Judgment : S.P. Srivastava 1. BEING aggrieved by the notice dated 12-11-92 issued by General Manager of the Allahabad District Co-operative Bank Limited, Allahabad wherein the petitioner was informed that on his attaining the age of superannuation of 58 years in the afternoon on 4-5-93, he will stand retired from service, he has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition filed on 22-2-93 seeking the quashing of the impugned notice dated 12-11-92 and praying for a direction requiring the respondents to permit him to continue in service till 14-5-95 treating the age of superannuation to be 60 years and not 58 years. 2. THE Allahabad District Cooperative Bank, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) the respondent no. 1 admittedly is a Cooperative Bank registered under the Cooperative Societies Act and is managed by a Board of Directors headed by a Chairman. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the aforesaid Bank on 18-5-60. At that time he fell in the category of 'workman' as envisaged under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. His status even on the date of the impugned notice continued to be that of a workman which fact is clearly asserted in para 4 of the affidavit dated 26-2-93 filed on behalf of the respondents on the said date. According to the respondents, as asserted in para 5 of the counter affidavit dated 24-4-93 filed on their behalf, there was no service rule governing the service conditions of the employees of the Bank prior to the year 1975. According to the petitioner who was a member of U.P. Bank Employees/Allahabad District Cooperative Bank Union Allahabad a settlement was arrived at between the recognised employees Labour Union and the employer on 22-2-66 hereunder apart from other settlements reached between the employees and p employer, it was also settled that the date of superannuation of an employee workman would be 60 years. The respondents do not dispute this settlement dated 22-2-66. The respondents do not dispute this settlement dated 22-2-66. In fact from a perusal of the letter dated 13-5-88 issued by the General Manager of the Allahabad District Cooperative Bank, Allahabad; a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, it is apparent that the employer had required all the workman employees to endorse their satisfaction and consent for the implementation of the terms of settlement which had been arrived at during the pendency of the Industrial Dispute before the Labour Tribunal-III, Allahabad. The list of employees who were required to append their signature as a token of their having consented to the settlement includes the name of the petitioner and against this name he is shown to have put his signature as required. 3. IT, however, appears that U. P. Cooperative 'Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975, were framed in accordance with the provisions contained in the U. P. Cooperative Societies Acf and came into force with effect from 6-1-76. IT not disputed by the respondents that the service conditions of the petitioner stands regulated by the provisions 'contained in the aforesaid regulations. Regulation 24 of the aforesaid Regulations provides that the age of retirement of an employee of a Cooperative Society shall be 58 years. Sub-clause (ii) of the aforesaid Regulation, however, provides that if before coming into operation of these regulations, the Society had entered into any contract with an employee on the date of his employment whereby he is entitled to continue beyond 58 years, the rule of retirement at the age of 58 years as contained in clause (i) shall not apply and the age of retirement shall be governed by the contract, The aforesaid regulation 24 was amended vide the U. P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service (IVth Amendment) Regulations, 1983 which came into force with effect from 17-5-83. Thereunder for the regulation 24 of the Regulations of 1975 referred to hereinbefore a new Regulation 24 to the following effect was substituted :- "24. Thereunder for the regulation 24 of the Regulations of 1975 referred to hereinbefore a new Regulation 24 to the following effect was substituted :- "24. Retirement-the date of superannuation from service of an employee of a Cooperative Society shall be; (a) the date on which he attains the age of 58 years, if he is appointed to a post in category I, II, or III : Provided that, where before commencement of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Employee's Service Regulations, 1975, the Society had entered, with an employee, at the time of his appointment, into a contract whereby he is entitled to be retained in service after the date on which he attains the age of 58 years, the provision of this sub-clause shall not apply and the date of superannuation of such employee shall be determined in accordance with the terms of the said contract; (b) the date on which he attains the age of 60 years, if he is appointed to a post in category IV." 4. I have heard Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vijai Bahadur Singh, learned counsel representing the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner was clearly entitled to the benefits envisaged under Regulation 24 (ii) of the Service Regulations of 1975 which benefits were not at all disturbed even after the substitution of Regulation 24 by a new regulation in the year 1983, The contention is that regulation 24 (ii) of the year 1975 was really an exception to regulation 24 (i) and this exception continued to remain in force even after the amendment of the year 1983 as the same exception was retained in the proviso to regulation 24 (a) as substituted by the U. P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service (IVth Amendment) Regulation, 1983. It is contended that regulation 24 (ii) of the Regulations of 1975 permitted an employee of the society having entered into any contract with his employer the date of his employment whereby he was entitled to continue beyond 58 years, till he attained the age of retirement as contemplated under the contract unaffected by regulation 24 (1). It is contended that regulation 24 (ii) of the Regulations of 1975 permitted an employee of the society having entered into any contract with his employer the date of his employment whereby he was entitled to continue beyond 58 years, till he attained the age of retirement as contemplated under the contract unaffected by regulation 24 (1). Similarly, the substituted Regulation 24 provided that if an employee of the Society had entered with the employer at the time of his appointment into a contract whereby he was entitled to be retained in service after the date on which he attained she age of 58 years, the provisions contained in new Regulation 24 (a) fixing the age of retirement to be 58 years were not to apply and the date of superannuation of such employee had to be determined in accordance with the terms of the said contract. The learned counsel strenuously contended that under the impugned notice the respondent-bank purported to cut down the tenure of service of the petitioner which stood secured in his favour entitling, him to remain in service till he attains the age of 60 years, to only upto the age of 58 years seeking to enforce regulation 24 (a) of the Regulations denying the petitioner the statutory benefit to which he was entitled under the proviso to regulation 24 (a) as brought in the Statute Book in the year 1983. The contention is that the impugned action is manifestly illegal and the impugned action curtailing the service tenure of the petitioner which stood secured in his favour under a Statute, is clearly without jurisdiction. The learned counsel in this connection, has heavily relied upon the settlement reached between the employee Union and the employer Bank on 22-2-66 which according to the learned counsel represented the contract between the petitioner and the Bank entered into and in force immediately preceding the enforcement of the regulation of 1975 or the Regulation of 1983. According to the learned counsel, for attracting the exception contemplated under the proviso to Regulation 24 (a) of Regulation 24 as was in force at the relevant time, the only thing required to be seen was the existence of a contract securing in favour of an employee a larger tenure of service than envisaged under Regulation 24 (a). According to the learned counsel, for attracting the exception contemplated under the proviso to Regulation 24 (a) of Regulation 24 as was in force at the relevant time, the only thing required to be seen was the existence of a contract securing in favour of an employee a larger tenure of service than envisaged under Regulation 24 (a). Since the settlement dated 22-2-66, according 1o the learned counsel was such a contract and was in force before 1975 and continued to be in force even on the date when the amendments of 1983 became effective, the statutory benefits contemplated under the proviso referred to hereinbefore could not be denied to the petitioner and it was asserted that the respondents have acted with manifest illegality in doing otherwise. 5. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has at the out set challenged the maintainability of this writ petition. The assertion is that the respondent Bank does not fall within the ambit of 'State' as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been contended that the respondent Bank cannot be deemed to be an 'authority' as contemplated either under Article 12 of the Constitution or under Article 226 thereof It is urged that in this view of the matter the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 6. IT has further been contended that the petitioner has an equally effective alternative remedy under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and should approach that forum for the redressal of his grievance. It has further been contended that even on merits, the petitioner's claim is not justifiable inasmuch as he does not fall within the exception envisaged under the proviso to Regulation 24 (a) of the Regulation in question. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the contract stipulated under the proviso is a contract arrived at between the employer and the employee at the time of the appointment of the employee concerned and not any other contract. What has been emphasised is that the contract referred to in the proviso to regulation 24 (a) must be a contract arrived at between the employee and the employer on the date of initial appointment of the employee concerned. What has been emphasised is that the contract referred to in the proviso to regulation 24 (a) must be a contract arrived at between the employee and the employer on the date of initial appointment of the employee concerned. Since in the present case, the learned counsel contended that the petitioner had been employed in the year 1960 and the contract relied upon by him is dated 22-2-66, it cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner. It has further been asserted that in view of the allegations made in the counter-affidavit which has not been rebutted in any manner that there was no service rule in force prior to 1975 governing the service conditions of the employees of the Bank, the petitioner cannot fall within the ambit of the exception as claimed and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and I have also considered the case law cited at the Bar. 8. THE question whether an entity can be regarded as an instrumentality of the State is dependent on various factors which may be peculiar to the facts of a particular case. No specific fact can be held to be conclusive and an over all cumulative view has to be taken. From the facts and circumstances detailed in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank dated 26-2- 93, the assertion made wherein have not been controverted at all, it seems to me, that the State cannot be deemed to have any deep and pervassive control over the functioning and affairs of the respondent-Bank so as to bring it within the ambit of 'State' as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the respondent has in this connection placed strong reliance on the Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Banbihari Tripathy v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, AIR 1989 Ori. 31 , and on the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in the case of 'THE Shamrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Limited v Padubidri Pattabhiram, AIR 1993 Bom. 91 . 31 , and on the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in the case of 'THE Shamrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Limited v Padubidri Pattabhiram, AIR 1993 Bom. 91 . In the case of Banbihari Tripathy (supra) the question was as to whether a Cooperative Society registered under Cooperative Societies Act as such will come within the fold of Article 12 of the Constitution and whether such a Society is created under statute or discharges any such functions which make it an instrumentality of the State. The Full Bench in this case had held that a Cooperative Society on merely getting registered under the Cooperative Societies Act does Dot acquire any status of becoming an authority to render it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It was further held in that decision that if the Cooperative Bank is born under or created by a Statute then it may acquire the status of an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution otherwise it has to satisfy the essential tests formulated by the various decisions of the Supreme Court for which there cannot be a straight jacket formula. It was, however, clarified that in a given case only some of the prominent features may give it that status. But that must be so predominant that on tearing the veil, it may appear that the Society is merely a projection of the State the voice being that of the State and the hands also of the State. 9. IN the case of Shamrao Vithal Coperative Bank and another (supra), the question considered by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was whether the Cooperative Bank in that case was 'State' within the meaning of Article 12, after considering the various decisions, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that merely because banking function is of public importance that factor itself was not sufficient to make the Cooperative Bank 'State' or other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court it was observed that what was required to be seen was whether there was pervassive state control over the management of the Bank and its functioning and merely because an organisation performs functions of public importance, one cannot hold that organisation to be 'State' under Article 12. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court it was observed that what was required to be seen was whether there was pervassive state control over the management of the Bank and its functioning and merely because an organisation performs functions of public importance, one cannot hold that organisation to be 'State' under Article 12. It further observed that merely because a Bank was regulated by laws which are enacted to cover a large number of organisations regulating the functioning of the organisations in public interest by itself cannot automatically bring the organisation within the ambit of State' as contemplated under Article 12. Consequently, the Full Bench held that a registered Cooperative Society under a Cooperative Societies Act which carried on the business of banking and stood governed by the banking regulation Act did not thereby fall within the expression 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 10. A similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in the case of Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad, AIR 1977 Alld. 539, decided by a Full Bench. In its decision in the aforesaid case the Full Bench of this Court agreed with the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in its decision in the case of Mis. Kumkum Khanna v. The Principal, Jesus and Mary College, AIR 1976 Delhi 35, and the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the cage of Ramswarup v. Madhya Pradesh Marketing Federation Limited, AIR 1976 MP 152 , wherein it had been held that a Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court except in cases where according to the provisions of the Statute or Rules or Regulations framed under the Act by which the Society is governed there is a statutory or public duty imposed on it and the enforcement of which is being sought. The Full Bench of this Court also agreed with the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that whenever it was pointed out that any statutory provision on requiring the Society to act in a particular manner creates a right or interest in favour of the person concerned, it will be permissible for such person to approach the High Court for seeking the writ of mandamus to direct not to commit breach of the statute and that a Cooperative Society will be amenable to writ jurisdiction only in cases relating to performance of legal obligation and duties imposed by a Stature creating a corresponding legal right in one. It stay be pointed out that the Full Bench of this Court had further agreed with the view of the Delhi High Court to the effect that the use of the word 'person' in relation to. mandamus and certiorari would show that the person or authority against whom these remedies are given need not be invariably created by a Statute. These writs can be issued against a natural person provided that he is exercising a public or a statutory power or doing a public or a statutory duty. Taking into consideration the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Praga Tools Corporation's case reported in AIR 1969 SC 1306 , it was indicated that even a non-statutory body may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court where it is entrusted with performance of statutory duties or conferred with statutory powers. 11. THE Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Aley Ahmad (supra) made it amply clear that a writ petition filed against a non-statutory body is maintainable if such a petition is for enforcement or performance of any legal obligation or duty imposed on such body by a statute. 12. IN a recent decision of this Court in the case of Sarnam Singh v. president, Konch Sahkari Kraya Vikraya Samiti Ltd. Konch, 1992 (1) UP LB EC 464, a Division Bench of this Court relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sri Anandimukta Sadguru S.M.V.S.J.M.S. Trust v. V. R. Audanu, AIR 1989 SC 1607 , clearly indicated that a writ can be issued to any person or any authority for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It was clarified that the term 'authority' used in Article 226 of the Constitution in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 of the Constitution. It was pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court that the words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. It was pointed out that the form of the body is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The Division Bench clarified that this duty must be judged in the light of the positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party no matter by what means the duty is imposed. In the present case taking into consideration the implications arising under the U. P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975 which have statutory force and the rights, duties and obligations arising thereunder. I have no manner to doubt, that the respondents cannot derive any advantage out of the decisions in the case of the "The Shamrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Limited and another" (supra) decided by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and in the case of Banbihari Tripathy (supra) decided by the Full Bench of the Orisa High Court, wherein the aspects tanen into account in the decision of this Court referred to hereinbefore do not appear to be noticed and considered. The ratio of the decisions of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Aley Ahmad Abidi (supra) and of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sarnam Singh (supra) which appear to be unexceptionable stand clearly attracted in the present case and I am bound to follow them 13. MOREOVER there can be no manner of doubt that the person or body who has legel authority to determine the questions affecting statutory rights or obligations of other persons as individual clearly fall within the ambit of the term 'authority' as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the decision in the case of Regina v. National Joint Council For the Craft of Dental Technicials (Disputes Committee), 1 QBD Vol. In the decision in the case of Regina v. National Joint Council For the Craft of Dental Technicials (Disputes Committee), 1 QBD Vol. I, 704, it was observed that in the case of a body on whom a great many powers had been conferred by Act of Parliament, it is essential that the courts should be able to control the exercise of their jurisdiction strictly within the limits which Parliament has conferred upon them. Further, as observed in the decision in the case of The King v. Electricity Commissioners, 1 KBD Vol. I, 171, the Court could examine the proceedings of all jurisdiction enacted by Act of Parliament, and if under pretence of such Act, they proceed to encroach jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warrants, the Court could send a certiorari to them, to have their proceedings returned to the Court, to the end that the Court might see, that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction and if they exceed it, to restrain them. In the aforesaid decision observations made in a decision in the case of Reg v. Local Government Board, 10 QBD 309, were noticed which were to the effect that the Court should not be chary of exercising its jurisdiction relating to the power of prohibition and that where ever the Legislature entrusts to any body or person other than the superior courts the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals the courts ought to exercise as widely as they can. the power of controlling those bodies of persons if those persons admittedly attempt to exercise powers beyond the powers given to them by Act of Parliament. 14. HERE, in the present case, the regulations of 1975 have statutory force and have been framed in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under the provisions contained in section 122 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act. The regulation 24 of the aforesaid Regulations provides for a security of tenure to an employee in accordance with the terms of the contract entered into as envisaged under the proviso to Regulation 24 (a). The regulation 24 of the aforesaid Regulations provides for a security of tenure to an employee in accordance with the terms of the contract entered into as envisaged under the proviso to Regulation 24 (a). If the body purporting, to exercise its jurisdiction vested in the aforesaid regulations, cuts down or curtails the tenure of service of an employee governed by the Regulations and entitled to the protection envisaged thereunder securing in his favour a larger tenure of service, in that case, if it is made out that the discretion exercised by such body is so unreasonable that no man could came to it or it is in excess of the jurisdiction, in that case there can be no impediment in entertaining the writ petition. This writ petition, consequently, in view of what has been indicated hereinbefore, cannot be held to be not maintainable as urged by the learned counsel for the respondent. His submission in this regard is not at all acceptable and is rejected. 15. SO far as the question relating to the availability of the alternative remedy under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and its effect is concerned, it may be noticed that it is by now well settled that the mere existence of an effective remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court but it is only one of the circumstances that the Court should take into account while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The requirement of the exhaustion of the alternative remedy is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The power conferred in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot, be taken away by an ordinary law and if at all it can only be taken away or curtailed by an amendment of the Constitution. Obviously, therefore, no Jaw by purporting to provide an exclusive machinery for the determination of certain matters can take away High Court's power secured under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. Obviously, therefore, no Jaw by purporting to provide an exclusive machinery for the determination of certain matters can take away High Court's power secured under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. FURTHER it should not be lost sight of that although a law can bar a suit it cannot deprive the High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and any law attempting to bar the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be ultra-vires and void subject, however, to the exception contemplated under Article 323-A (2) (d) of the Constitution, As pointed out by Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 20186 of 1993 Surendra Pal Singh v. Munsif, Aonla, Bareilly and others decided on 21-9-93, while it is true that the High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes for which-remedies under the general law (civil) or (criminal) are available as iris not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by the special and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution which cannot be expected to be exercised casually or lightly yet the failure to have resort to the alternative remedy cannot by itself, be sufficient to constitute an absolute bar or reason for refusal to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court secured under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution and it must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. IN the present case, taking into consideration the admissions contained in the affidavit filed by the contesting respondents no enquiry into any disputed facts is involved. This writ petition was presented on 4-2-93. The parties have already exchanged their affidavits. If the petitioner is relegated to the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, the matter would be further delayed. Since no investigation of fact is inquired in the present case, it would not be in the interest' of justice to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy. More so when on the facts and circumstances of the present case it will be appropriate to clarify the legal position in regard to the implications arising under the regulation in question which will be in public interest. 18. More so when on the facts and circumstances of the present case it will be appropriate to clarify the legal position in regard to the implications arising under the regulation in question which will be in public interest. 18. TAKING into consideration the peculiar facts of the present case and the circumstances indicated hereinbefore, I am of the firm Opinion that the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the writ petition should be dismissed as the petitioner is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and has alternative remedy to approach the Labour Court against his grievance does not deserve to be accepted and consequently, the objection in this regard is hereby rejected, as it is not necessary to direct the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. It has been strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that the 'date of employment' contemplated under regulation 24 (ii) of the Regulations of 1975 and the time of appointment contemplated under the proviso to regulation (24) (a) as contained in the IVth Amendment Regulations, 1983 must be deemed to refer to the. date of initial employment or date of original appointment. The contention of the learned counsel, for the petitioner on the other hand is that the word 'initial' or the word 'original' cannot be supplanted and the contract on the 'date of employment' or at the time of appointment envisaged under the regulation must be deemed to refer to the contract which is in force immediately preceding the enforcement of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 or the U.P. Cooperative Societies Service (IV Amendment) Regulations, 1983. The claim of the contesting respondent is that since the settlement dated 22-2-66 which is said to contain the terms of contract of service of the petitioner who had been appointed in the year 1960 cannot be taken to be a contract as envisaged under regulation 24 of the Regulations referred to herein, before and consequently, this part of the regulation cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner so as to bring him within the exception in question. 19. 19. AS observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur v. Dattatraya Dahankar, 1991 JT 4 SC 500, a mechanical approach to construction of a statute is altogether out of step with modern positive approach which is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. I am of, the clear opinion that the proviso in question should be construed so as to promote the general legislative purpose and it is not at all appropriate to go by the letter of the Staute but it is necessary to have in mind the spirit thereof. 20. THE settlement arrived at on 22-2-66 could not be changed or altered by law unilaterally. . It was a settlement as contemplated under section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act which was binding on the parties to the agreement and its effect, under the law could not be wiped out, unilaterally by any regulation made in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged Under section 122 of the Cooperative Societies Act. As clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v..D. J. Bahadur, 1580 LIC 1218(SC), a settlement arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act must prevail and continue to remain binding unless it is superseded or annulled either by a fresh settlement or in a proceeding under the. Industrial Disputes Act itself as otherwise it would result in violation of the relevant provisions of the said Act which is being a' special Act is not permissible. In the circumstances, therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Industrial Disputes Act being a special law must previl upon the regulations framed under the provisions of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act and a regulation of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act. A Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the settlement dated 22-2-66 in its decision in the case of Shanker Swarup Saxena v. Allahabad District Cooperative Bank Limited, 1978 ALJ 940. This Court had observed in its aforesaid decision that the settlement dated 22-2-66 was a bipartite settlement between the Bank and the workmen of the Bank and contained the terms and conditions of service. This Court had observed in its aforesaid decision that the settlement dated 22-2-66 was a bipartite settlement between the Bank and the workmen of the Bank and contained the terms and conditions of service. It was clearly observed in the aforesaid decision that the terms of the said Settlement formed the conditions of service of the workman concerned. It was also observed that question whether the settlement was a registered settlement or not was not at all relevant. In the present case the learned counsel for the respondent has not at all challenged the genuineness or the enforceability of the settlement dated 22-2-66 which contained a condition of service whereunder the petitioner had a security of tenure till he attained the age of sixty years. It seems to me that the purpose behind the exception in question was to ensure that any term and condition of service of a workman-employee of any Cooperative Society fixing a particular tenure of service which stood secured under a binding settlement is not nullified. Even otherwise the regulation framed unilaterally could not, under the law supersede or annul a binding settlement arrived at under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It appears that it was with this end in view that while providing for an age of superannuation to be 58 years, it was made clear that this condition of service will not apply, it those cases where there was a contract containing a condition to the contrary which contract continued to be effective and binding immediately preceding the enforcement of the Regulations. 21. AS observed by the Apex Court In its decision in the case of Hindustan Lever Limited v. Hindustan Ltd. 1985. LIC 276 (287) the courts by interpretative process must strive to reduce ' the filed of conflict and expand the area of agreement and show its preference for upholding agreements sanctified by mutuality and consensus in larger public interest namely, to eschew industrial strife confrontation and consequent wastage. 22. IN the circumstances, therefore, I am of the firm opinion that it is hot permissible or possible to add and supplant the words 'initial' or 'original' in the Regulation 24 in question as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent and his contention in this regard deserves to be and is hereby, rejected. 22. IN the circumstances, therefore, I am of the firm opinion that it is hot permissible or possible to add and supplant the words 'initial' or 'original' in the Regulation 24 in question as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent and his contention in this regard deserves to be and is hereby, rejected. I am of the firm opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the contract referred to in the either regulation 24 (ii) of the Regulation, 1975 or the contract referred to in the proviso to regulation 24 (a) as substituted by the IV Amendment, Regulation, 1983 should be deemed to refer to the contract which was subsisting under the immediately preceding the date of enforcement of the regulation of 1975 or 1983 as the case may be. Since in the present case admittedly bipartite settlement dated 22-2-66 has not been superseded or altered and was in force prior to the enforcement of the Regulation 24 of the Regulations, 1975 and the petitioner who according to the respondents themselves continues to be a workman could not be deemed to have attained the age of superannuation as contemplated under regulation 24 of the Regulations of 1975 as amended. The respondents, therefore, have no jurisdiction to curtail the tenure of service of the petitioner in the purported exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under regulation 24 (1) of the Regulations of 1975 or the regulation 24 (a) of the Regulation 24 as substituted in the year 1983. 23. THE petitioner has described himself as Junior Branch Manager. From the perusal of the order dated 10-3-84 passed by the respondent, it appears that the petitioner had been promoted to the said post which promotion had been approved on 9-3-84. Even though the petitioner has the designation of Junior Branch Manager the respondent in the affidavit filed on its behalf to Which a reference has already been made hereinbefore has admitted the status of the petitioner vis-a-vis the employer to be that of a workman. A Junior Branch Manger being termed as workman or worker sounds odd. In fact prima-facie, it appears to be paradoxical and contradiction in terms. However, in face of the pleadings in the present case the designation of the petitioner looses all its significance. A Junior Branch Manger being termed as workman or worker sounds odd. In fact prima-facie, it appears to be paradoxical and contradiction in terms. However, in face of the pleadings in the present case the designation of the petitioner looses all its significance. THE petitioner has asserted that he continues to be a workman inspite of the aforesaid designation and this assertion is admitted by the respondent. THE designation of Junior Branch Manager, therefore, appears to be a misnomer. Since the fact that the petitioner's status vis-a-vis the employer continues to be that of a workman stands admitted, it is not at all necessary to find out his real status and nature of service in the present proceedings as the term 'workman' has been interpreted to have a very wide connotation and meaning and includes many of employees who prima-facie, appear to be officers and managers. 24. IN view of the conclusions indicated hereinbefore, this writ petition succeeds in part and the notice dated 12-11-92 is hereby quashed. It is further directed that the respondent shall not withhold the benefits to which the petitioner is entitled under the terms and conditions contained in the bipartite settlement dated 22-2-66 so long as it is not superseded or annulled in accordance with law and further, so long as the petitioner continues to be a 'workman', the respondents shall ensure that his service tenure secured under the bipartite settlement is not curtailed only on the basis of regulation 24 (ii) of the Regulation of 1975 or the regulation 24 (a) as substituted by U. P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service (IVth Amendment) Regulation, 1983. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all the consequential benefits. In the circumstance of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.