Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. The 6th defendant is the suit is the appellant. The suit is for the recovery of a sum of Rs.2,31,7025. The plaintiff is the banking company. The first defendant is a partnership firm. Defendants 2 to 5 are partners of the firm. Defendants 2 to 5 applied for loan to the plaintiff bank for purchase of a trawler for fishing trade. The plaintiff bank sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,80,000 by its order dated 31. 1977. The defendants executed a letter of hypothecation on 13. 1977 in respect of the trawler in favour of the bank. It was also stipulated as a condition that defendants 1 to 5 shall insure the trawler with the insurance company. Accordingly, the trawler was insured with the 6th defendant. The first policy was for the period 24. 1977 to 24. 1978. After the expiry of the first policy, the second policy, which was in renewal of the first policy, was for the period 24. 1978 to 24. 1979. The first defendant was never regular in payments of the monthly instalments towards the discharge of loan and there was a balance of Rs.2,31,709.25 including interest. The plaintiff was informed that the trawler was sunkon ll.l2.1978 and the 5th defendant was also informed of it. As the trawler is insured with the 6th defendant, the plaintiff has filed the suit against all the defendants contending that the 6th defendant is also liable. 2. It is not necessary to set out the defence raised by defendants 1 to 5, as they have not preferred any appeal against the decree passed against them. The 6th defendant filed a written statement disputing its liability on the following grounds: (1) The policy specifically provided permission to ply within port limits only during prohibited periods of monsoon, viz., 1st November to 31st January on Tamil Nadu coasts and the port limits extend only upto 6 fathoms, but the boat sank at a place called "Arichakadal’ and, therefore, the 6th defendant cannot be made liable for the loss of the boat as it had entered the prohibited area. (2) The first defendant had leased the boat to one Balu Shanmugam under an agreement dated 19. 1978 and handed over possession of the vessel to the said lessee. (2) The first defendant had leased the boat to one Balu Shanmugam under an agreement dated 19. 1978 and handed over possession of the vessel to the said lessee. As the vessel was not in the possession and control of the first defendant on the date on which the boat sank, the policy became void under clause 5 of ISTLO Clause (Hulls). Thus, the policy lapsed and was not in force on 112. 1978. (3) The owners of the boat had not taken reasonable steps to recover and protect the property as is the custom and usage. (4) The vessel was deliberately sunk in the high seas in order to make a fraudulent claim on the defendant. 3. The trial court negatived the defence raised by defendants 1 to 5 and found them liable to meet the suit claim. On the contentions raised by the 6th defendant, the trial court held that there was no evidence to prove that the boat entered prohibited areas and got sunk in such area. It was also found that the case of the 6th defendant that the boat was sunk deliberately with a fraudulent intention for making a claim as against the insurance company was not proved. The trial court also held that clause 5 of ISTLO Clause would not apply in the case of a lease, as the first defendant continued to have interest in the boat, which was an insurable interest. Consequently, the trial court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for. 4. In this appeal by the 6th defendant, three of the contentions raised in the court below are repeated. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that during the prohibited period, the boat went outside the port limits and, therefore, the insurance company cannot be made liable. Secondly it is argued that the boat was wantonly and deliberately sank by the parties with a view to make a claim against the insurance company, as they were not in a position to discharge the loan due to the plaintiff bank. Thirdly it is contended that on them first defendant entering into a lease transaction with a third party Bala Shanmugam, the policy get lapsed by virtue of clause 5 of ISTLO and the appellant cannot be made liable for any amount. 5. The first two contentions are factual. They depend on the evidence on record. Thirdly it is contended that on them first defendant entering into a lease transaction with a third party Bala Shanmugam, the policy get lapsed by virtue of clause 5 of ISTLO and the appellant cannot be made liable for any amount. 5. The first two contentions are factual. They depend on the evidence on record. There is no satisfactory evidence in support of the case put forward by the appellant. The appellant relied upon a report submitted by a private detective agency appointed by itself for the purpose of investigating the matter. The report is marked as Ex.B-2. The Chief Detective of the said agency by name Harris has been examined as D.W.1. He has no personnal knowledge of the matters spoken to by him. He relied only on his report, which is said to be based on the statement made by certain persons. The persons who’ are said to have given statements before D. W.l at the time of investigation have not been examined. There is no accept-able evidence before court to show that Arichaka-dal. Where the boat sunk was in the prohibited area. There is some ambiguity in the relevant clause, but it is not necessary for us to rely on that circumstances. However, we will point out the same. The clauses on which reliance is placed by the appellant read as follows: “Trading Warranty: 1. Warranted fishing vessels employment limited to coasts of Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, Kerala & Andhra. (Sic.) 2. Vessel not to ply beyond 50 miles into thesea from shore. Relaxation in Trading Warranty: 1. In consideration of payment of additional premium at 1.50% of the.sum insured fishing port limits during prohibited period on Coasts of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry and Andhra from 1st November to31st January and Kerala from 1st June to 15th August (both days inclusive) are hereby allowed.” It is doubtful whether the clauses intended to prohibit the plying of the trawler into certain areas after stipulating an additional premium. If an additional premium is stipulated, the insurer must be permitted to travel more areas than what was originally permitted. But, the clauses read otherwise. However, there is nothing in evidence to explain the ambiguity. 6. Suffice it for us to point out that the evidence in record us wholly insufficient to accept the case on: the appellant that when the boat sunk, it was in the prohibited area. But, the clauses read otherwise. However, there is nothing in evidence to explain the ambiguity. 6. Suffice it for us to point out that the evidence in record us wholly insufficient to accept the case on: the appellant that when the boat sunk, it was in the prohibited area. Nor is there anything to show that Arichakadal is beyond the stipulated distance. In the circumstances, we affirm the finding of the trial court, that it is not proved that the boat was in the prohibited areas. 7. On the other question as to whether the parties deliberately sunk the trawler, again there is no evidence. Excepting some suggestions made in the cross-examination, which have been denied, there is nothing worthy of acceptance to substantiate the case of the appellant. Hence, we confirm the finding of the trial court on that question also. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant laid considerable stress on the contention that in view of the execution of the lease deed dated 19. 1978 under Ex.B-1, the policy got lapsed. As stated earlier, there was a policy for the period 24. 1977 to 24. 1978. That is marked as Ex.A-3. The next policy is for the subsequent period 24. 1978 to 24. 1979. That is marked as Ex.A-4. The policy which was in force at the time when the boat got sunk was Ex.A-4. In the court below, the contention was that clause 5 of the Institute Standard T.L.O. Clause (Hulls) would apply and as per the said clause, the policy got lapsed. The clause reads thus: "If the vessel is sold or transferred to new management then unless the underwriters agree in writing to continue the insurance this policy shall become cancelled from the time of sale or transfer, unless the vessel has cargo on board and has already sailed from her loading port or is at sea in ballast, in either of which cases, such cancellation shall, if required, be suspended until arrival at final port of discharge if with cargo, or at part of destination if in ballast. A prorata daily return of premium shall be made. A prorata daily return of premium shall be made. This clause shall prevail not with standing any provision whether written, typed or printed in the policy inconsistent therewith." Arguments were advanced by learned counsel for the appellant on the question of interpretation of the clause as to whether the expression ‘transfer’ used in the clause would include a lease. According to the appellant, the expression used is ‘sold or transferred to new management’ and that would undoubtedly include a lease. He has also referred to the evidence on record to the effect that after the execution of the lease deed, the entire mana- ‘gement was with the lessee and defendants 1 to 5 were not in possession or control of the trawler. 9. When learned counsel for defendants 1 to 3 commenced his arguments, he submitted that the ISTLO Clause or warranties were not attached to Ex.A-4. He pointed out that the document marked as Ex.A-4 does not contain either the ISTLO Clause or the warranties, while they find a place in Ex.A-3. According to him. when the ISTLO Clause is not attached to the policy, which is the relevant policy to be considered by the court, the appellant cannot claim that the clause would apply to the present case and the policy got lapsed. It is contended that the contract of insurance under Ex.A-4 does not contain any exclusion clause and the appellant will consequently be liable for paying the amount claimed. 10. In the trial court, the parties proceeded as if ISTLO Clause would apply to the relevant policy. No question was raised in the trial Court, either in the pleadings or at the time of arguments as to applicability of the said clause. It is raised for the first time in this Court. But the question has to be decided on the evidence already available and, therefore, we have permitted the respondents to raise the question. The documents which are marked as exhibits arc before us. We find as a fact that Ex. A-4does not contain either ISTLO Clause or the warranties, while both are attached to Ex.A-3. We must also point out that the two documents which arc marked as exhibits are only xerox copies of the original policies. The originals have not been produced before court. None of the parties though fit to call for the original. A-4does not contain either ISTLO Clause or the warranties, while both are attached to Ex.A-3. We must also point out that the two documents which arc marked as exhibits are only xerox copies of the original policies. The originals have not been produced before court. None of the parties though fit to call for the original. The parties proceeded on the footing that the documents which were produced before court were true copies of the original and they did not contain any errors. 11. When learned counsel for the respondents relied on the absence of ISTLO Clause and the warranties in Ex.A-4, learned- counsel for the appellant prayed for an opportunity to produce the office copies of the relevant policies maintained in the office of the appellant. We directed all the three parties viz., the plaintiff bank, the appellant-insurance company and defendants 1 to 5 produce the copies respectively available with them so that the facts can be ascertained correctly. The plaintiffs counsel has reported that no document is available with the plaintiff bank and whatever was available with them had been filed into the Court, which are marked as exhibits. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has produced typed copies of the policies retained in the office of the appcllant. Along with it, an affidavit sworn to by a senior Assistant in the appellant-company has been filed. In that affidavit it is stated that the deponent was the person who prepared the policy in question in accordance with the directions given by the then Branch Manager Mr.T.G.Lakshmanan. It is necessary to extract paragraphs 4 to 7: "4. I state that as stated earlier, in accordance with the directions given by the then Manager I had prepared the original policy No.945/ 4100002 and the normal practice in the preparation of policy is that the original will be prepared and from that original two copies will be prepared of which one will be sent to the Regional Office and the other will be kept by the office which prepares the policy. 5. With reference to the printed forms that are attached to the original policy, in the office-copy, there will be merely reference to the attached clauses and the same would be attached only to the original policy. 6. Whatever clauses were prepared for the first time for the policy, a copy will be kept along with the duplicate. 7. 5. With reference to the printed forms that are attached to the original policy, in the office-copy, there will be merely reference to the attached clauses and the same would be attached only to the original policy. 6. Whatever clauses were prepared for the first time for the policy, a copy will be kept along with the duplicate. 7. So far as the present policy is concerned, along with the original policy, TLO Clause, strike clause, off-season risk and SRCC clauses were attached. Since they are printed forms, a copy of the same was not kept along with the office copy. For the first time, instalment clause was prepared and we have kept the copy of the said annexure only along with the office copy since that was the only clause prepared afresh. All other clauses including the T.L.O. clause, were attached to the original policy and given to the first respondent herein." 13.The copies which are produced before us by the appellant arc not copies of the policy as such. They are only notes of the relevant details which are set out in the policy. They mention the policy number, the date, the value of the trawler and the amount of premium. It is also mentioned that strike clause, instalment payment clause and T.L.O. clause are attached. It is further stated that warranties as per schedule are attached. Copy of the said clauses or the warranties arc not kept with the copy of the document which is not produced before us. Asset out in the affidavit, it is staled that the appellant company will only maintain the details of the policy issued and it will not keep copies of the said clauses or warranties attached to the notes maintained. However, it is averred in the affidavit that printed forms containing the T.L.O. clauses and the warranties were attached to the original policy and given to the first respondent. 14.. Respondents 2 to 5 have produced the copies which were forwarded to them by the plaintiff bank after the policy was issued. They have also filed an affidavit sworn to by the third respondent. It is stated in that affidavit that the documents now produced before Court arc those which were sent to them by the bank. They produced copies of the policy for the year 24. 1977 to 24. 1978 and for the year 24. 1978 to 24. 1979. They have also filed an affidavit sworn to by the third respondent. It is stated in that affidavit that the documents now produced before Court arc those which were sent to them by the bank. They produced copies of the policy for the year 24. 1977 to 24. 1978 and for the year 24. 1978 to 24. 1979. The copies produced by them arc identical with Exs.A-3 and A-4. 15. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that even in the typed set of papers furnished by the appellants for use in the appeal, the copies of Exs.A-3 and A-4 are included and those copies show that the T.L.O. clause as well as the warranties are not attached to Ex.A-4 while they arc attached to Ex.A-3. Having regard to these facts, we must decide whether the policy for the year 24. 1978 to 26. 4.1979 contained the T.L.O. clause and the warranties. Though it is mentioned that T.L.O. Clause and Warranties as per the schedule are attached, they are not actually attached to the policy issued under Ex.A-4. The appellant has failed to prove that along with the policy for the year 24. 1978 to 24. 1979 the T.L.O. Clause and Warranties as per schedule were sent to the party. There is no reason to doubt that the copies produced by the respondents along with their affidavit are not the copies which were received by them from the bank when the policy was effected. There is no suggestion that the docu-ments which are marked as Exs.A-3 and A-4 in the trial Court have been tampered with. In those circumstances, we have to proceed on the footing that Ex.A-3 and Ex-A-4 represent the true copies of the policies which were actually effected at the relevant time. No doubt there was no contention before the trial court that the T.L.O. Clause was not attached to Ex.A-4. But,obviously, the parties took it for granted that all the papers attached to Ex.A-3. would also have been attached to Ex.A-4. It is only on that basis arguments would appear to have been advanced before the trial court. The court has also not taken care to look into Ex.A-4. But,obviously, the parties took it for granted that all the papers attached to Ex.A-3. would also have been attached to Ex.A-4. It is only on that basis arguments would appear to have been advanced before the trial court. The court has also not taken care to look into Ex.A-4. In fact in paragraph 10 which contains the relevant discussion, the following passage is significant: "Ex.A-3 is the photostat copy of the Insurance policy issued by the 6th defendant in respect of the Tralwer in question covering the period bctween24. 1977and 24. 1978. Ex.A-4 is the photostat copy of the policy of Insurance company in respect of the said vessel covering the period between 24. 1978 and 24. 1979. In Ex.A-3 certain warranties, terms and conditions forming part of the policy are incorporated." That passage shows that the trial court looked into Ex.A-3 and found that warranties and terms and conditions forming part of the policy were incorporated. The trial court does not say that such incorporation was found in Ex.A-4 also. Obviously, the trial court proceeded on the footing that whatever was part of Ex.A-3 would be part of Ex.A-4 also. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the T.L.O. Clause and warranties are usually attached to Marine Insurance policies and the court must proceed on the footing that they form part of the contract represented by Ex.A-4. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in General Assurance Society Limited v. Chandmull Jain and another, A.I.R. 1965 S.C 1644: (1966)2 S.L.J. 101: (1966)2 Comp.L .J. 1: (1966)36 C.C. 468: (1966)2 S.C.A. 219. In that case, the insurance company accepted the proposals and issued cover notes. The cover notes referred to t he policy to be issued. The question was whether a clause in the policy was applicable. The court answered it in the affirmative holding that there was incorporation by reference. The court said: “(11) A contract of insurance is a species of commercial transactions and there is a well-established commercial practice to send cover notes even prior to the completion of a proper proposal or while the proposal is being considered or a policy is in preparation for delivery. A cover note is a temporary and limited agreement. It may be self-contained or it may incorporate by reference the terms and conditions of the future policy. A cover note is a temporary and limited agreement. It may be self-contained or it may incorporate by reference the terms and conditions of the future policy. When the cover note incorporates the policy in the manner, it docs not have to recite the terms and conditions, but merely to refer to a parlicular standard policy. If the proposal is for a standard policy and the cover note refers to it, the assured is taken to have accepted the terms of that policy. The reference to the policy and its terms and conditions may be expressed in the proposal of the cover note or even in the letter of acceptance including the cover note. The incorporation of the terms and conditions of the policy may also arise from a combination of reference in two or more documents passing between the parties. Documents like the proposal, cover note and the policy are commercial documents and to interpret them commercial habits and practice cannot altogether be ignored. During the time the cover note operates, the relations of the parties are governed by its terms and conditions, if any, but more usually by the terms and conditions of the policy bargained for and to be issued. When this happens the terms of the policy arc incipient, but after the period of temporary cover, the relations are governed only by the terms and conditions of the policy unless insurance is declined in the meantime. Delay in issuing the policy makes no difference. The relations even then are governed by the future policy if the cover notes give sufficient indication that it would be so.” 17. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on the above passage and submits that the T.L.O. Clause as well as the warranties form part of the insurance contracts and the court must treat them as terms of the policy under Ex.A-4 also. We are unable to accept this contention. If the policy had merely stated that ‘subject to the usual T.L.O. Clause and warranties’ the position would have been different. But, in the present case, the policy states that the T.L.O. Clause and the warranties as persched-ule are attached. If they are not so attached, then the appellant cannot claim that they should be treated as part of the contract. But, in the present case, the policy states that the T.L.O. Clause and the warranties as persched-ule are attached. If they are not so attached, then the appellant cannot claim that they should be treated as part of the contract. In the above ruling of the Supreme Court it is also said: “In other respects there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of insurance there is a requirement of uberima fides, i.e., good faith on the part of the assured and that contract is likely to be construed contra proferentem that is against the company in case of ambiguity or doubt.” [Italics ours ] 18. Applying the said rule in the present case, the contract must be construed only against the appel-lant inasmuch as the policy to the party is not accompanied by the T.L.O. Clause or warranties as per the schedule. He reliance can be placed on Ex.A-3 as the said policy has come to an end on 14. 1978. The only policy which is relevant is the policy lhat was in force between 24. 1978 and 24. 1979. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents also draws our attention to the fact that the appellant company was receiving insurance premiums, both after the date of the lease deed and after the date of the accident on which the trawler got sunk. Ex.A-12 shows that premium was collected on 210. 1978 and Ex.A-33 shows that premium was collected on 21. 1979. That proves that the appellant proceeded on the footing that the policy was alive and in force at the time when the trawler got sunk. Hence, the appellant cannot invoke clause 5 of ISTLO Clause. 20. In the view we have taken on the facts of the case, we are not making any reference 10 the various rulings cited by learned counsel on both sides on the question whether a lease would be a transfer to the new management within the meaning of clause 5. 21. The decree passed by the trial court is well-founded and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.