JUDGMENT (ORAL) I.G. Shah, J. The appellant-accused who has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment for causing death of his wife, Banubai, by burning her, in Sessions Case No. 110 of 1992 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Pandharpur, has preferred this appeal. 2. Briefly stated facts giving rise to this appeal are as under: The appellant-accused is the resident of village Akluj, Tal, Malshiras, Dist. Solapur. He resided at Akluj with his parents and brother. The family resides in a hut having two rooms. The appellant-accused was divorced by his first wife and he contracted a second marriage with the deceased Banubai, daughter of Abhiman Hapu Jadhav, P.W. 3, the complainant in the present case. The said marriage was solemnized on 22nd February, 1992. After the said marriage the deceased Banubai cohabited with the appellant accused at his house. It is the prosecution case that there were some quarrels taking place between the appellant-accused and his newly wedded Wife and that the appellant-accused used to ill-treat at his Bauubai. 3. It also appears to be the prosecution case that prior to 13th March, 1992 i.e. the eventful day, the deceased Banubai had gone to her mother's house and she was not prepared to go back to the house of her husband appellant-accused. However, she was ultimately persuaded to do so. 4. On 13th March, 1992, the appellant accused at about 3.00 p.m. is alleged to have asked his wife Banubai as to why she was raising disputes with his family and causing quarrels and, therefore, he is alleged to have poured kerosene on her saree and set her on fire. After setting her on fire, he is alleged to have run away. Banubai and then she was taken through a Rickshaw to the Rural Hospital at Akluj where she was initially treated by the Medical Officer. Abhiman, P. W. 1, father of the deceased Banubai, received the news while he was in the bazar, at Akluj and he rushed to the hospital. It is also the prosecution case that after Banubai was admitted to the hospital at Akluj her Dying declaration was got recorded through an Executive Magistrate at Akluj. The Medical Officer of the Rural Hospital advised the relatives of the deceased, Banubai, to take her to Solapur for treatment. It is also the prosecution case that after Banubai was admitted to the hospital at Akluj her Dying declaration was got recorded through an Executive Magistrate at Akluj. The Medical Officer of the Rural Hospital advised the relatives of the deceased, Banubai, to take her to Solapur for treatment. Accordingly, she was removed to Solapur for further treatment. While she was at the hospital at Solapur, her statement also was recorded by Head Constable Mohamadrafik Babulal Sheikh, P.W. 12. The said statement also is relied upon by the prosecution as a dying declaration. In the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Villas Ganpat Kotmire, P.W. 5, the deceased Banubai is alleged to have told that on 13th March, 1992 at about 3.00 p.m. while she was working at her house, her husband, the appellant-accused, who was enraged because of the quarrel which had taken place 4 days before, poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire and thereafter immediately he ran away on a bicycle. Similarly in the statement recorded by Head Constable Sheikh P.W. 12 also, deceased Banubai, is alleged to have involved the appellant-accused as to the person who burnt her after pouring kerosene on her body. In the said statement she also stated the cause of the said act of the appellant-accused, as quarrel taking place between her and her husband and that her husband used to regularly abuse and beat her on casual reasons. Deceased Banubai had sustained about 93% bum injuries and ultimately due to the said bum injuries as result of shock she died on 15th March, 1992. Dr. Subhashchandra Sangmeshwar Sardar, P.W. 14, carried out the post mortem examination on the dead body of deceased Banubai and he opined in the post mortem notes Exhibit- 44 that the deceased died as a result of shock and toxemia due to 93% bum injuries. Dt. 16th December, 1993 On the basis of the complaint lodged by Abhiman on 13th June, 1992 at about 6.15 p.m. P.S.I. Babasaheb Dagdubhai Shaikh, P.W. 13, claims to have prepared F.I.R. and registered an offence under crime No. 37 of 1992 under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, P.S.I. Babasaheb went to the spot of the incident and inspected the same in the presence of panch witnesses and prepared a panchnama of the scene of offence, Exhibit - 11. Thereafter, P.S.I. Babasaheb went to the spot of the incident and inspected the same in the presence of panch witnesses and prepared a panchnama of the scene of offence, Exhibit - 11. He claims to have also recorded the statements of Sunil and Harnabai on the same day. Thereafter, Police Head Constable Dnyaneshwar Ramrao Devkate, P.W. l is alleged to have produced dying declaration, Exhibit - 21, of deceased Banubai recorded by the Executive Magistrate along with his report, Exhibit - 30. On 14th March, 1992, he claims to have recorded the statements of other witnesses including Bapu, P.W. 8, Sangita P.W. 7 and Nagnath P.W. 9. He arrested the accused on 15th March, 1992 and effected the punchanama of arrest at Exhibit - 36. He claims to have further recorded supplementary statement of P.W. 7, Sangita, P.W. 8, Bapu, P.W. 9, Nagnath, P.W. 3, Abhiman, Sunil and Harnabai on 16th March, 1992. He also is alleged to have recorded the statements of Kusum, P.W. 10 and few others on that day. On 16th March, 1992, he claims to have received from Sadar Bazar Police Station, Solapur, papers about the death of Banubai, and thereafter he converted the offence to one under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On 16th March, 1992, deceased Banubai's partly burnt blouse, Saree and Petticoat alleged to have been produced by Abhiman, P.W. 3, were seized by him under a Panchanama, Exhibit - 30. On 31st March, 1992 he sent articles seized by him to Chemical Analyser. Ultimately he filed a charge sheet against the accused on completion of investigation. 5. The prosecution relies on seven other oral dying declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased, Banubai, to the prosecution witnesses, who are examined by the prosecution before the Court. 6. The case of the accused was committed to the Court of Sessions. On the strength of the evidence led before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Pandharpur, he found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code an sentenced him as stated above. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence the appellant has filed the present appeal. 7. On the strength of the evidence led before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Pandharpur, he found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code an sentenced him as stated above. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence the appellant has filed the present appeal. 7. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of two dying declarations recorded by Villas Kotmire, the Executive Magistrate and Babulal Sheikh, P.W. 12, Police Head, constable at the hospital at Solapur, which are at Exhibits 21 and 32 respectively. The other piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is the F.I.R. Exhibit 50 alleged to have been lodged with the Police at Akluj Police Station on 13th March, 1992 at 6.15 p.m. wherein also Abhiman is alleged to have reported that deceased Banubai when questioned by Abhiman had told him that it was the appellant-accused who had burnt her. Apart from these three dying declarations the prosecution also relics on the evidence of Bapu P.W. 8, Sangeeta, P.W. 9, and Kusum P.W. 10 to prove that the deceased Banubai had also told them on 13th March, 1992 itself that she was burnt by the appellant. The prosecution also relies upon the Chemical Anal year's report in respect of the burnt clothes of the deceased having been found to be having the residue of kerosene. The said report, however, does not appear to have exhibited by the trial court. However, the report is on the record and being the Chemical Analyser's report it could be exhibited even now. It is accordingly exhibited. Apart from this, it is also clear that the question about the said Chemical Analyser's report was put to the appellant accused while he was being examined under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Finding the two dying declarations as reliable and the oral dying declarations made by the deceased to Abhiman and the other above stated prosecution witnesses also reliable the trial Court accepted the -said evidence and convicted the appellant accused on behalf of the appellant-accused, the dying declaration, Exhibit - 21, is very strenuously attacked. 8. Shri Mane the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant-accused invited our attention to the evidence of Vilas Kotmire, the Executive Magistrate, who is alleged to have recorded the said dying declaration. 8. Shri Mane the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant-accused invited our attention to the evidence of Vilas Kotmire, the Executive Magistrate, who is alleged to have recorded the said dying declaration. He pointed out that according to the said witness on 13th March, 1992 he was called by the Police and then he was taken to Rural Hospital at Akluj and there he found that deceased Banubai was admitted as an indoor patient and he asked her about the incident. Then she narrated about the incident and he recorded her statement and Exhibit - 21 is the same dying declaration. Shri Mane contended that though in examination-in-chief he claims to have recorded the statement, it is clear from cross-examination that the said dying declaration is not in the handwriting of the said Vilas Kotmire. He therefore contended that the evidence of the said witness that he recorded the dying declaration is, therefore, not factually correct. Therefore, the said dying declaration being actually written by some other person, it was necessary for the prosecution to examine the said person. He also has pointed out that the said Executive Magistrate has also admitted in cross-examination that he is a social worker belonging to the Congress (1) party and he works for the public. He has also further stated that he is required to go to the Police station for the work of the public and he has to maintain good relations with the police and other officers. Relying on this evidence of the said Executive Magistrate Shri Mane contended that the said witness even though he is an Executive Magistrate appears to be amenable to the police and, therefore, it is possible that the said dying declaration was not even recorded by him and was recorded by the police themselves and merely his signature and seal was obtained on it subsequently. To substantiate this contention Shri Mane relic on the evidence of Dr. Ashok Metkari, P.W. 6 who has stated in his evidence that after he had reported the matter to the police through a letter Exhibit 23, the Police came and that the patient was in a shock condition. To substantiate this contention Shri Mane relic on the evidence of Dr. Ashok Metkari, P.W. 6 who has stated in his evidence that after he had reported the matter to the police through a letter Exhibit 23, the Police came and that the patient was in a shock condition. It is contended that though the said witness thereafter to a leading question put to him in examination-in-chief has stated "however, she was in conscious condition" the fact that she was in shock would necessarily be required to be taken into consideration while considering about her capacity to make a statement of what had actually happened. Similarly it is further pointed out that in the entire deposition of the said Medical Officer there is no mention at all of the Executive Magistrate having come to the hospital and recording the dying declaration. It is pointed out that he only speaks about the Police coming to the hospital and further that he did not know what Police did later on as he was attending the O.P.D. It appears that thereafter the dying declaration Exhibit - 21 was shown to the witness and on seeing the said dying declaration he stated that he had made endorsement on the said dying declaration Exhibit - 21 stating that the patient is in conscious condition. This is the entire evidence led by the prosecution through the mouth of the said Medical Officer in respect of the dying declaration, Exhibit - 21. Shri Mane, therefore, contended that when the Medical Officer does not speak about the Executive Magistrate having recorded the said dying declaration in his deposition and only speaks that the Police had come and thereafter he did not know what had happened later on as he was attending to the O.P.D it is difficult to accept that the Executive Magistrate had actually visited the hospital for recording the dying declaration. On behalf of the prosecution an attempt is made to contend that on the said dying declaration Exhibit - 21 there appears a signature of the Executive Magistrate and also his seal and on the same document the Medical Officer has put his signature scarifying that the patient is conscious and the time is mentioned as 4.45 p.m. Therefore, according to the prosecution, it would be sufficient to hold that the said dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate in the presence of the said Medical Officer. We are unable to even imagine as to how it was not tried to be elicited through the said Medical Officer about the presence of the Executive Magistrate in the hospital al all. Merely showing him the dying declaration, Exhibit - 21 which now has the signature of the Executive Magistrate and his seal also would not show that at the time when the Medical Officer put his endorsement the said signature and the seal were on the document. As a matter of fact, if the said Medical Officer was not prepared to support the prosecution case about the Executive Magistrate having recorded the dying declarations in his presence, it was necessary for the prosecution to declare the said-witness hostile and cross-examine him so that the prosecution could have contended that the evidence of the respect of this dying declaration should be discarded as unreliable and the evidence Executive Magistrate would be sufficient and could be relied upon. Now in the absence of any such procedure being adopted it is difficult to hold that the evidence of the said doctor who was the Medical Officer of the Rural Hospital at Akluj is unreliable and needs to be discarded. This is more so when it appears from the admission given by the Executive Magistrate that he is apparently amenable to the Police and maintains good relations with them. Apart from this, there is one another circumstance, which is relied upon by Shri Mande, to contend that the said dying declaration could not have been recorded at 4.45 p.m. at all as the endorsement on it shows. Apart from this, there is one another circumstance, which is relied upon by Shri Mande, to contend that the said dying declaration could not have been recorded at 4.45 p.m. at all as the endorsement on it shows. Reliance is placed at Exhibit - 23 to substantiate this contention and it is pointed out that the information about the deceased Banubai being admitted to the Rural Hospital at Akluj was sent by a Yadi to the Police Station at Akluj and the same appears to have been received by the Police Station, Akluj, at about 4.45 p.m. It is, therefore, contended that it is only thereafter that the Police would come to know about the admission of deceased, Banubai, in the hospital at Akluj and it is only thereafter that them must have sent for the Executive Magistrate. Therefore, the Executive Magistrate must have reached the Police Station after 4.45 p.m. It is only thereafter that he could have come to the Rural Hospital for recording the Dying Declaration. Therefore, the time put by the Medical Officer below his endorsement of 4.45 p.m. could not be correct. Shri Mane ultimately contended that at any rate the said dying declaration relied upon by the prosecution appears to be a doubtful documental, therefore, cannot be relied upon. It is also contended that the Medical Officer has only certified that the patient is conscious. That by itself, according to him, does not mean that the patient was in a position and a fit condition to speak and give dying declaration. No attempt has been made to elicit from the Medical Officer in his evidence that the patient was in a fit condition to give a dying declaration. Shri Mane also contended that, as a matter of fact, in the same breath the Medical Officer stated on being pointed out the endorsement at Exhibit - 21 that the patient is in conscious condition after stating at an earlier stage that the patient was in shock condition. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for the prosecution to elicit from the Medical Officer about her condition in respect of making a statement and as no such attempt is made at all there is nothing to show that the deceased Banubai was in fit condition to make a statement. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for the prosecution to elicit from the Medical Officer about her condition in respect of making a statement and as no such attempt is made at all there is nothing to show that the deceased Banubai was in fit condition to make a statement. It is also pointed out that even the dying declaration does not record anywhere that the Executive Magistrate had found that deceased Banubai was in a fit condition to make a statement. No doubt, the Executive Magistrate in his deposition before the Court has stated that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a statement. But it is contended on behalf of the appellant-accused that the said statement in the absence of any contemporaneous statement being found in the dying declaration itself should be considered as an improvement at the stage of giving evidence. In view of the evidence of Dr. Ashok Matkari, P.W. 6, it is difficult to hold that the said dying declaration, Exhibit - 21, relied upon by the prosecution was recorded by the Executive Magistrate in the hospital as claimed by the Executive Magistrate in his deposition. At any rate a suspicion creates in the mind in this respect and the said suspicion cannot be said to be such that it should be ignored. The learned Public Prosecutor tried to contend that the said dying declaration being recorded by an Executive Magistrate, and as deceased Banubai was perfectly in a position to recognise her assailant and has clearly involved the appellant-accused in the said offence, should be relied upon in spite of the deficiencies which have been pointed out on behalf of the appellant-accused. Reliance is placed on a ruling reported in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay1 to contend that the dying declaration, if it is found truthful by the Court, could be made the sole basis of conviction. There is no quarrel with the said proposition. The question really is as to whether the said dying declaration was in fact recorded by the Executive Magistrate in the hospital, as is purported to be shown by the said Executive Magistrate. There is no quarrel with the said proposition. The question really is as to whether the said dying declaration was in fact recorded by the Executive Magistrate in the hospital, as is purported to be shown by the said Executive Magistrate. In view of the evidence of the doctor, P.W. 6, we feel that the position is not free from doubt and, therefore, we cannot persuade ourselves to hold that relying on the evidence of the Executive Magistrate alone, it could be held that the said dying declaration of deceased Banubai was recorded by the Executive Magistrate as claimed by him. 9. The other dying declaration, Exhibit - 32, recorded by the Head Constable, Mohamadrafik Babulal Sheikh, P.W. 12, is also pressed in service, by the prosecution and it is contended that tile trial Court has rightly found the said dying declaration as reliable and it does not suffer from any inference. As against this on behalf of the appellant-accused it is contended that the said dying declaration is recorded at the hospital at Sholapur by Head Constable Sheikh P.W. 12. The said dying declaration also has an endorsement of the doctor that the patient was conscious and also further that the patient can give a statement. However, unfortunately for the prosecution the said doctor, who has made the said endorsement, has not been examined by the prosecution. Even the Head Constable Sheikh. P.W. 12. does not make a statement in his deposition that the Medical Officer of the Civil Hospital was present, when he recorded the statement or that he had made the said endorsement on the dying declaration in his presence. He also does not make a statement that deceased Banubai was in a fit condition to make a statement. The said dying declaration, Exhibit 32, therefore suffers from an infirmity as the Medical Officer has not been examined to prove the said endorsement about the condition of deceased, Banubai. Therefore. Shri Mane is right in inviting us to discard the said dying declaration also on this ground. We, therefore, are constrained to brush aside the said piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution from consideration. 10. Now, we arc left with several oral dying declaration, which are alleged to have been made by deceased Banubai to several prosecution witnesses, including Abhiman, P.W. 3, the complainant. We, therefore, are constrained to brush aside the said piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution from consideration. 10. Now, we arc left with several oral dying declaration, which are alleged to have been made by deceased Banubai to several prosecution witnesses, including Abhiman, P.W. 3, the complainant. First we would consider the alleged dying declaration made by the deceased, Banubai, to Abhiman P.W. 3. Abhiman, P.W. 3, is the father of deceased Banubai. According to the statement made by him in the complaint, he claims that on the day of the incident he had actually first visited deceased Banubai at her house in the morning hours and thereafter he had gone to the house of Housabai and while he was there at the house of Housabai at about 3.30 P.M. he noticed people running and shouting that Banubai was burnt. Then he went to her house to see what has happened. Then he came to know that the people had carried Banubai to the hospital in the rickshaw. Then he went to the Government Hospital at Akluj and asked Banubai how she was burnt. At the time she is alleged to have told him that due to the quarrel before four days her husband poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire after lighting a matchstick and then he ran away. Now in his evidence, however, he states a bit differently. He has deposed before the Court that on the day of the incident he had gone to Akluj and was standing in bazaar and at that time one girl, the daughter of one Balu of Akluj came to him and told him that his daughter was set to fire by the accused and that Banubai was even taken to the Rural hospital at Akluj and so he accompanied her to the hospital and then at the hospital he found that Banubai was alive. At that time she had sustained bum injuries and he asked her as to how she had sustained injuries and then she told him that the accused after pouring kerosene on her saree set fire to her and then went away. Therefore, there is no doubt that there is some discrepancy as to how he came to know about deceased, Banubai, being burnt. Therefore, there is no doubt that there is some discrepancy as to how he came to know about deceased, Banubai, being burnt. Actually if the said witness had come to know about the said incident from the daughter of one Balu of Akluj in the absence of the evidence of that daughter the said statement of what was told by that daughter of Balu to Abhiman would become hearsay and would not be admissible in evidence. However, it also appears that one Sangeeta who is a daughter of Balu is examined as P.W. 7. She does not speak about going to Abhiman and meeting him in the bazaar and informing anything about the incident Therefore, we have to initially start with a note of caution while appreciating the evidence of the said witness. According to Abhiman after learning in the hospital from Banubai that she was burnt by the appellant accused he went to the Police station and lodged his complaint, Exhibit - 15. Exhibit - 15 shows that the said complaint was lodged at 6.15 p.m. Shri Mane has pointed out that the prosecution has also examined, Kusum P.W. 10, who is the former wife of the said Abhiman and the mother of the deceased and she claims that on the day of the incidents, she had gone to Madha alongwith her husband Lahu Shelke, to whom she appears to have married after divorce from Abhiman. She claims that on 13th March, 1992 she returned to Akluj where she normally resides. She claims that she returned to the bus stand, Akluj, at about 8.30 p.m. She claims that while she was at Mada her brother Nagaraj and one Bapu P.W. 8 had come to Mada and informed her about the incident that had taken place at Akluj in respect of deceased, Banubai. She therefore returned to Akluj by a bus at 8.30 p.m. She went to the Police Station at Akluj. At that time she was told by the Police that the deceased Banubai was already shifted to the Civil Hospital at Sholapur and that she should go there. She also claims that at that time she was told by the Police that her former husband, father of deceased Banubai, had come to the Police station and his complaint would be recorded. She also claims that at that time she was told by the Police that her former husband, father of deceased Banubai, had come to the Police station and his complaint would be recorded. If this evidence is true, then the timing 6.15 p.m. stated on F.I.R. Exhibit - 15, becomes doubtful. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that Abhiman, P.W. 3, after he had learnt from the deceased, Banubai, that she was burnt by the appellant accused had immediately gone to the police station and lodged a complaint stating therein what he had learnt from the deceased Banubai. It therefore appears that the complaint was not recorded at least till 8.30 p.m. and was probably shown to have been lodged at 6.15 p.m. putting the earliest time earlier then when it was actually was lodged. In such circumstances, it is difficult to rely on the evidence of Abhiman P.W. 3 that he was actually told by deceased Banubai that it was the appellant-accused who had burnt her as claimed by him and that he had accordingly lodged a complaint immediately with the Police at Akluj. 11. As stated earlier the prosecution further relics on the evidence of Sangita, P.W. 7, Bapu, P.W. 8, Nagnath P.W. 9, and Kusum P.W. 10 to move the oral dying declarations made to them by deceased Banubai involving the appellant. Sangeeta, P.W. 7, in her deposition has stated that the deceased Banubai was the daughter of her maternal Aunt and she herself resides beyond about four houses from the house of Banubai. She claims that at about 3.00 p.m. she was in her house and she went to the house of the accused and noticed that the deceased Banubai was sitting in burnt condition and that she told her that she was set to fire by the appellant-accused and he run away. She, therefore, admittedly is related to the deceased. But apart from that her evidence further shows that her statement came to be recorded by the Police after four days of the incident. No doubt P.S.I, Babasaheb Sheikh, P.W. 13, in his deposition, however, has stated that he had recorded the statement of Sangeeta, P.W. 7, on 14th March, 1992. In the cross-examination of P.S.I. P.W. 13 a suggestion has been made that he had anti dated this statement. The suggestion no doubt is refuted. No doubt P.S.I, Babasaheb Sheikh, P.W. 13, in his deposition, however, has stated that he had recorded the statement of Sangeeta, P.W. 7, on 14th March, 1992. In the cross-examination of P.S.I. P.W. 13 a suggestion has been made that he had anti dated this statement. The suggestion no doubt is refuted. But in view of the admission of Sangita that her statement was recorded after four days of the incident, it is doubtful as to whether Sangita's statement was actually recorded on 14th March, 1992. There is no reason to discard her evidence in this respect and it also appears that even all the other witnesses have also stated that their statements were recorded after four days. Under these circumstances, it is more probable that the statements of these witnesses, which are relied upon, to prove the oral dying declarations of deceased Banubai, were recorded after four days of the incident. From the evidence of P.S.I. Sheikh, P.W. 13, it appears that on 13th March, 1992 i.e. the day of the incident he had recorded the statements of Sunil and Harnabai. The prosecution, it appears did not examine these two witnesses. They were the first witnesses whose statements came to be recorded on the day of the incident in question. Hamabai even according to the other evidence on record had definitely gone to deceased, Banubai, immediately after the incident. Therefore, if the deceased had made a statement involving the appellant-accused normally she would have also said so. There is no explanation coming forth as to why her evidence is not recorded. Under these circumstances, the evidence of Sangita, P.W. 7, that she was told by the deceased Banubai about the involvement of the appellant-accused in the offence will have to be brushed aside, being not reliable. Bapu, P.W. 5, and Nagnath, P.W. 9 also claim that the deceased Banubai had disclosed to them that it was the appellant accused, who had burnt her. All these witnesses have also admitted that their statements came to be recorded by the Police after four days of the incident. This delay in recording of their statements make their evidence suspect. Therefore, no reliance could be placed on their evidence to hold that the deceased Banubai had disclosed to them on 13th March, 1992 itself that it was the appellant who had burnt her. This delay in recording of their statements make their evidence suspect. Therefore, no reliance could be placed on their evidence to hold that the deceased Banubai had disclosed to them on 13th March, 1992 itself that it was the appellant who had burnt her. Kusum, P.W. 10 is the other witness relied upon by the prosecution to prove that her daughter deceased Banubai had made a statement to her involving the appellant accused as the person who had burnt her. Kusum also had admittedly gone to the hospital on 13th March, 1992. Her statement also carne to be recorded on 16th March, 1992. It is possible that she being at Solapur and as it is only at Solapur that she was told by the deceased Banubai as to how the incident had taken place, she may not be available at Akluj till 16th March, 1992 for recording of her statement. But, at any rate, even the disclosure to her would become suspicious in the state of evidence which is brought before the Court and it would be unsafe to rely upon her testimony to hold that deceased Banubai had disclosed to her on 13th March, 1992 itself that the appellant-accused was burnt. 12. The case of the appellant accused is that the deceased Banubai was unhappy to marry him, and she was forced by her parents to marry him. It is also his contention that deceased banubai used to have a particular way of life to some extent luxurious at the house of her mother Kusum with whom she used to reside. Through the evidence of Abhiman it is brought on record that Kusum had a built house in which she used to reside with deceased Banubai. She was also having a tape recorder and such gadgets in her house, and in contrast to that the appellant-accused being a poor person was residing in a hut and, therefore, the deceased was unhappy about the said marriage. From the evidence of Kusum it appears that prior to the present incident, deceased Banubai had gone to the house of the mother of Kusum and thereafter she had come to her house and she was not prepared to go to her husband's house. From the evidence of Kusum it appears that prior to the present incident, deceased Banubai had gone to the house of the mother of Kusum and thereafter she had come to her house and she was not prepared to go to her husband's house. It also appears that on the next day, the appellant-accused, Krishnabai the grand mother of the accused and few other persons had gone to the house of Kusum and asked her as to why the deceased, Banubai, was not ready to cohabit with the accused and also whether there was any ill treatment. It is also clear from her evidence that Kusum had told that she was not ready to reside with the accused and thereafter the accused and the persons accompanying him returned on being told that they would persuade deceased Banubai and send her to his house. It appears that accordingly deceased, Banubai, was persuaded and sent back to the house of the appellant-accused. Therefore, it does appear that there is some substance contention of the appellant-accused that the deceased was not able to reconcile herself with the conditions at the house of the appellant-accused and it is probably due to the fact that at the house of her mother she was leading a better life than the appellant-accused could afford to give her. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the suggestions by the defence that deceased Banubai, as she was not willing to reside at the house of the appellant-accused, had probably committed suicide, is a hollow suggestion. The evidence of Chemical Analyser's report is compatible with both, suicide as well as homicide. Therefore, the said report by itself does not help the prosecution in the absence of satisfactory evidence about what actually had taken place on the day of the incident. 13. In view of the above discussion, we are constrained to brush aside the evidence of two written documents of dying declarations, Exhibits 21 and 32 as untrustworthy and also the oral dying declarations alleged to have been made by deceased Banubai to several witnesses as unreliable. Once the said dying declarations are brushed aside there is no other evidence available for the prosecution to link the appellant accused with the offence. Hence the appeal will have to be allowed. In view of this, the following order is passed. 14. The appeal is allowed. Once the said dying declarations are brushed aside there is no other evidence available for the prosecution to link the appellant accused with the offence. Hence the appeal will have to be allowed. In view of this, the following order is passed. 14. The appeal is allowed. The order of conviction of the appellant-accused of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence awarded there under is set aside. The appellant-accused is set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other offence. Appeal allowed. 1. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 22.