the defendant challenging the assessment. Contention ofthe defendant is that as no suit was filed by the plaintiff within six months after receipt ofthe notice dated 14-12-1978 the suit filed in 1982 cannot be considered to be filed in time under S.392(3) of the Act. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that merely because plaintiff was served with the notice on 14-12-1978 asking him to pay half yearly building tax it was not necessary on his part to have filed the suit within six months from the receipt ofthe said notice as it would be open to him to institute the suit as it is a case of continuing injury as the defendant continued to impose tax which was arbitrarily fixed originally. 8. The question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff could file suit on the date chosen by him on the ground that the demand of tax made on him constitutes a continuing injury. 8. The question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff could file suit on the date chosen by him on the ground that the demand of tax made on him constitutes a continuing injury. If the argument ofthe plaintiff's counsel is accepted, it would lead to a position whereby an assessee can file the suit challenging the assessment on the basis that every demand constitutes a continuing injury, consequence that follows nonpayment of tax to the Municipality would not amount to a continuing injury. When a party is served with assessment order and if he wants to challenge it, he cannot wait till he receives subsequent assessment orders and decide to challenge them at a later date under S.392. Assessment order has to be challenged then and there. Assessee cannot remain passive and when subsequent assessment orders follow he cannot file the suit on the ground that it is a continuing injury. As the cause of action arose actually on 14-12-1978 and as no suit was filed within six months as contemplated under S.392, it has to be held that the suit is barred by limitation. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside. The suit is dismissed. The second appeal stands allowed.