JUDGMENT G.H. Guttal, J. 1. The petitioner is a deaf and dumb person and therefore physically handicapped. The respondent No. 1 is the State of Kerala. The respondent No. 2 is Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited, a mining company owned by the Government of Kerala. The respondent No. 3 is the Chief General Manager of the respondent No. 2. The petitioner impugns the validity of the communication No. A6/PD/16-18/93/662, dated 6th September 1993 issued by the respondent No. 2 whereby the petitioner was informed that he could not be employed in their Mineral Separation Unit (M. S. Unit for short) because by reason of his handicap he does not fulfil the standards of medical fitness prescribed in Form P-1 under R.29F of the Mines Rules, 1955 framed under the Mines Act, 1952. 2. The petitioner is physically fit except for his handicap of hearing and speech. The petitioner actually worked as a trainee fitter in the M., S. Unit between 29th May 1986 to 30th June 1987. At one time the respondent No. 2 was willing to consider the petitioner for appointment, as soon as the Government lifted the ban on recruitment of staff. But when the time to consider his appointment arose, the respondent No. 2 sought clarification from the Director General of Mines Safety, Dhanbad, Bihar, by letter dated 19th March 1993 [Ext. R2(a) ] annexed to the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 2 dated 12th October 1993. The Director General of Mines Safety, Dhanbad, informed the respondent No. 2 that in view of the rules the petitioner could not be appointed in the mine. 3. The question is whether the Mineral Separation Unit of the Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited is a "mine" as denned in S.2 clause (J) of the Act. In order to resolve this question the facts in regard to the actual activity carried on by the respondent No. 2, may be considered. The respondent No. 2 has two independent units, the Mineral Separation Unit (the M. S. Unit) and Titanium Dioxide Pigment Unit (the Pigment Unit for short). The excavation of sand for the purpose of extracting minerals like ilmenite and other products is carried out on the Chavra coast. The sand extracted from Chavara Beach is collected and brought to the M. S. Unit which is a couple of kilometres away from the site of excavation. The excavation of sand for the purpose of extracting minerals like ilmenite and other products is carried out on the Chavra coast. The sand extracted from Chavara Beach is collected and brought to the M. S. Unit which is a couple of kilometres away from the site of excavation. At the M. S. Unit minerals like ilmenite and by products like Rutile, Leucoxene etc. are separated by physical process. Does the activity of the separation of minerals from the sand carried out at the M. S. Unit constitute a mine? 4. "Mine" has been defined to mean any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on. But -the definition of mine summarised in the last sentence is not exclusive. It is followed by the words "and includes." What is included in the definition of "mine" is set out in clauses (i) to (x). What is included in the meaning of mine, in so far as is applicable to this case is in clause (x): "any premises ............used for depositing sand or other material used in a mine; or for depositing refuse; or in which any operations in connection with suck sand, refuse or other material is being carried on being premises exclusively occupied by the owner of the mine." It is undisputed that the premises of the M. S. Unit are exclusively occupied by the respondent No. 2. The premises of the M. S. Unit are used for depositing sand. Secondly the operations in connection with the sand are carried on on the premises of the M. S. Unit. These are the uses of the premises referred to in sub-clause (x) of clause (j) of S.2(1) of the Act. Therefore the premises of the M. S. Unit answer the requirements of sub-clause (x) of clause (j) of S.2(1) of the Act. 5. It is an established rule of construction that an inclusive definition must be so construed as to comprehend not only such things as it signifies according to its natural meaning but also those things which the definition clause declares that they shall include. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, Page 270). The word "mine" in respect of which 'includes' is used bears its extended statutory meaning and its ordinary popular and natural sense whenever they would be properly applicable. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, Page 270). The word "mine" in respect of which 'includes' is used bears its extended statutory meaning and its ordinary popular and natural sense whenever they would be properly applicable. Whereas the definition of a word declared to "mean" is restrictive, the word "includes" used in the definition clause extends the meaning to those items which it includes. While the primary natural meaning of 'mine' means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching and obtaining minerals is carried out, the Parliament by defining it inclusively insists upon saying that mine means something more than what its natural and restricted meaning imports. When the Parliament says that "mine" includes premises which are used for depositing sand or for carrying out operation in connection with sand it means that such premises even if they are not the sites of excavation, constitute a mine. In my opinion therefore the M. S. Unit where operations of the kind referred to in the inclusive clause are carried on is a mine as defined in the Mines Act. 6. It is undisputed that by virtue of the fact that the petitioner is deaf and dumb he does not possess the standard of fitness in regard to his hearing and speech stipulated in clauses (5) and (6) of Form P-1 of R.29F of the Mines Rules which are statutory rules. The respondents were therefore right in denying to the petitioner the employment in the mines. 7. It is unfortunate that the petitioner cannot get the job for which he is otherwise fit. He has received one year's training at the same place. The respondents shall consider whether it is possible to employ the petitioner in a suitable position. 8. For all these reasons the O.P. is dismissed.