J. M. PANCHAL, J. ( 1 ) SO far as Civil Appeal No. 1914 of 1984, which arises out of Claim Case no. 154 of 1982 is concerned, it was submitted by Mr. K. F. Dalal, learned Counsel for the appellants that the appellant No. 1-truck driver and deceased Hemantlal, who is found to be 25% negligent in the accident, were joint tort-feasors and the claimants in Claim Case No. 154 of 1982 having not impleaded either the heirs of deceased hemantlal who was driver-cum-owner of car bearing registration No. GTQ-7064 or the Insurance Company with which the said car was insured, the appellants would be liable to satisfy the claim of the claimants only to the extent of 75% and the entire amount of compensation awarded cannot be recovered from the appellants. It was submitted that in a case of composite negligence, in the absence of all the joint tort-feasors, the entire amount cannot be realised from the joint tort-feasor who is sued because the joint tort-feasor who is sued would not be in a position to realise the amount from the other joint tort-feasor, who is not a party before the Court, in case it is made liable to pay the entire amount. The learned Counsel further submitted that in the written statement it was specifically contended that the driver-cum-owner of the car bearing registration No. GTQ-7064 and in the alternative his heirs and Insurance Company with which the said car was insured were necessary parties and no action having been taken by the claimants in Claim case No. 154 of 1982 to implead the owner-cum-driver of car bearing registration no. GTQ-7064 and the Insurance Company with which it was insured as parties to the proceedings, the appellants cannot be made to pay the entire amount to the claimants and suitable deduction should be made from the amount of compensation which is awarded to the claimants. The learned Counsel also submitted that the negligence having been apportioned by this Court, the claimants should be directed to recover 25% of the amount of compensation from the driver-cum-owner of car bearing registration No. GTQ-7064 and/or his heirs and the Insurance Company with which the said car was insured, but the appellants should not be made to pay the entire amount in question. In support of his submission, learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the case of (1) Bhajan Lal Bishnoi v. Rajasthan state Road Transport Corporation, 1991 ACJ 651 and (2) Bakhtawar Singh and Anr. v. Gurbachan Singh and Ors. , 1991 ACJ 362. ( 2 ) MR. Mehta, learned Advocate for the claimants submitted that in a case of composite negligence, it is for the claimants to choose any of the joint tort-feasors and claim the entire amount from him irrespective of the fact whether the other joint tort-feasors have contributed to the accident by their negligence or not and therefore, the appellants would be liable to satisfy the entire claim of the claimants. According to the learned Counsel, it was for the appellants as joint tort-feasors to recover the proportionate amount due from the other joint tort-feasors by initiating appropriate proceedings, but the claimants would be entitled to recover the whole amount awarded from the appellants and, therefore, there is no merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants. In support of his submission, mr. Mehta, placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of (1) Hiraben bhaga v. G. S. R. T. Corporation, reported in 1982 (1) GLR 190 , (2) Life Insurance corporation of India and Anr. v. Heirs and Legal Representatives of deceased naranbhai Munjabhai Vadhia and Ors. , 1972 GLR 920 and (3) Gujarat State Road transport Corporation v. Gurunath Shahu and Ors. , 1989 0 ACJ 314 . ( 3 ) IT is well settled that where two or more people by their independent breaches of duty to the plaintiff cause him to suffer distinct injuries, no special rules are required for each tort-feasor is liable for damage which he caused. Persons are not joint tort-feasors merely because their independent wrongful acts have resulted in one damnum. Where damage is caused as the result of torts committed by two or more tort-feasors, the tort-feasors may be (i) joint tort-feasors, (ii) several tort-feasors causing the same damage or (iii) several tort-feasors causing different damage. Who, then, are joint tort-feasors ? One way of answering the question is to see whether the cause of action against each tort-feasor is the same. If the same evidence would support an action against each, they are joint tort-feasors. Who, then, are joint tort-feasors ? One way of answering the question is to see whether the cause of action against each tort-feasor is the same. If the same evidence would support an action against each, they are joint tort-feasors. Wrong-doers are deemed to be joint tort-feasors where cause of action against each of them is same, viz. , that the same evidence would support action against them individually. They will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for the commission of which they are both responsible and not for a tort where each is responsible for a different injuria and the two injuria happen to produce the same damnum. All persons who aid or counsel, direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are joint tort-feasors. Normally, joint liability arises under three circumstances : (i) Agency, when one person employs another to do an act which turns out to be a tort, (ii) Vicarious liability, i. e. , the liability arising from relationship such as master and servant, principal and agent, guardian and ward etc. and (iii) Joint action where two or more persons combine together to commit an act which amounts to a tort. Persons are said to be joint tort-feasors when their separate shares in the commission of an act are done in furtherance of a common design. Joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the whole damage resulting from the tort. They may be sued jointly or severally. If sued jointly, damage may be levied from all or either. Where a person is injured without any negligence on his part but as a result of the combined negligence of two drivers of the colliding vehicles, it is not a case of contributory negligence but a case of what has been described by Pallock as "injury by composite negligence. " In a suit for "composite negligence" meaning thereby negligence of two or more persons other than the victim of the negligence, the plaintiff is not bound to a strict analysis of the proximate or immediate cause of the event to find out whom he can sue. " In a suit for "composite negligence" meaning thereby negligence of two or more persons other than the victim of the negligence, the plaintiff is not bound to a strict analysis of the proximate or immediate cause of the event to find out whom he can sue. Subject to the rules as to remoteness of damage, he is entitled to sue all or any of the negligent persons and it is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between those persons, though in any case he cannot recover in the whole more than his whole damage. He has a right to recover the full amount of damage from any of the joint tort-feasors. Those who are sued cannot insist on having the others being joined as defendants because the liability of the joint tort-feasors is joint and several. ( 4 ) WHERE a person is injured in a motor accident which occurs not on account of his negligence, but because the drivers of collided vehicles were negligent, the claimants are entitled to damage jointly and severally from the negligent respondents. Every wrong-doer is liable for the whole damage and it does not matter whether they acted between themselves as equals. A decree passed against two or more tortfeasors can be executed against any one of the defendants and such defendant can be compelled to pay the entire amount of damages decreed. It is further clear that the defendant who is compelled to pay the entire amount of damages decreed has a right to contribution from the other wrong-doer. The liability in the case of composite negligence, unless must normally should not be apportioned because the claimant is able to recover the whole amount of compensation from owner or driver of either vehicles. In case of composite negligence, liability for compensation in normal circumstances, should not be apportioned, as both wrong-doers are jointly and severally liable for the whole loss. Rule of apportionment of liability applies in a case of contributory negligence, i. e. , where the injured himself is also guilty of negligence. ( 5 ) WE would now refer to the decisions of this Court on the point in question. In the case of Hiraben Bhaga and Ors. v. G. S. R. T. Corporation and Ors. Rule of apportionment of liability applies in a case of contributory negligence, i. e. , where the injured himself is also guilty of negligence. ( 5 ) WE would now refer to the decisions of this Court on the point in question. In the case of Hiraben Bhaga and Ors. v. G. S. R. T. Corporation and Ors. , 1982 (1) glr 190 , four Motor Accident Claim Petitions, which arose out of an accident on account of a collision between a jeep and a S. T. Bus, were filed. The Jeep was driven by one Thakkar Dalpatji Sundarji. The heirs and legal representatives of deceased Manji Bhaga had instituted Claim Petition No. 6 of 1974 and had claimed total compensation of Rs. 1,15,000. 00. Issue No. 5 framed by the Tribunal for determination was whether Dalpatji Sundarji who was driving the jeep, was a necessary party or not and on appreciation of the evidence, the said issue was answered by the Tribunal in the affirmative. The Tribunal awarded the claim in all Rs. 1,15,000. 00 with six per cent interest. Having been aggrieved by the said award, the claimant filed an appeal before this Court. On behalf of the S. T. Corporation, it was submitted before this Court that in view of the finding on issue No. 5 to the effect that Dalpatji Sundarji, who was driving the jeep, is a necessary party, application for compensation must fail, as he had not been joined to the proceedings despite the fact that an application was given to the Tribunal for that purpose. While negativing the above referred submission, the Division Bench has held as under :-"it is true that the Tribunal has given an affirmative finding on the issue concerning that question, but, with respect, we are of the view that that is not a correct finding. Since Dalpatji Sundarji was concerned as a driver in the occurrence of the incident, the claimants indeed had the option to join him as one of the opponents, but that choice given to the claimants does not make Dalpatji Sundarji a necessary party. Necessary party means that no decree can be passed without his presence in the proceedings. Since Dalpatji Sundarji was concerned as a driver in the occurrence of the incident, the claimants indeed had the option to join him as one of the opponents, but that choice given to the claimants does not make Dalpatji Sundarji a necessary party. Necessary party means that no decree can be passed without his presence in the proceedings. In other words, a party is a necessary party when his presence in the proceedings is necessary for the very constitution of the suit, that is to say, persons in whose absence no effective decree at all can be passed. Such is not the case with regard to the absence in the proceedings of Dalpatji Sundarji. The claimants can sue the joint tort-feasors either jointly or severally and can have a complete redress for the injuries suffered by them from either of them. This is now a settled legal position, vide 1972 GLR 920 (Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. v. Heirs and Legal representatives of decd. Naranbhai Munjabhai Vadhia and Ors. ). Mr. Shahs submission, therefore, does not have any force and on our part we need not elaborate the legal position further in order to reject his submission. "in view of the above principle laid down by this Court, it is clear that in order to have a complete redress for the injuries suffered by the claimants, it is not necessary for them to sue all the joint tort-feasors and the claimants can sue the joint tort-feasors either jointly or severally. ( 6 ) IN the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn. v. Gurunath Shahu and Ors. , 1989 0 ACJ 314 , the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased had preferred claim petition. In the claim petition, owner of the vehicle and the insurance company with which the said vehicle had been insured, were not joined as parties. The Corporation contended that the vehicle owner and the insurance company be also joined as parties. The Tribunal rejected the said contention taking the view that it was for the claimants to select the tort-feasor for suing and non-joinder of another tort-feasor would not entitle the tort-feasor joined in the proceedings to pray that the amount of compensation to be awarded be reduced to the extent of the liability of the tort-feasor who is not joined in the petition. In an appeal before this Court, it has been held as under :-"4. Prima-facie, on technical considerations, the Tribunal appears to be right and its decision does not seem to be incorrect. However, the practical aspect and certain intractable difficulties which may arise on account of such a course being adopted by the Tribunal cannot be lost sight of. Some such considerations which ought to have weighed and which ought to have been taken into consideration by the tribunal while deciding questions regarding joinder or non-joinder of joint tortfeasors are as follows : (i) It is settled legal position that even if the liability of a joint tort-feasor is to the extent of 1 per cent, the entire amount, i. e. , hundred per cent of the amount of compensation awarded can be recovered from the tort-feasor whose liability is adjudged to the extent of 1 per cent only. In a given case the claimants may enter into collusion with the tort-feasor whose liability may be to a greater extent and that joint tort-feasor may not be joined at all before the Tribunal. This possibility cannot be ruled out. (ii) Ultimately, in a given case entire amount of compensation may be paid by insurance company or public body. But while determining the question as to the extent of liability, the question as regards who was negligent in driving the vehicle has got to be decided by the Tribunal. While deciding some cases it may not be of much significance for the Tribunal (or for that matter for this High Court also) to say as to which driver was responsible, and to what extent, for causing the accident in question. However, for determining the rate of premium to be charged for each type of vehicle and for determining the reasonable rate of passenger fare by public corporations like the appellant herein, decisions on such questions have far-reaching significance. Therefore, though it may not be necessary for determining the issues involved in the case, it is certainly a matter of consequence for the purposes of public finance and particularly for determining the policy questions of finances pertaining to public institutions like transport corporations and insurance companies. Therefore, though it may not be necessary for determining the issues involved in the case, it is certainly a matter of consequence for the purposes of public finance and particularly for determining the policy questions of finances pertaining to public institutions like transport corporations and insurance companies. Therefore, it is very much necessary that whenever such question is raised before Tribunal, as far as possible, the Tribunal should not avoid the same and should see that all the tort-feasors are brought before the Tribunal and all the issues pertaining to contributory negligence are decided in the same claim petition. (iii) Be it noted that bifurcation of the liability without the presence of another joint tort-feasor becomes an academic formality only. The other joint tort-feasor in whose absence the question is decided, may very well say that the decision is not binding on him, because he was not party to the said proceedings. On the other hand, if other joint tort-feasor is brought on the record and is given an opportunity to plead his case, he may be in a position to show that he was not at all negligent, or that in his presence certain evidence against him can also be produced by other joint tort-feasor and his liability may be adjudged to a larger extent. (iv) As far as public corporations like the appellant are concerned, the decision fixing the extent of negligence and/or the liability may even have impact on the departmental proceedings against the driver concerned. (v) In a present complex society in which the judicial institutions are working, the Courts and Tribunls cannot, and as far as possible should not, function so as to leave problems for the future decision. Avoidance of future litigation and prevention of multiplicity of litigation should be an endeavour of all the judicial Tribunals. We cannot function in isolation being totally oblivious and indifferent to the needs for co-ordination between different public bodies and the need for speedy resolution of socio-economic issues, reference to which has been made hereinabove. (vi) In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We cannot function in isolation being totally oblivious and indifferent to the needs for co-ordination between different public bodies and the need for speedy resolution of socio-economic issues, reference to which has been made hereinabove. (vi) In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. As per this provision, a Civil Court, to which the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable, is empowered to direct that a particular party be added as plaintiff or defendant whose presence in the opinion of the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. In proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal this principle can certainly be resorted to, or at any rate the same should be kept in mind by the Tribunal while deciding such questions. 5. In view of the aforesaid position, without deciding this question finally either way, on an assumption that Tribunals decision is technically correct, we would like to further observe as follows : Simply because technically it may be permissible, we hope the Tribunals will not adopt this easy course which may quickly dispose of matters. Such disposals will certainly sow the seeds for future litigation and it is bound to fructify the litigation. Therefore, whenever a plea for joining another joint tort-feasor is raised and prayed for, it would be better for the Tribunal to insist that all the joint tort-feasors be brought on record. At any rate when an application for joining party is submitted by a tort-feasor on record, we hope such application will be allowed almost as a matter of rule and practice and another joint tort-feasor will be joined as party defendant/opponent. " ( 7 ) WE entirely agree with aforesaid observations. Still, in the above referred case also, it is clearly held that it is settled legal position that even if the liability of a joint tort-feasor is to the extent of 1 per cent, the entire amount, i. e. , hundred per cent of the amount of compensation awarded can be recovered from the tortfeasor whose liability is adjudged to the extent of 1 per cent only and the omission to sue one of the joint tort-feasors will not disentitle the claimants from claiming full relief against one who is sued. However, we again emphasise that for the reasons stated in the above-referred to decision, when an application for joining party is submitted by one of joint tort-feasors on record, such application should be allowed almost as a matter of rule and practice and another joint tort-feasor should be joined as party defendant/opponent. It may be noted that in the above-referred to decision, the Division Bench has not considered the effect of non-joinder of joint tort-feasors in an action for claim and the judgment has been rendered on the assumption that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the contention of the Corporation that all the joint tort-feasors should have been impleaded as parties to the action for claim. ( 8 ) AS laid down in the said case, it would have been better if the deceased driver-cum-owner of the car through his heirs and the Insurance Company with which the car was insured, were impleaded as parties by the claimants in Claim Case No. 154 of 1982, as not only it would have made easier for the appellants to recover the amount due in proportion to the negligence fixed by the Court, but also would have avoided future litigation. However, non-impleadment of the other joint tortfeasor or his heirs or the Insurance Company with which the car was insured, has no effect on the claim of the claimants and the appellants are, in our view, jointly and severally liable to satisfy the entire award made in favour of the claimants. ( 9 ) IN the case of Bhajan Lal Bishnoi (supra) an accident took place on 8/09/1982 between a Jeep No. PUG-8240 driven by one Ram Chander and a bus belonging to Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation bearing registration no. RRB-7291 driven by one Nand Ram. There were 7 occupants in the Jeep, out of whom 4 died and 3 received injuries. The legal representatives of the deceased and the injured filed separate claim petitions under the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In none of the claim petitions, the driver or the owner of the Jeep involved in the accident was made party. Only the Corporation which owned the bus, was made a party. The entire blame of the accident was sought to be placed on the driver of the Jeep by the Corporation. In none of the claim petitions, the driver or the owner of the Jeep involved in the accident was made party. Only the Corporation which owned the bus, was made a party. The entire blame of the accident was sought to be placed on the driver of the Jeep by the Corporation. On the evidence led in the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the driver of the Jeep and the driver of the bus both were negligent and their negligence was 50 : 50. Since the owner and the driver of the Jeep were not made parties, 50% of compensation found due was awarded against the Corporation. Against that award, appeal was preferred by the Corporation and cross-objections were filed by the claimants. On behalf of the claimants it was submitted that an error was committed in confining the amount of compensation to 50% against the Corporation, inasmuch as the entire amount of compensation which was awarded, was realisable from the Corporation. On behalf of the Corporation, it was submitted that in absence of Jeep driver and the owner, entire amount could not be realised from the Corporation because the Corporation as a joint tort-feasor would not be in a position to realise from the other joint tortfeasors who are not parties, the proportionate amount to the extent of their contributory negligence. The Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court which decided the appeal held that the joint tort-feasor who is before the Court, would not be able to realise rest of the amount from the other joint tort-feasors in case it is made liable to pay the entire amount as in absence of party it is not bound by the judgment or award and consequently the party which is before the Court, cannot ask the other party which is not before the Court to contribute towards the amount awarded and did not agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of gujarat High Court in the case of Hiraben Bhaga (supra ). ( 10 ) WITH great respect to the learned Judges, who have decided the aforesaid case, we are unable to agree with the view taken by them. As held by the Division bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (supra) it would always be better to sue all joint tort-feasors in one proceeding. ( 10 ) WITH great respect to the learned Judges, who have decided the aforesaid case, we are unable to agree with the view taken by them. As held by the Division bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (supra) it would always be better to sue all joint tort-feasors in one proceeding. It would not only enable the Tribunal to apportion negligence between the joint tort-feasors, but would also facilitate the task of claimants in recovering the amount of compensation awarded and in appropriate cases directions can always be issued by the Tribunal to joint tort-feasors to share the liability of paying compensation in proportion to negligence established on the record of the case. However, for any reasons, if one of the joint tort-feasors is not sued by the claimants or the request made by the joint tort-feasors who is sued, to implead other person as one of the joint tort-feasors as a party to the proceedings, is turned down, that would not mean that the joint tort-feasor who is held liable to pay the entire amount cannot recover the proportionate amount from the joint tort-feasor who is not sued. In such an eventuality, on the strength of the finding in the judgment or award of the Tribunal to the effect that the tort-feasor who is not before the Tribunal is also negligent, the tort-feasor who is made liable to pay the amount of compensation can always initiate appropriate proceedings for recovering proportionate amount from the joint tort-feasor who is not sued. In such proceedings the finding regarding composite neglience of joint tort-feasor would not be binding on the joint tort-feasor who is sought to be made liable, nor the findings recorded by the Tribunal earlier would operate as res judiciata because it has been accepted as a general rule since long that so far as regards the truth of the matter decided, a judgment is not an admissible evidence against one who is a stranger to the suit. The negligence and proportion of negligence will have to be proved by the tort-feasor who wants to saddle another person as joint tort-feasor for the claimants and the forum in which the proceedings have been initiated will have to decide the aspect of negligence and proportion of liability of another person as joint tort-feasor on the evidence led before it. The negligence and proportion of negligence will have to be proved by the tort-feasor who wants to saddle another person as joint tort-feasor for the claimants and the forum in which the proceedings have been initiated will have to decide the aspect of negligence and proportion of liability of another person as joint tort-feasor on the evidence led before it. It is true that in absence of a party, it is not bound by the judgment or award finding him compositely negligent as one of the joint tort-feasors. However, on the finding in the judgment or the award to the effect that the party who is not before the Court, is also negligent, the tort-feasor who is before the Court and who is made liable to pay the entire amount for compensation would be entitled to institute appropriate proceedings to realise from the absentee joint tort-feasor, the proportionate amount to the extent of contributory negligence. In case of initiation of such proceedings between the joint tort-feasors, the forum in which such proceedings are initiated will have to ascertain the facts and reach a conclusion on the point of negligence independently of tentative findings recorded in the earlier proceeding and if it is found that there was composite negligence, then appropriate orders will have to be passed after ascertaining the proportion of negligence. The tentative findings regarding proportionate liability of joint tort-feasors fixed by judgment or award in absence of one of the joint tort-feasors, cannot be treated as binding decision or barred by the principle of res-judicata. Therefore, in our view the premise on which the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court proceeds is erronous and it is not correct to say as a matter of principle that in absence of a party, the party which is before the Court, cannot ask the other party who is not before the Court to contribute towards the amount awarded. A joint tort-feasor in an action for contribution of damages against another joint tort-feasor will have to prove independently that the absentee joint tort-feasor in whose absence finding of composite negligence was recorded in a judgment or award, was in fact negligent and liable to contribute proportionately to the joint tort-feasor for the compensation awarded to the claimants. ( 11 ) IN the case of Bakhtwar Singh and Anr. ( 11 ) IN the case of Bakhtwar Singh and Anr. (supra) a collision between a car and bus resulted in the death of passengers in the car. The claimants in their claim application pleaded that the accident was caused due to neglience of the bus driver and did not implead the legal representatives of the owner-driver of the car and they had never pleaded negligence of the car driver. On appreciation of the evidence, it was held that the accident was caused due to negligence of the owner-driver of the car who was not made a party. The Punjab and Haryana High Court considered the question whether the insurer of the car can be held liable and has held as under :"after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties in this behalf, I find that there is no merit in this contention. Admittedly, the claimants never pleaded in the alternative in the claim petitions that in case the bus driver was not found to be negligent, then they were entitled to claim compensation from the insurer of the car. Moreover, the claimants at least in the two claim petitions, where there was no difficulty, have not made the legal representatives of the deceased driver (who is also the owner) of the car, parties to their claim petitions. That being so, in view of the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bachan Singh, 1982 ACJ 211 (P and H), the Insurance Company could not be held liable unless judgment was obtained against the insured person who had taken the policy of insurance. Apart from that, there was no issue, either, claimed by the claimants, in the alternative that the accident had taken place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the car by Jarnail Singh. In the absence of any such plea and an issue in this behalf, it could not be successfully argued on behalf of the claimants that they were entitled to any compensation from the Insurance Company. In the absence of any such plea and an issue in this behalf, it could not be successfully argued on behalf of the claimants that they were entitled to any compensation from the Insurance Company. It is true that every presumption would be raised against the Insurance Company because it failed to produce a copy of the policy in this Court, in spite of the opportunities being afforded but the said presumption is not available in the absence of the pleadings by the claimants in their claim petitions that Jarnail Singh, the driver of the car was rash and negligent in driving and that the accident had taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by the car driver. "in the above referred to case a view has been taken that the Insurance Company could not be held liable unless judgment was obtained against insured person. Such is not the question posed for our consideration in these appeals. The decision turns on peculiar facts found therein and pleadings of the parties thereto and therefore, in our view the principle laid down in the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 12 ) IN our view, therefore, we do not find any substance in the submissions of Mr. K. F. Dalal that in absence of other joint tort-feasor, the appellants would not be liable to satisfy the entire award and would be liable to pay compensation to the extent of only 75%. We hold that the appellants are liable to satisfy full claim of the claimants in Claim Case No. 154 of 1982. .