HANSARIA, C. J. ( 1 ) A Hindu husband, who is a citizen of India, makes a grievance that though he has no choice insofar as application of Section 125, Cr. P. C. dealing with grant of maintenance, inter alia, to divorced wives is concerned, his counterpart, if he be a Muslim, has option because of what has been provided in Section 5 of the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter, "the Act"), and so, he is being discriminated against solely on the ground of religion which violates the mandate of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. The prayer, therefore, is that Section 5 of the Act should be struck down. ( 2 ) ARTICLE 15 is a facet of equality promised by Article 14 and to see that equality prevails, Article 15 prohibits discrimination on ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth by stating that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen only on these grounds. To put it differently, Article 14 guarantees the general right of equality; and Articles 15 and 16 are instances of the same right in favour of citizens in some special circumstances, as observed by a Constitution Bench in Gazula Dasarath v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 564 . The three provisions namely, Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other vide General Manager v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36. ( 3 ) THE two requirements to attract Article 15 (1) are : (1) there should be no discrimination; and (2) that too, only on ground, inter alia, of religion. We have, therefore, to see as to what is the purport of the word "discrimination". Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , presiding over a Constitution Bench explained the meaning of "discrimination" in Kathirening v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 , in paragraph 7 by stating that the expression "discriminate against" means according to the Oxford Dictionary "to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others". After having said so, the learned Chief Justice stated that "discrimination" thus involves "an element of unfavourable bias". After having said so, the learned Chief Justice stated that "discrimination" thus involves "an element of unfavourable bias". It was thereafter observed that if such bias is disclosed and is based on any of the grounds mentioned inter alia, in Article 15, it may well be that the statute will without more incur condemnation as violating a specific constitutional provision unless it is saved by one or other provisos to the Article. ( 4 ) THE word "only" has also significance, which was explained by the Constitution Bench in Kumari Chitra Ghose v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 35 , which had examined the constitutionality of reservation of seats to different categories of persons, one of which would be enough for us to note, the same being that reservations were made for the sons and daughters of the residents of the Union Territories other than Delhi, which was attacked on the ground that reservations had been made only on the ground of the place of birth, which is also not permissible in view of what has been stated in Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench observed that this discrimination is not only on the ground of the place of birth but the reservation had been made because of the reason that the areas in question were known to be comparatively backward, and with the exception of Himachal Pradesh, they did not have any medical college of their own -- the case being relatable to admission to medical colleges. The reservation was, therefore, not held to be violative of Article 15 (1 ). It, therefore, means that if reason for differentiation exists, the same would not be hit by Article 15. ( 5 ) WE have, therefore, to see whether the provision contained in Section 5 of the Act can be said to be founded on the basis of religion. According to Shri Misra, this is not so. The learned counsel brings to our notice the background of the passing of the Act, which was on a demand by the Muslims of the country to allow them to be governed in the matter of grant of maintenance to divorced wives according to their personal law following the decision of the apex Court in Saha Bano's case. The learned counsel brings to our notice the background of the passing of the Act, which was on a demand by the Muslims of the country to allow them to be governed in the matter of grant of maintenance to divorced wives according to their personal law following the decision of the apex Court in Saha Bano's case. Shri Misra contends that the mischief rule is one of the tools of interpretation, and we should bear the same in mind, and if that is done, it would be apparent that the Act was passed not only because of a person concerned being a Muslim but because the personal law of the person concerned, who is a Muslim, was sought to be protected. As to this, the reply of Shri Mohanty is that the Hindus have also their personal laws relating to maintenance, as would appear from the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; and so, there was no reason for giving the benefit of personal law in this regard to a Muslim husband alone and not to a Hindu husband. The question of giving benefit of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act shall be adverted later. We shall first examine whether Section 5 of the Act is hit by Article 15, for which purpose we have to see whether religion alone was the cause of enactment of Section 5 which permits a Muslim husband to opt to be governed by the provisions of Section 125, Cr. P. C. as it is on such a declaration being made either jointly with the divorced woman or separately that they prefer to be governed by Section 125, Cr. P. C. , that the said Section becomes applicable in the case of a Muslim husband. ( 6 ) IT will be worthwhile to note some of the decisions of the apex Court and High Courts to see as to how cases of the present nature had been examined. ( 7 ) WE may start with B. Venakataraman v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 229 , to which our attention is invited by Shri Mohanty, in which an order of the Madras Government which, besides making reservation of posts for Harijans and backward Hindus as sanctioned by clause (4) of Article 16, made reservation of posts for Christians etc. also. This was held to be violative of Article 14, being communal in nature. also. This was held to be violative of Article 14, being communal in nature. Indeed, the Government Order had been described as Communal G. O. The reservation was found to have been ordered only on the ground of community, and so, held bad. ( 8 ) IN State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, AIR 1953 SC 10 , the question which had come up for consideration before the Constitution Bench was whether Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949 was discriminatory. The attack on the constitutionality was advanced on the ground that that Act applied only to a male or female child if he or she be a Muslim, as would appear from the definition of the expression "abducted person" given in Section 2 (1) (a ). In repelling the attack on the anvil of Article 14, it was stated that Muslim abducted persons constitute a well defined class for the purposes of legislation. So, the Act even though it applied only to the Muslims was not held violative of the equality clause. Relying on this decision, a Bench of the Punjab High Court in Raghbir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Punjab 261, upheld the validity of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 which had declared that certain mortgages of the property belonging to Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan shall stand extinguished under certain circumstances. The statute had been assailed on the ground that it applied only to the properties belonging to Muslims. The Court, however, stated that the mortgages of the property of Muslim evacuees constitute a well defined class for the purposes of legislation and it was pointed out that if substantial differences exist among persons who are included and those who are excluded, the classification would not be bad. It was then held that the Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan substantially differed from other persons. It was further observed that the Act made no discrimination between one person and another in the group and each one of them was treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions. It was then held that the Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan substantially differed from other persons. It was further observed that the Act made no discrimination between one person and another in the group and each one of them was treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions. The classification was said to be neither capricious nor arbitrary and was held to be based on the fact that the situation and circumstances of persons who are mortgages of evacuee property are different from the situation and circumstances of persons who are mortgages of other property; and there was a clear and distinct connection between the classification and the object of the Act. The validity of the Act was, therefore, upheld. ( 9 ) SHRI Mohanty, however, brings to our notice another decision of the apex Court - the same being Nain Sukh Das v. State of U. P. , AIR 1953 SC 384 , in which it was held that any law providing for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religious communities offends Article 15 (1 ). It was stated that the constitutional mandate contained in Article 15 extended to political as well as other rights. Shri Mohanty draws our attention to a Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Shekeransingh v. Daulatram, AIR 1955 Rajasthan 201 also, in which as to the rule of Damdupat (which was that a person could not claim a larger sum on account of interest than the principal) recognised by Hindu Law, it was stated that after the coming into force of the Constitution, the same had ceased to be binding and cannot be given effect to, because enforcement of the rule would be discriminating between Hindus and non-Hindus inasmuch as the rule applied only to Hindus or, at any rate, where the original debtor was a Hindu. The learned counsel then refers to State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208 , in which classification on the basis of religion only was held to be violative of Article 15 (1 ). There an exemption was granted under Section 15 (5) of the Police Act, 1861, inter alia, to Muslim inhabitants of the villages in which an additional police force was stationed, from the levy of the cost of the additional force. There an exemption was granted under Section 15 (5) of the Police Act, 1861, inter alia, to Muslim inhabitants of the villages in which an additional police force was stationed, from the levy of the cost of the additional force. It was held that the exemption discriminated against the lawa-biding members of the other communities and in favour of the Muslims on the basis of only religion, and so, the exemption was violative of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution, and so, unconstitutional. Still another decision brought to our notice is that of Judicial Commissioner rendered in Especiosa Nunes v. Francisco, AIR 1974 Goa, Daman and Diu 46, in which Article 4 of Decree No. 35, 461 was declared to be ultra vires because that took away the right of getting a divorce under civil law only from those Catholics who had married canonically under Catholic rites and not from the Catholics who had married under common civil law. This restriction was challenged on the ground that it was imposed only on the Catholics and was founded purely on religious grounds. This argument was accepted and the decree was declared ultra vires. ( 10 ) SHRI Misra in his turn refers to some further decisions wherein though the classification was based only on the ground of religion, nonetheless, the provision was not held ultra vires. The first such decision is that of the apex Court in Mahant Moti Das v. S. P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942 , in which the validity of the provisions contained in Sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act was assailed on the ground that the definition of the word 'hindu' in Section 2 does not include Sikhs; and Section 5 constitutes a Board for religious trusts other than Jain religious trusts. As to Sections 6, 7 and 8, it was alleged that the constitution of the Board for religious trusts other than Jain religious trusts differs in material particulars from the constitution of the two Boards for Jain religious trusts. The challenge was, however, not accepted by pointing out that there are some differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains in some of the essential details of the faith which they profess and the religious practices they observe. The challenge was, however, not accepted by pointing out that there are some differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains in some of the essential details of the faith which they profess and the religious practices they observe. The Court held that in view of these differences, it could not be said that in the matter of religious trusts in the State of Bihar, Sikhs, Hindus and Jains are situated alike or that the needs of the Jains and Hindus are the same in the matter of the administration of their respective religious trusts; and so, the classification was held to be not ultra vires. This decision of the Constitution Bench was followed by another Constitution Bench in State of Bihar v. Bhabapritananda, AIR 1959 SC 1073 . Earlier to these two decisions, the Madras High Court in Lakshmindra v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, AIR 1952 Mad 613 , had observed that the classification made by the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act had not been made for the first time by the State Legislature - the distinction between different religious denominations had existed for nearly a century; and the incidents and the nature of the institutions and endowments of different religious differed because of which it could not be said that the classification was made solely on religion as the institutions included in the classification were religious as well as secular. The only other decision brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the parties is that of Judicial Commissioner in Abdulla Khan v. Chandni Bi, AIR 1956 Bhopal 71, in which the challenge was to the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 on the ground that the Act gave the benefit to Hindu woman only to live separately from her husband, but this was denied to Muslim woman in a similar situation. The validity was, however, upheld by pointing out that the legislature is reluctant to legislate on a religious matter to which objection may be taken by most of the members belonging to that religion. It was, therefore, observed that if in these circumstances a law is passed and made applicable to followers of only one religion, the same could not be said to be arbitrary and discriminatory. It is stated with respect that the reasons given in this decision do not appear to be very convincing. It was, therefore, observed that if in these circumstances a law is passed and made applicable to followers of only one religion, the same could not be said to be arbitrary and discriminatory. It is stated with respect that the reasons given in this decision do not appear to be very convincing. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid shows that merely because the basis of the classification made by the legislation is based on religion would not ipso facto make the legislation offensive of Article 15 (1 ). The same has to be 'discriminatory' in the sense that it involves an element of unfavourable bias. This apart, the classification must have been made only on the basis of religion which would not be so if there exists historical, personal or other reasons supporting the classification. This is apparent from the decision in Ajaib Singh's case, AIR 1953 SC 10 , wherein the statute applied only to Muslims, even so, the same was not held to be ultra vires, because Muslim abducted persons were regarded to constitute a well defined class, following which the Punjab High Court in Raghbir Singh's case, AIR 1954 Punj 261 upheld the validity of the Evacuee interest (Separation) Act, 1951 though it related to certain mortgages of property belonging to Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan, inter alia, on the ground that substantial differences existed between the persons who are covered by the Act and those who had left. Same view was taken in Mahant Moti Das ( AIR 1959 SC 942 , which was followed in AIR 1959 SC 1073 ), where the attack was not upheld though certain provisions of the statute at hand applied to Hindus only and not to Sikhs and Jains, by pointing out that in matters of religious practices, various differences existed between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains. Reference may also be made in this context to Chitra Ghose's case, AIR 1970 SC 35 , though in that case discrimination was alleged on the ground of the place of birth which is also prohibited by Article 15 (1), as in the ground of religion, because of which what was stated qua that ground would apply to the ground at hand. It was held therein that the classification was really not because of the place of birth, but for other reasons. It was held therein that the classification was really not because of the place of birth, but for other reasons. ( 12 ) AS against the above, the cases in which violation of Article 15 (1) was read were those in which the classification rested solely on the basis of religion. Be this the case of Venkatraman, AIR 1951 SC 229 ,; Nain Sukh Das, AIR 1953 SC 384 ; Sheokaran Singh, AIR 1955 Raj 201 (FB); Thakur Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208 or the Goa case, AIR 1974 Goa 46 . No justification had existed to classify similarly situated persons differently. The differentiation was therefore regarded as an instance of hostile discrimination - a result of unfavourable bias shown on the ground of religion only. ( 13 ) LET us see whether it can be said about Section 5 of the Act that it is grounded only on the fact of a husband being a Muslim or there is any justification for the same; and whether a Muslim husband differs substantially in this regard from a Hindu husband. The difference, as is known, is based on personal law of Muslims. Hindus do not have a personal law relating to the quantum of maintenance to be granted to their divorced wives, as what has been stated in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to which alone Shri Mohanty has referred in this connection is generally about the maintenance of wives vide Section 18 of the Act, it has not stated anything in particular about the maintenance to be claimed by a Hindu wife after she has been divorced. We, therefore, do not read any unfavourable bias in favour of a Muslim husband nor can it be said that the classification was founded on the basis of religion without any justification. The question of wisdom of the enactment at hand is not for us to decide or comment. ( 14 ) THE aforesaid being the position, the attack on Section 5 of the Act on the anvil of Article 15 (1) cannot be sustained. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Before parting, we would observe that this case has again brought to the fore the need to have a uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India desired by Article 44 of the Constitution. ( 15 ) B. N. DASH, J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed. .